The U.S. Strategic Community’s Debate on Liberal International Order and Its Policy Orientation by RUAN Jianping and QIN Zining
A potential return to a more nationalist and transactional foreign policy will further increase the urgency and likelihood of forging a new global order.
Welcome to the 34th edition of our weekly newsletter! I’m SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies and a visiting scholar at the Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School (fall 2024).
ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.
Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com
Today, we have selected an article written by RUAN Jianping & QIN Zining, which focuses on the debate on Liberal International Order within the US strategic community.
Summary
The contemporary international landscape, characterized by a shifting global power distribution and internal strife within Western democracies, has ignited a vigorous debate within the U.S. strategic community concerning the Liberal International Order (LIO). Realist scholars contend that LIO is an artifact of American hegemony, and its current predicament is due to the evolving global power balance. This perspective advocates for an American foreign policy agenda explicitly grounded in power maximization, achieved by making adjustments to the international system and geopolitical structures to accommodate emerging power dynamics. This may result in a return to the Cold War-era realist strategies, such as the expansion of alliances to contain adversaries.
Conversely, liberal internationalists argue that LIO is founded upon liberal values and a network of international institutions. They identify two primary threats to this order: the rise of revisionist powers on the world stage and the ascendance of populist forces within Western democracies. To address these challenges, liberals advocate for the reinvigoration of democratic norms within the liberal states and the fortification of alliances among democracies to counter external threats. Despite these contrasting perspectives, both realist and liberal factions within the U.S. strategic community converge on a policy orientation that prioritizes the maintenance of U.S. primacy. This includes a renewed emphasis on great power competition, the re-emergence of bloc politics, and the strengthening of the domestic economy.
The prevailing discourse within the U.S. strategic community reflects a diminishing commitment to the liberal internationalist project. A potential return to a more nationalist and transactional foreign policy, exemplified by the second Trump presidency, would likely accelerate this trend, further eroding the open and cooperative nature of the global order and exacerbating the struggle between unipolarity and multipolarity. However, this could well increase the urgency and likelihood of forging a new global order through international cooperation.
Why It Matters
Before the 1940s, the U.S. generally opposed significant involvement in international affairs beyond the Western world. After 1945, the “Liberal International Order” (LIO) led by the U.S. emerged as a loose array of multilateral institutions, providing aid to allies and deploying American military forces abroad. However, some have argued that the costs of maintaining this order outweigh its benefits. In 2017, Joseph S. Nye Jr. published an article titled “Will the Liberal Order Survive?” in Foreign Affairs, expressing concerns that the LIO was facing its greatest challenges in generations. Soon after, leading American think tanks such as the Rand Corporation and the Brookings Institution also released research on the future of the LIO, drawing significant attention from the U.S. strategic community.
Trump’s second-term “America First” policy, characterized by protectionism and predation, has further intensified the challenges facing the LIO. In February, Vice President J.D. Vance delivered a speech at the Munich Security Conference, which shocked European leaders. From the America First Trade Policy (AFTP) and the imposition of tariffs on allies to a unilateral approach to the Gaza issue, the Trump administration is increasingly distancing itself from the multilateral order.
The influence of strategic debates on US policy decisions is considerable, and China has faced mounting pressure from the United States. Therefore, a thorough understanding of recent American discussions on the Liberal International Order is essential for fully grasping the trajectory and underlying logic of U.S. strategy, and may also serve as a reference for China’s policy decisions.
Key Points
The LIO established by the U.S. and other Western countries has a complex and contradictory relationship with the UN-centered international order based on the UN Charter and international law. LIO promoted globally by the U.S. after the end of the Cold War is relatively open economically and overlaps to some extent with the UN-centered order. However, in terms of politics and security, it is more exclusive. As John Mearsheimer mentioned, it essentially represents a “liberal hegemonic order”. Accordingly, the LIO aims to ensure absolute security for the West and preserve U.S. global dominance, using Western ideologies to marginalize and exclude other countries.
1. The U.S. Strategic Community’s Perception of LIO has Gone Through a Process of Affirmation, Reflection, and Readjustment.
● Period of Confidence and Affirmation (1992–2015):
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. strategic community reached an unprecedented level of confidence in liberalism. The U.S. strongly advocated the global expansion of the Western liberal order, which it had played a leading role in shaping during the Cold War. Most strategists believed that the LIO would become the future global order and that the U.S. should actively promote liberalism worldwide. This gave rise to a wave of “new interventionism”.
● Period of Growing Doubt and Reflection (2016–2019):
Following Brexit and Donald Trump’s election in 2016, prominent scholars such as Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Graham Allison began to question the LIO, sparking the first round of debates on LIO within the U.S. strategic community. Patrick Porter sided with Graham Allison, pointing out that the so-called LIO is historically inaccurate and inherently contradictory. Their opinions were opposed by other scholars. During this period, most strategists began to recognize that the LIO was facing crises, but they still viewed the challenges as temporary setbacks caused by populism, rather than fundamental threats to the U.S.-led order.
● Period of Reevaluation and Adjustment (2020–present):
Debates on the LIO surged again in 2020 and have continued since. The Trump administration’s unilateral policies, the global disruptions caused by the pandemic and the Capitol attack on January 6 raised concerns about both the international and domestic foundations of the U.S.-led LIO. Some scholars called for reinforcing American democracy to preserve the LIO, while others argued for reforming and adjusting the LIO itself.
2. The Division between Liberals and Realists over the LIO Centers on Three Key Issues: Its Nature, Its Sources of Crisis, and Its Future.
● The Nature of the LIO: Maintaining U.S. Dominance
Liberals view the LIO as a normative international institutional arrangement designed to spread liberal values and expand the democratic camp. Realists argue that normative ideals were never the primary motivation for the U.S., instead, it pursued this order from a realist perspective to maintain its dominance. In their view, U.S. interventionist policies were not aimed at spreading liberal values, but rather at maintaining dominance by suppressing regional competitors under the pretext of promoting liberal values.
● LIO’s Crises Result from the Shifting Global Power Dynamics
Liberals view the crises faced by the LIO as a result of the erosion of liberal norms and consensus—internally due to the weakening of shared liberal values, and externally due to the rise of revisionist powers. Realists, on the other hand, see it as stemming from shifts in the global balance of power. They argue that U.S. overreach and China’s rapid rise have weakened U.S. dominance and undermined the foundations of LIO.
● The Future of the LIO Depends on the Outcome of Strategic Rivalry with China:
Liberals believe that the order now faces a new ideological rivalry similar to the Cold War. They call for a revitalization of liberal ideology to compete with authoritarian expansion abroad and populism at home. Realists believe the future of the order depends on whether the U.S. can maintain or even expand its advantage in the strategic rivalry with China. Only by doing so can the LIO survive.
3. Liberal and Realist Responses to the Crisis of the LIO: Emphasizing Great Power Competition, Bloc Politics, and Economic Revitalization
● A Renewed Emphasis on Great Power Competition:
Liberals argue that the U.S. should engage in ideological and strategic competition with revisionist powers to safeguard liberal leadership. Realists argue that the U.S. must compete with rising powers like China to maintain its relative advantage. As a result, both liberals and realists see renewed great power competition as essential to preserving the LIO.
● A Re-emergence of Bloc Politics:
Liberals advocate for rebuilding alliances among liberal democracies. This means strengthening transatlantic ties in Europe and enhancing security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. Realists, from a geopolitical perspective, emphasize rediscovering the ideological flexibility and rebuilding relations with traditional non-Western allies. Despite their differing reasoning, both advocate a return to the bloc politics of the Cold War era.
● Revival of the Domestic Society:
Liberals call for economic revitalization, suppressing technological competitors, advancing innovation, and promoting reindustrialization. Realists emphasize strategic retrenchment, refocusing on national interest, shifting military resources to the Indo-Pacific, implementing protectionist trade policies, and reviving domestic economic strength. Both perspectives agree that the stability of the LIO hinges on America's domestic strength, unity, and resilience.
4. Trump’s Return will Further Undermine the LIO
Trump’s return has incontrovertibly impacted the international order, primarily through his protectionist, isolationist, and unilateralist policies. His “America First” policies also pose greater challenges for developing countries in their efforts to establish a new international order that is peaceful, stable, fair, and equitable. Therefore, the mainstream view in the U.S. strategic community is that such developments not only violate the normative values of the LIO, but also threaten the foundations of U.S. power, including its alliance systems.
Whether viewed as a so-called “revisionist” by the US or as a country increasingly integrated into the global system, China will face growing pressures. As a responsible major power in the international community, China should firmly safeguard global peace and stability, oppose closed and confrontational bloc politics, and put mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation into practice. This approach not only serves the interests of China and other Global South countries, but also aligns with the interests of the vast majority of nations and international organizations, including U.S. allies such as the EU, and ultimately benefits the U.S. in the long run.
Conclusion
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. strategic community’s perception of the Liberal International Order has evolved from affirmation to reflection and ultimately to readjustment. Realists and liberal internationalists differ in their understanding of the Order’s nature, the root causes of its crisis, and its future trajectory. However, both tend to support the policy orientations of restarting great power competition, restoring bloc politics, and improving domestic economics. Under these circumstances, China should work together with other countries in the Global South to firmly uphold the UN-centered international system and an international order based on international law, safeguard multilateralism, and promote open and inclusive development.
About the Author
RUAN Jianping阮建平: Professor and Vice Dean of the School of Political Science & Public Administration at Wuhan University. His research mainly focus on US foreign strategy, international political economy and polar ocean issues.
QIN Zining秦子宁: Ph.D. candidate at the China Institute of Boundary and Ocean Studies, Wuhan University.
About the Publication
The Chinese version of this article was published in International Forum（《国际论坛》）. The journal, founded in 1999 by Beijing Foreign Studies University and supervised by the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, is one of the most comprehensive academic journals specializing in international issues research. In December 2014, the journal became one of the first academic journals recognized by the former State Administration of Film, Radio and Television (SARFT).
