The European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Strategy and the Prospects for China–EU Cooperation in AI Governance by LU Chuanying
As China and the EU mark the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations, it is all the more essential for both sides to uphold the principle of mutual benefit and cooperation.
Welcome to the 41st edition of our weekly newsletter! I’m SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies and a visiting scholar at the Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School (fall 2024).
ChinAffairsplus is a weekly newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.
Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com
Today, we have selected an article written by LU Chuanying, which focuses on The EU’s Artificial Intelligence strategy and China-EU Cooperation in AI Governance.
Summary
Since the European Commission released its policy document Artificial Intelligence for Europe in 2018, the EU has gradually shaped an AI strategy centered on regulatory leadership, rule-setting, and technological sovereignty. However, the EU’s “regulation-first” approach has encountered multiple constraints in practice, including a lack of military power to support the EU’s ambitions, the “securitization” tendency of AI governance, innovation-suppressing effects, structural weaknesses in the EU’s industrial ecosystem, and a strategic dilemma between pursuing autonomy and maintaining external dependencies through international cooperation.
Confronted with the reality of “strong regulation but weak competitiveness,” the EU is now seeking to recalibrate its AI strategy—aiming to preserve its leadership in governance while enhancing its capacity for technological innovation. China and the EU enjoy complementary strengths in AI research and development, share common interests in sustainable development, and hold broadly aligned positions on global governance. Both sides should deepen cooperation in areas such as institutional dialogue, standard-setting, and multilateral coordination, jointly promoting the establishment of an open, fair, and effective global AI governance system, and ensuring that AI technologies truly serve the well-being of humanity.
Why it Matters
As artificial intelligence rises to prominence and its transformative potential becomes increasingly evident, countries around the world are racing to formulate national AI development strategies. The goal is to gain a strategic edge in the newest wave of the technological revolution and to leverage emerging technologies to enhance economic growth, national defense, and overall national power. However, the shifting balance of national power brought about by emerging technologies—along with the risks inherent in AI itself—has raised widespread concern.
The three leading actors in global AI development, the United States, China, and the European Union have each adopted distinct approaches. The U.S., as a technological frontrunner, prioritizes innovation and leadership over safety, aiming to preserve its absolute advantage in AI. China, as a fast-moving latecomer, places emphasis on balancing safety with development and has made notable progress in both foundation models and semiconductor technologies. The EU, despite being a technological leader, finds itself caught in a dilemma between regulation and innovation, increasingly confronted with the reality of being over-regulated and under-competitive.
Against this backdrop, there is a growing strategic rationale for China–EU cooperation on AI. Both sides emphasize the principles of safety and responsibility in AI development, share complementary technological strengths, and uphold multilateralism in AI governance. These shared values and interests between China and the EU provide a strong foundation for future collaboration in building a more open, equitable, and effective global AI governance framework.
Key Points
1. The Core Pillars of the EU’s Artificial Intelligence Strategy: Norm Shaping, Leadership in Rule-Making, and Technological Sovereignty
In recent years, the EU has successively released key policy documents—including Artificial Intelligence for Europe, the White Paper on Artificial Intelligence, and the draft Artificial Intelligence Act—thereby progressively shaping its strategic vision for AI development and regulation. The EU’s AI strategy rests on three core pillars: norm shaping, leadership in rule-making, and technological sovereignty.
（1）Norm Shaping: A Value-Driven Regulatory Framework for AI
The EU seeks to guide AI applications through a value-oriented regulatory framework. The centerpiece of this effort is the Artificial Intelligence Act, which introduces a strict, risk-based classification model for AI regulation and aims to provide a comprehensive “EU paradigm” for global AI governance. As the world’s first comprehensive legal framework on AI, the Act establishes a full-cycle regulatory mechanism—from design to deployment—encompassing high-risk system assessments, transparency requirements, data governance, and compliance mechanisms. By providing a unified regulatory basis for all EU member states, the Act sets de facto entry standards for global AI companies seeking to access the European market.
（2）Leadership in Rule-Making: Exporting EU Values and Expanding Global Influence
The EU aspires to shape international AI governance by promoting its core values of trustworthiness and “human-centricity.” It actively advocates for the establishment of global ethical principles and governance frameworks for AI within multilateral platforms such as the United Nations, the OECD, the G7, and the G20. The EU has also expressed strong support for the UN Secretary-General’s proposal to create a global AI governance body. In addition, the EU seeks to extend its normative influence beyond that of the China and the U.S. by fostering digital cooperation with the Global South—including Africa and ASEAN—thus building a path toward a third approach to AI governance.
（3）Technological Sovereignty: Enhancing Strategic Autonomy in Digital Technologies
A central tenet of the EU’s strategy is the pursuit of technological sovereignty, aimed at reducing external dependencies and enhancing Europe’s digital autonomy. However, in comparison to China and the United States, the EU faces notable shortcomings in AI research and development as well as industrial innovation capacity. On one hand, Europe lacks AI innovation hubs comparable to Silicon Valley in the U.S. or Hangzhou and Shenzhen in China. On the other hand, its overall investment in AI remains significantly lower than that of China or the U.S., making it increasingly difficult for the EU to keep pace in the ongoing global AI race.
2. The EU’s AI Strategy and the Dilemma of Strategic Imbalance
Despite its visionary framework for artificial intelligence governance, multiple layers of imbalance will doubtless emerge during the implementation of the European Union’s AI strategy. These imbalances are, in essence, the manifestation of structural tensions between the EU’s model of governance and the inherent logic of technological innovation. From strategic orientation to institutional design, from technological development to market transformation, and from internal coordination to global rule-making, the EU’s AI strategy exposes deep-seated contradictions in its resource allocation and policymaking mechanisms—ultimately constraining the realization of its strategic goals.
（1）Lack of Military Support
The EU’s AI strategy lacks an integrated vision that incorporates military power, which reveals a structural weakness marked by strong normative ambitions but limited hard power. It fails to recognize AI as a core strategic resource that requires comprehensive planning and civil–military integration. As a result, the EU struggles to address the security challenges posed by AI as a strategic technology. Without robust support from military or intelligence infrastructures, the EU lacks both the authority to enforce its governance framework and the ability to shape global AI governance effectively.
（2）The Over-Securitization of AI Governance and The Suppression of Innovation
The EU places a heavy emphasis on safety and regulation in its AI strategy, reflecting a trend toward the “over-securitization” of technology governance—where political oversight dominates technological development while overlooking the structural power embedded in AI technologies themselves. For instance, the Artificial Intelligence Act constructs a complex system of risk management, data governance, and compliance, yet it fails to account for the uncertainty and rapid evolution of AI technologies, the laws governing which must therefore be ever evolving. Although theoretically reinforcing technological safety, the EU’s approach in practice tends to stifle innovation and hinder technological breakthroughs.
（3）Structural Weaknesses in the EU’s Industrial Ecosystem and Its Innovation Deficit
The EU’s traditional industrial strengths lie in sectors such as manufacturing and energy, but support for emerging industries like the internet and AI has lagged behind. This is partly due to the conservative nature of European capital markets, which are often risk-averse when it comes to high-tech investment, limiting access to large-scale financing for startups. Moreover, the dual-layered governance structure between the EU and its member states has further restricted the Union’s ability to formulate cohesive industrial policies and cultivate a dynamic innovation ecosystem.
（4）Strategic Autonomy vs. Practical Dependence
In the realm of international cooperation, the EU faces a fundamental mismatch between its pursuit of strategic autonomy and its practical dependence on the U.S. On one hand, the EU promotes the concept of “digital sovereignty” and seeks to exert leadership in global AI governance while avoiding overreliance on any major power. On the other hand, geopolitical and security considerations often lead the EU to align with U.S.-led “minilateral coalitions”, undermining its claims of autonomy. Similarly, in AI cooperation with China, the EU is frequently constrained by pressure from the United States, whose politicization and instrumentalization of technology have disrupted the open and collaborative global innovation environment.
3. Prospects for and Constraints faced by China–EU Cooperation in the Context of Strategic Shifts in AI Policy
（1）The Outlook for China–EU Cooperation: Technological R&D, Sustainable Development, and Global Governance
First, in terms of technological complementarity, China and the EU exhibit distinct comparative advantages. The EU has long maintained strong capabilities in basic research and foundational algorithms, having produced many leading scientists and breakthroughs in the AI field. However, it has struggled to translate this scientific strength into large-scale commercial applications and industrial competitiveness. In contrast, China stands out in AI engineering and scalable application, with technology firms demonstrating exceptional capacity to rapidly deploy and iterate AI models in real-world scenarios.
Second, regarding sustainable development, China and the EU share a high degree of interest alignment. Both the EU’s Green Deal and China’s innovation-driven development strategy require robust support from AI technologies. In fields such as healthcare, climate change, and energy transition, the two sides have broad common interests and overlapping policy priorities.
Third, in the realm of global AI governance, China and the EU hold similar positions in advocating multilateralism and opposing the unilateral instrumentalization of technology. While the United States tends to promote a “small yard, high fence” approach and export controls to shape the global tech ecosystem, China and the EU have both expressed support for an open, inclusive, and cooperative model of international technological governance.
（2）Key Challenges: Data Compliance, National Security, and Ethical Values
First, data privacy regulations present a significant challenge. The EU has established the world’s most stringent personal data protection framework, centered around the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which emphasizes user privacy and localized data storage. All AI products entering the European market must comply with GDPR and related regulations. The EU remains concerned about whether Chinese models—such as DeepSeek—will adhere to EU privacy standards and ensure that European data is not transferred abroad without authorization.
Second, national security considerations complicate cooperation. The EU’s AI policy toward China is often caught between its pursuit of “strategic autonomy” and its deep security reliance on the transatlantic alliance. This structural tension is particularly evident in areas such as standard-setting and corporate screening. In recent years, security reviews of Chinese tech firms have grown more stringent. European intelligence agencies and policymakers remain wary of potential security risks posed by Chinese companies, especially the perceived possibility of collaboration between Chinese firms and Chinese authorities.
Third, ethical norms and value systems pose another area of contention. European public discourse often cites China’s “social credit system” as a reason to question the ethical orientation of Chinese technologies and their compatibility with European values. The pilot projects of China’s social credit initiatives have been portrayed by some Western media outlets as symbols of “big data authoritarianism,” fueling public concerns in Europe about the potential use of AI technologies for social control. At the same time, European policymakers worry that if Chinese-developed foundation models fail to align with Western ethical preferences, they may challenge or undermine the EU’s established ethical standards.
4. Pathways for China–EU Cooperation in AI Governance
Given the substantial shared interests and structural complementarities between China and the European Union in the field of AI governance, the two sides have both a practical foundation and strategic imperative for building a deeper cooperative relationship.
（1）Establishing a High-Level China–EU AI Governance Dialogue Mechanism
China and the EU should explore the creation of an institutional platform for dialogue on digital policy and AI governance. A dedicated joint working group on AI governance could be established to enable candid exchanges on issues of mutual concern—such as data protection, algorithmic transparency, and AI compliance certification. In addition, both parties could promote multi-stakeholder engagement by encouraging interactions among legislators, regulatory bodies, industry leaders, and academic institutions, thereby forming a trilateral dialogue architecture that integrates policy, technology, and industry.
（2）Advancing the Alignment and Co-Development of AI Governance Standards
With the EU’s Artificial Intelligence Act recently enacted and China accelerating its regulatory frameworks on algorithmic security, cross-border data flows, and security assessments, there is significant space for technical standard cooperation. On one hand, standardization agencies and research institutions from both sides can be encouraged to engage in joint efforts on AI ethics guidelines, risk classification systems, and evaluation methodologies, fostering compatibility between respective regulatory standards and minimizing compliance conflicts for cross-border enterprises. On the other hand, China and the EU could contribute more public goods to international standardization bodies—such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)—to help shape a global consensus on AI governance.
（3）Strengthening Multilateral Cooperation and Policy Coordination
As key actors in global governance, China and the EU have a shared responsibility to lead in building an inclusive framework for international AI governance. By jointly resisting the bloc-based fragmentation of technological governance, they can offer a “third pathway” distinct from unilateral models, and help overcome the structural dilemma where a few major powers dictate rules while others passively accept them.
（4）Building Mechanisms for Corporate Collaboration and Risk Mitigation
Beyond intergovernmental cooperation, China and the EU should encourage flagship AI companies to establish joint research and development platforms, share selected training resources and evaluation tools, and improve the cross-linguistic and cross-cultural adaptability of AI models. This would help reduce practical mistrust and close the gap between technical deployment and regulatory expectations.
Conclusion
The European Union’s artificial intelligence strategy reflects a profound tension between its ambition to shape global rules and its efforts to preserve technological sovereignty. In the face of the paradigm shift brought about by emerging foundation model technology, no single actor can effectively address the complex challenges of AI governance alone. As China and the EU mark the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations, it is all the more essential for both sides to uphold the principle of mutual benefit and cooperation, and to build strategic trust in key areas such as AI ethics standards, safety certification, and cross-border collaboration.
About the Author
LU Chuanying 鲁传颖：Lu Chuanying is a professor in the School of Political Science & International Relations and executive deputy director of the Research Institute for Cyberspace International Governance, Tongji University. His research mainly focuses on international security and cybersecurity, the global governance of cyberspace, and the governance of artificial intelligence.
About the Publication
The Chinese version of the article was published by the Contemporary World Journal Press《当代世界》, supervised by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (IDCPC). The Journal is a comprehensive bimonthly periodical distributed both in China and overseas. It brings together a wealth of views from renowned experts and think tanks around the world on international issues, and offers in-depth analysis of the contemporary world, dynamic changes to the international landscape, and China’s foreign policies and practices.
