Welcome to the 86th edition of our weekly newsletter! I’m Chenghao Sun, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies and a visiting scholar at the Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School (fall 2024).
This article is adapted from my remarks at a journalists’ association event in Beijing on September 22 with foreign correspondents ahead of the upcoming China–U.S. summit. HE Yuxi and I have edited the remarks.
Over the past week, journalists from different countries have asked me remarkably similar questions. What has changed in China–U.S. relations since the Beijing summit in May? What can the Washington meeting deliver? Could trade and artificial intelligence offer room for progress? And could Taiwan question or Iran war once again disrupt efforts to stabilize the relationship?
These questions all lead to a broader one: are China and the United States learning to sustain a working relationship despite their disagreements?
That is the question I will have in mind when the two presidents meet. New agreements would be welcome, but their significance will depend on what happens after the leaders leave the room.
What has changed since May?
I would be cautious about describing the current relationship as a reconciliation or a return to normal. Structural conflicts over trade, technology and security remain. Yet something has changed since May: the two governments have devoted more attention to managing their competition.
The idea of a “constructive strategic stability relationship” addresses a problem that has repeatedly damaged bilateral ties. When a dispute arises in one area, can both sides prevent it from spreading across the rest of the relationship?
In recent years, chip export restrictions have quickly affected the broader atmosphere for economic engagement. Friction over Taiwan has disrupted diplomacy, security discussions and people-to-people exchanges. Each dispute has made the next one harder to manage.
Since May, economic teams have continued talking and diplomatic channels have remained open. Disagreements have not brought every other discussion to a halt. This does not mean that competition has become less intense. It suggests that both governments see value in keeping the relationship functioning while they compete.
Washington offers an opportunity to give that approach more substance. I would look for progress in several specific areas, without expecting a comprehensive settlement of the relationship’s underlying disputes.
Giving trade and investment mechanisms something to do.
The trade and investment bodies agreed in May need a practical agenda. The immediate question is whether they can move from institutional arrangements to decisions that businesses can use.
The recent New York consultations offer one possible starting point. U.S. officials have discussed reducing tariffs on a limited range of non-sensitive goods, including consumer products, agricultural goods, energy and medical equipment. The Associated Press reported that the two sides had moved to operationalize the trade body, with discussions continuing over which products should qualify.
Even a limited first list would matter. It could begin to establish more predictable conditions for ordinary trade, while highly strategic products remain contested. Consumer goods, food and medical supplies should not automatically be caught up in every security dispute.
Purchases will also attract attention. In May, Trump announced a prospective Chinese purchase of 200 Boeing aircraft. The White House also described commitments to buy at least $17 billion in U.S. agricultural products annually in 2026–2028, excluding earlier soybean commitments. The questions now are how those arrangements will be implemented and whether Washington will produce additional orders.
With the U.S. midterm elections approaching, Trump has an obvious interest in results he can present to farmers and manufacturing workers. New agricultural purchases, aircraft orders or an expansion of energy trade would therefore be unsurprising. Reported discussions over tariffs on U.S. liquefied natural gas illustrate how purchases and tariff negotiations may be connected.
From China’s perspective, the terms accompanying those purchases are important. Larger orders should be considered alongside tariff reductions, market access and reliable U.S. supply. Aircraft purchases, for example, depend on confidence that engines, components and after-sales support will remain available. An impressive headline figure means less if companies cannot be sure the underlying transaction will proceed.
Investment could introduce a somewhat different conversation. Reuters has reported that executives from companies including BYD, CATL and Xiaomi may join the visit, alongside representatives from sectors such as consumer electronics, agriculture and finance. The final delegation has not been confirmed, and its composition should not be treated as evidence that particular projects have been agreed.
If such a delegation materializes, however, it would raise a useful question: can Washington distinguish more clearly between importing Chinese products and allowing Chinese companies to invest and produce in the United States?
Political resistance and regulatory barriers make any immediate opening for Chinese electric vehicles unlikely. But the investment mechanism could provide a setting for discussing the conditions under which projects in automobiles, batteries, consumer electronics and other manufacturing sectors might proceed, including how to address data and security concerns.
For years, the bilateral economic debate has revolved around how much China sells to the United States. Investment discussions could give more attention to what Chinese companies might produce there, the jobs they could create and the rules under which they would operate. Whether the U.S. side is prepared to pursue that conversation will be worth watching.
Building an AI dialogue amid technological competition.
AI has become more prominent on the bilateral agenda since May. In New York, the teams led by Scott Bessent and He Lifeng discussed AI risks, and the United States proposed a mechanism for notifying each other of significant AI safety incidents. According to Reuters’ account of the talks, controls on advanced AI chips were not discussed.
On September 21, Bessent said further AI safety talks were planned in Shenzhen in roughly two months. The scope and operation of the dialogue will still need to be worked out.
China and the United States face two simultaneous realities in AI. They compete over chips, computing power, models and the rules governing access to technology. They also face risks that neither country can address entirely on its own, including AI-assisted cyberattacks, biological misuse, loss of control over autonomous agents and threats to critical infrastructure.
The most useful near-term outcome would be to give discussions of those risks a regular institutional basis. Both sides could designate standing points of contact, agree on which incidents warrant notification and bring government officials and technical experts together at regular intervals. More difficult discussions about military applications and human control could develop over time.
There is also a basic problem of language. Both countries discuss AI safety, but terms such as “loss of control,” “autonomy” and “major incident” may carry different meanings. A notification channel will be more useful if the people using it have some shared understanding of what they are reporting.
I have long believed that strategic trust should not be a prerequisite for this work. Limited trust makes communication more necessary: a serious technical incident could otherwise be mistaken for a deliberate hostile act.
Meanwhile, export controls will remain contentious. China wants the United States to stop expanding restrictions on Chinese companies and advanced technologies. Washington continues to raise concerns about access to critical minerals. A single summit is unlikely to settle these disputes. Some mutual restraint in introducing new measures, together with greater predictability in implementation, would nevertheless make a practical difference to businesses.
More Practical Cooperation beyond Trade.
Counternarcotics cooperation deserves attention because the two sides can work on defined problems even while broader disagreements persist. Precursor chemicals, drug-production equipment, online advertising and illicit financial flows all offer concrete subjects for cooperation.
An outcome on fentanyl should therefore be judged by whether it produces follow-up action. New investigations, better information-sharing, closer scrutiny of illicit funds or more regular working-level contacts would be more informative than another general commitment to cooperate.
People-to-people exchanges deserve a similar standard of assessment. Education, tourism, local exchanges and academic cooperation depend on practical conditions. More accessible visas, better flight connections and fewer obstacles to university partnerships would make renewed engagement tangible to people outside government.
These measures rarely receive the attention given to aircraft orders or tariff announcements. Their effects, however, accumulate over time. Leaders meet only occasionally; students, scholars, businesses and local communities can maintain contact throughout the year. A more stable relationship needs that wider foundation.
Taiwan question and regional crises remain serious tests.
Taiwan question belongs in a different category from procurement or investment. It concerns China’s core interests and the political foundation of bilateral relations. It cannot be treated as an ordinary commercial bargaining item.
In May, the Chinese side explicitly linked the handling of Taiwan question to the overall stability of China–U.S. relations. The relevant question in Washington is whether U.S. policy statements and subsequent actions reduce the risk of another confrontation. Arms sales and official interactions will be particularly important indicators.
No one should expect a single summit to resolve the Taiwan question. But if political assurances are followed by actions that undermine them, improvements elsewhere in the relationship will remain vulnerable. Managing competition requires a serious understanding of where the other side’s most consequential concerns lie.
Iran presents a different challenge. The United States would like China to use more of its influence with Tehran, while China has its own diplomatic and economic relationship with Iran. Their priorities and assessments will not necessarily coincide.
I would not expect a comprehensive joint plan. Continued direct communication over a ceasefire, the nuclear issue, the Strait of Hormuz and energy security would still be valuable. Such communication can help the two governments understand each other’s intentions even where they disagree about how to proceed.
Regional crises will increasingly affect bilateral relations. A more stable China–U.S. relationship must be able to accommodate differing positions on third countries without turning every conflict into an additional bilateral confrontation.
Test will continue after Washington.
The September summit will be followed by several important political and diplomatic milestones. The U.S. midterm elections will shape the domestic environment in which Trump handles trade, agriculture, manufacturing and China policy. China alone will not determine the election result, but election pressures can influence the timing and presentation of decisions about the relationship.
The APEC meeting in Shenzhen and the G20 summit in Miami will provide further opportunities for high-level engagement later in the year. Additional bilateral meetings should not be assumed before they are confirmed. Still, these gatherings offer occasions to review implementation and decide what comes next.
I will therefore judge Washington’s results over the following months. Do the mechanisms agreed in May begin doing useful work? Are new commitments implemented through October and November? When the later summits arrive, can the two governments build on progress rather than devote their attention to repairing another breakdown?
Competition will continue, and some disagreements may become more difficult. The opportunity in Washington is to establish working arrangements that can endure those pressures. If both sides can keep agreements functioning when the next dispute arises, the summit will have made a meaningful contribution to a more stable relationship.
Edited by HE Yuxi
