Strategic Form of Renewal of the U.S. Alliance System by ZUO Xiying
A military, political, economic and ideological integrated U.S. alliance system confronting China
Welcome to the 16th edition of our weekly newsletter! ChinAffairs+ is a weekly newsletter that shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu. I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, and a visiting scholar at the Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School (fall semester 2024).
I recently returned to China from the United States and have had exchanges with scholars from American think tanks. I will later share my thoughts on the next phase of China-U.S. relations and write articles on the topic.
Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions or criticisms may be addressed to sunchenghao@tsinghua.edu.cn
Today, we have selected an article written by ZUO Xiying, which focuses on strategic form of renewal of the U.S. alliance system.
Summary
Alliance system is the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and a key tool for it to respond to challenges from competitors. In recent years, the U.S. has actively united the so-called “free world” to contain, encircle, and suppress China. Its goal in alliance strategy is to reorganize the alliance system and build a Western camp similar to the one that contained the Soviet Union during the Cold War. To this end, the U.S. continues to strengthen its military alliances, reshape its political and economic alliance system, and strive to push out China from its dominant liberal international order, thereby maintaining a shrinking version of the liberal international order. Moreover, the U.S. continues to strengthen the auxiliary regimes of its alliance system, using international trade control systems and domestic export control systems, requiring its allies to cooperate in preventing China from acquiring advanced technologies. In the future, the U.S. will promote the renewal of a military, political, and economic integrated alliance system, by building a so-called “free world” similar to the Cold War era, in order to drive the confrontation between China and the Western world.
Why it matters
The rivalry between China and the U.S. remains a central issue in global geopolitics. Since 2017, when Donald Trump took office, this rivalry has intensified, reshaping the world order. To better understand and analyze the influence and future tendency of this continuous development, we need to examine it from multiple perspectives. While many academic works in English reflect American or Western values, this article aims to provide an alternative standpoint from China’s perspective.
The article examines the evolution of the U.S. alliance system in the context of its rivalry with China. Originally formed to contain the Soviet Union, these alliances have adapted to counter China’s influence, reflecting a broader effort to exclude China from a Western-led global order. Zuo’s analysis helps us understand the strategic reshaping of U.S. alliances, emphasizing a comprehensive military-political-economic-ideology bloc aimed at excluding China from the Western-dominated international order.
This piece is especially valuable for scholars and policymakers as it provides a nuanced perspective on the strategic logic behind the U.S. alliance reshaping from a Chinese perspective. Zuo highlights the importance of both military and ideological dimensions, noting the reinvigoration of Cold War-era strategies and their application to contemporary China.
In conclusion, the article sheds light on how the mobilization of U.S. allies is reshaping international relations in Asia and Europe, with significant implications for global security and China’s role in the world.
Key Points
Advancing the Military Alliance System
The two most significant military alliances for the United States are NATO and the Asia-Pacific alliance system. NATO, established on April 4, 1949, has become a cornerstone of the U.S. alliance framework. Meanwhile, the outbreak of the Korean War served as a catalyst for the formation of the Asia-Pacific alliance system.
A focus on Bilateral Military Alliance Relations
The U.S. considers its alliances in the Indo-Pacific vital for strengthening deterrence, particularly against China. Enhancing military coordination with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia has gained increasing importance in addressing potential conflicts. The Biden administration has bolstered these partnerships, exemplified by Japan’s heightened defense spending and the expanded U.S. military presence in the Philippines. The U.S.-South Korea alliance has also deepened, highlighted by the 2023 Washington Declaration, which permits the deployment of nuclear-capable submarines to the region.
A primary focus of U.S. strategy is integrated deterrence, particularly concerning Taiwan. By strengthening defense ties with allies and supporting Taiwan’s security, the U.S. aims to deter Chinese aggression and maintain regional stability. Strategic agreements with Japan and South Korea further align their positions with the U.S. on Taiwan’s defense. In sum, the U.S. is leveraging its alliances to bolster deterrence and address emerging threats, especially in light of China’s growing influence.
A build of small multilateral security frameworks depending on existing multilateral security mechanisms
In recent years, the U.S. has prioritized strengthening multilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific to counter China. This includes encouraging NATO to recognize China as a "systemic challenge" and leveraging regional mechanisms such as the "Five Eyes" intelligence network and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. A notable initiative is the 2022 Indo-Pacific Maritime Awareness Partnership, which aims to enhance maritime monitoring in response to Chinese activities.
The U.S. has also advanced smaller security pacts, including the 2021 AUKUS trilateral agreement, focused on developing advanced military capabilities. Efforts to improve Japan-South Korea relations have culminated in the 2024 security cooperation framework, further solidifying regional partnerships. Collectively, these actions reflect a U.S. strategy to reshape the regional geopolitical balance and bolster deterrence against China.
Promoting NATO and Indo-Pacific allies cooperation
At the 2022 NATO Summit, China was officially designated a systemic challenge, which prompts NATO to deepen cooperation with Indo-Pacific nations such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Both South Korea and Japan joined NATO’s Cyber Defence Centres, further strengthening security ties and signaling a broader realignment of global alliances influenced by U.S. strategic interests. NATO’s engagement with these nations, alongside U.S. reliance on South Korea for arms supplies to Ukraine, highlights a coordinated strategy to counter China through multilateral alliances and regional partnerships.
Rebuilding the Political and Economic Alliance System
During the Cold War, the U.S. alliance system functioned as a closed and highly cohesive framework, integrating military, political, and economic dimensions to counter the Soviet bloc. In the context of the ongoing U.S.-China strategic competition, the U.S. has revived Cold War-era strategies, focusing on rebuilding political and economic alliances to contain and counter China's influence.
Promoting the ideological competition
The strategy to exclude China from the international order is largely driven by promoting democratic values, leveraging political narratives, and fostering ideological divisions. Under the Biden administration, the U.S. has prioritized forming a global democratic alliance, urging nations to align with the West in countering China’s rise. Initiatives such as the "Summit for Democracy" aim to categorize countries based on democratic credentials and solidify the U.S.’s leadership in setting global rules.
Furthermore, the U.S. has worked to curtail China’s influence in international multilateral platforms, marking a departure from the Trump administration’s withdrawal from such agreements. Biden has revitalized multilateralism by rejoining global organizations like the Paris Climate Agreement and the WHO, while also challenging China’s role in the World Trade Organization. These efforts underscore a broader U.S. strategy to reshape the international system, counter China’s influence, and rally support from like-minded nations.
Implementing decoupling policies
The United States has been strategically reshaping global supply chains and economic alliances to achieve its goal of decoupling from China. Through the "Small Yard, High Fence" strategy, the U.S. has prioritized collaboration with allies to dominate key industries and reduce reliance on China. These efforts are particularly evident in high-tech sectors such as semiconductors, electric batteries, and critical minerals.
Promoting "friendshoring," the U.S. has encouraged allies to replace China in global supply chains, exemplified by initiatives like the CHIPS Act and collaborations with European partners on semiconductor production and supply chain security. Additionally, the U.S. has bolstered transatlantic relations and launched frameworks such as the Quad security dialogue and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) to build an economic alliance that excludes China. By rallying global partners, the U.S. aims to sustain technological leadership and counter China’s growing influence in the global economy.
Revitalizing the Auxiliary Institutions of the Alliance System
Centered around military alliances, the U.S.-led alliance system is bolstered by political, economic, and legal frameworks designed to restrict interactions with adversaries and maintain system stability.
The formation and development of auxiliary institutions for revitalizing U.S. alliance system
During the Cold War, the U.S. established a trade control system targeting socialist countries, creating the Paris Coordination Committee in 1949 and the China Committee in 1952 to embargo strategic materials and regulate dual-use military-civilian technologies. After the Cold War, the U.S. continued its export control efforts, culminating in the 1996 formation of the Wassenaar Arrangement, a multilateral agreement with 33 Western countries to regulate exports of conventional weapons and dual-use technologies.
Domestically, the U.S. passed the Export Control Act in 1949 and the Export Administration Act in 1969, transitioning from broad embargoes to more targeted controls. The Department of Commerce enforces the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Additionally, the U.S. implemented economic sanctions systems such as ITAR and various sanction lists (SDN, Entity List) to impose penalties, including trade bans, asset freezes, and financial restrictions on individuals, entities, and governments.
While these export controls and sanctions are not formal components of the U.S. alliance framework, they play a critical role in strengthening alliances by limiting adversaries' access to essential technologies and reinforcing U.S. leadership in global trade and security.
Current U.S. measures to strengthen the auxiliary institutions
To strengthen its trade control system, the U.S. requires its allies to cooperate on export restrictions. Through multilateral frameworks such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, NSG, MTCR, and the Quad, along with the Five Eyes alliance, the U.S. aims to block China’s access to advanced and emerging technologies. Domestically, agencies like the Treasury, Commerce, and State enforce sanctions on China and Russia, effectively creating a "moat" around the U.S. and its allies to protect critical technologies.
A key component of this strategy is forming alliances with countries like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Netherlands to exclude China from semiconductor supply chains. The U.S. spearheaded the creation of the Chip 4 alliance and secured agreements with Japan and the Netherlands to restrict semiconductor equipment exports to China. Additionally, through its "long arm" jurisdiction, the U.S. has worked with companies such as TSMC, Samsung, and Intel to bolster a U.S.-led semiconductor supply chain, denying China’s access to essential technologies, including semiconductors and AI.
Conclusion
In the era of China-U.S. strategic competition, the United States’ alliance system has become a critical tool for containing, encircling, and suppressing China. A review of recent years reveals that the restructuring of this system mirrors historical patterns, particularly the Cold War-era strategies used against the Soviet Union. Essentially, the U.S. is reapplying tactics once used to counter the Soviet Union to its rivalry with China. However, while the Soviet-led alliance system was economically weak—giving the U.S. a significant asymmetrical advantage—such an advantage is absent in the case of China.
To maintain its hegemonic position, the U.S. now relies on a robust alliance system that is deeply integrated into its domestic political and social structures. This system is underpinned by a series of domestic laws that enable long-arm jurisdiction and sanctions capabilities. Therefore, understanding the restructuring of the U.S. alliance system must be viewed in the broader context of its global hegemonic framework. Focusing solely on military alliances does not fully explain the U.S. efforts to contain China or the mechanisms driving its extensive global influence.
For the U.S., constructing an alliance system that integrates military, economic, technological, and ideological elements, supported by multi-layered arrangements, is key. This intricate system, deeply embedded in the liberal international order, represents the ultimate strategic goal of the U.S. alliance restructuring.
About the Author
Zuo Xiying 左希迎: Zuo Xiying is a Professor in School of International Studies at Renmin University of China (RUC). His research maily focuses on international security, American foreign policy, and regional security of Asia-Pacific. He also holds a fellowship at the National Academy of Development and Strategy of RUC. He obtained his B.A. degree from Nankai University in 2007 and then pursued his Ph.D. in International Politics from Fudan University, successfully completing his doctoral studies in 2013. From August 2011 to August 2012, he served as a visiting scholar at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University.
About the Publication
The Chinese version of the article is published in the Journal of Strategy and Decision-Making (《战略决策研究》). This is an academic journal published by Guangdong University of Foreign Studies focusing on the study of international issues, with a particular emphasis on international strategic research. The journal addresses significant global, regional, and national issues, highlighting academic rigor, timeliness, and innovation in its research output. Its aims include promoting the development of international strategic theory and policy research. Adhering to academic principles, it advocates problem-oriented research, prioritizes cutting-edge developments, and encourages interdisciplinary studies. Regular columns include International Strategic Theory, Frontiers of International Strategy, and Global and Regional Governance.
