#9 Ask China: Trump-Xi summit and China-US relations
The year 2026 holds special significance for both countries.
Welcome to the 9th edition of Ask China! I’m SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies, a visiting scholar at Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School in 2024 and Munich Young Leaders 2025.
ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me. Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com.
In this newsletter, we address concerns about China’s positions through a Q&A format, while also presenting key points of leading Chinese scholars’ commentaries. Through this series, we aim to provide policymakers, think tanks, and strategic communities overseas with access to Chinese scholars’ views, accompanied by curated academic perspectives that help readers better understand the considerations underlying China’s foreign policy choices.
Background
At President Xi Jinping’s invitation, U.S. President Donald Trump paid a state visit to China from May 13 to 15. It was the first face-to-face meeting between the two heads of state since Busan last October, and the first China visit by a U.S. president in nine years. The year 2026 holds special significance for both countries: China begins its 15th Five-Year Plan, while the United States marks the 250th anniversary of its independence. This renewed “handshake across the Pacific” has drawn global attention.
The constructive and strategically stable China-U.S. relationship is the highest-level political consensus reached at the China-U.S. presidential meeting in Beijing on May 14, 2026. Centered on the “four dimensions of stability,” this new positioning sets a new framework for China-U.S. relations in the coming three years and beyond.
President Xi Jinping defined “constructive strategic stability” from four perspectives. First, it should be positive stability with cooperation as the mainstay. China and the United States should make cooperation, not confrontation, the mainstream of their relationship, and expand common interests in climate change, public health, economic and trade exchanges, and other areas.
Second, it should be healthy stability with competition within proper limits. Competition between major countries is not unusual, but it should not define the whole of China-U.S. relations. Even where competition exists, it should be healthy competition in which the two sides learn from each other, positive competition in which both strive to do better, and fair competition that follows rules.
Third, it should be constant stability with manageable differences. Both sides should maintain policy continuity and stability, and in particular honor the commitments they have made. A positive expectation for China-U.S. cooperation will provide greater certainty for the development of both countries and for the international situation.
Fourth, it should be lasting stability with expectable peace. China and the United States must not slide into conflict, confrontation or war. Peaceful coexistence is the greatest common denominator between the two countries. The consequences of China-U.S. conflict would be unbearable for both sides and the world. The key lies in abiding by the three China-U.S. joint communiqués, respecting each other’s social systems and development paths, respecting each other’s core interests and major concerns, and respecting each other’s right to development.
Compared with previous formulations of China-U.S. relations, this new positioning carries important practical and theoretical significance. In practical terms, it first gives a clear answer to the fundamental question of whether China and the United States are partners or rivals. It rejects the erroneous logic of defining China-U.S. relations by “strategic competition.” The new positioning is not only a correction of misguided policies of the past few years, but also a reshaping of the future direction of China-U.S. relations. Under this new paradigm, the world may move out of the trap of zero-sum rivalry and toward a more stable, cooperative and just future.
Next, the new positioning demonstrates a shared sense of international responsibility. China and the United States are both permanent members of the UN Security Council and the world’s two largest economies. China-U.S. relations have long gone beyond the bilateral scope. They are a key variable affecting world peace, stability, development, cooperation and global governance. In this sense, a stable China-U.S. relationship is itself an important contribution to world peace and development.
Moreover, the new positioning reflects a sober understanding of each country’s development path. In 2026, both countries are entering important stages of development. China is at the start of the 15th Five-Year Plan period and is advancing Chinese modernization through high-quality development. The United States is marking the 250th anniversary of its independence. The two sides recognize that realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and making America great again can proceed in parallel and benefit the world. This consensus rejects ideological bias and shows that countries with different civilizations, systems and paths can live in peace and achieve common development.
In theoretical terms, the new positioning enriches the theory and practice of international relations. Firstly, it fully reflects the core essence and development of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy. Secondly, this new concept represents the latest summary of China-U.S. relations. Lastly, this new formulation updates the traditional concept of “strategic stability.” Traditional strategic stability originated in U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control during the Cold War and focused mainly on preventing nuclear war and avoiding an uncontrolled arms race. By contrast, a constructive and strategically stable China-U.S. relationship expands the concept beyond military and nuclear security to a comprehensive view of stability covering politics, economy, science and technology, people-to-people exchanges, and global governance.
Looking ahead, the new positioning will have significant implications. Above all, it provides a basic framework for China-U.S. relations and safeguards international security. One important element of a constructive and strategically stable relationship is to establish regular high-level communication and crisis-management mechanisms, so as to prevent accidents and misjudgments from escalating into confrontation. The two sides agreed to strengthen military-to-military communication and exchange views on major international and regional issues. This creates necessary strategic space for addressing regional hotspots, preventing nuclear proliferation, and responding to non-traditional security threats.
Besides, it injects certainty into the global economy and helps reduce the systemic risks of “decoupling” and supply-chain disruption. The Beijing meeting sent a positive signal that China-U.S. relations are moving from confrontation toward cooperation. This helped boost market confidence, stabilize expectations, and reduce volatility in commodity prices, major stock indexes and exchange rates.
Furthermore, it will help improve global governance and promote an equal and orderly multipolar world and a universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization. A stable China-U.S. relationship is itself a global public good. If the constructive and strategically stable relationship is implemented, it will contribute to world economic recovery, better global governance, and more effective management of regional hotspot issues.
There are three important pathways to realizing this relationship. First, the two sides should improve institutional mechanisms, including regular meetings between the presidents, dialogue channels at all levels, and crisis-management arrangements. Second, both should advance cooperation in multiple fields, giving priority to climate change, public health, nuclear non-proliferation and other global governance issues, while restoring economic, trade, scientific, technological and people-to-people exchanges. Third, political bottom lines must be upheld. The Taiwan question is at the very core of China’s core interests. The United States must honor its commitment of not supporting “Taiwan independence.” Both sides should respect each other’s sovereignty, security and development interests, and refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs.
For decades, economic interdependence was widely regarded as the anchor of peace in the US–China relations. Trade, investment, and deeply integrated supply chains created substantial mutual benefits that confrontation seems irrational. Yet in recent years, this assumption is breaking down as tariffs, export controls, technology restrictions, and supply chain restructuring have transformed economic ties into tools of strategic competition. Thus, the question is no longer whether economics matters in US–China relations, but whether economic interdependence can still function as a restraint on geopolitical rivalry once it has become weaponized.
The answer is positive, but in a more limited and fragile way than before. The recent US–China summit in Beijing reached an agreement to pursue a “constructive strategic stable relationship,” alongside discussions on trade conditions, bilateral investment, supply chain stability, agricultural exports, and energy cooperation, despite the intensifying strategic competition. This reflects a shared recognition that complete economic rupture would be profoundly costly. Even after years of tariffs and mutual restrictions, the economic interdependence between the two countries remains structurally deep. China remains a critical manufacturing center, an essential market, and an increasingly significant technological and industrial power. Meanwhile, the United States continues to offer capital, innovation ecosystems, agricultural exports, and global financial influence. Modern globalization makes supply chain interdependence far more complex than traditional bilateral trade balances suggest. No major economy can truly achieve total “decoupling and chain-breaking.”
Yet the character of this interdependence has changed fundamentally. Economic ties are increasingly seen as sources of vulnerability. Washington has weaponized tariffs, semiconductor export controls, and investment restrictions to constrain China’s technological rise. Beijing, in turn, has demonstrated its own leverage through strategic resources, supply chain positioning, and targeted countermeasures. Economic interdependence has shifted from being purely an anchor of peace to becoming part of the battlefield itself.
Economic entanglement now may no longer generate trust, but it still generates restraint. The old assumption was that trade would produce political convergence and reduce rivalry. That expectation has clearly failed. The US and China are now strategic competitors despite being deeply economically connected. But economic interdependence can still serve another purpose, which is to raise the cost of escalation. The greater the level of mutual exposure, the stronger the incentive to prevent confrontation from spiraling into systemic rupture.
Current geopolitical conditions reinforce this logic. The instability in the Middle East and uncertainty surrounding the Strait of Hormuz remind both Washington and Beijing that global energy security remains deeply interconnected. Inflationary pressures, supply disruptions, and financial volatility affect the global economy as a whole. In such an environment, economic cooperation becomes less about friendship and more about crisis management.
At the same time, the US domestic politics complicate the stabilizing role of economic ties. One of the most insightful arguments from the source material is that America’s turn toward protectionism is not simply about China, but about internal structural discontent. Globalization became politically toxic not because it failed to generate wealth, but because its gains were unevenly distributed. Trump’s embrace of tariffs partly aims to reduce the negative effects brought by globalization. It is widely supported by American blue collar workers even though the policy is widely criticised for not being able to solve the problem. This suggests that economic reasons alone cannot guarantee stability, because trade policy is increasingly shaped by electoral incentives rather than pure economic calculation. This is why economic ties can no longer be seen as a sufficient guarantee of peace.
In this sense, US–China economic relations can still serve as an anchor of peace, because in an era of weaponized interdependence, the costs of losing control have become too dangerous for either side to ignore. More importantly, Chinese development can create many opportunities for the US. The two economies need to identify new engines of growth together in order to seek a win-win situation where economic ties between them create greater values than what they can obtain on their own.
The establishment of a “constructive strategic stability relationship” between China and the United States will fundamentally reshape the strategic environment surrounding Europe’s China “de-risking” policy. It does not mean Europe will abandon de-risking, but it will weaken the external drivers pushing Europe toward further securitization, bloc confrontation, and quasi-decoupling, while creating greater room for policy recalibration.
First, the new China–U.S. framework weakens the external pressure for Europe to approach China through a Cold War-style bloc framework and high-intensity de-risking measures. In recent years, Europe’s China policy has been heavily influenced by Washington’s narrative of “systemic competition”. After the Russia–Ukraine conflict, Europe became more dependent on the United States for security, making it more likely to align with U.S. restrictions on China in areas such as technology, supply chains, and industrial security. However, following the May 2026 Beijing summit, China–U.S. relations were elevated from “overall stability” to “constructive strategic stability,” emphasizing stronger strategic trust, managed competition, and reduced risks of miscalculation in order to establish controllable boundaries for long-term rivalry. Under these conditions, the political and strategic basis for Europe to maintain a highly confrontational de-risking agenda is likely to weaken.
Second, this shift creates a new adjustment window for Europe’s China policy. Da Wei argued that there is now an opportunity to “recalibrate” China–U.S. relations, while Wu Xinbo noted that bilateral ties are entering “a more stable new phase”. Greater stability in China–U.S. relations reduces European concerns over uncontrolled great-power confrontation and lowers pressure to fully align with escalating strategic rivalry. Previously, Europe’s de-risking agenda was driven not only by concerns over industrial security and technological dependence, but also by defensive reactions to deteriorating China–U.S. ties. As Beijing and Washington move toward a more stable framework for interaction, pragmatic voices in Europe are likely to gain influence, arguing that China policy should balance competition, cooperation, and limited risk prevention rather than comprehensive containment. In areas such as green transition, climate governance, macroeconomic coordination, and civilian supply chains, Europe has neither the capacity nor the economic incentive to pursue long-term exclusion of China. As a result, Europe’s de-risking policy is likely to become narrower, more targeted, and more technical.
Third, the new China–U.S. positioning further exposes Europe’s structural dilemma: security dependence on the United States, economic reliance on China, and aspirations for strategic autonomy. Europe’s security architecture remains closely tied to Washington, while its economy still depends heavily on China’s market, manufacturing capacity, and green supply chains. Zheng Yongnian described this as not only a “new positioning” for China–U.S. relations, but also a“new paradigm” for international relations, reflecting recognition that China and the United States remain long-term competitors yet must coexist. Huang Jing and Ding Yifan similarly framed the shift as a move from “zero-sum rivalry” to “coexistence-based competition”. In this context, a highly securitized de-risking strategy would impose growing economic and strategic costs on Europe. While the United States may still maintain strategic coordination and red-line management with China through summit diplomacy, European firms risk losing access to Chinese markets and industrial opportunities because of rigid policies. As a result, Europe may increasingly redefine “strategic autonomy” around its own interests rather than simply extending Washington’s China strategy.
At the same time, Europe is unlikely to abandon de-risking entirely. European concerns about China stem not only from U.S. pressure, but also from anxieties over industrial competition, critical technologies, data security, market access, economic dependence, and Taiwan-related geopolitical risks. The more likely outcome is therefore not the disappearance of de-risking, but its moderation, narrowing, and technocratization. Europe will probably maintain restrictions and screening mechanisms in sensitive sectors such as semiconductors, AI, critical minerals, and data security, while becoming increasingly reluctant to expand de-risking into comprehensive decoupling or serve as the front line of prolonged China–U.S. confrontation.
In short, a “constructive strategic stability relationship” between China and the United States is unlikely to end Europe’s de-risking policy, but it may gradually shift it away from broad geopolitical securitization toward a narrower, more targeted, and more pragmatic form of risk management and strategic rebalancing.
The constructive strategic stability framework established at the Beijing summit carries significant structural implications for the Asia-Pacific and the broader international order. Its importance lies less in resolving the fundamental tensions between China and the United States than in redefining the terms on which great-power competition is conducted, with consequences that ripple outward to shape the strategic calculations of Asia-Pacific states, Europe, and the Global South alike.
In the Asia-Pacific, the power balance between China and the United States has shifted substantially over the past nine years. The region is moving away from a period of clear American primacy toward something closer to genuine Sino-American parity, and with that shift comes a more fluid regional order in which national interest increasingly takes precedence over durable allegiance. The reactions across the region have been sharply divergent. South Korea and ASEAN have greeted the development with broad relief: sustained bilateral dialogue raises the prospect of more effective crisis management in contested areas such as the South China Sea, reduces the economic spillover from trade disputes, and, perhaps most importantly, eases the pressure on smaller states to commit to one side. Japan‘s response has been rather more troubled. Its strategic value to Washington has long rested on the assumption of enduring China-US competition, and a more managed relationship between the two powers inevitably raises questions about what role Japan is meant to play. Cutting across all of these reactions is the underlying reality of deep supply chain integration between China and the United States, spanning precision manufacturing, electric vehicles, and related sectors, which makes the decoupling that some advocate considerably more disruptive in practice than it tends to appear in theory.
On Europe, the prevailing view is that the China-US-Europe triangle has become an essential framework for making sense of how the international system is being reorganized. Europe’s push for strategic autonomy signals that it no longer accepts the role of a passive variable in Sino-American competition, and the old hub-and-spoke structure centered on Washington is giving way to a more genuinely multipolar dynamic. That said, European China policy has long been shaped by American preferences, and the habits of deference built up over decades are not easily shed. The more immediate change is that transatlantic relations are under considerable strain, enough so that Europe is actively exploring greater room for maneuver in its engagement with Beijing. The trilateral relationship stands at an inflection point. Washington retains its structural advantage, and both Brussels and Beijing remain largely reactive, yet that still leaves meaningful space for the two to define the relationship on their own terms. In practical terms, this argues for reviving substantive China-Europe economic dialogue, treating existing trade frictions as an opening for negotiation rather than a source of grievance, and addressing what has become a conspicuous gap in the broader trilateral dynamic. Ultimately, Europe’s ability to play a meaningful role in managing Sino-American competition depends on developing a genuinely independent strategic judgment, something that goes beyond defense spending and touches on how Europe conceives of its interests and its place in the world.
For ASEAN and the Global South, the implications of China-US stability are tangible and pressing. The gains from a more settled bilateral relationship are not confined to Shanghai and San Francisco; they extend across the full length of global value chains, from Ho Chi Minh City to Hamburg and from São Paulo to Nairobi, with the benefits falling most heavily on smaller, trade-dependent economies with little buffer against the shocks that great-power confrontation tends to generate. One of the less remarked costs of sustained China-US tension has been the pressure it exerts on third countries to declare their allegiances. Across much of Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, this has amounted to a chronic and unwelcome predicament, at once economically costly and politically awkward. A more stable China-US relationship goes some way toward relieving that pressure. There is also a broader dimension. Across the Global South, there remains a widespread expectation that China and the United States will together provide the international public goods and the baseline of predictability that smaller states are simply not positioned to supply for themselves. The challenges of climate change, public health, food security, and emerging technology governance are inherently transnational, and experience suggests that meaningful progress on any of them is very difficult to achieve without substantive engagement from both Beijing and Washington.
It should by now be clear that there’s a fundamental asymmetry in negotiations between the U.S. and China on virtually any issue at hand. Particularly issues pertaining to American foreign policy.
More specifically, no U.S. President, in this instance Trump, has sufficient agency, the capacity to draft and enforce agreements that run contrary to the interests of the American deep state and/or the ruling oligarchy, both of which are the powers behind the American throne.
President Xi on the other hand, is the leader of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), which makes all the important decisions on the Middle Kingdom’s economy and foreign policy, and so is, in effect, China’s deep state. In other words, he’s able to make firmer pronouncements on what China’s policy will on any particular issue. In short, listen to him not Trump.