Changes and Continuities in the U.S. National Security Strategy by NI Feng

Recent U.S. actions in areas further illustrate how the strategic principles outlined in the NSS are being translated into practice.

Welcome to the 68th edition of our weekly newsletter! I’m SUN Chenghao,a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies, a visiting scholar at Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School in 2024 and Munich Young Leader 2025.

ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by NI Feng on Changes and Continuities in the U.S. National Security Strategy.

Edited by ChinAffairs+, ZHANG Xueyu

Why It Matters

U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) reports are closely watched worldwide because they provide the most authoritative and systematic articulation of Washington’s long-term strategic priorities. When the latest NSS was released, much public attention focused on the notion of a U.S. “strategic retrenchment.” However, a closer reading suggests that the United States is not abandoning its pursuit of global primacy. Rather, it seeks to recalibrate the means and costs of sustaining its dominant position by prioritizing resources, reshaping partnerships, and selectively engaging in international institutions.

In this sense, the NSS reflects a strategy of cost-conscious leadership adjustment rather than a withdrawal from global power competition. Recent U.S. actions in areas such as coercive diplomacy, extraterritorial enforcement, and selective disengagement from international mechanisms further illustrate how the strategic principles outlined in the NSS are being translated into practice.

This article, published in a leading Chinese party and government journal Qiushi(《求是》), represents a comprehensive assessment by the Chinese academic and policy communities of the strategic logic and long-term orientation of the U.S. NSS. By examining both the apparent adjustments and the enduring continuities in U.S. strategy, it seeks to provide a clearer basis for anticipating future U.S. behavior and for informing China’s policy planning in an increasingly fragmented and competitive international system.

Key Points

Since the end of the Second World War, U.S. national security strategy has largely been shaped by the tradition commonly described as liberal internationalism. Its central objective has been to construct an international order based on liberal principles through which the United States could exercise global leadership, while simultaneously safeguarding its national security, sustaining economic prosperity, and expanding the global influence of its values.

In recent years, as structural changes in the international system have accelerated, this long-standing strategic framework has encountered growing constraints. The relative weakening of U.S. hegemony has become increasingly visible, and the gap between strategic ambition and available resources has continued to widen. Against this background, the current U.S. administration has begun to reassess its global posture, shifting strategic resources away from broad global engagement and concentrating them instead on regions regarded as vital to the preservation of its hegemonic foundations. At the same time, it has sought to apply more selective, pragmatic, and long-term forms of containment toward those it identifies as its principal strategic competitors.

On December 4, 2025, the administration released a new National Security Strategy report, hereinafter referred to as the Report, which presents a systematic restructuring of U.S. global strategy. The positions articulated in the document largely correspond with recent U.S. diplomatic and security behavior. Examining both the changes introduced in the Report and the elements that remain constant allows for a clearer understanding of the evolving appearance of U.S. strategy as well as its underlying logic.

1. Where the Changes Lie

Strategic Thinking Emphasizes “America First”

The current administration argues that earlier U.S. global strategies devoted excessive attention and resources to external affairs, while neglecting domestic development, a pattern that it identifies as an important contributor to America’s relative decline. According to the Report, the United States pursued goals that were neither sustainable nor achievable, which gradually weakened its middle class and industrial base and ultimately limited its capacity to maintain global dominance.

In this context, the new national security strategy no longer seeks comprehensive global engagement. Instead, it focuses on protecting a limited number of core national interests that have been reordered according to perceived priority.

At the level of strategic ideology, the concept of “America First” occupies a central position. This approach is rooted in a combination of strong nationalism and utilitarian realism, both of which emphasize the primacy of U.S. interests. The Report adjusts previous assessments of American power and redefines strategic objectives by placing domestic challenges, including industrial decline, immigration pressures, drug proliferation, and border security, at the forefront of national security concerns. Such priorities reflect a security outlook that carries clear nationalist and populist characteristics and aligns closely with the political preferences of the “Make America Great Again” constituency, which holds that national renewal must begin with internal reconstruction.

Statements asserting that border security constitutes the primary element of national security, together with claims that the era of mass migration must come to an end, indicate an effort to redefine national strength in terms of social control, economic autonomy, industrial resilience, and cultural cohesion. Within this framework, reindustrialization, energy dominance, and financial leadership are no longer treated as economic objectives. Rather, they are increasingly presented as structural foundations necessary for sustaining military superiority and political independence, thereby contributing to a national security architecture that is strongly inward-oriented.

Strategic Retrenchment and the Construction of a “Western Hemisphere Fortress”

If “America First” provides the ideological foundation of the current strategy, the consolidation of U.S. dominance within the Western Hemisphere constitutes its most important geographic focus.

The historical narrative of America’s rise has long been intertwined with the Monroe Doctrine, while the expansion of U.S. global power was closely linked to sustained political and economic involvement in Latin America. However, as Washington progressively shifted its strategic attention toward Europe, the Asia-Pacific, and the Middle East, Latin America, despite its significance, gradually receded from the center of U.S. strategic planning.

The Report now elevates the region to the level of national security priority, arguing that after years of neglect, the United States must reassert its leadership in the Western Hemisphere. By explicitly reaffirming the Monroe Doctrine, the administration signals an intention to reconstruct a sphere of influence that it regards as exclusive. The so-called Trump Corollary articulated in the Report asserts that the United States is prepared to employ all available means, including military force, to prevent foreign powers from gaining control over critical assets in the hemisphere. Recent U.S. rhetoric and actions concerning Greenland further reinforce this strategic direction.

Outside the Western Hemisphere, U.S. engagement appears more selective and issue-specific. In Asia, the strategy places simultaneous emphasis on economic competition and security deterrence. In Europe, while acknowledging the region’s continued relevance, the Report increasingly highlights internal structural crises and confines U.S. interests to conflict management and regional stability. In the Middle East and Africa, ideological agendas such as democracy promotion are deliberately de-emphasized, while economic cooperation and transactional partnerships receive greater attention.

Through these adjustments, the administration seeks to concentrate limited strategic resources on defending a hemispheric stronghold while preparing for a prolonged phase of great-power rivalry characterized by sustained competition and gradual attrition. Nevertheless, practice does not always fully correspond with declared intentions, as continued U.S. threats of intervention in resource-rich states such as Iran suggest that strategic retrenchment does not imply a complete withdrawal from external coercion.

Strategic Measures Emphasize Cost Control and Burden Sharing

The Report outlines a revised hegemonic model that aims to reduce operational costs while preserving strategic advantages. This model rests on domestic revitalization and hemispheric consolidation, supported by economic, technological, and military superiority, while relying on the redistribution of responsibilities to external actors.

One dimension of this approach involves the restoration of domestic economic capacity through policies associated with economic nationalism. Under the justification of rebalancing global trade, the administration employs tariffs, industrial subsidies, and protective measures intended to encourage manufacturing reshoring and to reverse trends of industrial hollowing and trade imbalance.

A second dimension focuses on limiting external obligations. The administration views many existing multilateral institutions as burdens that constrain sovereignty and generate disproportionate costs. Consequently, the United States has withdrawn from or reduced participation in a wide range of international organizations and agreements, arguing that such arrangements no longer align with American interests.

A third component involves transferring the costs of hegemony to allies. Through pressure on NATO members to increase defense spending, as well as demands for financial and industrial contributions from allies such as Japan and South Korea, the United States seeks to maintain strategic dominance while minimizing its own expenditures.

Finally, the strategy explicitly downplays democracy promotion as a guiding principle of foreign policy. Institutions previously responsible for exporting U.S. political values have been significantly weakened, reflecting the view that economic engagement and commercial cooperation are more effective and less costly than efforts aimed at political or social transformation abroad.

2. What Remains Unchanged

Although the new National Security Strategy reflects substantial adjustments in rhetoric and priority, its fundamental orientation toward maintaining U.S. dominance has not been altered. The changes outlined above primarily concern methods and sequencing rather than ultimate objectives.

The Core Objective of Preserving U.S. Global Hegemony Remains Intact

While the language of global leadership has been moderated, the emphasis on protecting core national interests represents a recalibration of means rather than a retreat from hegemonic ambition. The underlying aim remains the preservation of a power structure in which no external actor can pose a serious challenge to U.S. supremacy.

In military terms, the strategy continues to stress overwhelming superiority, sustained deterrence, and expanded defense investment. In economic terms, the construction of a highly resilient and innovative industrial base is presented as the highest priority of national economic policy, ensuring productive capacity in both peacetime and wartime. In technological terms, continued leadership in advanced innovation is regarded as indispensable to maintaining both economic influence and military advantage.

From this perspective, the adjustments contained in the Report reflect tactical recalculation, while the pursuit of singular dominance remains unchanged.

The Strategic Orientation of Great-Power Competition Remains Unchanged

The contraction of U.S. strategic focus toward the Western Hemisphere does not signify abandonment of great-power competition. Instead, it reflects an effort to concentrate competition more precisely within selected domains.

The Report continues to define the Indo-Pacific as the central arena of geopolitical and economic rivalry, with China remaining the primary reference point. China is described as a near-peer competitor and the foremost economic challenger, and competition with China is framed as a long-term struggle over future global leadership.

A substantial portion of the Report’s China-related content addresses trade imbalances, supply chain security, critical minerals, manufacturing capacity, and technological leadership. This focus suggests that the United States seeks to rely on its existing economic and technological advantages while pursuing selective containment in key sectors, thereby avoiding the risks associated with comprehensive confrontation.

The Hegemonic Nature of External Intervention Remains Unchanged

Although the Report expresses a preference for restraint, U.S. behavior indicates a shift not toward non-intervention but toward more selective and power-oriented forms of interference.

This pattern is evident in continued military operations, as U.S. forces have carried out repeated strikes in multiple countries within a short period. Such actions demonstrate that the willingness to employ force remains an integral component of U.S. strategy.

Intervention is also manifested through political involvement in the domestic affairs of other states. Electoral interference, diplomatic pressure, and efforts to influence political outcomes continue to be employed where Washington considers its interests to be at stake.

Under the banner of “America First,” these practices have become increasingly explicit, reflecting a transformation in style rather than substance.

Conclusion

Following the release of the new National Security Strategy, a major adjustment in U.S. grand strategy has formally begun. Whether this adjustment can be sustained over time remains uncertain, as deep political divisions within the United States limit the formation of broad strategic consensus. While the Republican Party has generally expressed support, the Democratic Party continues to defend liberal internationalism as the normative foundation of U.S. foreign policy.

For the international community, the United States appears increasingly inclined to distance itself from an international order that it once helped design and uphold, without offering clear alternatives to multilateral cooperation or collective security. Such developments risk weakening the normative foundations of global governance and increasing the likelihood of bloc confrontation and strategic mistrust.

For China, the current U.S. adjustment should not be interpreted as a reduction in strategic pressure. Rather, it represents a recalibration following setbacks in comprehensive containment, one that seeks to preserve American advantages while raising the costs of others’ development. It signals the emergence of a long-term strategy centered on endurance and competition. In this context, maintaining strategic clarity and restraint remains essential.

About the Author

NI Feng(倪峰): Senior Research Fellow, PhD supervisor, Former Director of the Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and President of the Chinese Association for American Studies (CAAS). His main research interests include U.S. domestic politics and China–U.S. relations.

About the Publication

The Chinese Version of this article was published on Qiushi. Qiushi (《求是》) Journal is an official publication of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. It serves as an important theoretical medium for guiding the work of the entire Party and the country as a whole. As the English website of Qiushi Journal, Qiushi Online uses materials from the Chinese and English versions of the journal to introduce the CPC’s theories, policies, and practical experience in national governance to domestic and foreign audiences.