YAN Xuetong on Moral Issues in International Politics
The U.S. will continue engaging in wars, but I believe the likelihood of direct war between China and the U.S. in the next ten years is relatively low.
Welcome to the 42nd edition of our weekly newsletter! I’m SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies and a visiting scholar at the Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School (fall 2024).
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Amid profound changes in the global landscape, the international community is facing multiple challenges—including accelerated multipolarity, intensifying geopolitical rivalry, and rising non-traditional security threats. On May 29, the forum “Moral Realism and New Paradigms of Global Governance” and the book launch of The Essence of Interstate Leadership were held at Tsinghua University.
Professor YAN Xuetong, Academic Committee Member of the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS), distinguished professor of Social Sciences and Honorary Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, participated in the event.
In an exclusive interview with Phoenix Int’l Think Tank’s Big Story(凤凰大参考) of ifeng.com, Yan discussed a wide range of issues including the impact of Donald Trump’s policies on U.S. global influence, how Europe and Japan navigate between China and the U.S., China’s path to enhancing global leadership, and the possibility of a U.S.-China military conflict. The conversation explored the role of morality in international politics and examined how moral realism can be applied in today’s turbulent world order.
Interviewer and Interviewee:
Key Points:
1. Yan Xuetong argued that Trump’s policies marked a regression for the U.S., leading to a decline in its overall national strength and negatively affecting its global influence and scientific research capacity. He emphasized that Trump’s rationality cannot be judged solely through the lens of economic interests. For Trump, the highest personal goal is not economic gain, but becoming “the greatest president in U.S. history.” Similarly, from the perspective of moral realism, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is a highly rational yet deeply immoral leader.
2. Yan observed that the current international structure is evolving into a configuration of “dual poles—China and the U.S.—plus a vast middle ground.” Trump’s approach has driven some traditional U.S. allies away, prompting countries like Japan to shift from a “one-sided strategy” back to a “hedging strategy” after the tariff war. European countries, sensing security threats from both China and the U.S., have also adopted hedging strategies. This trend, Yan predicts, will become more pronounced over the next decade. In the future, countries will adopt more issue-specific alignment strategies: for instance, relying on China for trade, the U.S. for finance; the U.S. for wartime security, but China for shaping the global security order. He believes the likelihood of direct war between China and the U.S. remains low in the next ten years.
3. Yan noted that in contrast to Trump, China’s global image as a responsible leader has improved. However, China has yet to assume leadership within global institutions such as the WTO, IMF or UN. Its leadership is more pronounced in issue-specific frameworks like BRICS or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. As Trump’s policies unfold, a global leadership vacuum is emerging. Yet China has neither the intention nor the resources to replace the U.S. as the world leader. Yan cautioned that China should act within its means and focus on domestic development. True global leadership, he argued, will only come when the international community demands China take the lead—otherwise, China risks falling into a “leadership trap.”
4. Yan emphasized that China must first implement its values at home before attempting to promote them abroad. Citing the U.S. as an example, he argued that its decline in international leadership stems from its failure to uphold liberal values domestically. Likewise, if China hopes to advocate principles such as a balance between rights and responsibilities or the ideal of “the world belongs to all”(天下为公), it must first realize these values through domestic reform. Only then will the international community recognize and accept China’s values; forced promotion will backfire. Ultimately, the future of U.S.-China competition will be determined by each country’s capacity for internal reform—not just geopolitical rivalry.
Q1: Is Trump a rational leader? How should we evaluate his impact?
Yan Xuetong: He caused a decline in U.S. comprehensive power.
Hou Yichao: When it comes to international leadership, there’s a common view that Trump damaged the credibility of the United States. Yet domestically, he was democratically elected and is seen by some as a leader with a strong capacity for “reform.” This appears to present a contradiction: both domestic and international leadership affect a country's global status. How do you interpret this discrepancy? How should we assess Trump’s leadership?
Yan Xuetong: There is a distinction between “reform” and “change”. “Reform” refers to progress—moving society from a backward or irrational state to a more rational and advanced one. That’s why we talk about “reform and opening-up” in China. In contrast, "change" simply denotes a difference from the past—it has no inherent direction. If the change is positive, we call it reform; if it's negative, it's regression. A classic example of negative change in politics is "restoration", such as Zhang Xun’s attempt to restore the monarchy in the early Republic of China—this was change, but a regressive one. Trump's domestic policies are generally not regarded as reforms, even within the U.S.; rather, they are described as changes—more specifically, as regressive changes.
Hou Yichao: So in your view, Trump’s impact on the United States’ international standing has been purely detrimental?
Yan Xuetong: I would argue that Trump’s leadership either slowed the normal pace of growth in U.S. comprehensive power or, more seriously, led to an actual decline in absolute terms. We are already seeing signs of this. America’s international leadership has declined; its number of followers is decreasing. If we examine U.S. national power, its trade capacity isn’t growing—it’s shrinking, due to the trade wars he initiated. Scientific research has also declined, as many research labs were shut down, and many scientists have chosen to leave the country. The core of research capacity is human talent. A reduced number of researchers naturally leads to diminished capabilities. This damage has already materialized: in the first quarter, the U.S. economy contracted by 0.3% quarter-on-quarter.
Hou Yichao: Do you see this as a short-term effect, or is it likely to have long-term consequences? For instance, by 2028 or beyond, could the U.S. continue to experience this kind of decline?
Yan Xuetong: It’s hard to say whether Trump will serve another term. But speaking only of his last term, I believe it marked a period of particularly rapid decline in U.S. national power.
Hou Yichao: Another key issue is whether Trump should be considered a rational actor. You have argued that leadership types should be analyzed through a lens of rationality. When he launched the trade war, many questioned the economic theory behind it—and failed to identify a coherent rationale. Is it fair, then, to conclude that Trump’s behavior was irrational?
Yan Xuetong: That’s a very good question. Many people, when discussing rationality, implicitly adopt a standard tied to money: if something increases wealth, it is deemed rational. I believe this standard is flawed. Judging Trump’s policies based on whether they increased or decreased America’s wealth is not a valid way to assess his rationality. Using economic determinism as the sole benchmark for rationality makes it impossible to analyze international relations effectively, let alone Trump’s actions. For Trump, economic gain was not the highest priority. His paramount interest was to become the “greatest” president in American history. That was his personal highest objective.
Hou Yichao: Another common misunderstanding concerns your concept of “morality.” Dr. Fang has noted that moral judgment should focus on whether a leader’s policies serve national interest and align with national power—not personal character. You’ve evaluated leaders like Zelensky and Ghani. How would you assess Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, whose Gaza policies—such as framing it as a colony or likening it to postwar Japan—may serve short-term national interests but have eroded international support?
Yan Xuetong: Netanyahu is a highly rational yet profoundly immoral leader. He places his personal interests above those of the Israeli people and the Israeli state. His policies not only inflict harm on ordinary civilians in Gaza, but also damage the wellbeing of Israeli citizens and Jews around the world. That is why both in Israel and abroad, mass protests have erupted against him. He suppresses domestic dissent with force and shows no regard for Israeli hostages, insisting on continuing the war regardless. Indicted for war crimes, he uses the conflict to delay elections and avoid imprisonment. His actions are thus highly rational—but profoundly immoral.
Q2: What does the international order look like in an era without leadership?
Yan Xuetong: Countries will adopt issue-specific alignment strategies between China and the US.
Hou Yichao: Some scholars have cited the “Kindleberger Trap” (Editor’s Note: Historian Charles Kindleberger warned that when great powers fail to uphold international order and provide global public goods, chaos may follow). You’ve argued that neither China nor the U.S. can offer global leadership, though leadership may be issue-specific. In an era of stalled globalization and rising populism, how should we view the division of leadership between them?
Yan Xuetong: At present, no country in the world has the capacity to exercise unilateral leadership. Neither China nor the US can do so alone, and the two powers are not cooperating to offer joint leadership. Since no form of leadership is being provided, there is no actual division of leadership responsibilities to speak of.
Hou Yichao: So, would you say we are currently in a fully realized “Kindleberger Trap”?
Yan Xuetong: First of all, I believe the concept of the "Kindleberger Trap" is misleading. A trap implies intentionality—that someone deliberately constructed a pitfall for others to fall into. But Kindleberger never argued that a specific actor purposefully created such an environment to entrap others. The term “trap” is therefore not appropriate for describing the current state of international leadership vacuum. It’s like trying to describe the weight of a stone using smell—it simply doesn’t make sense.
Hou Yichao: If we are indeed in a state of global leadership absence, what about cases like the European Union claiming leadership in the green transition? Can actors like the EU exercise leadership in specific vertical issue areas?
Yan Xuetong: All leadership is defined by the followers, not by the leaders themselves. It is followers who determine whether someone is a leader. In most cases, when an actor declares itself to be a leader, it is precisely because it lacks the actual capacity to lead. True leadership does not require self-declaration—if one is truly leading, followers will naturally affirm it. Without followers, any claim to leadership is meaningless in the international context.
Hou Yichao: I recall you once said that we are currently in a bipolar world, but with a broad middle ground in between. How do you see this situation evolving?
Yan Xuetong: I believe the trend is toward a China–U.S. bipolarity, but not one defined by opposing blocs. Rather, it is a non-bloc bipolar structure. Trump’s policies have pushed some of the countries that traditionally allied with or followed the United States to distance themselves. Many of these countries are now pursuing hedging strategies, taking advantage of tensions between China and the U.S., rather than aligning exclusively with Washington. So it is a bipolarity not based on alliance systems. We cannot predict what will happen twenty years from now, but over the next decade, this trend should become increasingly pronounced.
Hou Yichao: You have previously argued that if China adheres strictly to its non-alignment policy and refrains from providing security guarantees to other states—including its neighbors—then it cannot serve as a global leader. Recently, however, there have been new developments, such as the “2+2” dialogue mechanism with Indonesia and a “3+3” mechanism with Vietnam. Would you consider these efforts to be attempts at constructing a security order under the principle of non-alignment?
Yan Xuetong: These are indeed methods of building an international security order, but they are not ways of establishing a leadership–follower relationship. The “2+2” mechanisms that China has established with these countries are partnerships based on equality, not on a hierarchical leader–follower dynamic. These are cooperative relationships between equals.
Hou Yichao: You mentioned earlier that the relationship between the U.S. and Japan is not one of equality, but rather one of power hierarchy. You also predicted that more of America’s allies may peel away or shift back toward hedging. Does this include Japan?
Yan Xuetong: Japan has already been pursuing a hedging strategy. Even before Trump’s first term, Prime Minister Abe had proposed that while Japan must rely on the U.S. for security, it should engage economically with China. When Trump came into office, Japan began moving away from that hedging approach and leaned heavily toward the U.S. But now, as Trump has imposed tariffs on Japan, the country is recalibrating. Japan has reached 20 cooperation agreements with China and is again exploring expanded economic collaboration. From this perspective, Japan is reverting to its earlier hedging strategy.
Hou Yichao: You’ve noted that countries may rely on China for economics and the U.S. for security. But as security concerns increasingly spill into economic issues—exemplified by the trade war and the “lose-lose” theme of last year’s Munich Security Conference—are hedging strategies not being increasingly constrained by U.S. pressure?
Yan Xuetong: What you're describing—the “securitization” of economic issues—is a consequence of the global rise of populism. More and more policymakers have begun using the term “economic security,” but most of them don’t actually know what it means. They cannot define the boundaries of economic security, nor can they determine the proper balance between economic security and economic development. As a result, “economic security” has become a legitimizing rationale for reducing or halting international economic cooperation. Under this banner, countries seek to lessen interdependence with others. This is a manifestation of populism.
And this is not unique to the U.S.—virtually all major powers around the world are formulating their own economic security strategies. It’s not so much that political agendas are hijacking economic concerns; rather, it’s a shift in the prevailing mindset. With the rise of populism, economic security has been elevated above economic development. In the past, under liberalism, development came first; now, in conflicts between security and development interests, the hierarchy of priorities has changed.
Hou Yichao: The securitization trend tends to produce a chilling effect. Do you think it will shrink the space for countries to hedge and force them into choosing sides?
Yan Xuetong: Countries do have security concerns, but the direction they lean depends on whom they perceive as the source of economic security threats. If they believe the threat comes from China, they may gravitate toward the U.S.; if they see it coming from the U.S., they may turn to China. If they view both as threats, then they are more likely to adopt hedging strategies and move toward a middle position. Since Trump took office, the trend appears to favor this third option. For example, many European states now perceive security threats emanating from both China and the U.S., and this is why their policies are increasingly shifting toward hedging.
Hou Yichao: From your response, I gather that the traditional pattern where countries "rely on China economically and the U.S. for security" no longer applies. Now, countries may rely on both or distance themselves from both in both domains.
Yan Xuetong: That’s not quite accurate. The earlier understanding of hedging—summed up as “economically with China, militarily with the U.S.”—has become overly simplistic. Today’s hedging strategies are far more nuanced. For instance, a country may rely on China for trade but on the U.S. for financial services. In the security realm, it may depend on the U.S. for wartime capabilities, while looking to China to help establish global security norms. The pattern is becoming increasingly refined—what I call “issue-based alignment,” or alignment determined by specific policy issues.
Q3: As the U.S. retreats, is China seeking global leadership?
Yan Xuetong: Only if others insist on it, and you can’t turn it down.
Hou Yichao: You’ve mentioned that studying international leadership shouldn’t focus solely on the leader—it’s more about the followers. Both China and the U.S. have been building different partnership mechanisms depending on the issue. For instance, China has trade-related partnerships and partnerships under the Global Security Initiative. The U.S. has multilateral frameworks too, like the AUKUS trilateral security pact with the UK and Australia. How would you evaluate the strategy of both sides trying to “make friends”?
Yan Xuetong: International organizations vary in nature. If we look only at security-related organizations, there are at least two types. One is preventive cooperation mechanisms aimed at avoiding conflict. The other is alliance mechanisms targeting third parties. Take NATO as an example—it’s a third-party-targeted mechanism aimed at Russia. It doesn’t exist to prevent war; it exists to win war. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, on the other hand, is a mechanism to prevent conflict. So their nature is different, but they’re all just tools—like a hammer and a screwdriver. You can’t really say which is more effective; it depends on what job you’re using them for.
Hou Yichao: You mentioned evaluating leadership through the number and quality of followers. And we also touched on the different types of international organizations China is engaged in. Based on all this, how would you assess the current state of China’s global leadership?
Yan Xuetong: Overall, China’s international environment is improving. More and more countries are developing a better impression of China, and this shift is largely due to Trump’s policies. As more countries compared the two, they concluded that Trump’s administration was far worse than China’s. So it’s a result of relative comparison. In terms of international cooperation, China still leads relatively few organizations. Among global organizations—such as the WTO, World Bank, IMF, and the UN—China doesn’t hold a leading position. In China-led initiatives like BRICS and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), China plays a more prominent role. But these are issue-specific initiatives, not global ones.
Q4: How can China promote its “Humane Authority” (王道) globally?
Yan Xuetong: Practice it at home first.
Hou Yichao: You’ve said that China shouldn’t become a leader like the U.S. when rising in the world. You’ve also argued that Chinese foreign policy should emphasize three things: a responsibility-rights balance in global order; a reversed double standard—meaning developed countries should be held to stricter norms than developing ones; and an “open world as one family” principle. The first and third points seem to be in practice—China often emphasizes the balance between rights and responsibilities, and has recently promoted openness. But on the second point, some argue that “double standards are a privilege of great powers.” Others criticize both the U.S. and China for double standards—pointing to Gaza for the U.S. and the Russia–Ukraine war for China. How do you respond to these criticisms? How can China promote better norms in the face of such resistance?
Yan Xuetong: First, from the perspective of moral realism, humane authority(王道) is rare and occurs only under exceptional circumstances. In contrast, hegemonic leadership based on double standards is far more common. As you said, many believe being a global leader means holding privileges and practicing hegemony. About your third point, any value system or social norm you want to promote globally must first be practiced domestically. If you can’t implement it at home, you can’t succeed in promoting it abroad. It’s the idea that “if you can’t sweep your own house, how can you sweep the world?” Take the U.S. under Trump—why did its global leadership decline? Because the liberal values it previously championed were no longer upheld at home. Without domestic practice, international promotion fails.
Hou Yichao: You’ve argued that future U.S.-China competition will be about internal reform capacity. So does that mean studying U.S.-China relations—or even international relations theory—will become less important? Will research shift more toward domestic politics or area studies?
Yan Xuetong: The study of international relations is about relationships between states. If we abandon this focus, we’re no longer studying international relations but something else—domestic law, medicine, education, etc. If someone says they study international relations but also claims that U.S.-China relations are not worth studying, then they are likely studying something else entirely.
Hou Yichao: But if we attribute U.S.-China competition mainly to each side’s reform capabilities, wouldn’t that mean existing theoretical paradigms need to be thoroughly rethought or updated?
Yan Xuetong: Existing systemic theories no longer explain current realities. Whether it’s liberal institutionalism, constructivism’s emphasis on norms and ideas, or structural realism’s focus on international structure—none can explain the policy shift from Biden to Trump, nor why Trump’s approach deviated not only from Biden’s but also from decades of post-WWII U.S. foreign policy. So yes, international relations research needs to shift from systemic-level analysis to the individual level.
Q5: Where will the China-U.S. relations head?
Yan Xuetong: Global politics is reversing course; U.S.-China war unlikely within a decade
Hou Yichao: This brings us to a pressing question. Many people ask me, “What is Trump thinking?” But I often feel there’s no solid basis to answer that. We have reports and interviews, but how can we objectively reconstruct his decision-making?
Yan Xuetong: When people ask you what Trump is thinking—do you know what they are thinking? No one truly knows what’s in someone else’s mind. We only infer thoughts from external behavior. That’s how international relations research works too: we observe behavior and then infer intentions. You can’t read minds; you interpret actions.
Hou Yichao: Finally, your lecture today was titled “Global Governance,” but I came away with a rather pessimistic outlook. With neither China nor the U.S. showing much interest in global leadership, will the world face more instability or even conflict? After the Russia–Ukraine war, we’ve seen growing tensions in many regions, like between India and Pakistan. Could the retreat of U.S. leadership create a power vacuum and greater chaos?
Yan Xuetong: Two years ago, I wrote two articles—“History Reverses Course” and “Global Politics Has Turned Around” (The World has turned around《世界已经掉头》). I predicted a shift from globalization to de-globalization, from progress to regression. At the time, many didn’t accept this and remained optimistic. But after Trump returned, more people have come to agree—pessimism is rising. The trend is real and won’t reverse easily, perhaps not for another ten years.
Hou Yichao: So do you think war is coming?
Yan Xuetong: Humans have fought wars every day throughout history—there’s never been a day without war. Ukraine, Russia, Gaza, Sudan—wars are happening. The question is not whether war exists, but whether it lands on you, and how many countries are drawn in at once.
Hou Yichao: What’s your assessment—will there be direct conflict between China and the U.S.? Any further predictions for the next decade?
Yan Xuetong: The U.S. will continue engaging in wars, but I believe the likelihood of direct war between China and the U.S. in the next ten years is relatively low. Two trends will continue to rise: first, the growth of populist ideologies; second, a stronger tide of de-globalization.
Hou Yichao: Do you foresee a tipping point—say, where populism becomes self-limiting?
Yan Xuetong: Any prediction requires a time frame. Predicting beyond ten years is very hard. Within five years is easier. A ten-year outlook is already difficult. I hope populism declines in ten years, but I think that’s unlikely.
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