The Views of Chinese and American Think Tanks regarding China-US Geo-technological Competition and Its Implications for China
Think tanks play important roles in track two diplomacy, so their perspectives on great power competition should be given special attention.
Welcome to the 32nd edition of our weekly newsletter! I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies and a visiting scholar at the Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School (fall 2024).
ChinAffairsplus shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu.
Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions or criticisms may be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com
Today, we have selected an article written by CHEN Xi, SHAO Guangyan, HU Jiayu, ZHU Xufeng, WANG Dong, which focuses on The views of Chinese and American think tanks from perspective of Sino-US geo-technological competition and its Implications for China.
Summary
The geopolitical and technological competition (geo-technological competition) between China and the United States is the main arena of great power competition in the 21st century. This has impacted the global technology, supply chain, and economic development landscape in unexpected ways.
Although this issue has been widely discussed in the academic community, the activity of leading think tanks in China and the U.S. had yet to be systematically studied. Therefore, this study selects the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), the Brookings Institution, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) as research subjects. It collects, sorts, and analyzes their public online comments from 2000 to 2024, and attempts to explore the decision-making preferences of these leading think tanks.
This study finds that although think tanks on both sides diverge in their views of “supply chain” and “accusation”, they show common concerns over issues represented by the keyphrases “engagement” and “equality and governance”. We deduce from this that the geo-technological competition between China and the United States will be long term.
The academic contributions of this study are: (1) collating the views of leading think tanks in China and the United States from 2000 onwards; and (2) analyzing the decision-making preferences of Chinese and American think tanks and predicting trends for future activity on both sides. It is hoped that the content of this study is a useful addition to existing literature on the future trajectory of and coping strategies resulting from this geo-technological competition.
Why It Matters
This study selects the ITIF, the Brookings Institution, and CASS as its research subjects. By examining their public commentary from 2000 to 2024, it finds that Chinese and American think tanks exhibit competitive postures in areas such as “supply chains” and “accusations”, while sharing overlapping concerns in “engagement" and “equality and governance”. The findings suggest that geo-technological competition between China and the United States is likely to be long-term and structural.
Theoretically, this research constructs a corpus of viewpoints from leading Chinese and American think tanks from the early 21st century to the present day, offering a new lens through which to analyze China-U.S. policy preferences. Its methodological framework is also applicable to the study of how other countries or regions respond to geo-technological rivalry.
Practically, the study provides policy insights for China, the United States, and the global community in addressing geo-technological competition. Against the backdrop of the China-U.S. tariff war, it helps clarify U.S. strategic intentions and offers reference points for China’s policy responses, such as expanding openness, deepening market-oriented reforms, strengthening international cooperation, promoting indigenous innovation, and improving the innovation ecosystem. These measures are vital for China to take the initiative in navigating complex geo-technological dynamics and to contribute to the stability and sustainability of global industrial chains.
Key Points
Research Question and Subjects
Previous studies lack a systematic examination of the path of China-U.S. geo-technological competition since China began to participate deeply in globalization following its accession to the WTO in 2001. Therefore, this study seeks to analyze public comments from major think tanks in both China and the U.S. to uncover the dynamics of the geopolitical technological competition between the two nations. This study examines the evolution of China–U.S. relations from cooperation to competition in the context of geo-technological rivalry, using the administrations of George W. Bush (2001–2009), Barack Obama (2009–2017), Donald Trump (2017–2021), and Joe Biden (2021–2025) as key temporal benchmarks.
Specifically, this study collects, organizes, and analyzes public statements made by key figures from leading Chinese and American think tanks since the beginning of the 21st century. It constructs a corpus of views centered on China-U.S. geo-technological competition, identifies the policy preferences articulated at different points in time, and thereby provides intellectual support to professionals in policy research, academic inquiry, and industrial development in China. With the arrival of Donald Trump’s second presidential term (2025–2029), this research is all the more timely and forward-looking.
Methodology
A Three-Step Approach to Targeting Research Subjects and Collecting Data
The first step was the selection of research subjects. Think tanks representing decision-making trends and authoritative institutions in the social sciences were chosen. The ITIF, Brookings, and CASS were selected as representatives of the U.S. and China in the context of geopolitical technological competition.
The second step was the identification of data sources from the selected think tanks. For the U.S., the study utilizes 169 public comments made by Dr. Robert Atkinson (ITIF president, 2006–2024) and relevant remarks from senior Brookings researchers (2000–2024). For China, comments from senior CASS experts (2008–2024) are used.
The third step was setting the rules for data collection, then retrieving and filtering the data. Keyphrases like “China and technology” and “U.S. and technology” were used to retrieve relevant comments. The time frame spans four U.S. administrations (2001–2024), extracting key insights into China-U.S. geopolitical technological competition.
Setting Keyphrases for the China-U.S. Geopolitical Technology Competition
Drawing on significant academic articles selected and filtered by the authors, the study identified six keyphrases: “supply chain” (31.25% of the total amount of articles), “collaboration and containment” (21.88%), “nationalism” (17.19%), “allies” (14.06%), “equality and governance” (9.38%), and “infrastructure collaboration” (6.25%).
Specifically, the term “supply chain” primarily covers information technology, military technology, and critical minerals. “Collaboration and containment” refers to the U.S. adopting a “carrot-and-stick” approach, selectively engaging with China while maintaining competition. “Equality and governance” addresses issues related to social fairness or global governance. The term “allies” refers to the U.S. building an alliance network to jointly compete with it against China or expand common markets. “Nationalism” mainly refers to the U.S. using technology, legal frameworks, and alliances to suppress Chinese companies and weaken China’s influence. “Infrastructure collaboration” involves cooperation among different actors to enhance infrastructure security and stability, promoting regional development.
Comparison and Analysis
Academic perspectives on “cooperation” align with think tank views on “engagement”, but most viewpoints are not entirely the same. U.S. think tanks focus more on “accusations” and “engagement”, while “infrastructure collaboration” is more common in academic discourse due to its systemic, complex, and long-term nature, attracting more academic attention.
U.S. Think Tank Perspectives
ITIF and Brookings share some common views on strengthening key supply chains, accusations against trade or politics, building alliances, and implementing cooperation strategies, but differ significantly in others:
ITIF prefers the discourse on nationalism and great power competition. It focuses heavily on censuring China for its supply chains, which remain a top priority. The keyphrases “supply chain” and “accusation” rank consistently high, although their combined share is declining. Meanwhile, the focus on “nationalism” and “engagement” has risen, particularly during the Biden administration, reaching 20.00% and 16.36%, respectively.
In the meantime, the Brookings focuses on engagement with China. It consistently prioritizes engagement with China, with “engagement”, “supply chain” and “equality and governance” comprising the top three keyphrases. However, their share decreased during Biden’s administration. “Engagement” dropped from 35.29% in the Bush and Obama years to 28.00% in Trump’s first term and 28.23% under Biden, but remained the dominant keyphrase.
In reality, there exists no difference between the basic stances of these two think tanks. However, they have adopted different approaches and strategic preferences for the U.S. in its competition with China.
Chinese Think Tank Perspectives
At CASS, “equality and governance” and “supply chain” have been central themes, reflecting China’s decision-making concerns. During Biden’s term, the share of “equality and governance” decreased, but it still remained the top keyphrase, while “supply chain” rose to 40.45%. Censure of U.S. protectionism or unilateralism decreased significantly from 26.53% under Trump to 7.87% under Biden. The proportion of discussions advocating engagement with the U.S. also showed little change.
Similarities and Differences in Perspectives Between U.S. and Chinese Think Tanks
CASS and Brookings share similar viewpoints on some issues. Both CASS and Brookings prioritize “engagement” and “equality and governance”. CASS advocates for multilateralism, global governance, and cooperation, focusing on issues such as the digital and AI divide, privacy protection, climate change, and financial and cyber regulation. Brookings shares these concerns, particularly around antitrust issues, reflecting its emphasis on fair competition and global governance.
However, CASS and ITIF exhibit opposing stances. ITIF accuses many countries, including China, of trade protectionism, arguing that this harms U.S. international trade. ITIF calls for strengthening U.S. supply chains through tax incentives, building tech centers, and expanding sources of raw materials. CASS, in contrast, condemns U.S. protectionism and unilateralism, emphasizing the stability of Chinese and global supply chains, international cooperation, technology, talent cultivation, and innovation.
In all, while CASS and Brookings share common views on “supply chain”, “equality and governance” and “engagement”, Brookings has increasingly focused on making “accusations” against China. As China-U.S. geopolitical technological competition intensifies, Brookings’ criticisms of China are expected to rise.
Discussion and Suggestions
Predictions about U.S. Actions: Limited Engagement and Effective Strike
Trade-driven “engagement” will persist, though U.S. containment strategies and trade imbalances will diminish trade’s stabilizing role between the countries, as will differing industrial structures and supply chain dynamics.
Aside from this, the U.S. will continue to reduce reliance on Chinese supply chains, using strategies like expanding the Entity List and promoting a “Trade NATO” to disrupt China’s tech sectors and preserve U.S. dominance in key fields.
Suggestions for China’s Response: Expanding Openness and Fostering Innovation
China should deepen market reforms, facilitating talent, capital, and tech flows, and expand international cooperation, particularly in renewable energy and materials. It should enhance infrastructure and cultural exchanges to strengthen global connectivity.
Further, China should promote domestic tech innovation, focus on regional clusters like the Greater Bay Area, and improve national governance of global challenges like climate change and AI, creating opportunities for cooperation with the U.S. and other global stakeholders.
Conclusion
This paper analyzes the positions of ITIF, Brookings, and CASS in the geopolitical technological competition, highlighting the complex dynamics between China and the U.S. in both cooperation and competition. It finds that while both sides contradict one another on issues like “supply chain” and “accusation”, they share common concerns regarding “engagement” and “equality and governance”. In response to the growing complexity of China-U.S. geopolitical technological competition, China should expand openness by advancing market reforms, leveraging its advantages to enhance bilateral cooperation, and strengthening initiatives like the Belt and Road and cultural exchanges. Additionally, China should focus on innovation, enhance research and development, improve governance capacity, and invest in regional innovation clusters. It is crucial to explore and expand mutual interests through pilot projects and manage competition or disputes effectively, ensuring a mutually beneficial and sustainable global development.
About the Authors
CHEN Xi 陈溪：Distinguished professor at Zhejiang International Studies University, the Director of the Institute for Urban Internationalization. He previously served as the Director of the Beijing Smart City Planning and Design Institute, supporting the Beijing municipal government in formulating smart city policies, standards, and evaluation systems. He has contributed dozens of commentaries and articles to global think tanks, including the G20 Think Tank Summit (T20).
ShAO Guangyan 邵广妍：Student at the School of English Studies at Zhejiang International Studies University.
HU Jiayu 胡珈毓：Student at the School of Foreign Studies at Nankai University.
ZHU Xufeng 朱旭峰: Professor and Dean at the School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University (SPPM) and Executive Director of the Institute for Sustainable Development Goals, Tsinghua University (TUSDG), Director of the Science & Technology Development and Governance Center, Tsinghua University (TUSTDG), Editor-in-Chief of China Public Administration Review, and Director of the Think Tank Research Center of the SPPM. Dr. ZHU earned his bachelor’s degree in environmental engineering and doctorate in public management from Tsinghua University in 2000 and 2005. He was previously a Professor at the Zhou Enlai School of Government, Nankai University. His research interests include public policy theory, science & technology policy, environment and climate policy, and public governance in transitional China.
WANG Dong 王栋：Full Professor with tenure at the School of International Studies, Peking University. He holds a joint professorship appointment at the Institute for Global Health and Development, Peking University. Prof. Wang also serves as Deputy Director of the Office for Humanities and Social Sciences and Executive Director of the Institute for Global Cooperation and understanding (IGCU), both at Peking University. He also serves as a standing council member of the Chinese Association of American Studies, and member of both the Steering Committee of the East Asia Security Forum, and the Chinese Overseas Educated Scholars Association, among other advisory posts.
About the Publication
Bulletin of Chinese Academy of Sciences (Chinese Version)《中国科学院院刊》 is supervised and sponsored by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and distributed worldwide. Bulletin of Chinese Academy of Sciences (BCAS) is a think tank journal that focuses on strategy and decision-making research. Designated as the “core publication among national science think tanks”, BCAS is the key media platform for the leading national think ‘The Chinese Academy of Sciences’. BCAS mainly publishes research reports authored by academics from the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Chinese Academy of Engineering, as well as scientists working on major strategic issues related to China’s scientific, technological, economic and social development. It reviews the development of and trends in important frontiers and interdisciplinary research. With the authors’ rich scientific knowledge and sense of social responsibility, BCAS is designated to provide scientific support for national macro-strategic decision-making, and to disseminate scientific thinking and the scientific spirit to society broadly and effectively.
