From Crisis Management to Strategic Stability in China-U.S. Relations by ZHOU Guiyin

This article moves beyond the common “new Cold War” framing and instead examines whether major power competition can remain manageable.

Welcome to the 76th edition of our weekly newsletter! I’m SUN Chenghao,a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies, a visiting scholar at Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School in 2024 and Munich Young Leader 2025.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by Zhou Guiyin on From Crisis Management to Strategic Stability in China-U.S. Relations.

Edited by ChinAffairsplus.

Summary

Since 2017, the United States has engaged in comprehensive strategic competition with China, leading to recurring crises in their bilateral relationship. Yet through the interaction of domestic and international factors on both sides, especially thanks to the efforts of the two countries’ leaders, relationship has repeatedly returned to a phase of relative stabilization after each period of tension, demonstrating a notable degree of resilience.

A comparative analysis of China-U.S. relations and historical cases of great-power competition in the modern era suggests that there is a positive relationship between stable great-power relations and a stable international order. The stability of international order, in turn, depends on two fundamental conditions: consensus among major powers, and commonly accepted rules and institutions for managing major bilateral and multilateral affairs.

Based on this argument, the article proposes a multi-level and multi-sector policy agenda aimed at shifting China-U.S. relations from crisis management toward strategic stability. At the bilateral level, China and the United States must respect each other’s core interests and seek mutual understanding on key disputes, including economic and trade relations, the Taiwan issue, the South China Sea, and technological competition. At the regional and global levels, both sides should take each other’s major concerns into account and work toward agreements on secondary issues such as reform of international organizations, regional security, nonproliferation, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity.

Why it Matters

As China-U.S. tensions continue to expand from trade and technology into security, artificial intelligence, and regional geopolitics, discussions about “strategic stability” have become increasingly important.

This article is valuable because it moves beyond the common “new Cold War” framing and instead examines whether major power competition can remain manageable under current international conditions. Rather than focusing only on political disputes, the article places current China-U.S. relations in a broader historical context.

By comparing today’s rivalry with cases such as the Concert of Europe, Anglo-German competition before World War I, and the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, it argues that the stability of international order often depends on whether major powers can maintain communication, crisis management mechanisms, and limited strategic consensus even during periods of intense competition.

The article is also closely connected to ongoing developments. Issues such as semiconductor restrictions, supply chain restructuring, Taiwan, the South China Sea, and AI governance are no longer isolated policy disputes; rather, they increasingly shape global economic and security structures. Against this backdrop, the article provides a useful framework for understanding why both competition and coexistence are likely to remain defining features of China-U.S. relations in the coming years.

Key Points

As China-U.S. tensions continue to expand into trade, technology, AI, and regional security, discussions about “strategic stability” have become increasingly important. Rather than simply framing the relationship as a “new Cold War,” this article focuses on whether major power competition can remain manageable. By comparing current China-U.S. relations with historical cases such as the Concert of Europe and the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, the article argues that competition does not necessarily lead to direct conflict. Diplomacy, communication, and crisis management still matter.

I. The Expansion and Management of U.S. Strategic Competition with China

As China-U.S. tensions increasingly expand into trade, technology, AI, and regional security, discussions about “strategic stability” have become more important. This article is useful because it moves beyond the simple “new Cold War” narrative and instead focuses on whether competition between major powers can still be managed.

The article places current China-U.S. relations in a broader historical context by comparing them with cases such as the Concert of Europe, Anglo-German rivalry before World War I, and the U.S.-Soviet Cold War. It argues that competition does not automatically lead to direct conflict. Communication mechanisms, diplomacy, and limited strategic consensus can still help stabilize great power relations.

The discussion is also closely connected to current events. Issues such as semiconductor restrictions, supply chain restructuring, Taiwan, the South China Sea, and AI governance are increasingly affecting not only bilateral relations but also the wider international order. Against this background, the article provides a relatively clear framework for understanding why competition and coexistence are likely to continue at the same time in China-U.S. relations.

II. The Resilience of China-U.S. Relations

Since the United States began comprehensive strategic competition with China, China-U.S. relations have repeatedly moved through cycles of tension, negotiation, and partial stabilization. Major crises, including the 2018 trade war, the 2020 COVID-19 origins dispute, the 2022 Pelosi Taiwan visit, and the 2025 tariff war, all pushed bilateral ties into periods of instability. Yet after each crisis, both sides eventually resumed dialogue and crisis management, showing that the relationship still retains significant resilience.

This resilience comes from four main sources.

First, China and the United States remain deeply economically interdependent. For decades, economic ties have acted as a “ballast” in bilateral relations. Although recent trade wars and technology restrictions revealed the risks of mutual disruption, they also showed that neither side can fully absorb the costs of economic decoupling. This explains why both countries repeatedly returned to negotiations and eventually reached partial agreements.

Second, cooperation in regional and global governance, together with pressure from third parties, has helped prevent relations from collapsing completely. Even during periods of intense competition, China and the United States continued to cooperate on issues such as climate change, pandemic response, nonproliferation, AI governance, fentanyl control, and regional conflicts. At the same time, actors such as the European Union, ASEAN, and many Global South countries generally refused to fully choose sides, preferring strategic autonomy and hedging strategies instead. These external actors have indirectly moderated China-U.S. tensions.

Third, sustained diplomatic dialogue has remained essential. Although many bilateral dialogue mechanisms established during the Bush and Obama years were suspended, high-level communication channels survived. New consultation mechanisms were also created to handle trade disputes, security tensions, and strategic communication. Most importantly, leader- to- leader diplomacy between Chinese and American presidents has played a key role in stabilizing relations during moments of crisis.

Fourth, and most importantly, the resilience of China-U.S. relations ultimately rests on the balance of power between the two countries. The United States still possesses unmatched global military alliances, technological innovation capacity, and international influence. China, however, has rapidly expanded its military capabilities, built the world’s most comprehensive manufacturing system, and increased its international influence. This combination of competition, mutual constraints, and asymmetric strengths has prevented either side from fully dominating the other, creating the conditions for what the author describes as an “uncomfortable coexistence.”

III. Comparing U.S.-China Competition with Historical Great Power Rivalries

The resilience of China-U.S. relations suggests that effective crisis management is possible, but long-term strategic stability remains uncertain. To better understand this issue, the article compares current U.S.-China competition with several historical cases, including Anglo-German rivalry before World War I, the Concert of Europe after the Congress of Vienna, and the U.S.-Soviet Cold War.

Stable great power relations are closely tied to a stable international order. Historically, international systems have always been hierarchical, meaning that relations among major powers largely determine the structure and stability of the world order. The comparison shows that a stable international order usually depends on two core conditions.

First, major powers must share at least a minimal consensus on preserving the overall international system. During both the Concert of Europe and later Cold War, rival powers still accepted certain rules, spheres of influence, and mechanisms for crisis management. Strategic stability was maintained not because conflict disappeared, but because competition remained bounded by shared understandings.

Second, diplomacy matters. Even during severe confrontations, major powers continued negotiations, maintained communication channels, and sought limited compromises. According to the article, diplomacy becomes more important, not less, during periods of high tension.

The article also highlights several historical lessons from failed great power competition. International order tends to collapse when rival states refuse to compromise over territory, economic competition, security interests, or prestige. Excessive pressure, ideological confrontation, arms races, and strategic overextension often push crises toward war. Historical examples such as Imperial Germany, Nazi Germany, and later stage Soviet expansion are presented as warnings about the dangers of aggressive rivalry and overreach.

Overall, the article argues that the future stability of China-U.S. relations will depend on whether both countries can maintain strategic restraint, preserve dialogue mechanisms, respect each other’s core interests and avoid turning competition into direct confrontation.

IV. The Possibility of Strategic Stability in China-U.S. Relations

Can China-U.S. relations move from crisis management toward long- term strategic stability? The article argues that despite growing competition, this possibility still exists because the relationship remains deeply interconnected and both sides still share an interest in maintaining overall international stability.

The author believes that U.S.-China competition is comprehensive but also asymmetric. The two countries compete in politics, economics, technology, military affairs and international influence, yet their strengths and goals are not identical. China repeatedly emphasizes that it does not seek to replace the United States, while the United States continues to view China as its main strategic competitor. At the same time, the two countries remain deeply connected through supply chains, global markets and international institutions.

According to the article, strategic stability requires both sides to clarify and respect each other’s core interests. For China, the most important issues include continued economic development, the Taiwan issue and political security. For the United States, major concerns include technological leadership, domestic political stability and maintaining its dominant position in the Asia Pacific.

The article suggests that future China-U.S. relations should focus on “managed competition” rather than confrontation. In the bilateral sphere, both sides should maintain dialogue, seek compromises on secondary issues, and avoid escalation on sensitive issues such as Taiwan and the South China Sea. Economically, trade agreements and supply chain cooperation could continue to serve as stabilizing forces. In the technology realm, competition will likely continue, but limited cooperation in areas such as AI governance and scientific research may still be possible.

At the regional and global level, the article argues that China and the United States should continue cooperating on issues including climate change, nuclear nonproliferation, global governance reform, cybersecurity and artificial intelligence. Ultimately, strategic stability will depend on whether both countries can maintain communication, exercise restraint and reach at least a minimal consensus on preserving international order.

Conclusion

Competition will likely remain a long-term feature of China-U.S. relations, but competition does not automatically mean confrontation or conflict. Whether the relationship can shift from repeated crisis management toward greater strategic stability will depend on continued dialogue, mutual restraint, and the ability of both sides to manage disagreements within a stable international framework.

About the Author

ZHOU Guiyin(周桂银) is Professor at the School of International Relations/Research School for Southeast Asian Studies and the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Xiamen University. His research focuses on the intellectual history of international relations, the history of strategic thought, China’s neighborhood diplomacy, and China-U.S. relations.

About the Publication

Forum of World Economics & Politics is a bimonthly academic journal supervised by the Jiangsu Academy of Social Sciences and published by its Institute of World Economics. Since its founding in 1981, the journal has developed into an important academic platform in China for research on world economics and international politics. Since 2004, the journal has continuously been included in the Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index (CSSCI) and the Guide to Chinese Core Journals. It mainly publishes recent research on international relations, international politics, international security, international strategy, world economy, international trade and investment, and international finance.