#5 Ask China: What the Busan Summit Reveals About the Future of U.S.–China Relations
The Busan summit marked a cautious reopening of U.S.–China dialogue, as both sides sought to steady rivalry, rebuild economic confidence, and find a new balance in global cooperation.
Welcome to the 63rd edition of our newsletter! I’m SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies, a visiting scholar at Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School in 2024 and Munich Young Leaders 2025.
ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me. Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com.
In this newsletter, we address concerns about China’s positions through a Q&A format, while also presenting key points of leading Chinese scholars’ commentaries. Through this series, we aim to provide policymakers, think tanks, and strategic communities overseas with access to Chinese scholars’ views, accompanied by curated academic perspectives that help readers better understand the considerations underlying China’s foreign policy choices.
Background
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting held in Busan, South Korea, on October 30–31, 2025, marked a pivotal moment in U.S.-China relations. It was the first face-to-face dialogue between President Xi Jinping and President Donald Trump in six years, and Trump’s first meeting with Xi since returning to the White House.
Convened under the theme “Restoring Connectivity in an Era of Fragmentation,” the summit took place amid rising geopolitical tensions, slowing global trade, and increasingly divergent industrial policies across the Asia-Pacific. For both sides, the meeting carried clear dual motives: Beijing sought to stabilize external relations and restore market confidence after years of “decoupling” rhetoric, while Washington faced domestic inflation, supply-chain pressures, and the political imperative of delivering foreign-policy gains in an election year.
The Xi–Trump meeting became the focal point of the Busan summit. Both sides announced limited easing measures, including the temporary suspension of certain tariffs and export controls, the reopening of agricultural and energy trade channels, and phased adjustments to restrictions on rare earths and critical minerals. Though modest, these steps signaled a shift from confrontation to cautious re-engagement. Notably, issues such as Taiwan and security did not appear on the public agenda, reflecting a deliberate prioritization of “economics first, politics later.” For many observers, the Busan summit did not end strategic rivalry but rather ushered in a new phase of managed interdependence in which competition is contained within more predictable boundaries.
These developments raise several key questions: Against a backdrop of enduring rivalry and limited mutual trust, how much stabilizing power can a leaders’ meeting exert in the broader China-U.S. relationship? Given that Washington’s enthusiasm was largely driven by domestic political and economic pressures, can the current stability be sustained, or will it again fluctuate with shifting cycles of pragmatism and confrontation? Ultimately, will future China-U.S. competition remain defined by zero-sum logic, or will it evolve toward a model of “competitive coexistence”? In this context, as the two sides reopen parts of their economic cooperation, how will Global South economies reposition themselves within rebalanced supply chains, and how might China advance “South–South cooperation” to promote a more equitable global order?
By exploring these questions, we bring together leading Chinese scholars’ insights, from assessments of great-power diplomacy and economic rebalancing to reflections on Global South cooperation and the evolving model of competitive coexistence, to provide a clearer understanding of how China perceives and interprets the post-Busan trajectory of China-U.S. relations.
Ask China
The answers expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of our newsletter. They are drawn from articles and commentaries written by Chinese scholars.
Above all, the China-U.S. summit served to recalibrate the current state of bilateral relations, setting the “main tone” for the future trajectory of China-U.S. relations, which helps stabilize the relationship to some extent.
On one hand, during this summit, both sides “relaxed” tensions by making concessions on issues such as tariffs and rare earths, ensuring that China-U.S. relations would continue to compete without breaking down. The two sides also agreed to mutual port fee waivers for one year, and the U.S. will suspend its Section 301 investigation and proposed measures targeting China’s maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for a year. In response, China will also suspend its corresponding countermeasures for the same period.
On the other hand, the summit also set the tone for the bilateral relationship. Held at a time of heightened tension, the meeting served as a “strategic recalibration,” signaling that after a period of difficulties and adjustments, both sides are now ready to work toward stabilizing the relationship and managing differences responsibly. President Xi’s remark, “Dialogue is better than confrontation,” set the tone for the future direction of China-U.S. relations.
The meeting also clarified the direction for the future bilateral agenda, which may work as a guardrail in future bilateral relations. First, dialogue is expected to expand beyond economic issues. President Xi emphasized the need to maintain communication across all channels and highlighted potential areas for cooperation, including illegal migration, telecom fraud, anti-money laundering, AI governance, and infectious-disease response. Second, both sides signaled a willingness to strengthen coordination on regional and global challenges, such as Ukraine, the Middle East, and humanitarian crises, where major-power responsibility calls for constructive engagement. Third, further leader-level diplomacy is anticipated, as sustained high-level contact remains essential for providing strategic guidance. President Trump referred to President Xi as a “longtime friend,” expressed confidence in building a stable and enduring relationship, and signaled his intention to visit China while inviting President Xi to the United States.
Last but not the least, at the level of the international system, the leaders’ meeting significantly shaped global expectations regarding the trajectory of U.S.–China relations. For the broader international community, it offered allies and third countries a clearer basis for assessing the bilateral relationship. Against a backdrop of recurrent disruptions, sluggish economic recovery, and mounting geopolitical conflicts, this meeting strengthened positive expectations about the relationship, helping to ease anxieties in global markets and reduce geopolitical tension.
The Busan summit between Chinese and U.S. leaders successfully brought bilateral relations to a point of stabilization, but Chinese scholars remain cautiously optimistic, viewing it as a technical easing rather than a structural improvement in U.S.–China competition. Against this backdrop, Beijing must carefully assess the resilience of this stability, as Washington’s enthusiasm was largely driven by domestic political cycles and short-term economic pressures, especially its need to stabilize financial markets and deliver quick domestic results. Such motives make U.S. policy prone to reversals.
Additionally, the structure of domestic politics in the U.S. will continue to constrain the stability of bilateral relations. Within the U.S., there remains an “auto-hawkish” tendency toward China. Congress, the military, security agencies, certain executive departments, and segments of the media often display reflexive political reactions on China-related issues. Demonstrating toughness is frequently used to claim political legitimacy or gain agenda-setting advantages. Even when the White House or senior decision-makers seek to stabilize the relationship, institutional inertia may still generate friction in areas such as visa screening, technology export controls, corporate enforcement actions, and the regulation of critical minerals and supply chains—negatively affecting the broader atmosphere of bilateral ties.
To sustain the post-Busan stability, China should adopt a long-term strategic mindset, turning this tactical pause into strategic anchoring. Economically, China should act on President Xi’s view that trade and economic ties must remain the ballast and engine of China–U.S. relations, expanding cooperation into practical areas such as fentanyl control, agricultural trade, and specific corporate cases to deepen mutual benefit. Institutionally, China should upgrade the effective practice of seeking cooperation through struggle into a rules-based framework. It should focus on restoring and strengthening bilateral dialogue mechanisms across key areas, anchoring the course of China–U.S. relations on a stable and results-oriented track. At the same time, China should promote transparent and accountable mechanisms to turn suspended U.S. measures, such as Section 301 investigations, into binding long-term agreements. The ultimate goal is to steer U.S.–China relations toward a new paradigm of advancing through struggle.
The renewed dialogue brought greater stability to energy and resource markets, as both sides eased restrictions on rare earths and critical minerals, signaling a managed interdependence in high-tech supply chains. This provided resource exporters in Africa and Latin America with new opportunities to engage both China and advanced economies on more balanced terms. At the same time, the trade adjustments reached in Busan eased pressure on global shipping and manufacturing. Short-term disruptions in logistics, shipbuilding, and energy markets began to subside, and Southeast Asian ports saw traffic gradually normalize, opening a window for Global South economies to attract new investment and industrial relocation. Finally, the rebalancing of supply chains is also driving industrial upgrading. In Southeast Asia, hundreds of Chinese firms have partnered with local manufacturers in automobiles, solar energy, and electronics, accelerating the formation of a China + ASEAN production network and restoring investor confidence in regional manufacturing.
From China’s perspective, détente does not signal concession but rather an opportunity to shape rules through cooperation. Beijing reiterated that China and the United States can achieve mutual success and common prosperity and should work together on major, beneficial, and concrete undertakings. China will continue advancing South–South cooperation through frameworks such as the Belt and Road Initiative, BRICS expansion, and the Global Development Initiative (GDI), extending collaboration from infrastructure projects to institutional cooperation in digital, energy, and industrial-chain governance.
This partial easing of China–U.S. relations has created structural opportunities for the Global South, reducing supply-chain tensions, diversifying industrial layouts, and reviving energy cooperation. Leveraging this diplomatic window, China is promoting a more balanced, inclusive, and sustainable global economic landscape through openness, partnership, and institutional innovation. This pragmatic approach, seeking cooperation within competition and stability within cooperation, may well define the next stage of China–U.S. engagement and the shared development of the Global South.
The Busan summit produced meaningful outcomes, including progress on economic arrangements, suspension of certain tariffs and export controls, and reaffirmation of the need to restore stability to bilateral ties. These developments demonstrate that both sides recognize the necessity of taking the long view, seeking to reduce the problem list while expanding the cooperation list. Economic ties, which long regarded as the ballast, once again proved central in preventing deterioration and anchoring dialogue across broader areas such as public health, counter-illicit activities, and emerging technologies.
A more fundamental structural pattern is emerging that competition and dialogue intensify simultaneously. Both Beijing and Washington understand that conflict is too costly, yet strategic rivalry is not disappearing. Instead, the relationship is entering a phase of managed, institutionalized tension, where cooperation coexists with friction. In regional and global governance, the two sides will likely continue presenting contrasting models: the US relying on exclusive alliances, China advocating inclusive and open cooperation. Even so, the Busan meeting showed that both countries are willing to coordinate where interests converge, including on humanitarian hotspots, nuclear nonproliferation, and global economic stability.
Looking ahead, the prospect of a stable, partnership-oriented equilibrium remains possible, but achieving it will require sustained high-level communication, careful management of domestic political constraints in the US, and China’s continued focus on internal development and reform as the ultimate source of strategic resilience. The Busan summit signals that cooperation remains achievable and that both sides see value in avoiding confrontation. Yet the risks, including policy reversals, renewed trade tensions, and intensified technological rivalry, remain significant. As such, the most realistic expectation for the foreseeable future is neither a return to confrontation nor a decisive strategic reconciliation, but a dynamic balance of competition and cooperation, where progress is possible but must be continually defended, reinforced, and recalibrated.
Conclusion
The Busan summit was less a breakthrough than a breather in China-U.S. relations. Still, it reopened channels of dialogue and helped lower the temperature of strategic rivalry. By putting economic pragmatism ahead of political confrontation, both sides showed a willingness to manage competition rather than let it spiral. How lasting this stability proves will depend on whether Washington and Beijing can turn restraint into a habit and build steady cooperation on broader global issues, bringing not only predictability to their own ties but also a new balance and opportunity for the wider Global South.
