#1 Ask China: Chinese Perspective on Russia-Ukraine Conflict
Has China provided support to Russia? Under what conditions do Chinese scholars believe a ceasefire could be achieved? What are the main concerns Chinese scholars hold regarding the conflict?
Welcome to the 50th edition of our weekly newsletter! I'm SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies, a visiting scholar at Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School in 2024 and Munich Young Leader 2025.
ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China's foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.
Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China's academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com.
In this newsletter, we introduce a new section “Ask China” to address concerns about China’s positions through a Q&A format, while also presenting key points of leading Chinese scholars’ commentaries. Through the new part, we aim to provide policymakers, think tanks, and strategic communities overseas with access to Chinese scholars’ views, accompanied by curated academic perspectives that help readers better understand the considerations underlying China’s foreign policy choices.
The Russia–Ukraine conflict has now entered its fourth year, evolving from an initial blitzkrieg into a protracted war of attrition. In mid-August, President Putin and President Trump held talks in Alaska, followed by President Zelensky’s visit to Washington with several European leaders. While these meetings sought to underscore the resilience of transatlantic relations, they also tested the prospects for a ceasefire and new “security guarantees.” Beyond reshaping Europe’s security order and the global balance of power, the conflict has also had profound implications for China’s external relations.
China–Russia relations, underpinned by strategic cooperation, remain a central focus of international attention, with close scrutiny of Beijing’s position as the conflict drags on. China–EU relations have also been significantly affected. Meanwhile, the U.S. and Europe are experiencing frictions over the modalities and costs of assistance to Ukraine, reflecting a broader restructuring of transatlantic relations. Taken together, the conflict not only shapes intra-European dynamics and transatlantic ties but also directly influences the triangular relationship between China, the United States, and Europe. Against this backdrop, today’s Ask China addresses three questions frequently raised abroad: Has China provided support to Russia? Under what conditions do Chinese scholars believe a ceasefire could be achieved? What are the main concerns Chinese scholars hold regarding the conflict?
By engaging with these questions directly, we aim to offer a clearer picture of China’s perspectives. In addition, we selected and compiled four prominent Chinese scholars’ commentaries, aiming to offer readers a more comprehensive understanding of China’s thinking on the policy front.
Ask China
Generally speaking, Chinese scholars believe that China has never supported Russia’s “special military operation” (conflict/war) and has simply maintained normal economic cooperation with Russia. They believe the Western view that China has definitively sided with Russia is a mistaken one. China has made independent judgements based on “the rights and wrongs of the matter itself”, therefore China’s current positioning can more accurately be termed “constructive involvement”. At the bilateral level, China remains one of Ukraine’s largest trading partners and Ukrainian forces continue to use many Chinese-made drones. The stance taken by Russia and China that there are “no forbidden areas of cooperation” is subject to the caveat of “non-alignment” or neutrality on China’s part. It’s worth noting that Putin did not inform China of his plans in advance, and China therefore did not approve these plans nor indeed voice support for Russia’s actions in the immediate aftermath. At the multilateral level, China stresses respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, statements in favor of Ukraine, while insisting that all countries’ security concerns must be taken seriously, a belief in Russia’s favor.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict is not merely a war between Russia and Ukraine; a key root cause lies in NATO’s eastward expansion. Therefore, a ceasefire requires not only that internal conditions—such as a compromise between Russia and Ukraine and the opening of humanitarian corridors— be satisfied, but also that external conditions be met. Overall, four external conditions must be met. First and foremost, a compromise between the United States and Russia is imperative. Second, a new understanding must be forged between Russia and Europe, with economic and security dialogues to ease tensions. Third, the rise of international peace movements is needed to guide public opinion against prolonged confrontation and humanitarian disasters. Fourth, the international community must recognize Russia’s legitimate concerns, so that Russia no longer needs to defend its security sphere through military means. Additionally, when conditions for a ceasefire are ripe, UN peacekeeping forces—comprising a mix of non-aligned countries—could be deployed to establish a more durable peace.
Overall, Chinese scholars focus less on battlefield outcomes. They worry more that the Russia-Ukraine conflict could reshape geopolitics and erode international trust, increasing security pressure on China. The foremost concern is a drawn-out conflict that locks in bloc confrontation and pushes the system toward bipolarity. That would shrink China’s room for strategic maneuver and worsen the environment for its development. If China is forced to choose sides, ties with Russia or Europe could swing sharply. That would undercut a China-centered, dynamically balanced external posture. Prolonged fighting also creates spillovers. Nuclear safety and the stability of food and energy supplies could suffer, disrupting the global governance agenda. Beijing therefore proposes leading a seven-party peacekeeping effort, paired with a UN-authorized ceasefire and peacekeeping. It argues that the fighting be halted first, after which disputes can be addressed. Western views of Chinese mediation mix expectation with skepticism. A visible trust gap limits China’s ability to steer talks and invites unfair burden-shifting. Europe’s security order will take years to rebuild. European “de-risking” and other external pressures will narrow China’s strategic and economic space. China faces structural constraints and must balance relations with Russia, Europe, and the United States.
China Scholars’ Insights
Da Wei: What Does China Want in Ukraine? -- Beijing’s Ambivalence is Limiting Its Role
The war in Ukraine continues to reshape China’s foreign relations. In Europe, Beijing’s close ties with Moscow cast a persistent shadow over EU-China relations, even as many in Europe hope China will use its leverage to press Russia to “respect the United Nations Charter” and end the war. China’s leaders would prefer a durable settlement between Moscow and Kyiv, but it lacks the ability—and the political space—to promote this outcome. The domestic debate inside China over the war is complex and constraining, and as the war grinds on, frictions between China and Europe have deepened.
Inside China, there are two dominant views regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict. One camp views Russia’s actions as a violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty. Given China’s own history of foreign invasion, Beijing places great emphasis on sovereignty and independence. From this perspective, the invasion contradicts the principles of international law that China claims to uphold. This camp also notes China’s generally friendly ties with Ukraine since the Soviet collapse. A second camp sees the war as a continuation of Cold War-era regional tensions and the culmination of sustained Western pressure on Russia. Many in this camp express empathy for Moscow’s choices: in their view, Russia’s bold response to Western pressure channels a wider public mood shaped by Europe’s and America’s recent pressure on China, and carries a sense of vindication for those who are skeptical of Beijing’s restraint toward the West. This duality is reflected in China’s 12-point position paper of 2023: it simultaneously stresses respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity while insisting that all countries’ security concerns must be taken seriously.
At the same time, the common Western perception that China has unambiguously sided with Russia is overstated. China remains one of Ukraine’s largest trading partners, and Ukrainian forces continue to use many Chinese-made drones. Frankly speaking, China’s approach to Russia is shaped by geo-political concerns and national strategy. Russia is a nuclear power sharing a roughly 2,600-kilometer land border with China; prudence dictates a carefully managed relationship, not direct confrontation and disagreement. And despite frequent rhetoric about a “no-limits partnership,” the relationship between China and Russia contains differences, asymmetries, and latent tensions that mark any major-power alignment.
Theoretically, China appears well suited to act as a mediator: it maintains channels with all sides, frames its diplomacy in terms of sovereignty and non-interference, and advertises a capacity for pragmatic dealmaking. In reality, however, Beijing is poorly positioned to play the central diplomatic role. Its friendly ties with Moscow constrain how forcefully it can press Russia, and the long-shared border restrains China in pushing the relationship into open or private disagreement. Meanwhile, China’s strained ties with the United States and an increasingly skeptical Europe make Western governments reluctant to endorse a Beijing-led peace process; many in the West assume China would tilt toward outcomes favorable to Russia and are therefore wary of conferring that legitimacy.
For China, one of the war’s most consequential externalities has been the deterioration of relations with Europe—an outcome Beijing did not fully anticipate. Even so, China still seeks to stabilize and improve ties with the EU. Looking ahead, the manner in which the war ends will have far-reaching effects on Eurasia’s balance of power and Europe’s security order, and will in turn shape Chinese foreign policy. If Russia emerges weakened, states in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus are likely to move closer to the EU and to Turkey, while hedging among China, Russia, Europe, and others. If the war ends on terms favorable to Moscow, Russia will consolidate influence across the region. Either scenario would generate new regional tensions. Nowadays, Chinese policymakers are already assessing post-war contingencies and the adjustments each path would require.
Wang Huiyao: China Can Help Trump and Putin End the War in Ukraine
U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s summit in Alaska represents a hopeful start to ending the war in Ukraine. However, true peace will require the involvement of more parties, such as Ukraine, Europe, the United Nations and China. Seven-party talks in Beijing leading to the formation of a UN-backed peacekeeping force could help secure peace. This solution works to reframe the problem by seeking out shared interests such as nuclear safety, regional stability and an end to the human misery created by active fighting.
Although Moscow and Kyiv remain at loggerheads over how to end the war, a solution that respects both sides’ red lines is difficult but not impossible since both Ukraine and Russia are open to peace. China, with its diplomatic standing and economic leverage, could lead to create a formal seven-party framework consisting of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council as well as Ukraine, alongside representatives from the European Union. China was both Russia and Ukraine’s largest trading partner in 2023, and additionally, both Russia and Ukraine are members of the Belt and Road Initiative.
To end the war in Ukraine, the first step is a ceasefire focusing on freezing hostilities, opening humanitarian corridors, restoring basic economic functionality and beginning negotiations for a longer-term settlement. A UN peacekeeping force would be necessary for these processes. An effective peacekeeping force could be composed of a mixture of nonaligned states and European ones to offer a politically viable middle ground. This force could be composed of five European countries like Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Poland, Italy and five BRICS nations like China, Brazil, India, South Africa and Egypt. After all, BRICS countries are more capable of offering creative guarantees and confidence-building measures that all parties would accept.
Aside from the ceasefire, China could alsocan aid in Ukraine and Russia’s postwar recovery by providing logistical and technical support as well as hosting seven-party talks. China not only has the engineering expertise and financing capacity to aid in reconstruction efforts but lead to create smaller working groups to tackle specific challenges such as humanitarian access, territorial disputes, energy infrastructure and long-term security guarantees. The entire world has a responsibility to help preserve peace, and China always insists on its wider commitment to peace, stability, and inclusive development.
Zhao Huasheng: China’s Policy Choices and China–Russia Relations in the Context of the Ukraine Crisis
The Ukraine crisis is the most serious international conflict since the end of the Cold War and is having a profound impact on China’s strategic environment and on global stability. China cannot be insulated from this impact and should not stand idly by.
Calling China’s stance “neutral” is inaccurate. China is neither a permanently neutral state nor has it declared neutrality in this crisis. At the policy level has made independent judgments based on “the rights and wrongs of the matter itself.” This principle was established on February 25, 2022, and remains in effect. In relevant UN votes China has cast votes in favor, against, and abstained; these votes are based on assessments of the nature of each issue, not on a posture of neutrality. China’s position is thus one of “constructive involvement.” In concrete terms, from the outbreak of the crisis China has urged peace talks, called for a ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, sought to prevent escalation, and promoted a political settlement. This approach is consistent with the “constructive participation” China has advocated in handling conflict hotspots in recent years: upholding non‑interference while mediating to prevent the spread of war.
There is no fundamental contradiction between “non‑alignment” and “no forbidden areas of cooperation.” “No alliance, no confrontation, and not targeting third parties” is a basic principle of China–Russia relations. China’s non‑alignment policy has not changed because of the phrase “no forbidden areas of cooperation”; that phrase is an attitudinal expression that must be understood within the framework of non‑alignment. In recent years Chinese official statements have tended to use more precise formulations to reduce misinterpretation. Some Western analysts, however, simply equate “no forbidden areas of cooperation” with China allying with Russia or even providing military support. Putin gave China no forewarning of the imminent attack on Ukraine during a visit to China in February 2022, nor did China voice its support of the war when it broke out. “No forbidden areas of cooperation” does not target third parties and certainly does not amount to a military alliance. The Western inference of a “China–Russia alliance” does not stand.
The domestic Chinese debate on the Russia–Ukraine conflict can be summarized as follows: one camp advocates moving closer to Russia, arguing that the United States and NATO bear significant responsibility and that “after defeating Russia the United States will concentrate on dealing with China.” Another camp argues that China–Russia relations should “hit the brakes,” citing the negative impact of the conflict on China’s international image and the risk that Chinese firms may face secondary sanctions from the United States and Europe.
Regarding policy choices, China should aim at “maintaining normal state‑to‑state relations with Russia,” for three main reasons: first, the crisis does not directly involve China, so maintaining normal interactions with Russia and with the United States and Europe is the natural choice; second, sound development of China–Russia relations helps maintain basic stability on the Eurasian continent and prevents an imbalance in the regional order; third, maintaining cooperation does not mean endorsing all of the other side’s policies. China has never supported Russia’s “special military operation,” has not recognized the incorporation of Crimea and the four regions into Russia, and advocates upholding Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity while stressing that all parties’ legitimate security concerns should be properly addressed.
There exist two risks for China. If China were to visibly distance itself from Russia politically and economically, Russia’s strategic position would sharply worsen and the regional balance of power would tilt. If, on the other hand, China’s joint posture with Russia were too overt and tough, it would invite bloc confrontation and add a camp‑to‑camp dimension to the conflict. Therefore, policy toward Russia is the core “transmission” channel of China’s overall policy and must balance maintaining principles with ensuring flexibility.
With regard to China–US relations and sanctions, first, the crux of China–US contradictions lies in the Taiwan issue and is not directly related to China’s specific stance on Ukraine. Even if China condemned Russia and joined Western sanctions, a fundamental shift in US policy toward China would be unlikely. Second, Chinese firms do face risks of secondary sanctions, but these stem from US sanctions policy itself rather than from the so-called China–Russia partnership. China should identify and avoid risks under a compliance framework and, together with Russia, seek relatively safe modes of cooperation.
There are concrete methods of “constructive involvement,” aligned with the 12‑point “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis,” including a ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, launching peace talks, ensuring grain exports, halting unilateral sanctions, safeguarding the stability of industrial and supply chains, and post‑war reconstruction. The goal is to advance an agenda acceptable to both sides, avoid escalation, and create conditions for negotiation.
To conclude, China should, in principle, adhere to non‑alignment, non‑confrontation, and not targeting third parties; in terms of positioning, it should replace a “neutrality” narrative with “constructive involvement”; in policy, it should maintain normal relations with Russia while drawing clear boundaries; in strategy, it should use the promotion of talks and risk management as levers; and in external communication, it should avoid allowing the China–Russia–West triangular relationship to be swept into binary narratives. The United States’ “black‑or‑white” approach will push China and Russia closer together and deepen global division and bloc dynamics. China needs to maintain strategic steadiness and operational flexibility, keep the fundamentals steady, and continue to intensify efforts towards feasible agendas.
Wang Wei: Systemic Roots of Regional Conflicts: Long-term Competition between the United States and Russia and Peace in Eurasia
The outbreak and continuation of the Russia–Ukraine war cannot be reduced to bilateral disputes between Moscow and Kyiv. Instead, it reflects a deeper structural antagonism. The conflict is the inevitable outcome of U.S.–Russia strategic competition—an extension of the post–Cold War tension between a unipolar order championed by the United States and the multipolar ambitions of Russia.
The conflict can be examined from bothAmerican and Russian perspectives to uncover its systemic roots. The U.S., empowered by overwhelming political, military, and economic advantages after the Cold War, sought to expand Western influence worldwide. NATO enlargement and EU expansion were the main instruments of this strategy. The logic was clear: “expansion means security.” Central and Eastern European states, along with post-Soviet republics, were gradually integrated into the Western community. While this was considered stabilizing from a Western standpoint, it had significant unintended consequences. By shrinking Russia’s geopolitical sphere of influence, it heightened Moscow’s sense of insecurity. NATO’s eastward expansion as a military alliance was interpreted by Russia as a direct erosion of its strategic buffer zone, steadily transforming itself into a structural security dilemma.
From the Russian perspective, as the primary successor state of the Soviet Union, Moscow has consistently asserted “special rights” in the post-Soviet space. This assertion is not merely strategic; it is also rooted in culture and identity. Russia has sought to construct a regional order centered on Orthodox Christianity, with surrounding Islamic states serving as a buffer, in order to preserve its primacy in Eurasia. With economic recovery and energy-driven prosperity in the 2000s, Russia regained confidence and reasserted its influence in regional affairs. Yet Moscow remained highly vigilant toward NATO enlargement, viewing the potential accession of Ukraine as a direct threat to its vital national interests. To Russia, the act of Ukraine joining NATO would bring Western power projection to its very doorstep. When traditional deterrence failed to alter this trajectory, Moscow turned to military force in the form of its “special military operation.”
The two different demands for order between the United States and Russia have collided fiercely. The former has insisted on unipolar primacy, while the later has sought regional primacy in Eurasia. The Russia–Ukraine conflict is thus not the result of two states’ independent choices alone, but the result of the long-term competition between the United States and Russia.
On this basis, the prospects for a peace settlement depend on the great powers behind this war. Russia, as the initiator of the military operation, targeted Ukraine directly but aimed strategically at NATO. Given the asymmetry of power and the absence of trust between Russia and Ukraine, a ceasefire is unlikely to emerge spontaneously from the wills of these two states. Therefore, certain external conditions must be created. On a theoretical level, four prerequisites are necessary for peace. First, a U.S.–Russia compromise must be achieved. This is the most decisive step, for without some level of accommodation between Washington and Moscow, peace will remain unattainable. Second, a Russia–Europe rapprochement should take place, easing geopolitical confrontation and restoring elements of cooperation. Third, international peace movements must gain strength, generating social pressure to resist prolonged conflict and humanitarian catastrophe. Fourth, the international community must acknowledge Russia’s existence and legitimate its security concerns, thereby reducing its perceived need to defend its space through military force. The first two conditions depend largely on the balance of material interests among major powers, while the latter two require broader international participation to de-escalate hostility and reconstitute shared norms.
Ultimately, the Russia–Ukraine conflict stems from the collision between the West’s long-standing liberal expansion and Russia’s enduring security imperatives. NATO enlargement has entrenched a rigid “us vs them” dichotomy, solidifying mutual suspicion and hostility. Without transcending this identity-based confrontation, peace will remain out of reach. To promote regional stability, all parties must work to reconstruct a higher-level security framework. This requires moving beyond NATO-centered thinking and abandoning the mentality of imposing one’s will on others. Only through such transformation can the dawn of genuine peace finally appear.
Conclusion
Regarding the origins and nature of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, there are diverse views within China. Yet in one respect China’s expectations align with those of all parties: a hope for the conflict to end and for grievances to be addressed through an appropriate settlement. The strategic partnership between China and Russia is shaped by complex historical and contemporary factors, including Beijing’s own security environment and strategic considerations. However, closer ties with Moscow do not imply opposition to Ukraine or Europe. It is also clear that China did not anticipate either the prolonged duration of the war or the breadth and depth of its global repercussions—especially the strain placed on China–EU relations. Today, Beijing continues to seek constructive pathways toward peace, while also striving to repair and deepen ties with Europe in order to jointly address broader global challenges and uncertainties.
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