#8 Ask China: The U.S.-Iran War and Middle East Issues
With the Iran war driving expanding spillover effects, the key questions now are how Washington responds, how Beijing reacts, and where the Middle East is ultimately heading.
Welcome to the 8th edition of Ask China! I’m SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies, a visiting scholar at Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School in 2024 and Munich Young Leaders 2025.
ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me. Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com.
In this newsletter, we address concerns about China’s positions through a Q&A format, while also presenting key points of leading Chinese scholars’ commentaries. Through this series, we aim to provide policymakers, think tanks, and strategic communities overseas with access to Chinese scholars’ views, accompanied by curated academic perspectives that help readers better understand the considerations underlying China’s foreign policy choices.
Background
On 28 February 2026, the United States, in coordination with Israel, launched large-scale air strikes against Iran. Iran immediately retaliated by targeting U.S. military assets in the Middle East and Israel, further escalating the turmoil in the Middle East. Washington had intended to replicate the model of its strikes against Venezuela at the beginning of the year, seeking to achieve its preset goals through a string of “low-cost” air operations. Yet the conflict has not turned into a quick campaign as expected. Confronted with Iran’s effective counterattacks, the war costs have kept mounting, with spillover effects rippling into the economic and geopolitical domains. How does China perceive this U.S.-Iran conflict? What implications does it carry for China, China-U.S. competition, and the Gulf states? In this episode of Ask China, we bring you the views of Chinese scholars on these issues.
The stated justifications for the U.S.-Israeli military operation against Iran are Iran’s alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons, long-standing “support for terrorism,” and threats to U.S. and Israeli security. In reality, however, this war is an unjust unilateral U.S. military action to maintain its Middle East hegemony and contain its regional influence.
Politically, the war exemplifies hegemonism and power politics, driven by four key factors. The First factor is the anxiety over a Nuclear-Armed Iran. The U.S. and Israel, adhering to absolute security, view Iran’s nuclear program as a grave threat. The second factor is the regional hegemony competition. Iran, a major regional power opposing U.S. hegemony and Israeli aggression, has built a “Shia Crescent” to challenge them, prompting the U.S. and Israel to aim at weakening Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.” The third factor is the control of energy routes. The U.S. seeks control over key energy routes like the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea shipping lanes, a core interest highlighted in its 2025 National Security Strategy. The fourth is the lobbying efforts of Israel, which also served as an accelerator for the outbreak of the war. The last factor is the U.S. domestic political calculation. While the war has objectively harmed the Republican Party’s electoral prospects, Trump’s decision to launch strikes against Iran—with fantasies of a quick, decisive victory—was partially motivated by a desire to boost Republican support.
Legally, the U.S. military action against Iran constitutes an illegal act of aggression under international law. Above all, the U.S.-Israeli military strikes were launched without any authorization from the UN Security Council, violating the fundamental UN Charter principle prohibiting the use of force in international relations. This lack of legitimacy is underscored by European allies publicly refusing to cooperate with U.S. military deployments and maintaining distance from the operation, as well as the surge in anti-war sentiment within the U.S. itself—both clear indicators that this is a “war that should never have been fought.” What’s more, the conflict stems from the U.S. claim that Iran is on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons, making it a classic case of preventive war, failing to meet the strict criteria for legitimate self-defense under international law. Finally, the war resulted in significant loss of life, including senior Iranian leadership figures, sparking international concerns about potential war crimes.
Historically, the war stems from decades of U.S.-Iranian tensions. Following Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, the country adopted an explicitly anti-American foreign policy, transforming the U.S.-Iranian relationship from alliance to enmity. The U.S. imposed long-term sanctions on Iran, laying the groundwork for decades of subsequent tensions. The Trump administration’s 2018 unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and reinstatement of “maximum pressure” policies further escalated hostilities, setting the stage for military confrontation. The collapse of nuclear negotiations in Geneva in February 2026 served as the immediate trigger, with the U.S. demanding Iran’s complete abandonment of its nuclear program and Iran refusing to transfer enriched uranium abroad.
Additionally, the U.S. and Israel chose this particular moment to strike because they judged Iran to be at its weakest point, seeing an opportunity to potentially overthrow the current Iranian government. Domestically, Iran has faced near-economic stagnation and growing hardship due to prolonged U.S. economic sanctions and military threats, leading to periodic public protests. Externally, senior leadership and military capabilities of Hamas and Hezbollah had been severely damaged by consecutive Israeli attacks, leaving Iran in a precarious position with its regional “Resistance Front” significantly weakened. This combination of internal fragility and external setbacks created what the U.S. and Israel perceived it as a window of opportunity to use force against Iran and pursue regime change.
China maintains a clear and principled position on this conflict, insisting that the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of Iran and all Gulf states must be respected and inviolable, advocating that all parties should resolve differences through equal dialogue and negotiation. To implement this principled position with concrete actions, China has dispatched its Special Envoy for Middle Eastern Affairs to carry out shuttle mediation in the Middle East, aiming to de-escalate tensions and facilitate peace talks between relevant parties.
Middle East conflicts, particularly the recent U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, have reignited debate over whether such crises could reshape the trajectory of U.S.–China strategic competition. While these developments undeniably introduce new uncertainties into the international system, their impact is better understood as a disruption of the pace of competition rather than a transformation of its structure.
In the short term, the conflict creates a reallocation of strategic attention and resources. The United States, already engaged in Ukraine, now faces another flashpoint in the Middle East, which may appear to dilute its focus on the Indo-Pacific. This could temporarily ease pressure on China. However, such an effect is inherently unstable. If the situation in Iran evolves in a way that serves U.S. interests—whether through containment or regime weakening—Washington could quickly redirect its strategic resources back to Asia. In this sense, the Middle East won’t permanently distract the United States but instead functions as a flexible theater within a broader global strategy.
For China, the situation is far from advantageous. The Iran conflict not only threatens its overseas interests—particularly its energy security and economic presence in the region—but also exposes the limits of its ability to safeguard strategic partners under conditions of escalating conflict. China’s restrained posture, evident in both the Iran and Venezuela cases, has fueled external skepticism about its willingness and capacity to defend its partners. As a result, Beijing finds itself in a somewhat awkward position: seeking to balance risk avoidance with the expectations attached to its growing global role.
At a structural level, the conflict does not alter the essential nature of U.S.–China competition. Instead, it reinforces an ongoing shift toward a more complex, multi-dimensional rivalry. The United States is increasingly integrating military action, economic sanctions, financial controls, and alliance networks into a coordinated strategic toolkit. This approach, demonstrated in the Middle East, extends beyond the region and has implications for China’s global interests. As a result, the competition is not fundamentally changed but rather intensified in its scope and sophistication.
Simultaneously, heightened tensions in the Middle East also underscore a shared reluctance between the United States and China to allow regional crises to escalate into bilateral confrontation. China has responded to the Iran issue with restraint, refraining from a forceful reaction or direct involvement while adopting a mediating posture and calling for de-escalation. The United States, for its part, has likewise shown little interest in letting the Iran crisis significantly disrupt broader U.S.–China relations, maintaining channels for high-level engagement with Beijing. Furthermore, U.S. military action against Iran does not necessarily tilt the balance of negotiations in Washington’s favor. If the conflict were to escalate into a prolonged ground war, it could significantly drain U.S. military resources and strategic focus. These risks further reduces the probability of the US engaging in a direct confrontation with China in the short term. Taken together, these dynamics suggest that both sides seek to prevent external conflicts from spilling over into strategic tensions between them.
The old bargain has been badly shaken, but not fully replaced. The 2026 U.S.–Israel–Iran war exposed the core weakness of the Gulf security model: American bases in Gulf monarchies became magnets for retaliation rather than reliable shields, critical infrastructure and shipping routes came under direct pressure, and the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz threatened the economic foundation of Gulf states. At the same time, Iran’s political system proved more resilient than a simple regime-collapse scenario assumed, which means Gulf capitals cannot count on a decisive American military solution to eliminate their main regional challenge. Their likely trajectory is therefore neither full emancipation nor deeper submission, but selective strategic autonomy under continued hard-security dependence.
First, the “oil-for-security” formula has lost much of its credibility. As Jin Liangxiang argues, the model was always asymmetrical: Gulf states recycled oil wealth through the dollar system and U.S. arms purchases, while Washington’s security commitment grew increasingly selective. That credibility problem was visible in the 2019 attacks on Saudi oil facilities and became unmistakable in 2026, when the United States used Gulf bases for operations against Iran, leaving Gulf partners exposed to retaliation and with little real say over escalation.
Second, Gulf states are likely to seek stronger strategic autonomy in diplomacy. But this autonomy will be uneven, not uniform. Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait have stronger incentives to de-escalate and preserve mediation channels, while Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain remain more threat-sensitive toward Iran. Even so, the shared lesson is clear: Iran is a permanent neighbor, while American protection is contingent and reversible. That is why hedging, selective engagement with Tehran, and broader regional dialogue will become more attractive than a pure bloc-based posture.
Third, stronger diplomatic autonomy will not eliminate security dependence. The Hormuz crisis and the possibility of Red Sea spillover show that Gulf security now spans missiles, drones, shipping lanes, ports, and energy infrastructure. Analyses of Houthi restraint also suggest how fragile this environment remains: their calculations were shaped by domestic priorities, leadership risk, and the danger of reopening the Saudi front. This points to a hybrid future in which Gulf monarchies still need outside support for air and missile defense, maritime security, intelligence, and advanced systems, even as they resist exclusive alignment with any single patron.
Finally, the most plausible destination is a layered regional order. Gulf states are unlikely to abandon the U.S. umbrella overnight, but they are also unlikely to keep treating it as sufficient. The direction of change points instead toward a “GCC+” approach: more intra-Gulf coordination, limited reconciliation with Iran, and broader security cooperation with regional actors such as Turkey and Egypt, while keeping U.S. ties as insurance rather than destiny.
In sum, the old “security in exchange for protection” model has failed as a strategic belief system, even if Gulf states still rely on parts of the U.S. security architecture. The region is moving not toward full independence or deeper subordination, but toward more autonomy in diplomacy and diversification, combined with continued dependence on external powers for the hardest security tasks. In that sense, the Gulf’s future is neither post-American nor fully American-led. It is hedging by design.
In the “ceasefire without peace” phase following the 2026 U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict, the Middle East is entering a prolonged state of intensified surface conflict and frozen structural contradictions. China’s medium- to long-term strategy should therefore focus on four priorities: resilience, balance, diversification, and strategic stability.
First, China must treat energy security as a structural risk. Key chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb have become geopolitical weapons. China should diversify supply routes (e.g., pipelines via Russia and Central Asia), expand strategic reserves, and strengthen cross-border energy cooperation to build a robust energy security shield.
Second, China should pursue calibrated geopolitical balancing amid the emerging “two Middle Easts”. While maintaining coordination with Iran, it should deepen ties with Gulf states adjusting beyond the oil-for-security model, promoting common security and development-based stability without direct alignment.
Third, China should focus on building an integrated energy–technology–finance security framework, as modern warfare increasingly relies on AI and critical infrastructure. AI capability depends on stable energy supply, making energy the physical foundation of digital conflict. If energy trade remains dollar-dominated, sanctions could disrupt both payments and supply, threatening computing systems. Expanding RMB-based energy settlement is therefore key to securing an independent resource base. At the same time, China should strengthen core technologies while deepening cooperation with Middle Eastern partners in digital infrastructure and AI governance. By linking Chinese technology standards with RMB-based systems, China can build a closed-loop structure connecting energy, digital operations, and decision-making, reducing reliance on Western systems and hedging against the joint weaponization of the dollar and advanced technology.
Finally, China should anticipate the spillover effects within the United States and shift from avoiding crises to structurally protecting its overseas interests. This conflict has become an amplifier of American politics, and military actions related to Iran have become a “second front” influenced by electoral pressure, which has increased the security risks to Chinese ports, energy routes, and personnel. China should not adopt a passive response attitude but should deepen the “Belt and Road” cooperation, embed its own interests into the regional economy and governance structure, and build a network that combines development with risk buffering. As the region gradually moves towards a long-term “small Cold War“, China should provide a more predictable and development-based security approach to strengthen regional stability and the resilience of its own overseas interests.
The most immediate and measurable impact lies in the disruption of critical energy transit routes. Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has reportedly declined by as much as 95%. Should the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait also become operationally constrained, the simultaneous disruption of these two maritime chokepoints would represent the most severe interruption to global trade flows since World War II. Industrialized countries with concentrated energy structures and high external dependence, particularly in Europe, Japan, and South Korea, are expected to face elevated inflationary pressures and supply chain disruptions.
At the regional level, the conflict is increasingly characterized by decentralized and asymmetric escalation. Following the death of Khamenei, Shia-aligned armed groups across multiple theaters have reportedly intensified cross-factional retaliation. The erosion of previously observed informal “red lines” has reduced predictability and increased the risk of uncontrolled escalation. At the same time, perceptions of U.S. security guarantees are shifting among regional partners. Gulf states are showing signs of reassessing their reliance on the United States, as U.S. military presence, traditionally viewed as a stabilizing force, is increasingly seen as a potential liability in a high-intensity conflict environment. More broadly, the initiation of military operations during an ongoing negotiation process with Iran has contributed to skepticism about the reliability of diplomatic engagement. For smaller and medium-sized states, this may reinforce perceptions that formal negotiations offer limited protection against coercive actions, thereby weakening confidence in existing international mechanisms.
The most consequential long-term risk lies in the potential erosion of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Iran’s reported stockpile of approximately 450 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% purity places it within closer proximity to weapons-grade capability, heightening concerns about rapid escalation under crisis conditions. Should nuclear weapons be introduced into the conflict, the implications would extend beyond immediate military effects. Such a development would represent the most severe systemic shock to the global non-proliferation architecture since the establishment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, with implications for both horizontal proliferation and strategic stability.
