Welcome to the 91st edition of our weekly newsletter! I’m SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies, a visiting scholar at Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School in 2024 and Munich Young Leader 2025.
ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.
Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com.
Today, we have selected an article written by Gu Wei on how Russia has adjusted its external energy strategy under the continuing impact of the Ukraine crisis.
Abstract
As one of the most important energy powers in the world, Russia attaches great importance to energy strategy and actively conducts energy diplomacy. Since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, Russia’s traditional energy ties have suffered a major shock, the stability of energy supply has been difficult to guarantee, and the smooth conduct of energy transactions has been obstructed. This has not only reduced Russia’s economic income but also damaged its position in the global energy field.
Under these circumstances, Russia has actively expanded its cooperation partners and maintained its energy influence; adjusted the types and structure of its external energy cooperation; prioritized security objectives and highlighted the political nature of external energy cooperation; and emphasized the use of technical means to enhance the flexibility of external energy cooperation. Although these adjustment measures have achieved certain results, they are also constrained by great-power competition and geopolitical conflicts, changes in supply-and-demand relations, the process of green transition, and other factors.
Against the broader background of the evolution of the global energy landscape, a traditional energy strategy relying on a single type of resource and a single set of methods is unlikely to achieve the expected results. Russia’s external energy strategy will therefore be further adjusted in a more comprehensive, diversified, dynamic, and realistic direction.
Why it Matters
Energy is not merely an export sector for Russia. It is a source of fiscal revenue, a foundation of industrial capacity, a means of sustaining strategic influence, and an instrument of diplomacy. The rupture of Russia’s long-standing energy relationship with Europe has therefore had consequences far beyond trade flows. It has forced Moscow to redirect exports, rebuild payment and transport systems, and reconsider how commercial interests, national security, and geopolitical alignment fit together.
The article also illuminates a broader transformation in the global energy order. Russia’s eastward pivot is strengthening energy ties with China, India, Türkiye, the Middle East, Africa, and other parts of the Global South, while Europe is turning to alternative suppliers. The result is not a simple replacement of one market with another, but a more fragmented system in which infrastructure, sanctions exposure, financing, technology, and political risk increasingly determine who can trade with whom and on what terms.
Key Points
Against a backdrop of rising global energy demand and repeated disruptions to resource access and supply, external energy strategy has become an important means for states to safeguard energy security, promote sustainable development, address climate change, and conduct international cooperation. As a major producer and exporter of energy, Russia assigns exceptional importance to this area. Implementing an external energy strategy and conducting energy diplomacy are major instruments of Russian foreign policy. Under the continuing impact of the Ukraine crisis, Russia has adjusted the focus, partners, objectives, resources, and methods of its external energy strategy in an effort to improve its external environment and expand its diplomatic room for maneuver. Yet great-power competition, geopolitical conflict, and the green transition have limited the effectiveness of these changes.
I. The Impact of the Ukraine Crisis on Russia’s External Energy Strategy
Energy is a key domain through which Russia’s strategic position is expressed. Russia ranks sixth in proven oil reserves, first in natural-gas reserves, and second in coal reserves. In 2020, Russia issued the Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation through 2035, defining its objectives as maximizing energy’s contribution to socioeconomic development and strengthening Russia’s position in the global energy sector. The Ukraine crisis, however, has had a profound effect on this strategy.
(1) Traditional Energy Ties Have Suffered a Major Shock
After the Cold War, the European Union and Russia gradually built close energy ties. Following the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the EU and major European states progressively reduced imports of Russian oil and gas in support of Ukraine and in an effort to prevent Moscow from using energy as a weapon against Europe. Russian pipeline-gas deliveries to the EU fell from 150.8 billion cubic meters in 2021 to 67.9 billion cubic meters in 2022 and then to 27.3 billion cubic meters in 2023. In 2022, the EU prohibited purchases of Russian petroleum products transported by sea. As Russia developed methods to circumvent these measures, the EU added further sanctions and prohibitions. In 2025, the EU for the first time barred Russian LNG from the European market and lowered the price cap on Russian crude oil to US$44.10 in 2026. These prohibitions and price restrictions sharply reduced Russia’s earnings from oil sales to the EU. The deepening energy “decoupling” between Russia and the West has not only reduced Russian income but also obstructed Moscow’s use of energy as a diplomatic instrument.
(2) Supply Stability Has Become Harder to Guarantee
First, traditional energy pipelines have suffered direct damage. Alternative pipelines have shortcomings in volume and reliability and cannot fully replace the former channels. Second, stringent sanctions have obstructed economic and technological cooperation. EU and the UK firms ceased providing insurance, reinsurance, and financing services,. Uninsured Russian vessels could no longer pass through certain ports and canals. Normal economic and technological cooperation between Russia and Western countries became impossible, forcing older machinery to remain in use beyond its normal service life and increasing safety risks. Finally, geopolitical conflict has threatened production capacity inside Russia itself. Especially after repeated large-scale Ukrainian drone attacks on energy infrastructure deep inside Russia in 2026, some refineries have been damaged or forced to suspend operations, prompting the government to impose export bans to ease domestic pressure. Damage to productive capacity, combined with unreliable delivery, has harmed Russia’s commercial reputation and weakened its position in the global energy market.
(3) Energy Transactions Have Been Seriously Obstructed
In February 2022, the U.S. imposed sanctions on major Russian banks. A defining escalation came when the U.S. and other Western countries removed selected Russian banks from the SWIFT. This substantially increased the cost of Russian financial transactions, slowed foreign-trade settlement, and severely constrained energy commerce. Russia’s domestically developed System for Transfer of Financial Messages, or SPFS, can replace some SWIFT functions, but its overseas reach remains limited and cross-border payments continue to face obstacles. In March 2022, the U.S. revoked permanent normal trade relations for Russia, weakening the competitiveness of Russian goods. In response, Russia formally introduced ruble-based settlement in place of the dollar, which helped stabilize the ruble. In October 2025, the United States announced sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil. In its nineteenth sanctions package against Russia, the EU broadened its restrictions on Russian financial institutions. Successive rounds of Western sanctions have disrupted Russia’s energy-trading system and compelled Moscow to adjust its broader strategy.
II. Major Adjustments in Russia’s External Energy Strategy
(1) Expanding the Circle of Partners to Preserve Energy Influence
Today, Russian energy products mainly flowed to non-Western markets, instead of European countries. In 2022, Russia established a trilateral gas union with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and Gazprom signed a memorandum with the National Iranian Oil Company. Türkiye has also become a major energy partner in the Middle East, and Russia has sought to establish a gas hub there. In the Asia-Pacific, Russia has strengthened energy ties with China and India. Asia’s importance in Russia’s energy market has risen markedly: by 2024, the Asia-Pacific region accounted for more than 60 percent of Russian energy exports.
Alongside its search for new partners, Russia has sought to preserve influence by responding to demand created by technological change and by working through international institutions. Moscow has pursued nuclear-energy partnerships with Latin American countries including Brazil, Argentina, and Bolivia. It has advocated a fairer, multipolar model of energy development and emphasized that access to energy should be treated as a basic right rather than a privilege. OPEC+ is one of the global mechanisms in which Russia retains substantial influence. Since April 2025, OPEC+ members, including Russia, have held regular consultations on production plans and worked jointly to influence global oil prices. BRICS is another priority. Following the group’s historic expansion, BRICS members collectively account for three-quarters of global coal production and consumption, 40 percent of global natural-gas production and consumption, and more than 40 percent of world oil output. Russia therefore seeks to expand energy cooperation among member states, promote a BRICS energy dialogue, and advocate a unified BRICS energy strategy that can translate collective weight into greater influence and agenda-setting power. Used as a diplomatic lever, energy cooperation has strengthened Russia’s relations with the non-Western world and has helped Moscow partially reshape its external environment.
(2) Rebalancing the Types and Structure of External Energy Cooperation
Russia is first adjusting the form in which individual energy products are supplied. Pressure from transit states and the destruction of pipeline infrastructure have revealed the vulnerability of pipeline-based transport. To reduce dependence on traditional routes, Russia is seeking more flexible and diverse forms of gas delivery, particularly liquefied natural gas.
Russia is also changing the relative priority and investment devoted to different energy sources. Since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, it has placed greater emphasis on nuclear diplomacy. Nuclear projects involve fuel supply, maintenance, personnel training, and other technical fields, thereby expanding the scope of cooperation. Because nuclear power is linked to sustainable development and decarbonization, it can also enhance Russian soft power. Russia holds the world’s fourth-largest uranium reserves, providing a resource base for its nuclear industry and international partnerships. Since 2025, Russia has cooperated with Hungary. Vietnam and at least twenty countries in Africa.
(3) Prioritizing Security and Increasing the Political Character of Cooperation
Russia has placed security at the top of its external energy agenda. It seeks to reduce asymmetric dependence on any single market, transit country, or other external factor, while increasing domestic production of equipment for liquefied natural gas so as to avoid excessive reliance on foreign technology. Moscow differentiates among countries, pursuing active and pragmatic policies toward those it classifies as “friendly” while narrowing cooperation with “unfriendly” states. With friendly countries, Russia has accelerated pipeline construction and increased supply.
Russia has used restrictive countersanctions against unfriendly countries and employed energy as an instrument of political bargaining. In 2022, after some countries refused to pay for natural gas in rubles, Russia progressively reduced or fully halted supplies to them. In 2023, Moscow prohibited oil exports to countries that observed the Western price cap.
(4) Using Technical Measures to Increase Flexibility
To break through export restrictions, Russia has invested heavily in assembling a “shadow fleet.” It has extended the use of older oil tankers and employed third-country registration, flag changes, and ship-to-ship transfers to circumvent Western controls and increase deliveries to the Middle East, Africa, and other regions. The redesign of pipeline networks and shipping routes is another major response to external pressure. Russia has accelerated the development of new pipelines and routes, including the Northern Sea Route, which can shorten oil and gas transportation times. It has also reallocated volumes among existing routes and increased the capacity of gas pipelines serving Asia.
At the technological level, Russia is accelerating the development of proprietary LNG technologies and promoting their commercialization and broader use. Russia has also expanded settlement in RMB to improve the stability of energy finance. Finally, Moscow has increased its commercial flexibility and sought to exploit openings created by changes in the international situation. In March 2026, disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz generated emergency demand for Russian crude. The U.S. temporarily eased certain restrictions and issued a time-limited license permitting purchases of Russian oil, allowing Russia to accelerate the drawdown of crude inventories.
III. The Limits of Russia’s External Energy Strategy Adjustment
The adjustment of Russia’s external energy strategy has supported economic development and widened diplomatic options. At a broader level,Russia’s eastward shift has given countries of the Global South access to additional supplies and has, in an objective sense, improved the equity of energy access and supported their economic development. Increased Russian investment in LNG is raising the role of natural gas in the global market, potentially supporting elements of the global green transition. However, Europe’s purchases from the U.S., Australia, and other suppliers, combined with non-Western purchases from Russia and other producers, are creating a geopolitical fault line in global energy trade. This fragmentation increases the system’s exposure to political shocks and impedes globalization.
Russia’s strategy also faces several important internal and external constraints.
(1) Great-Power Competition and Geopolitical Conflict Constrain the Effectiveness of Russia’s Adjustments to Its External Energy Strategy
The U.S. and Europe use both incentives and restrictions to influence third countries. On the incentive side, they offer more favorable terms to persuade partners to reduce or abandon energy cooperation with Russia. For example, in November 2025 India and the U.S. signed what was described as a “historic first” purchasing agreement in pursuit of their bilateral trade target. On the restrictive side, the U.S. and Europe continue to impose new sanctions and controls. Countries concerned about secondary sanctions or spillover effects often adopt balancing measures, weakening the effectiveness of Russian energy diplomacy.
Some countries have also concluded from the Russia-Europe confrontation that their own energy security requires avoiding excessive dependence on a single supplier. Industrial powers such as India and China are expanding domestic refining capacity and improving local value chains rather than simply buying higher-priced Russian petroleum products. This trend further restricts the room available for Russian energy diplomacy.
(2) Changes in Supply and Demand Affect the Effectiveness of Russia’s Energy Strategy Adjustments
Under the impact of Western sanctions, Russian energy products generally face a global market characterized by excess supply relative to accessible demand. Russia’s need for buyers has therefore increased, leaving it in a comparatively weak position in supply-and-demand negotiations. Non-Western buyers can use the caps to increase their bargaining leverage, forcing Russia to offer discounts. Moscow thus confronts a dilemma: discounts are necessary to stimulate purchasing interest, but lower prices reduce both profit margins and total revenue. The limited incremental demand available in non-Western markets further affects overall earnings. In 2025, Russian energy revenue fell by approximately 20 percent compared with 2024.
These changes are also altering previous patterns of asymmetric dependence. Central Asian countries historically maintained close energy relations with Russia, but their geopolitical value has risen since the Ukraine crisis. Russia’s feasibility study for a new gas pipeline to China through Kazakhstan illustrates this shift. Central Asian energy states are becoming important transit corridors for Russian exports, transforming a relationship once characterized by Russia’s unilateral control of transport routes into one of closer interdependence. Moscow increasingly needs their support to carry out energy diplomacy, while these states can use their position to improve their bargaining power and increase their own returns.
(3) The Global Green Transition Limits Russia’s Room for Maneuver in Its External Energy Strategy
Western countries are accelerating decarbonization and reduce fossil-fuel consumption, while a growing number of states have adopted carbon-neutrality targets. Russia also recognizes that the global green transition is irreversible. On the one hand, Russia will find it increasingly difficult to sustain revenue through sales of traditional fossil fuels, while sanctions may further depress export prices. On the other hand, the green transition makes it harder for Russia’s traditional energy industries to attract investment. Shortages of capital and advanced technology for industrial modernization not only constrain the development of clean energy inside Russia but also make it difficult for the country to integrate into global clean-energy cooperation.
Although Russia possesses resource and technological advantages in nuclear power, nuclear partnerships require extensive infrastructure and long-term investment. The development of critical minerals likewise entails major technological obstacles. These conditions impose demanding transformation requirements. In 2024, the U.S. prohibited imports of Russian enriched uranium, further reducing Russian energy revenue and obstructing its participation in the green transition.
Russia’s strategic adjustment also depends on supporting conditions that can change quickly. Natural-gas exports require pipelines, but new or converted pipelines demand substantial capital and lengthy construction periods. Political change, weak regulation, and other sources of domestic instability in some developing countries may also reduce their capacity to fulfill contracts and weaken the results of energy cooperation with Russia.
Conclusion
More than four years of the Ukraine crisis have profoundly transformed Russia’s domestic and international environment. As a major resource in Russia’s diplomatic toolkit, external energy strategy and energy diplomacy have helped the country respond to risk and expand its diplomatic space. Yet most European countries are gradually adapting to energy “de-Russification,” while the global green transition and intensifying geopolitical competition are making countries of the Global South more cautious about energy cooperation with Moscow.
Since the beginning of 2026, repeated Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian refineries have weakened production capacity and placed additional pressure on the implementation of Russia’s energy strategy. A considerable gap remains between Moscow’s objectives and actual results. Both Russia’s ability to mobilize resources and the reaction of external markets constrain the strategy’s effectiveness.
Overall, amid a changing global energy landscape and a prolonged geopolitical conflict, a traditional energy strategy based on a single category of resources and a limited set of instruments is unlikely to achieve the expected results. Russia’s external energy strategy will have to evolve in a direction that is more comprehensive, diversified, dynamic, and grounded in practical constraints.
About the Author
GU Wei is a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, where she serves as director of the Russia and Central Asia Research Division. She is also the chief expert of the academy’s Innovation Program research team on “New-Type Major-Country Relations amid Changes Unseen in a Century.” Her principal research interests include major-country relations, European regional affairs, and Russian foreign policy.
About the Publication
The Chinese version of this article was published in the July 2026 issue of Contemporary World (《当代世界》). Established in 1981 and published monthly, Contemporary World is a Chinese journal of international politics supervised by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and sponsored by the Center for Contemporary World Studies. It publishes research and analysis on the international order, global development, political parties, the world economy, and major international issues.
