Welcome to the 93rd edition of our weekly newsletter! I’m SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies, a visiting scholar at Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School in 2024 and Munich Young Leader 2025.
ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.
Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com
Today, we have selected an article written by YU Bowen on APEC’s composite transformation and China’s role in an era of great power competition.
Summary
Since the late twentieth century, internal disagreements and external challenges have weakened APEC’s traditional role in trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, while its institutional responses have failed to deliver a fundamental breakthrough. Nevertheless, APEC has gradually undergone a transformation. The scattered addition of issues began in the early twenty-first century; around 2010, this piecemeal approach developed into a composite transformation across three interrelated dimensions: objectives, ideas, and organizational structure. In terms of objectives, APEC has maintained its emphasis on trade and investment cooperation while establishing innovation and growth as new priorities. In terms of ideas, the traditional spirit of an Asia-Pacific family has evolved into a vision of an Asia-Pacific community centered on shared prosperity. In terms of organizational structure, an official-led model has expanded into a network encompassing meetings, specialized centers, and participation by diverse actors. Trade cooperation initiatives and capacity-building projects translate these changes into concrete outcomes. This composite transformation reflects both external pressure from great power competition and the normative influence of the global development agenda. Institutional flexibility and active engagement by key members have enabled the process. China has advanced APEC’s transformation by promoting a development-oriented agenda, shaping the discourse of an Asia-Pacific community, organizing host-year meetings, establishing functional platforms, and committing resources to dedicated projects.
Why It Matters
As China prepares to host APEC leaders in Shenzhen in November 2026, attention will naturally turn to summit diplomacy and tensions among major powers. Yet assessing APEC principally through leaders’ encounters or breakthroughs in trade negotiations can miss how the forum’s day-to-day work is changing. China’s host-year priorities of openness, innovation, and cooperation make the relationship between geopolitical competition and practical economic collaboration a particularly timely issue.
We selected Bowen YU’s article because it offers a useful way to assess that relationship. His argument directs attention to the connections among development priorities, community-building language, and the institutions that organize cooperation. For overseas readers, this helps explain why Beijing invests in APEC even as it promotes other international initiatives. It also identifies practical channels through which China seeks influence within an existing institution: shaping agendas, supporting specialized centers, and financing projects that other members can join voluntarily.
The article’s account nevertheless invites scrutiny. Evidence of new meetings, platforms, and projects demonstrates institutional adaptation more readily than it establishes broad economic impact or a shared regional identity. Reading the analysis with this distinction in mind gives policymakers a more demanding test for the 2026 host year: whether development-centered commitments produce sustained, accessible benefits across member economies. The article is valuable as one Chinese scholar’s explanation of institutional change and China’s contribution; its assessment should not be treated as a definitive account of Chinese academic consensus or of every member’s experience.
Key Points
1. APEC’s Traditional Trade Role Has Weakened
APEC’s early achievements rested on open regionalism, voluntary liberalization, and cooperation through consensus. The Bogor Goals supplied a common direction, while the forum helped generate momentum for multilateral trade negotiations. Those strengths became less effective when cooperation reached sensitive industries and domestic regulatory barriers. The failure of Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization in 1997-1998 exposed the limits of pushing liberalization beyond members’ willingness to act.
Subsequent progress was uneven. Preferential trade agreements increasingly delivered new market-opening commitments, while APEC’s influence on WTO negotiations declined. Its initial response was to add issues, including public health, counterterrorism, and supply-chain cooperation. Yu argues that these additions were initially reactive and fragmented, lacking an overarching direction.
2. Transformation Connects Objectives, Ideas, and Organizational Structure
2.1 Development Has Become a Central Organizing Objective
Around 2010, APEC began integrating scattered initiatives into a broader development agenda. Its 2010 Growth Strategy connected previously separate activities to balanced, inclusive, sustainable, innovative, and secure growth. The 2020 Putrajaya Vision 2040 consolidated this shift through three economic drivers: trade and investment; innovation and digitalization; and strong, balanced, secure, sustainable, and inclusive growth. The 2021 Aotearoa Plan of Action translated the vision into individual and collective actions and review arrangements.
Trade and investment cooperation remains foundational, but development now provides a wider framework for organizing work. Environmental goods commitments, digital inclusion initiatives, and capacity-building projects illustrate how the revised objectives can reach practical implementation.
2.2 An Asia-Pacific Community Gives Cooperation a Shared Direction
The early Asia-Pacific family emphasized comfortable interaction among diverse members. The emerging Asia-Pacific community vision more explicitly connects cooperation to common development and shared prosperity. Yu interprets this as a change in purpose, without a move toward European-style integration or sovereignty transfers. The language supplies a common framework for members with different political systems and strategic alignments. However, changes in official language alone do not establish a shared identity.
2.3 Networks Extend the Forum’s Capacity to Act
APEC has expanded through dense meeting schedules, specialized centers, and more stable business and academic participation. These networks provide expertise, policy proposals, and implementation capacity without requiring a powerful central bureaucracy. Projects and training then turn broad commitments into testable activities. Their results feed back into working groups and future agendas. For Yu, this interaction among objectives, ideas, organizational networks, and practical feedback distinguishes composite transformation from simply accumulating more issues.
This interplay also changes how cooperation develops. New priorities generate demand for specialist knowledge and participation; networks supply research and feasible policy options; and the community vision gives members a broadly acceptable rationale for working together. Small projects allow ideas to be tried without requiring agreement on an extensive binding settlement. Successful experience can then inform subsequent policy discussion and institutional design.
3. Competition Creates Pressure while Development and Flexibility Shape the Response
Great power rivalry and competing regional arrangements have narrowed APEC’s traditional institutional space. Members can shift negotiations and resources to other forums, while confrontation obstructs consensus. The failure to issue a leaders’ declaration in 2018 illustrates that vulnerability. Yu argues that these pressures encourage APEC to find areas where members can still cooperate and to articulate a renewed purpose.
Development offers such common ground. Members may disagree over trade rules and geopolitical alignments while retaining interests in innovation, connectivity, green growth, and capacity building. APEC also retains value as a relatively accessible setting for high-level communication when other diplomatic channels become strained.
The global development agenda helps organize this response. The UN 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement supply internationally accepted reference points that connect APEC’s existing work on growth, inclusion, and environmental protection. Their influence gives development cooperation a more coherent direction and wider legitimacy.
Institutional flexibility makes adjustment possible. Hosts propose priorities; officials, businesses, and researchers refine them; and the pathfinder approach allows willing members to pilot arrangements before others join. Voluntary funding and dedicated sub-funds create additional channels for experimentation. These mechanisms lower the costs of trying new initiatives, although translating them into shared outcomes still requires sustained leadership by key members.
4. China Supports Transformation through Agendas, Ideas, Platforms, and Projects
4.1 Hosting Provides Opportunities to Shape the Agenda
China’s host years in 2001, 2014, and 2026 show an expanding role. Shanghai highlighted human-resource capacity building alongside liberalization. Beijing advanced the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific roadmap, connectivity, and innovative development. In 2026, China has connected openness, innovation, and cooperation to an overarching community-building objective. Yu emphasizes that Chinese proposals become APEC commitments through negotiation and consensus among members.
4.2 Community-Building Language Links Cooperation to Development
China has repeatedly promoted an Asia-Pacific community and connected it to openness, inclusion, common development, and shared prosperity. Yu sees this as a way to give diverse initiatives a shared purpose and reduce pressures toward bloc-based cooperation. The 2026 theme reinforces the emphasis on turning the community vision into action. Its significance depends partly on whether members translate that language into workable cooperation.
4.3 Meetings and Specialized Centers Sustain Cooperation
China supports the organizational networks needed to maintain activity between leaders’ meetings. Yu highlights extensive host-year meeting programs and twelve APEC-related mechanisms established in China by April 2026. These cover fields including sustainable energy, technology transfer, small-business services, e-commerce, and green supply chains. Such platforms connect domestic expertise with APEC’s ongoing research, training, and policy discussions.
4.4 Funding and Local Experience Help Deliver Projects
Dedicated financial contributions support work on connectivity, innovation, green transformation, and regional integration. Yu reports Chinese contributions totaling US$15.7 million across the general APEC Support Fund and relevant sub-funds in the funding estimates he examines. Specialized centers also develop and execute projects. Sustainable-energy initiatives and the sharing of local e-commerce poverty-alleviation experience illustrate how Chinese resources and policy experience enter regional capacity building and knowledge exchange.
These contributions form an implementation chain: funding creates stable channels for priority issues, centers organize research and training, and projects turn experience into knowledge that other economies can use. Yu presents China as an important contributor within a collective process, whose results depend on members accepting proposals and sustaining participation.
5. Adaptation Does Not Remove APEC’s Structural Constraints
Yu qualifies his argument: the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific remains uncertain, fragmented resources and uneven execution persist, and strategic rivalry continues to narrow political space. APEC’s future relevance depends on preserving openness, inclusion, and voluntary participation while delivering concrete results. China’s 2026 host year therefore provides a test of whether the forum can sustain cooperation and deepen its transformation under increasingly difficult conditions.
Conclusion
Yu argues that APEC’s continued relevance rests on coordinated changes in its objectives, community vision, and organizational networks, supported by practical projects. Great power competition pressures the forum to adapt, while the global development agenda helps orient that adaptation. China contributes through agenda setting, sustained advocacy, institutional platforms, and project resources. Yet institutional activity alone cannot resolve strategic divisions or guarantee economic benefits. The practical task for China and other members is to preserve an open, inclusive framework and turn shared priorities into sustained cooperation on digitalization, green transformation, supply-chain resilience, and inclusive growth. The 2026 host year offers an opportunity to assess how far that effort can go.
About the Author

余博闻Bowen YU: is an associate professor in the School of International Relations and Public Affairs at Fudan University. He holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Toronto. His research focuses on international organizations, global development, global environmental governance, and international relations theory, particularly change in global governance.
About the Publication
The Chinese version of this article was published in Foreign Affairs Review. Published by China Foreign Affairs University under the supervision of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the journal covers international politics, Chinese diplomacy, regional and country studies, and national security. It is also the journal of the China National Association for International Studies.









