SUN Chenghao: What Trump’s 2025 NSS Means for China
NSS signals a foreign policy orientation that is more domestically focused, more economically driven, more skeptical of alliances, more transactional, and less values-oriented.
Welcome to the 17th edition of China Scholar Insights!
China Scholar Insights is a feature which aimed at providing you with the latest analysis on issues that Chinese scholars and strategic communities are focusing on. We will carefully select commentary articles and highlight key points. Questions or criticisms can be directed to sch0625@gmail.com
I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University. ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu.
SUN Chenghao: What Trump’s New National Security Strategy Means for China
The Trump administration released its latest version of the National Security Strategy (NSS), a document that has drawn significant attention and debate among Chinese scholars, policy analysts, and the media. Earlier today, I was interviewed by Phoenix TV in Hong Kong regarding the implications of the report and the broader shifts it signals for U.S. foreign and China policy. I would like to share with readers of this newsletter the questions posed during the interview and my full responses, which reflect my preliminary assessment of the new NSS and its impact on the trajectory of China–U.S. relations.
Question 1
Compared with the Biden administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS), what changes does the 2025 NSS reflect in America’s foreign policy direction? What are the underlying drivers of these adjustments?
A close comparison between the Biden administration’s 2022 NSS and the Trump administration’s newly released 2025 NSS reveals not a marginal revision but a significant paradigm shift—from liberal internationalism toward a form of conservative nationalism. The new document signals a foreign policy orientation that is more domestically focused, more economically driven, more skeptical of alliances, less values-oriented, and distinctly more transactional in its approach to global affairs.
First, the strategic orientation of U.S. foreign policy has undergone a fundamental transformation. The Biden administration advanced an “alliance-led” framework premised on collective democratic efforts to sustain the international order. It emphasized values, systemic competition, and coordination with allies. By contrast, the 2025 NSS explicitly calls for a return to core interests, criticizing past U.S. foreign policy for pursuing overly expansive objectives with insufficient focus. This represents a shift away from global leadership and multilateral institution-building toward an emphasis on sovereignty, cost-effectiveness, and results-oriented policymaking.
Second, there has been a notable reordering of strategic priorities. Whereas Biden’s NSS centered on an “Indo-Pacific First” approach and framed China as the most consequential long-term competitor, Trump’s 2025 NSS elevates the Western Hemisphere as the highest priority. The document outlines what has been described as a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, arguing that more military and diplomatic resources should be redirected to the Americas to address migration, narcotics flows, and perceived external interference. This constitutes a form of strategic retrenchment that privileges the United States’ immediate neighborhood.
Third, U.S. policy toward Europe reflects an unprecedented rhetorical and strategic shift. The Biden administration viewed Europe as the United States’ most indispensable alliance network. The 2025 NSS, however, sharply criticizes Europe’s migration policies and demographic trends, even suggesting the continent may become unrecognizable in 20 years or less. It questions whether European states can remain militarily and economically capable allies, implying a reassessment of the costs and benefits of U.S. commitments to Europe. This marks a significant step toward partial “de-alliance” thinking.
Fourth, the conceptualization of China and Russia has changed significantly. Biden’s NSS cast China and Russia as principal strategic threats and framed U.S.–China relations in terms of long-term systemic rivalry. While the 2025 NSS downplays ideological confrontation. It avoids portraying China as an existential challenger and instead highlights the need for a mutually advantageous economic relationship, identifying economic domains as the ultimate stakes of competition. Regarding Russia, the document refrains from labelling Moscow a threat and instead underscores Washington’s interest in ending the Ukraine war and restoring “strategic stability.” This reflects Trump’s preference for transactional diplomacy over long-term competitive framing.
Fifth, the U.S. approach to global governance has shifted markedly. The Biden NSS extensively addressed climate change, global health, supply chain resilience, and multilateral cooperation. In contrast, the 2025 NSS largely deemphasizes these issues, arguing that the United States should not be constrained by international institutions nor attempt to promote democratic reforms abroad. The section on the Middle East particularly reflects a shift toward pragmatic, low-cost engagement rather than institutional or normative ambitions.
Several factors explain these shifts.
First, domestic political realignment. Polarization has intensified, and a growing share of American voters now question globalization, oppose immigration, and resist bearing international obligations. Trump’s political narrative attributes many of the country’s problems to external factors—manufacturing moving overseas, immigration pressures, and allies taking advantage of the United States. As a result, the new strategy naturally reinforces the principle of “America First.”
Second, structural pressures on U.S. capabilities. Post-pandemic economic challenges, including inflation, fiscal strain, and supply chain vulnerabilities, have reduced public willingness to underwrite global security responsibilities, making strategic retrenchment more politically viable.
Third, increased fragmentation in the international system. Global multipolarity has become more pronounced, and relationships among major powers no longer resemble the binary confrontation of the Cold War. Instead, they are increasingly flexible and fluid. In this environment, mobilizing support through a Biden-style “values-based alliance” has become progressively more difficult. Trump has chosen a more pragmatic approach, relying on transactions, interests, and short-term outcomes to redefine America’s role in the world.
Question 2
Based on developments in China–U.S. relations this year and the 2025 NSS’s positioning on China, how can we characterize the overall tone of the Trump administration’s China policy? How will this shape bilateral relations over the next three years? What are the major risks, and how should China respond?
The overall tone of the Trump administration’s China policy can be characterized as high-pressure, negotiation-driven competition, defined by economic coercion, strategic deterrence, reduced ideological confrontation, and deliberate preservation of transactional space at the leadership level.
From the document itself, the new NSS no longer follows the Biden-era framing of China as a systemic rival seeking to reshape the international order. Instead, it brings economic issues to the forefront, calling for a truly mutually beneficial economic relationship with China and shifting the primary arena of competition to trade, industry, and technology, while downplaying value-based and systemic confrontation.
At the same time, the Trump administration has, since the beginning of the year, adopted a tariffs plus maximum pressure approach in the economic domain—imposing across-the-board high tariffs on Chinese products to force industrial reshoring and drive supply-chain reconfiguration. Therefore, the first foundational element of the new China policy is clear: treating China as the United States’ principal economic competitor and seeking to reshape the bilateral economic landscape through tariffs and rewritten rules.
A second defining feature is the shift from ideological mobilization toward realist bargaining. During the Biden era, Washington emphasized a “democracies versus autocracies” narrative and sought to rally allies against China through shared values. In contrast, the new strategy neither reproduces that stark democracy–authoritarian framing nor depicts China as an “existential threat”. Instead, it focuses more on “maintaining deterrence and preventing war” in the Indo-Pacific, while urging allies to “contribute more resources” to China-related security issues. This indicates that although the United States continues to adopt a high-pressure posture toward China in the security domain, the overall tone has shifted from a values-driven confrontation to a cost-benefit analysis, seeking to counter China’s challenge without indefinitely bearing the costs itself.
A third characteristic is that, while maintaining a generally tough economic stance, the strategy still leaves deliberate space for high-level diplomacy and potential recalibration. After the Busan summit, both the public statements from Beijing and Washington viewed it as an important moment for stopping the decline, stabilizing, and recalibrating the bilateral relationship. During the meeting, Trump repeatedly emphasized that China is a “great country,” which shows that while he is launching a “Tariff War 2.0” on the economic front, he also hopes to manage competition through leader-level diplomacy and place the China–U.S. relationship on a more negotiable, transactional track. This model of negotiation based on pressure is precisely the extension of Trump’s longstanding personal bargaining style into his China policy.
Against this backdrop, the next three years of China–U.S. relations are likely to exhibit periodic stabilization within a structurally competitive framework. The structural tensions include:
First, tariffs, industrial policies, and technology controls are unlikely to be rolled back, meaning trade frictions may follow a pattern of tightening and loosening in cycles. Second, in areas such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the broader military competition, the U.S. will continue to reinforce deterrence while pressing its allies to “significantly increase” their defense contributions, adding sustained pressure to the regional security environment. Third, the new “Trump-era Monroeism” will treat China’s presence in Latin America, energy domains, and key strategic corridors as priority challenges, seeking to narrow China’s operational space in the Western Hemisphere.
Nonetheless, following the summit, neither side is willing to move toward full confrontation or complete decoupling. It is foreseeable that economic and trade cooperation will continue to be used by both sides as a ballast: under macroeconomic pressures, inflation, and the ongoing restructuring of supply chains, either side would risk harming its own economy and employment if it pushed the bilateral economic relationship to extremes. This creates a set of practical constraints that make a certain degree of “limited cooperation” likely over the next three years.
The principal risks over the next three years fall into three categories:
First, the escalation of economic and technological conflict. If the United States continues to raise tariffs on Chinese goods and broadens restrictions on advanced manufacturing and critical technologies, and if China is compelled to retaliate with equal or higher tariffs, the conflict could extend from traditional goods trade into finance, digital sectors, and supply chains.
Second, the miscalculation in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding areas. The United States repeatedly stresses in its strategic documents that it does not seek a war, yet simultaneously increases arms sales, joint exercises, and allied mobilization, while pressing regional partners to “do more.” This combination inherently raises the probability of misjudgment. Given Trump’s highly personalized and improvisational decision-making style, any sudden incident would significantly complicate crisis management.
Third, the marginalization of multilateral mechanisms and crisis-management channels. The new strategy downplays multilateral cooperation and weakens traditional alliance coordination. Without at least minimal China-US alignment on issues such as artificial intelligence, climate, and arms control, localized crises could more easily evolve into systemic risks.
Against this backdrop, China’s response, in my view, should emphasize at least three points.
First, it is essential to accurately understand Trump’s emphasis on “economic priority” and “deal-making,” and use economic cooperation to stabilize the broader relationship. While upholding principles and safeguarding core interests, China can explore phased, verifiable, and mutually beneficial arrangements in areas such as agricultural products, energy, and services market access—allowing economic ties to continue functioning as both ballast and a driver.
Second, efforts should be made to keep the competition confined to economic and industrial domains, preventing security issues from being dragged into escalation. In fields such as artificial intelligence, nuclear safety, and crisis management, China can make use of Track-2 and Track-1.5 platforms to promote the development of “minimum rules” and “technical guardrails,” thereby laying the groundwork for potential official dialogue.
Third, China should strengthen expectations management on core sensitive issues such as the Taiwan Strait. On the one hand, it should adhere to its existing policy framework and red lines; on the other hand, it should clearly communicate China’s red lines and operational space to the United States and regional countries through multiple levels and channels. This will help reduce the risk of misinterpretation while encouraging regional states to recognize that turning the Taiwan Strait into a frontline of great-power rivalry is not in the long-term interests of any party.
Question 3
Against the backdrop of Washington’s heightened emphasis on economic competition with China, the 2025 NSS also repeatedly references Taiwan and stresses deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. How should we interpret U.S. strategic objectives regarding Taiwan? How might these statements interact with the rhetoric and actions of Japan’s Takaichi administration?
The 2025 NSS shows that even as the U.S. places much greater emphasis on economic competition with China, its approach to Taiwan continues to highlight two enduring themes: military deterrence and preservation of the status quo. The language and orientation of the document indicate that the Trump administration’s objectives are broadly consistent with longstanding U.S. policy—namely, maintaining deterrence to sustain the status quo while preserving strategic ambiguity to retain policy flexibility in the event of future contingencies. Compared with the Biden administration, the 2025 NSS reflects a more pragmatic approach with greater sensitivity to costs.
First, military deterrence remains the core of U.S. policy, accompanied by a stated desire to avoid conflict. The NSS makes clear at the outset that the U.S. seeks to prevent large-scale conflict through deterrence. The document’s discussion of Taiwan underscores this logic: maintaining military advantage and preventing war are defined as priority tasks. Trump does not pre-commit the United States to direct military intervention; instead, he emphasizes the maintenance of overwhelming military strength as the mechanism for preserving the status quo. This suggests a form of “high-pressure peace”—a posture aimed at avoiding a conflict that would impose unpredictable costs on the United States.
Second, the Trump administration’s articulation of Taiwan’s strategic importance adopts a more pragmatic framing.
The NSS describes Taiwan in terms that weaken value-based rhetoric and instead prioritize economic and geostrategic considerations. Taiwan’s critical role in the global semiconductor supply chain is integrated directly into the U.S. competitive strategy, and its geographical position is portrayed as enhancing U.S. posture along the “second island chain.” Relative to earlier iterations that emphasized “democratic values,” Trump views Taiwan as a functional and strategic asset that supports U.S. technological competition and regional military positioning. This aligns closely with Trump’s broader approach, which prioritizes material interests, strategic returns, and economic considerations over ideology.
Third, the report continues to uphold strategic ambiguity.
The NSS reiterates that the United States “does not support any unilateral change to the status quo,” reflecting the characteristic ambiguity embedded in long-standing U.S. statements on Taiwan. Such phrasing preserves deterrence and signals U.S. commitment to Taiwan, while simultaneously avoiding overly explicit obligations that could constrain Washington’s choices in a crisis. This approach is consistent with Trump’s broader diplomatic posture: retaining negotiation space, avoiding premature commitments, and ensuring that the U.S. is not locked into an unavoidable pathway to military involvement.
Regarding the second part of the question, the NSS’s content on Taiwan is unlikely to be directly linked to the Takaichi administration’s recent statements. This assessment holds true when analyzed from both the temporal and policy logic perspectives.
First, although the report was released belatedly, its core judgments regarding Taiwan were likely formulated before the Takaichi administration made its related statements. Second, the overall style of the document is highly consistent with Trump’s longstanding stance on Taiwan and does not show any obvious “Japan-responsive” orientation. In other words, U.S. assessments on Taiwan are unlikely to adjust in real time based on the political expressions of any given Japanese administration.
Finally, from the perspective of Trump’s view on alliances, he maintains a posture that is both attentive and somewhat “arrogant” toward allies, preferring that they align with the U.S. strategic rhythm rather than proactively coordinate policy language, and even potentially bearing the risk of their allies’ adventurous actions. Therefore, in the NSS report, which is central to U.S. strategic interests, it is highly improbable that the United States would adjust its Taiwan policy to accommodate Japan. If any linkage occurs, it is far more likely that the U.S. would require Japan to align with its new strategy rather than the reverse.
A more compelling reason is that Trump has recently signaled a desire to cool down the Takaichi administration’s more provocative statements and military gestures regarding Taiwan. According to Japanese media reports, Trump appears to have applied pressure on Japan regarding Taiwan during a recent U.S.–Japan leaders’ call.
At the same time, particular caution is warranted because, as the U.S. strengthens its military presence in the Asia-Pacific, it is placing greater reliance on regional allies and pressing Japan to assume a larger share of defense responsibilities. This trend aligns with Japan’s desire to expand its defense capabilities and could potentially unleash long-standing right-wing mentalities within Japan. The Takaichi administration has already shown signs of adventurism in foreign security policy, with actions that clearly depart from the prudence exercised by previous governments on Taiwan-related issues. Coupled with the U.S. policy of “peace through strength” in the Taiwan Strait, there remains the possibility that Japan may attempt to draw the U.S. into greater involvement. Such behavior is likely to introduce new uncertainties into the stability of the Taiwan Strait.
Therefore, while maintaining heightened vigilance over the situation in the Taiwan Strait, China must also closely monitor Japan’s stance on Taiwan and proactively establish mechanisms for crisis management and policy communication.
About the Author
SUN Chenghao 孙成昊: Dr. SUN Chenghao is a fellow and head of the U.S.-Europe program at the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS), Tsinghua University. He was a visiting scholar at Yale Law School in 2024. His research interests include U.S. domestic and foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, transatlantic relations, AI and International security, etc. He teaches a graduate-level course on Transatlantic Relations in Tsinghua University. Dr. Sun has co-authored dozens of reports and books. He is the Top 1% Highly Cited Scholar (2024) in China according to statistics of China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI). Dr. Sun is also Council Member of the Chinese Association of American Studies.
