The Impacts of European Strategic Autonomy on the U.S.’ China Policy by Yan Shaohua
Amid great power rivalry, deepening China-EU cooperation offers a pragmatic pathway to transcend binary confrontation and promote multipolar stability
Welcome to the 38th edition of our weekly newsletter! I'm SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies and a visiting scholar at the Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School (fall 2024).
ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China's foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.
Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China's academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com
Today, we have selected an article written by Yan Shaohua, which focuses on the impacts of European strategic autonomy on the U.S.’ China policy.
Summary
Against the backdrop of heightened tensions in China-U.S. relations and accelerating shifts in the international order, this article highlights the potential role of the European Union as a key third party in mitigating great power rivalry and promoting multipolar stability. By examining the transformation of Europe’s strategic autonomy and its possible implications for China-U.S. relations, the article underscores the importance of China proactively deepening China-EU cooperation, thereby supporting Europe’s pursuit of relative independence. This approach offers a pragmatic pathway for Chinese diplomacy to transcend binary confrontation and expands the space for strategic maneuver, carrying significant strategic value.
Why It Matters
The European Union plays a critical role as a third party in the competition between the United States and China. As Europe pursues strategic autonomy, it must directly engage with the China-U.S. rivalry, while also influencing the dynamics of this competition. Conceptually and practically, European strategic autonomy is evolving from a state of “passive autonomy” to “active autonomy.” This shift not only indicates that the EU’s China policy may maintain a greater degree of independence, but may also influence US perceptions of and policies toward China. However, Europe’s defense reliance on the US, the shift to the right in European politics, the weakening of Franco-German leadership, and the uncertainty surrounding the potential return of Donald Trump to the US presidency could limit this transition in European strategic autonomy. From the strategic standpoint of preventing a “new Cold War,” China should recognize the pivotal role of Europe in the US-China competition and actively seek to strengthen the endogenous momentum of China-EU relations amid Europe’s ongoing transition to greater strategic autonomy.
Key Points
Europe as the “Pivotal Third Party” in the China-U.S. Strategic Competition
The Growing Salience of Third Parties in the China-U.S. Rivalry
The strategic competition between China and the United States is characterized by its significance in terms of interests, its long-term nature, its comprehensive scope, and its systemic implications—factors that collectively transcend the bilateral dimension. As a result, third-party actors have increasingly become focal points in the unfolding China-U.S. rivalry. Since taking office, the Biden administration has intensified cooperation with allies and partner countries in an effort to construct a united front against China, thereby bringing third-party dynamics to the forefront of great power competition.
Two Competing Perspectives on Europe’s Role in the China-U.S. Competition
The Playground Theory
According to the playground theory, Europe is mainly an object, not a subject, of strategic maneuvering—caught in the spillover of China-U.S. competition but with limited influence. Dependent on the U.S. for security yet economically tied to China, Europe faces dual pressures: the U.S. aims to co-opt it in efforts to contain China, while China seeks to prevent a united transatlantic front. Europe’s military limitations, internal divisions, and normative stance weaken its role, risking its marginalization as a geopolitical “playground.”
The Player Theory
In contrast, the player theory sees Europe as an autonomous actor capable of carving a “middle path” or an independent “third way” between China and the U.S. As the largest market outside these two powers, with strong technological and diplomatic clout, Europe holds valuable leverage from the strategic courting of both Beijing and Washington. European elites increasingly agree on strengthening the EU’s geopolitical role. Moving forward, Europe is expected to use diverse policy tools to broaden its global strategic influence.
2. The Historical Roots and Contemporary Relevance of Europe’s Strategic Autonomy
The Historical Foundations of Strategic Autonomy
The pursuit of diplomatic and defense autonomy has been a consistent theme in European integration and transatlantic relations since World War II. Strategic autonomy has long been a key goal for France, especially since the Fifth Republic’s founding, and for Germany from the 1970s onwards. This drive intensified after the Soviet Union’s collapse and became evident in 2003 when many European countries opposed the U.S. on its bypassing of the the UN to launch the Iraq War. The Kosovo crisis further exposed Europe’s military shortcomings and reliance on the U.S., sparking a commitment to develop a common defense policy. A landmark moment was the 1998 St. Malo Declaration by the UK and France, initiating concrete steps toward the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).
The Contemporary Relevance of Strategic Autonomy
Conceptual Consensus and Controversies
Despite varied interpretations, strategic autonomy is broadly understood as Europe’s capacity to act independently in an interdependent world to define, defend, and pursue its values and interests. The concept has expanded to include related ideas like “European sovereignty,” “geopolitical Europe,” and “strategic sovereignty,” reflecting ongoing debates. Some Central and Eastern European countries see strategic autonomy as unrealistic, interpreting it as the EU’s attempt to distance itself from the U.S. and chart a “third way.” Conversely, countries such as France view it as essential for strengthening the EU’s global influence and managing risks amid growing international uncertainty. This ambiguity, while demonstrating conceptual divergence, allows EU actors flexibility to adapt the notion according to their national priorities.
The Evolution of Policy Implementation
In recent years, strategic autonomy has increasingly shaped EU policymaking. The term first appeared officially in a 2013 European Council document, initially focused on defense. The 2016 EU Global Strategy marked a turning point, making strategic autonomy a core principle and objective of the EU’s foreign policy. In 2020, the European Commission expanded the concept to “open strategic autonomy” in the NextGenerationEU recovery plan, extending it to the economic domain. Since then, strategic autonomy’s scope has grown substantially, covering not only security and defense but also industrial policy, trade, technology, finance, and public health. It has become a central guiding principle driving EU reform and policy adjustment amid a complex and rapidly changing global environment.
Three Major Transformations Encompassed by Europe’s Strategic Autonomy
Paradigm Shift in the Understanding of Interdependence and Power
The EU’s pursuit of strategic autonomy marks a shift in how interdependence is viewed—not only as a source of security and prosperity but also of vulnerability. Growing external dependencies have heightened the EU’s drive for greater autonomy. Europe’s ability to act independently, strengthen its capabilities, and bolster political will is now crucial. This shift reflects a reassessment of the importance of power, with the EU embracing power as an essential means to secure autonomy and protect its strategic interests.
Transformation in the Analytical Perspective on Strategic Autonomy
Facing growing geopolitical competition and global challenges, the EU’s view of strategic autonomy is expanding from a transatlantic focus to a broader global outlook. While traditionally centered on defense and EU-U.S. relations, this global perspective now includes geoeconomics, geopolitics, technology, health, and climate governance. It also requires recalibrating relations with major powers like China and Russia, alongside engagement with multilateral institutions. Ultimately, the goal is to better protect and promote the EU’s interests and values amid a rapidly evolving international environment.
Shift in the Cognitive Framework of Strategic Autonomy
Europe’s strategic autonomy is shifting from “negative autonomy,” focused on reducing dependence on the U.S., to “positive autonomy,” which emphasizes actively shaping the international environment. This transition moves from passively avoiding reliance to proactively engaging global challenges, projecting policy preferences, and influencing international rules. Although defense autonomy remains limited, the EU has strengthened its geopolitical influence by leveraging strategic tools in trade and technology, enhancing its role in global rulemaking and asserting greater agency on the world stage.
3. The Impacts of Europe’s Strategic Autonomy on the U.S.’ China Policy
Europe’s pursuit of strategic autonomy in the context of the intensifying China-U.S. rivalry not only reinforces the EU’s independent approach to China, but may also exert reverse influence on U.S. policy towards China—conceptually, institutionally, and in terms of policy practice—through transatlantic interactions.
Conceptual Dimension: Cognitive and Strategic Framing
During Trump’s first term, U.S. policy largely framed China as a strategic competitor, emphasizing geopolitical and security challenges under a “great-power competition” paradigm. In contrast, the EU, lacking comparable hard power and direct conflict, adopted a more nuanced “triple characterization” of China as a partner, economic competitor, and systemic rival, formalized in the 2019 EU-China Strategic Outlook. While the Biden administration maintained the competitor label, it increasingly aligned with the EU’s multidimensional approach. In March 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken outlined a framework to “compete where necessary, cooperate where possible, and confront where needed,” echoing the EU’s view. The June 2021 EU-U.S. summit further solidified this convergence, and Blinken’s May 2022 speech expanded on this with a three-pronged strategy of investing, aligning, and competing.
Institutional Dimension: EU-U.S. Dialogue on China and the Trade and Technology Council (TTC)
Since June 2020, the EU has played a key role in initiating and shaping transatlantic dialogue on China, starting with the EU-U.S. Dialogue on China under Josep Borrell’s leadership and progressing to the EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council (TTC) during the Biden administration. These platforms institutionalize cooperation on investment screening, export controls, AI, semiconductors, and non-market trade practices. Concerned about U.S. unilateral actions challenging the WTO order, the EU seeks to limit such unilateralism while promoting a balanced agenda. Although the U.S. frames the TTC as a tool for strategic competition, the EU works to moderate confrontational rhetoric, emphasizing cooperation. Through multi-issue groups, the EU aims to depoliticize the agenda and lead a comprehensive transatlantic China policy aligned with its “triple characterization” of China as partner, competitor, and systemic rival.
Policy Level: “De-risking”
U.S. has, in recent years, advocated for “decoupling”, implying a complete severance of ties. The EU have instead stressed “de-risking”, reflecting both a balanced approach towards China and increased independence from the U.S. This viewpoint has been positively received in the United States. After realizing that “decoupling” from China was neither realistic nor economically bearable, U.S. policymakers began to abandon the rhetoric of “decoupling” and instead adopted the concept of “de-risking” proposed by the European Union.
For instance, on April 5, 2023—less than a week after Ursula von der Leyen first laid out a “de-risking” approach towards China—then U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly responded to her “de-risking” position in an interview, stating that her views were “completely aligned” with U.S. policy toward China. He emphasized that the U.S. was not pursuing “decoupling” from China, but rather “de-risking.”
Conclusion
In the context of China-U.S. competition, European strategic autonomy aims not only to achieve independence in its China policy but also to influence, to some extent, the direction of U.S. policy towards China. Despite constraints posed by Europe’s security dependence on the U.S. and its economic and trade ties with China, European strategic autonomy demonstrates a certain capacity to shape the trilateral relationship, offering insights for China’s strategy toward Europe. To avoid pushing the EU toward confrontation, China should properly address the economic and trade frictions arising from the “risk reduction” approach, promote openness and cooperation, and support the EU’s continuation of an open strategic autonomy. At the same time, the EU should be regarded as a key force in preventing a “new Cold War,” and should be encouraged to play a mediating role between the U.S. and China. China-Europe relations should focus on endogenous bilateral dynamics; coordinated development of China’s modernization and European integration will contribute to building a more balanced and stable international order.
About the Author
Yan Shaohua严少华：Yan Shaohua is an associate research fellow and the deputy director of the Center for China-Europe Relations (CCER) at the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University.
About the Publication
The Chinese version of this article was published in International Studies（《国际问题研究》）. Founded in 1959, this journal is published by the Institute of International Studies. Currently a bimonthly journal, it is one of the most influential theoretical research and policy analysis publications in the field of international politics and international relations in China. The journal features articles on recent developments in international affairs and international relations, the directions of national foreign policies, as well as reviews of new schools of thought, trends, and theories within the discipline.
