The Trump 2.0 Era and the Fragmentation of Transatlantic Relations by ZHANG Jian

Transatlantic relations may eventually evolve into an ordinary partnership

Welcome to the 47th edition of our weekly newsletter! I’m SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies, a visiting scholar at Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School in 2024 and Munich Young Leader 2025.

I returned from a research trip to Washington D.C. and New York last month, where I engaged in conversations with American officials, scholars, and business leaders about the trajectory of China-U.S. relations. In my latest commentary for the South China Morning Post, I reflect on what I observed: https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-opinion/article/3319004/why-i-am-hopeful-about-us-china-ties-despite-trumps-tariff-tangle

If you have any thoughts on the commentary, please kindly let me know.

ChinAffairs+ is a weekly newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by Zhang Jian, which focuses on transatlantic relations under Trump 2.0.

Edited by ChinAffairs+.

Summary

Since Trump’s second inauguration, transatlantic relations have been continually fragmenting. Europe and the U.S. are facing unprecedented disagreements in fields including security, economics, trade, and values. The widening divergence between the two sides in security interests and conceptualizations, the rise of economic nationalism, and the emergence of right-wing populism are the main reasons for the tensions in transatlantic relations.

Trump’s re-election has further highlighted the differences between Europe and the U.S. The security, economic, trade, and values-based bonds between the two sides have been further weakened. Europe will continue to strive to maintain transatlantic relations, while the U.S. will still attach importance to Europe, because of the strong symbiotic nature of their relations. However, the trend towards fragmentation in transatlantic relations will be hard to reverse in the long term. Transatlantic relations may eventually evolve into an ordinary partnership.

Why it matters

This article identifies the current manifestations of the division in transatlantic relations, the causes of conflicts, and the future of transatlantic relations. The strength of the article lies in its in-depth analysis of transatlantic relations from a long-term perspective, getting to its essence. The author does not simply attribute the changes in this relationship to the impact brought by Trump, but instead takes note of the changes in the relative strength of the U.S. and Europe in the international system.

A minor shortcoming is that the analysis is relatively limited to transatlantic relations themselves, with less attention paid to how external changes shape transatlantic relations. For example, although Trump initially tended to support Russia, after multiple unsuccessful attempts to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the U.S. resumed military aid to Ukraine in early July 2025. As a result, the differences between Europe and the U.S., at least in the security field, may not constitute a lasting rift.

In any case, transatlantic relations involve important international actors. Changes in these relations not only affect Europe and the United States themselves but also have a global impact, so they deserve our continuous attention.

Key points

1. The Main Contradictions in Transatlantic Relations

• Unprecedented Differences over Security

The security alliance is the most important bond in transatlantic relations, with NATO as the cornerstone of transatlantic relations and the pillar of European security, but the bond is becoming increasingly loose. During his first term, Trump once called NATO “obsolete”, which triggered panic in Europe. During the 2024 U.S. presidential campaign, Trump stated that he would not protect European countries that fail to meet their military spending targets and opposed continuing aid to Ukraine amid the Ukraine crisis, again triggering panic in Europe and doubts about the reliability of the U.S. and NATO. After starting his second term, Trump became even more disdainful of Europe’s security “free-riding”, and in handling relevant affairs, he disregarded European countries’ security interests. Regarding the Ukraine crisis, Trump tended to support Russia, refused to condemn Russia, and accused Ukraine of provoking the war. While reeling from shock, Europe has begun to seriously consider how to effectively safeguard its own security interests without the U.S., including promoting European rearmament and reducing purchases of American weapons.

• A Huge Setback in the Economic Relations and Trade

Being each other’s largest trading partner and source of investment, Europe and the U.S. have close economic and trade ties. There has always been competition between them, which triggered large-scale trade conflicts from time to time. In his first term, Trump was dissatisfied with the U.S trade deficit with Europe. He even called Europe “the enemy”. Trump’s dissatisfaction with Europe has only increased since his second term. He claimed that “the European Union was formed in order to screw the United States ”, and demanded that the EU reduce its trade surplus with the United States. For this reason, the U.S. raised tariffs on the EU.

The current economic situation of the EU is far from robust. The uncertainty caused by American tariff policy worsened the situation of an already damaged EU economy, and deepened the EU’s resentment towards the U.S.

Beyond traditional trade friction, conflicts in the digital sphere have also escalated. Large-scale technology enterprises from the U.S. have basically monopolized the digital market of the EU, leaving the EU dissatisfied. Thus, the EU introduced several bills in the name of privacy protection and an anti-monopoly agenda. The US expressed grievances about resulting fines against American technology companies.

• The Gradual Divergence in Values

For a long time, both Europe and the United States assumed they shared core values such as beliefs in democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and free markets. However, since Trump took office again, value-based conflicts between the two have intensified. Europe regards Trump as a right-wing populist, and “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) as a populist movement. Meanwhile, Trump and many U.S. government officials hold a contemptuous attitude towards Europe’s so-called mainstream political parties and mainstream values, and instead express ideological affinity with European far-right movements such as Italy’s Brothers of Italy, France’s National Rally, Germany’s AfD, and others.

2. The Main Reasons for the Intensification of Contradictions in Transatlantic Relations

• The Widened Divergence in Security Interests and Security Perspectives

The end of the Cold War led to a diminishing of common threats and the differentiation in the security interests and prospects of the EU and the U.S. The U.S. turned more attention to the Asia-Pacific region, while Europe attempted to promote the transformation and development of the Middle East and transform Russia.

However, since the outbreak of the Crimean crisis in 2014 and the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, Europe has gradually regarded Russia as its greatest and most direct threat. Relations between Russia and Europe have taken a sharp downturn. The two major parties in the United States hold different attitudes towards Russia, but they both regard it as the U.S.’ main competitor. However, unlike EU states, the U.S. were unwilling to admit Ukraine into NATO, and moreover the U.S. has largely left the EU to defend Ukraine and resist Russia alone.

Meanwhile, with the development of global multipolarization, the strength of the U.S. and the EU has declined in relative terms. The U.S., increasingly unable to afford its massive overseas security obligations, began forcing its allies to share costs. Due to the decline in its absolute strength, Europe’s dependence on the United States for security has increased rather than decreased. When the United States ceases to prioritize Europe’s security concerns, European nations are likely to face greater strategic pressure and develop deeper resentment toward Washington.

• Increasing Economic Nationalism Intensifies Economic Competition

Entering the 21st century, with the deep entrenchment of globalization and the collective rise of countries in the Global South, the Western monopoly in science, technology, and economics has been become weakened. Western countries can no longer rely on their traditional advantages in science, technology, markets, and international rule-making to obtain high, monopolistic rents; their traditional models of economic and social operation have been impacted, and the welfare society has become unsustainable. Since the outbreak of the financial crisis in the U.S. in 2008 and the eruption of sovereign debt crisis in Europe in 2009, economic nationalism has emerged and continued to grow on both sides of the Atlantic. The main features of economic nationalism include opposing globalization and free trade, emphasizing protectionism, and promoting xenophobia.

Nevertheless, the economic nationalism of Europe and the U.S. not only harms third parties, but also these actors themselves. The reactions to and impacts of economic nationalism in transatlantic countries are even greater, as the economic and trade bonds between them are very close.

In terms of services trade, the U.S. is in a surplus position. American high-tech enterprises have monopolized the European market and reaped considerable profits.

Nowadays, the U.S. regards Europe as a competitor and is unwilling to provide it with protection in the security realm. Europe finds it even harder to tolerate the American monopoly in the science and technology industry and will adopt more measures to safeguard its “technological sovereignty”. For its part, the United States will strive to defend its monopolistic position in Europe, viewing Europe’s efforts to build “technological sovereignty” as anti-American actions, which will intensify the confrontation between the two sides.

• The Rise of Domestic Right-wing Populism Intensifies Conflicts and Contradictions in Values

Over the past two decades, right-wing populism has been growing steadily on both sides of the Atlantic. The 2016 Brexit referendum and Donald Trump’s election as U.S. president marked a peak of the right-wing populist wave across the Atlantic. Since then, this wave has continued to surge. Trump’s re-election as U.S. president indicates that right-wing populism has become the dominant ideology in American society. In Europe, several key elections in recent years, particularly those in 2024, have shown the growing influence of right-wing populism in European society.

Right-wing populism in Europe and the U.S. is not entirely the same, but it has formed resonance and convergence. This is because right-wing populism on both sides features nationalism, xenophobia, anti-multiculturalism, and anti-establishment attitudes, and the Trump administration clearly has a favorable attitude toward European right-wing populism.

3. The Future Trajectory of Transatlantic Relations: Divided but Not Separated

• Widening Rifts in Security and the Diminishing Role of Security Bonds

The fundamental reason why the Trump administration is eager to end the Ukraine crisis is that it does not consider this to be a matter of major security and strategic interest for the U.S. This conflict will only disrupt the U.S.’ global strategy and create unnecessary trouble for the country. The Trump administration has already reduced its support for Ukraine and improved its relations with Russia.

Europe still regards Russia as a security threat and continues to strengthen internal integration and unity. It hopes to develop independent armed forces and eliminate its dependence on the United States and NATO. However, this trend may exacerbate contradictions between the EU and the United States.

The EU’s pursuit of independence and autonomy in the field of defense will inevitably reduce its purchases of U.S. weapons. Meanwhile, the development of the European military industry will, to a certain extent, create competition with the United States. This may increase U.S. dissatisfaction with Europe and intensify U.S. suppression of Europe, especially its military industry. In turn, this will impel Europe to pursue greater independence and autonomy, plunging the two sides of the Atlantic into a vicious circle of confrontation.

• Intensifying competition and conflicts in economy and trade

Although transatlantic economic, trade, and investment relations remain close, they may have reached a peak. Economic nationalism within Europe and the United States is hindering further economic and trade integration between the two sides, and this trend will be even more pronounced.

The EU is promoting the construction of a capital markets union, seeking to build a more unified market, advancing the further internationalization of the euro, and establishing technological sovereignty. Once these goals are achieved, Europe will become more economically independent and autonomous, and its dependence on the United States will be greatly reduced. Even if these goals are difficult to achieve, the process of promoting them will intensify conflicts between the two sides and continuously weaken the economic and trade bonds across the Atlantic.

• Ideological Divides, Fragmented Global Governance and Unraveling Value Bonds

Trump’s re-election as U.S. President by a large margin indicated fundamental changes in American society, and MAGA has taken root in the hearts of the American people. The U.S. is no longer keen on promoting global “democratization” and has shown declining interest in “color revolutions”. In the past, Europe could count on forming an alliance of values with the United States to jointly expand Western influence and maintain the “rules-based international order”. However, at least during Trump’s term, Europe will have to fight this battle alone. Moreover, the mainstream political parties in Europe must also deal with the impact of MAGA on European right-wing populism.

• Transatlantic Relations Can Still be Maintained in the Medium Term

On the one hand, Europe still seeks to preserve its transatlantic ties. Although many European states are frustrated by recent U.S. actions and have begun exploring greater strategic autonomy, they are not prepared to abandon the transatlantic alliance altogether. Firstly, Europe continues to rely heavily on U.S. security guarantees. Without the protection of the United States and NATO, the security architecture that has underpinned European stability for the past eight decades would effectively collapse—an outcome that remains politically and strategically unthinkable for most European leaders. Secondly, the pro-Atlanticist forces within Europe remain influential. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Nordic states are traditionally pro-American, and have always aligned the U.S. on security and strategic issues.

On the other hand, the U.S. still views Europe as a valuable partner. Strategically, Europe remains a crucial pillar in sustaining America’s global hegemony. Not only does Europe largely accept U.S. global leadership, but it also actively cooperates with Washington’s broader strategic objectives. Additionally, deep transatlantic ties—rooted in shared history, cultural affinity, educational exchange, economic interdependence, and longstanding security cooperation—have fostered a resilient symbiotic relationship. Although these relations may inevitably fade gradually, they are likely to endure well into the future.

Conclusion

Transatlantic relations are of great significance for both Europe and the U.S. During Trump’s first administration, the alliance experienced an unprecedented shock, yet its foundational structure largely endured. However, with Trump’s return to power, transatlantic relations have come under even greater stain, marked by deeper divisions, and more prominent contradictions compared to those during his initial presidency.

In the foreseeable future, transatlantic relations may demonstrate a continuous trend of fragmentation. While the U.S. and Europe may continue to uphold a special alliance and strategic partnership in the near term, in the long run, their tendency to diverge seems irreversible. Transatlantic relations may continue to weaken and become de-specialized or may eventually degenerate into an ordinary partnership.

About the Author

张健Zhang Jian: Dr. Zhang Jian, Research Professor, is Vice President of China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). He got his Ph.D. in History from Wuhan University in 2003 and has been a researcher at CICIR since then. His research mainly focuses on European integration, the EU’s external relations, the EU-US relationship and Sino-EU relationship. He is a regular contributor to academic journals such as Contemporary International Relations, as well as national newspapers and magazines like People's Daily and Outlook Weekly, etc.

About the Publication

The Chinese version of the article was published by the Contemporary World Journal Press《当代世界》, a journal supervised by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (IDCPC). The Journal is a comprehensive bimonthly periodical distributed both in China and overseas. It brings together a wealth of views from renowned experts and think tanks around the world on international issues, and offers in-depth analyses of the contemporary world, dynamic changes to the international landscape, and China's foreign policies and practices.

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