US Middle East Security Policy during Trump’s Second Term: Characteristics, Objectives and Impacts by Li Yanan

Welcome to the 46th edition of our weekly newsletter! I'm SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies, a visiting scholar at Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School in 2024 and Munich Young Leader 2025.

ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China's foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China's academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by Li Yanan, which focuses on the US Middle East security policy during Trump’s second term.

Edited by ChinAffairs+.

Summary

The Middle East is undergoing profound geopolitical restructuring, marked by a complex security landscape where multipolar checks and balances coexist with bloc confrontations, and reconciliation efforts intertwine with localized conflicts. While regional development needs have helped prevent large-scale wars, deepening pessimism over security prospects has heightened the risk of an arms race. Regional security remains fragile and uncertain, standing at a strategic crossroads between collapse and institutional reconstruction. At this critical moment, Trump’s second presidential term introduces major potential fluctuations in U.S. Middle East policy—the most consequential external variable shaping the region’s security trajectory.

In terms of priorities, Trump’s approach will center on integrating allies, suppressing rivals, and avoiding direct war. Key goals include forging a new power balance anchored in Israel, applying maximum pressure to force a turning point in U.S.-Iran relations, relying on raw strength to reassert deterrence, and recalibrating U.S. engagement with the region through the lens of great power competition. Yet the likely outcome—Trump’s unpredictable "transactional unilateralism" and deeply self-interested "America First" ethos—will amplify security risks, destabilize cooperation, skew power dynamics, and fuel regional autonomy. The result may be an intensified contest between chaos and order in the Middle East.

Why It Matters

Donald Trump’s return to the presidency in 2025 reintroduces a foreign policy style marked by transactionalism, unilateralism, and unpredictability. While many aspects of his approach remain consistent with his first term, the international landscape has shifted. The Middle East, in particular, stands at a fragile crossroads—characterized by renewed conflict, evolving alliances, and mounting uncertainty about the future of U.S. engagement in the region.

This article addresses that intersection by treating Trump’s second term not simply as a political event, but as a structural variable with the potential to reshape the regional order. Rather than focusing on isolated flashpoints, it constructs a scenario-driven analysis of how U.S. policy under Trump might influence dynamics among key actors, including Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and others.

One of the article’s strengths lies in its regional scope and its effort to move beyond U.S.-centric analysis. It considers how local actors might respond to shifts in American strategy, and reflects a clear awareness of the Middle East’s internal transitions. The author avoids both alarmist and celebratory rhetoric, instead adopting a cautious and analytical tone.

That said, the piece has limitations. It gives relatively little attention to non-state actors, humanitarian dimensions, or the domestic constraints Trump may face in implementing bold regional policies. Its framing also depends on the assumption that Trump will largely revert to previous patterns—an assumption that may oversimplify the interplay between new global dynamics and second-term behavior.

Nonetheless, the article provides a useful conceptual framework for anticipating possible trajectories in Middle East security under renewed U.S. disruption. For scholars and policymakers alike, it encourages a shift from reactive analysis toward longer-term structural thinking—an approach increasingly necessary in a volatile regional environment.

Key Points

1. The Fundamental Reality of the Current Security Landscape in the Middle East

In recent years, shifts in major power policies, regional conflicts, and local development agendas have simultaneously strengthened forces for both reconciliation and conflict. This dual trend has created an unprecedentedly complex and multi-layered security landscape in the Middle East.

• Coexistence of Multipolar Balancing and Bloc Confrontation

The order led by the U.S. in the Middle East has weakened since the U.S. has pulled back, a trend that has accelerated under the administrations of Obama, Trump, and Biden. In this power vacuum, Russia, China, and the EU are now competing for influence. Russia's actions in Syria, its partnerships with Iran and Turkey, and its ongoing presence in Libya show that its goals are still the same, even though things have gone wrong since Ukraine. Since 2023, the EU has been conducting diplomacy with Arab countries, a strategy that differs from the approach taken by the United States. China has become a more important stabilizing force by leveraging its economic ties and acting as a mediator, as seen in its role in the Saudi-Iran détente.

At the same time, players from the region are fighting in this arena. Iran's "axis of resistance" is still strong, Israel has more military power, and Turkey is speaking out against Assad. I2U2 and IMEC are two U.S.-led frameworks that aim to maintain U.S. leadership, but they could also potentially divide the bloc.

• Frequent Local Conflicts Undermine Momentum for Reconciliation

The normalization trends of Arab-Israeli, Sunni-Shia, and post-political Islam show a practical shift caused by war fatigue and changing public expectations. However, the asymmetric wars in Yemen, Libya, and Sudan, as well as the worsening of the Israel-Palestine conflict, show that there are deep-seated problems and a lack of trust. As the conflict gets worse and turns into a U.S.-Israel versus Iran-led confrontation, proxy dynamics are increasingly connecting local problems to bigger ones.

• Rising Risk of a New Regional Arms Race

While Development-first policies have moderated interstate warfare, security anxieties persist. U.S. disengagement and structural mistrust have spurred military buildups, most notably after the 2019 Houthi strike on Saudi oil infrastructure. As modernization and deterrence strategies converge, the region faces a fragile balance: peace initiatives constrained by the realities of persistent insecurity.

2. Characteristics of U.S. Middle East Security Policy in Trump's Second Term

• Continuity: Rooted in Enduring Interests

The U.S. still has long-term goals in the Middle East, such as fighting terrorism, stopping the spread of nuclear weapons (especially in Iran), keeping trade and energy safe, and protecting allies. These strategic constants demonstrate what is best for the country as a whole, though different administrations have different styles. Trump's first term mostly followed this plan: working toward normalizing relations between Arabs and Israelis, putting pressure on Iran, and lowering the number of troops while shifting responsibilities to regional partners. Biden retained many of these policies, despite disagreeing with them. This continuity will still be in place when Trump returns in 2025.

• Particularity: The Distinct "Trump Style"

Trump's approach diverges sharply in execution. His diplomacy is based on transactionalism. For example, the Abraham Accords traded recognition for arms or concessions, putting the traditional peace process on hold. He pushed allies to take on security roles, which kept U.S. commitments to a minimum, as he sought to save money. His two sides—one theatrical and one practical—led to moves that were both random and planned, often based on instinct rather than strategy. Most importantly, Trump's unpredictability became a tool of leverage: in 2025, his proposal to "clear Gaza" forced Arab states to speed up their plans to rebuild.

Trump's second term combines strategic consistency with disruptive execution, providing the US with a changing stance in the Middle East that is both stable and unstable.

3. Objectives of U.S. Middle East Security Policy in Trump’s Second Term

• Building a Regional Order Around Israel

In his second term, Trump plans to make Israel the focal point of a new regional equilibrium. Quickly welcoming Netanyahu and proposing a Gaza plan that aligns with Israeli right-wing goals, he declared himself Israel's "defender" and thereby signaled his objectives. To limit Iran and lessen U.S. costs, Trump aspires to solidify Israel's recent victories into a permanent arrangement, push forward the "Deal of the Century," and expand the Abraham Accords.

• Reviving "Maximum Pressure" on Iran

Returning to the office, President Trump promised harsher sanctions and increased military pressure to encourage Iran to return to the negotiating table. While open to diplomacy, his goal remains curbing Iran’s nuclear and regional ambitions. With Tehran weakened owing to the Gaza conflict, Trump aims to force concessions and reshape U.S.–Iran dynamics from a position of strength.

• Rebuilding Deterrence Through Strength

Though he remains afraid of entanglement, Trump believes that peace necessitates force. He favors targeted military action, as evidenced by his March 2025 assault on Yemen's Houthis, to help Israel, secure trade routes, and discourage Iran. Expect selective drawdowns, but vigorous forward deployments will continue.

• Framing the Region Through Great Power Rivalry

Rather than treating the Middle East as a standalone arena, Trump situates it within the broader U.S.–China–Russia competition. He is expected to intensify partnerships with Gulf states, leveraging economic and security ties to counter China’s growing presence in technology, energy, and infrastructure. This strategic lens will increasingly bind regional initiatives to Washington’s global effort to contain rival powers and reassert U.S. influence.

4. The Impact of Trump’s Second-Term Middle East Security Policy on the Regional Landscape

• A Region Tilting Toward Imbalance

Donald Trump's resurgence in the White House heralds a presidency characterized by assertiveness and a transactional approach, marked by a willingness to employ coercion to achieve desired results from both allies and adversaries. In a Middle East that is precariously balanced between discord and tenuous harmony, his strategy introduces an element of unpredictability into an already fragile framework.

The disparity in power, initially ignited by Trump's unwavering endorsement of Israel, has only intensified. Through the support of U.S. diplomatic initiatives and military assistance, Israel has secured significant advancements on the battlefield against Hamas and Hezbollah, effectively striking a substantial blow to Iran's post-2011 "Axis of Resistance." However, rather than reinstating equilibrium, this advantage has fortified Israeli maximalism. The proposals for the annexation of the West Bank and the so-called "clearing" of Gaza, which implies the coerced relocation of Palestinians, indicate aspirations that extend beyond mere security concerns, leaning towards territorial expansion. This approach exacerbates regional tensions and undermines the possibility of a two-state solution.

Iran, diminished yet resilient, finds itself in a precarious position. The Pezeshkian administration has indicated a desire to rekindle relations with the West; however, the resurgence of Trump's "maximum pressure" strategy has prompted immediate counteractions. Tehran is allegedly hastening the development of an ad hoc nuclear program while issuing threats to obstruct the Strait of Hormuz, thereby endangering the potential for a new cycle of escalation. Even if dialogue recommences, a prevailing sense of strategic distrust will endure, and Iran's internal discord regarding negotiations may exacerbate the instability of its political foundation.

• The Unraveling of Cooperation

By prioritizing tactical advantage over strategic coherence, Trump’s Middle East policy abandons long-term conflict resolution in favor of short-term, transactional gains. It offers neither durable solutions to structural conflicts nor the foundation for trust-based cooperation. His rejection of multilateralism in favor of coercive bilateralism further erodes the U.S.’s traditional role as a regional security guarantor. The Palestinian issue, Iran’s nuclear file, and post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Syria and Yemen are now shaped less by diplomacy than by instrumental leverage and unilateral demands. This shift alienates allies. Trump has treated regional partners as assets to be monetized—demanding arms purchases, investment pledges, and political concessions in return for U.S. attention. Suspensions of aid and threats of conditional engagement (as seen in Gaza and Yemen) further reduce Washington’s reliability. The effect is a weakening of U.S. credibility and a growing perception that Washington no longer provides security—it rents it.

• A Region Moving on Its Own Terms

While Washington still holds significant sway, its hegemonic edge is eroding. Trump’s attempt to extract benefits while shedding responsibilities reveals a broader paradox: using the Middle East to advance global great power competition, while eroding the very stability required to do so. Regional states, even U.S. allies, increasingly pursue strategic autonomy, hedging between global powers, expanding ties with China, Russia, and India, and developing independent military capacities.

A new stubbornness has emerged as a result of this independence. From grain transactions in Ukraine to prisoner swaps between Russia and the US, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are acting as intermediaries in global diplomacy. With regional standards undermined, certain countries, like Israel and Iran, are acting independently, further fracturing the region.

Conflicts across Syria, Yemen, and Libya no longer hinge on great power alignments but on local rivalries and ambitions. Trump’s second term will not reverse this trend. On the contrary, it may hasten the Middle East’s transformation from a U.S.-managed sphere into a battlefield of autonomous actors competing in a crumbling order—where war is easier to start than peace is to sustain.

Conclusion

As the Middle East undergoes its most sweeping transformation since the end of the Cold War, the region stands at a fateful crossroads: will it descend into deeper chaos as the old order collapses, or chart a path toward a more stable, multipolar security framework? The latest wave of regional upheaval since 2023 has darkened prospects, but not foreclosed them. Much depends on the strategic choices of both regional actors and global powers.

Under Donald Trump’s second term, the United States has signaled a stark return to unilateralism. From Gaza to Tehran, Washington’s approach has been transactional, self-interested, and disengaged from the hard work of political resolution. The emphasis on "ending wars" without investing in peace, the erosion of trust through ad hoc deals, and the securitization of economic interests have all strained the foundations of regional diplomacy. Yet, American retrenchment may paradoxically accelerate the emergence of a more pluralistic regional order. As U.S. hegemony wanes, Middle Eastern states are asserting greater strategic autonomy, seeking development, dialogue, and diversified partnerships. In this turbulence, a new architecture is not guaranteed—but its outlines are beginning to take shape.

About the Author

李亚男 Li Yanan：Dr. Li Yanan is the Deputy Director and a Research Professor of the Institute of Middle East Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). She graduated from the School of International Studies at Peking University. Her research focuses on political and security issues in the Middle East, the Middle East policies of major powers and the Turkish issue. She has participated in major projects with the National Social Science Foundation, published papers in journals such as Contemporary International Relations, China Security Studies, Peace and Development, and Turkish Studies, and also a contributor to several books including International Strategic and Security Review, Situation Reports of the Arab States, etc.

About the Publication

The Chinese version of the article was published by West Asia and Africa (《西亚非洲》). The journal was founded in 1980, and is published by the Institute of West Asian and African Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). West Asia and Africa emphasizes in-depth exploration of political, economic, international relations, historical, religious, cultural, and social issues related to the regions of West Asia and Africa, balancing foundational theoretical research with major contemporary issues. The journal highlights research that is theoretical, forward-looking, and innovative. It has long been a prestigious academic resource for Chinese scholars in Middle Eastern and African studies and serves as an essential reference for relevant government agencies, institutions of higher education, and research organizations engaged in international affairs, as well as professionals in foreign trade and market analysis. West Asia and Africa is listed as an A-rated journal in the AMI evaluation of Chinese humanities and social sciences journals, a CSSCI source journal by Nanjing University, and a core journal in Chinese by Peking University.