The Limits of Wooing: Why Washington’s India Strategy Keeps Falling Short

Trump 2.0 and the Return of Competitive-Cooperative Relations Between India and the U.S. by Xie Chao

Welcome to the 56th edition of our weekly newsletter! I’m SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies and a visiting scholar at the Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School (fall 2024).

ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by Xie Chao, which focuses on the return of competitive-cooperative relations Between India and the U.S. under Trump’s second administration.

Edited by ZHANG Xueyu, ChinAffairs+.

Summary

During Trump’s first term, U.S. policy towards India in some issue areas demonstrated a unilateral courtship approach, which was inherited and expanded by the Biden administration into various policy practices. However, this strategy failed to yield the anticipated results. Instead, it prompted the Modi government to adopt radical pragmatism in its U.S. policy, which is manifested through three dimensions: countering American alliance demands with the “Non-Alignment 2.0 Strategy”, maintaining strategic flexibility between China and the U.S. to pursue opportunistic diplomacy, and resisting Washington’s pressure through ultra-independent diplomatic rhetoric.

As Trump enters his second term, persistent structural tensions in U.S.-India relations have worsened rather than eased. Three issues stand out: unresolved tariff disputes, conflicts over immigration policy, and deepening ideological divergences. Modi’s visit to the U.S. in February 2025 resulted in multiple agreements, however, three enduring challenges will reshape bilateral dynamics: India’s unfulfilled commitments to the U.S., Trump’s inability to curb Indo-Russian defense cooperation and India’s increasing use of strategic elasticity in the Sino-American rivalry. These factors indicate that U.S.-India relations are transitioning from unilateral courtship back to a competitive-cooperative trajectory.

Why It Matters

In early August 2025, President Trump imposed an additional 25% “reciprocal” tariff on Indian goods—bringing total duties in some cases to as high as 50%—citing India’s ongoing purchases of Russian oil. This sharp escalation represents the most severe trade escalation in decades between the two countries, directly challenging the rhetoric of strategic partnership.

This matters globally because U.S.–India ties are increasingly a hinge of Indo-Pacific geopolitics. Washington’s courtship, which brings U.S. naval repair work to Indian shipyards, is symbolized by defense logistics and maintenance deals. These regimes aim to translate shared concerns about China into practical security cooperation. Yet the relationship must now absorb tariff escalation, persistent trade-barrier complaints, and unresolved political irritants such as the 2024 U.S. Justice Department case alleging an India-linked plot against a Sikh activist in New York. Each pulls the partnership back toward a competitive-cooperative equilibrium rather than a formal alliance.

A Chinese perspective is indispensable here. Much of Washington’s rationale for courting India is explicitly about shaping Beijing’s strategic calculus; conversely, any Indian recalibration—on tariffs, Russia ties, or Quad priorities—reverberates through China’s regional environment and supply-chain geography. Beijing’s analysts will therefore read U.S.–India frictions not as bilateral noise but as signals about the durability of a balancing coalition—and about opportunities for de-escalation or wedge-driving diplomacy.

Two caveats must be made when recommending this article. First, its “unilateral U.S. wooing” frame underplays the congressional, legal, and commercial constraints now visible in the tariff wave and in USTR’s formal catalog of Indian barriers to trade; these limit how far Washington can “exempt” India for strategic reasons. Second, the piece may overstate India’s room for perpetual “multi-alignment”: episodes like the Sikh plot case, plus episodic U.S. pressure on market access, show how non-China issues can cap strategic intimacy. Readers should pay attention to whether trade talks meaningfully reduce barriers—or whether tariffs harden into the new baseline.

Key Points

U.S. Unilateral Courtship of India under Trump 1.0 and Biden

Since Trump’s first term, U.S. policy toward India has evolved from unilateral strategic support to increasingly institutionalized defense cooperation. Following Trump’s elevation of India’s role within the “Indo-Pacific Strategy,” Biden intensified these efforts, offering exemptions on contentious issues and downplaying human rights concerns to secure India’s partnership against China. This trajectory reveals both deepening defense collaboration and the asymmetry of expectations within the relationship.

• Trump’s Indo-Pacific Opening

Trump identified India as central to balancing power in Asia. The 2017 National Security Strategy explicitly welcomed India as a “leading global power” and prioritized collaboration in defense technology. India was granted “Major Defense Partner” status and later received “Strategic Trade Authorization,” enabling access to sensitive U.S. technologies once reserved for NATO allies. Key defense agreements such as the 2018 Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement and the 2020 Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement created frameworks for logistics sharing and intelligence exchange, institutionalizing a new phase in military cooperation.

• Biden’s Continuity and Expansion

Biden preserved the trajectory initiated by Trump but accelerated it. He elevated the Quad from working-level talks to leader summits, beginning with the 2021 virtual meeting. U.S.–India defense ties broadened through initiatives such as the U.S.–India Defense Acceleration Ecosystem, cooperation in artificial intelligence, and expanded arms trade. The 2023 Ship Repair Agreement allowed U.S. vessels maintenance access in Indian shipyards, while the 2024 Supply Security Arrangement and Liaison Officer Memorandum of Understanding granted India deeper integration with U.S. command structures. These steps effectively positioned India as a critical logistical and military partner in the Indo-Pacific.

• Strategic Concessions to India

The approach under the Biden administration was defined by unilateral tolerance. India’s refusal to align with the West over the Russia–Ukraine war did not trigger sanctions; instead, Washington reaffirmed India’s special status. On human rights, U.S. criticism of Modi’s domestic policies remained muted despite concerns over nationalism and minority rights. Even after U.S. accusations of Indian involvement in the Pannun assassination plot, Washington quickly restored high-level cooperation, underscoring India’s indispensability to U.S. regional strategy.

India’s United States Policy: A Turn to Radical Pragmatism

From Trump’s first term to Biden’s presidency, U.S. unilateral courtship of India advanced cooperation but failed to produce an alliance. Instead, Modi’s government confirmed the nation’s strategic autonomy, pursuing a pragmatic and nationalist diplomacy that leveraged U.S. overtures without binding commitments.

• Unmet Expectations of the U.S.’s Strategy

Washington tolerated India’s continued engagement with BRICS and the SCO, muted criticism of Modi’s human-rights record, and even invited New Delhi to NATO+. Yet, India refused to align with the U.S., sustaining ties with Russia and rejecting alliance proposals. U.S. gestures did not yield strategic reciprocity. Rather, India solidified its bargaining advantage. Scholars like Ashley Tellis now concede that India treats security cooperation as capacity-building rather than as a pledge to back the United States in crises, while commentators highlight a fundamental divergence in strategic vision.

• Non-Alignment 2.0 and the Quad

Since Trump’s first sterm, Washington has sought to enlist India in counterbalancing China. But Modi reiterated in 2023 that India would not join formal alliances, framing relations strictly in terms of national interest. This approach constrained U.S. hopes of militarizing the Quad, which India redirected toward areas of ‘low-politics’ such as vaccines, infrastructure, and supply-chain resilience. Analysts increasingly argue that U.S.–India relations have reached a ceiling under the current strategy of unilateral inducements.

• Hedging with China

Amid U.S. domestic uncertainty, India moved to ease tensions with Beijing. Talks advanced on the Ladakh border, while economic debates highlighted losses from disrupted ties: between 2019 and 2024, over 100,000 jobs and $15 billion in output were lost in electronics manufacturing owing to tensions between the two states. Senior officials began advocating for supply-chain reintegration and relaxed investment restrictions, with Finance Minister Sitharaman and the Chief Economic Adviser openly supporting Chinese investment in 2024. By early 2025, Modi was framing Sino-Indian competition as “healthy,” signaling cautious normalization.

• Strategic Autonomy as Doctrine

India’s growing power and nationalist politics underpin an assertive independence. Public opinion strongly favors great-power recognition, while Hindu nationalist narratives reinforce sovereignty-centered diplomacy. New Delhi continues to participate in BRICS and the SCO, selectively engages in U.S.-led initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, and emphasizes primacy in the Indian Ocean. For Washington, this underscores the limits of values-driven appeals: India will cooperate where interests align, but resist commitments that constrain its autonomy.

Three Major Challenges for U.S.–India Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era

Trump’s return to the White House in 2024 promises to reshape U.S.–India relations. Despite years of strategic courtship, enduring frictions over trade, immigration, and ideology remain unresolved. These structural tensions now loom large as both leaders seek to balance pragmatism with nationalist agendas.

• Trade and Tariff Battles

Economic disputes stand at the forefront of U.S.-India tensions. India’s protectionist policies, with average tariffs rising from 13 percent in 2014 to 18.1 percent in 2022, continue to frustrate U.S. firms. The imbalance is evident: in FY2023–24 India posted a $36.7 billion surplus with the United States. During his campaign, Trump branded India the “king of tariffs” and pledged retaliation. Once reelected, he pressed Modi to reduce duties and expand U.S. imports. Modi responded by cutting tariffs on motorcycles, luxury cars, and electronics, while pledging greater arms purchases and cooperation on deporting undocumented migrants. Yet frictions deepened: Trump imposed 25 percent duties on steel and aluminum and introduced “reciprocal tariffs,” directly challenging India’s trade model and casting doubt on future economic alignment.

• Immigration Frictions

Immigration is another fault line. Indians dominate the H-1B system, accounting for over 70 percent of approvals and becoming the second-largest source of U.S. naturalized citizens by 2024. While this reflects India’s integration into U.S. labor markets, critics argue it fosters “job displacement” and insular networks in Silicon Valley. Conservative voices—from senators to activists—have targeted Indian migration as a threat to American workers. Trump’s hardline stance could mean reduced visa quotas, deportations, and greater scrutiny of Indian immigrants, sparking tense bilateral negotiations.

• Ideological Ambiguities

Ideology complicates the picture. Under Biden, Washington muted human-rights concerns to sustain alignment, but clashes over Kashmir and minority rights persisted. With Trump, ideological overlaps between Hindu nationalism and American conservatism could temper disputes. Both sides have explored dialogue: Indian thinkers have addressed U.S. conservative conferences, framing Hindu nationalism as a cultural counterpart to Western conservatism. Yet skepticism endures, particularly from evangelical groups wary of restrictions on Christian missions in India. Thus, while Trump may bring greater rhetorical affinity, deep-seated tensions over religion and values remain unresolved.

Prospects for U.S.–India Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era

Modi’s February 2025 visit yielded an ambitious “U.S.–India 21st-Century Accord,” yet the relationship is poised to shift from unilateral U.S. courting to renewed competition-cum-cooperation as trade frictions, Russia ties, and great-power hedging reassert themselves.

• From Courtship to Conditionality: Trade as the Stress Test

Received as a priority partner in February, India pledged to deepen economic links (aiming for $500 billion in U.S.-China trade by 2030), expand U.S. oil and gas purchases, and strengthen defense cooperation—while emphasizing co-development, co-production, and technology transfer. Trump, however, doubled down on reciprocity: calling India “the highest-tariff country,” announcing 25% tariffs on steel and aluminum, and signing a “reciprocal tariffs” memo, later formalized by an April 2 order before a 90-day pause for talks. With FDI inflows at a 12-year low and an inter-industry split (e.g., textiles favor zero tariffs; steel/aluminum warn of $5 billion export risk), New Delhi signaled concessions: cuts on motorcycles, luxury cars, phone parts; cooperation on deportations and larger U.S. arms buys. Yet USTR’s 2025 barriers report placed India on a “priority watch list,” underscoring that implementation will be politically fraught—especially on agriculture—despite Delhi’s push to open bilateral trade talks.

• Defense Cooperation Meets Russia Reality

While Washington seeks rapid increases in big-ticket sales (e.g., F-35), India resists dependence and sustains diversified sourcing. Modi’s July 2024 Moscow visit marked 75 years of ties and advanced trade in discounted oil, nuclear cooperation, frigate deliveries, and a $4 billion long-range radar deal (Dec 2024). Indian debate casts U.S. offers as costly and technologically dated, and rejects ceding market primacy; Delhi will bargain hard with U.S. firms, cap overall purchases, and deepen Russian and European channels to preserve autonomy.

• Hedging in a Fluid U.S.–China Triangle

Trump’s tariff shock (lighter on China than promised) and mooted early Beijing outreach narrowed India’s hedging room. Indian analysts warn that a U.S.–China détente could dilute India’s leverage; thus Delhi seeks maximum policy elasticity—reassessing “China+1,” urging an independent China economic policy, and diversifying beyond “America First” exposure—while still competing to capture China’s trade share.

Conclusion

India’s foreign policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi reflects a blend of ideological ambition and pragmatic calculation, producing a posture of extreme independence. This has translated into only limited support for Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy and reinforced New Delhi’s reputation as the world’s most prominent “swing state.” The underlying logic is clear: India believes it is uniquely positioned to tilt the balance in U.S.–China competition. Which way and when it leans could shape not only Asia’s strategic environment but also the global distribution of power.

Yet India’s strategy of maneuvering between great powers is running into limits. Modi’s visit to Moscow during the Ukraine war provoked Western pushback, while his subsequent trip to Kyiv raised Russian concerns. Aligning with the U.S. and Europe on the Israel–Palestine conflict left India more isolated within the Global South. Tensions with China over the Quad contrast with India’s cautious cooperation in BRICS, which nonetheless alarms Washington.

Looking ahead, a second Trump term will sharpen disputes over tariffs, immigration, and ideology, pushing U.S.–India ties back toward a competitive–cooperative track. India’s challenge is to manage these pressures, stabilize ties with Beijing, and avoid sliding from “multi-alignment” to strategic overreach.

About the Author

Dr. XIE Chao is Associate Professor at the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University and Associate Editor-in-Chief of the Quarterly Journal of International Politics. He serves as Fellow of the Shanghai Pujiang Program (2022-2025). He earned his PhD in International Relations from Tsinghua University in 2018. He served as a Bangalore Fellow (The Takshashila Institution, 2019), a Raisina Young Fellow (Observer Research Foundation, 2020) and a Kautilya Fellow (India Foundation, 2020). He was an Assistant Professor at the Institute for International and Area Studies, Tsinghua University from 2018 to 2021 and a visiting faculty scholar at the Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University for two years (2018-2020). He also held visiting scholar positions at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University in 2014 and 2015, and at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford from 2013 to 2014. He has published one monograph and one edited book. His current research touch upon India’s political system, party politics and foreign policy. His broader research interests also include major power relations and international relations theories.

About the Publication

The Chinese version of the article was published by Journal of International Relations (《国际关系研究》). Journal of International Relations is a comprehensive bimonthly academic journal sponsored by the Institute of International Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, and was formally launched in 2013. The journal focuses on major theoretical and practical issues concerning the transformation of the contemporary international system and China’s path of peaceful development. It publishes research characterized by theoretical innovation, strategic foresight, policy analysis, and academic trend analysis. The journal aims to encourage scholarly discussion and intellectual exchange, to promote in-depth research on international relations theory, foreign policy, the history of political thought abroad, and global and regional conflict areas, thereby enriching the theoretical development of disciplines such as international relations, strategic studies, and diplomacy.

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