ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by ZHANG Shuyan and CHEN Zhimin The Rise of “Sovereign AI” in the Global South and China’s Cooperative Responses on how China’s pursuit of sovereign artificial intelligence has become closely tied to its broader vision for the Global South, technological autonomy, and a more inclusive global governance order.

Summary

“Sovereign AI” refers to the governance of Artificial Intelligence (AI) led by sovereign states: domestically, it relies on the “supremacy” of sovereignty to strike a balance between industrial development and security risks; externally, it leverages the “independence” of sovereignty to pursue strategic autonomy and international influence. The theoretical implication of this concept derives from the technological characteristics of AI. The rapid iteration and inherent uncontrollable nature of AI compels states to assert their agency in technology governance. The broad, general-purpose nature of AI requires state powers to coordinate efforts across multiple security domains. The cross-border mobility of technological factors of AI necessitates that “sovereign AI” pursue strategic autonomy while remaining open.

To counter the monopolization of technical standards and governance rules, “sovereign AI” must assert its voice in international rulemaking, thereby upholding the value of diversity in the global order. As a natural member of the Global South, China adopts a cooperative response towards “sovereign AI,” featuring a spirit of cooperation based on equality and mutual benefit, a capacity-building model integrating open-source strategies with localized deployment, and a solidarity approach to enhance global AI governance engagement.

Why It Matters

The article conceptualizes “Sovereign AI” as a strategic choice through which states seek to shape the development and governance of artificial intelligence according to their own national priorities. Rather than viewing AI governance solely through the lenses of regulation or technological competition, it argues that sovereign AI has increasingly become a strategy adopted by countries in the Global South to strengthen technological autonomy, safeguard national security, and expand their voice in global AI governance.

Against this backdrop, the 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) provides an important practical context through which the article’s arguments can be understood. At the opening ceremony, President Xi stated that artificial intelligence “should not be the solo performance of one country, but a symphony of global cooperation.” This vision reflects China’s long-standing emphasis on AI for good, openness and inclusiveness, and the belief that AI development should contribute to more equitable global development.

More importantly, China announced a series of concrete initiatives aimed at strengthening AI capacity in developing countries, including providing 5,000 AI training opportunities over the next five years, establishing AI application cooperation centers with organizations such as ASEAN, the African Union, the Arab League, CELAC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and BRICS, and expanding AI-enabled meteorological early-warning systems to thirty countries. These initiatives suggest that China’s understanding of sovereign AI extends beyond technological self-reliance to include capacity building and the diffusion of technological capabilities across the Global South.

The establishment of the World AI Cooperation Organization (WAICO) on 16 July 2026 further illustrates how this vision is being translated into institutional practice. Created through an intergovernmental agreement signed by twenty-nine founding member states, WAICO represents one of the first international organizations dedicated specifically to AI cooperation and governance. By emphasizing consultation, shared development, human-centered governance, and compliance with the purposes of the UN Charter, the organization seeks to provide a new multilateral platform through which developing countries can participate more actively in shaping international AI governance. In this sense, WAICO is significant not simply because it creates another international institution, but because it offers the Global South an additional institutional channel through which the goals of sovereign AI—greater technological autonomy, stronger governance capacity, and enhanced international representation—may be pursued collectively rather than individually.

Viewed from this perspective, the article’s analysis of China’s cooperative approach to sovereign AI is particularly timely. Recent developments at WAIC and the creation of WAICO do not simply demonstrate China’s growing role in AI governance; they illustrate a broader attempt to combine technology empowerment with institution building as complementary pathways for strengthening the agency of the Global South in global AI governance.

Subscribe now

Key Points

1. The Conceptual Logic of Sovereign AI

Existing scholarship often focuses on AI sovereignty, a normative concept emphasizing a state’s supreme authority over AI systems and data flows within its jurisdiction. By contrast, Sovereign AI is a policy-oriented concept centered on how states build the technological, industrial, and institutional capacities needed to achieve strategic autonomy in AI. Whereas AI sovereignty concerns a state’s right to govern, Sovereign AI concerns its ability to act. The article adopts the latter framework because it is more practical, better captures the interaction between AI and national security, and provides a broader lens for analyzing both domestic capacity-building and international cooperation in pursuit of technological autonomy.

• The Return of the State in AI Security Governance

Sovereign AI reflects a renewed emphasis on the state as the ultimate guarantor of security. Drawing on theories of sovereignty from Jean Bodin to Carl Schmitt, the concept argues that AI’s rapid evolution, opaque decision-making, and security risks are creating governance gaps akin to modern “states of exception.” As powerful AI systems and technology firms challenge traditional regulatory authority, governments are reasserting control over innovation, risk management, and public order. Sovereign AI thus extends earlier debates over cyber and digital sovereignty into the age of artificial intelligence.

• Sovereign AI as a Comprehensive Security Framework

Because AI is a general-purpose technology, its implications extend across every dimension of national security. In military affairs, autonomous weapons and AI-enabled intelligence reshape deterrence and warfare. Economically, AI may reconfigure global value chains and deepen technological inequalities. Socially and politically, generative AI amplifies misinformation, cyber threats, and governance challenges. Culturally, algorithmic bias and foreign data influence can affect national identity and societal values. Sovereign AI therefore seeks to coordinate responses across military, economic, social, political, and cultural domains rather than treat AI as a narrow technical issue.

• Sovereign AI and Open Strategic Autonomy

Despite its emphasis on autonomy, Sovereign AI does not imply technological self-sufficiency. AI development depends on globally distributed data, computing power, talent, capital, and infrastructure. As a result, states must balance domestic capacity-building with international cooperation. The goal is not ownership of every technological resource, but control over the ability to develop, deploy, and govern AI within a country’s jurisdiction. In this sense, Sovereign AI redefines technological sovereignty as open strategic autonomy within an interconnected global ecosystem.

• Sovereign AI and the Quest for International Voice

Sovereign AI also requires influence over global rulemaking. As AI standards and governance frameworks are increasingly shaped by a handful of states and technology giants, countries seek greater representation in setting international norms. The concept emphasizes translating national development priorities and governance experiences into global standards while respecting diverse political and institutional models. Ultimately, Sovereign AI combines domestic capability with international participation, advocating a more pluralistic and inclusive global AI order (as presented in the Table below) rather than a single universal model of governance.

2. Building Sovereign AI in the Global South

The United States and Europe are advancing their own Sovereign AI strategies to strengthen technological autonomy and reduce external dependence. Washington emphasizes state-backed innovation and industrial investment, while Brussels integrates AI into its broader digital sovereignty agenda. Together, these efforts reflect a broader global shift towards treating AI as a strategic national capability rather than merely a commercial technology.

• Constraints on Sovereign AI in the Global South

Global South countries face significant structural disadvantages in AI development. Data shortages, weak research ecosystems, limited computing capacity, and underfunded digital infrastructure constrain indigenous innovation. At the same time, these states remain vulnerable to cyberattacks, deepfakes, data breaches, and emerging AI-related security risks. Their dependence on foreign cloud services, advanced chips, and frontier models deepens technological reliance, while Western dominance in AI standards and governance institutions limits their influence over rulemaking.

• The Governance Gap

Beyond technological dependence, the Global South remains underrepresented in global AI governance. Many developing countries are excluded from key forums, while existing frameworks largely reflect Northern priorities. Issues central to the Global South—technology transfer, digital inclusion, data sovereignty, and equitable development—receive limited attention, reinforcing asymmetries in both rulemaking and implementation.

• Domestic Sovereignty: State Leadership and Regulation

The article argues that Sovereign AI begins with strengthening the state’s domestic role. Governments should formulate national AI strategies, coordinate investment in data, computing power, talent, and infrastructure, and establish regulatory frameworks capable of balancing innovation with security. Regardless of whether countries adopt “hard-law” or “soft-law” approaches, states must retain ultimate authority over AI governance.

• External Sovereignty: Strategic Autonomy and Voice

Externally, Sovereign AI requires reducing technological dependence without embracing isolationism. Global South countries should pursue open strategic autonomy through international cooperation, South–South partnerships, and local capacity-building. At the global level, they must coordinate efforts to increase representation, shape international norms, and secure a stronger voice in the future governance of AI.

3. The Practice of Sovereign AI in the Global South

Referencing Brazil and Indonesia as case studies, the article examines how Global South countries pursue Sovereign AI through state-led strategies, institutional design, and capacity-building. Their experiences highlight common challenges and emerging pathways for technological autonomy, while offering insights into broader patterns of AI governance and South–South cooperation.

• Brazil: State-Led Planning and Global South Rulemaking

Brazil has emerged as a leading AI hub in Latin America, ranking fifteenth globally in AI research in 2022. Its Sovereign AI strategy rests on state-led planning, legal regulation, and selective openness. The 2021 Brazilian AI Strategy set priorities in education, labor, innovation, industry, public security, and social applications, while the 2024–2028 AI Investment Plan pledged $4 billion for infrastructure, business innovation, public services, and regulation. Brazil has also strengthened data protection through the LGPD and advanced an AI bill based on risk classification. Internationally, it uses cooperation with China, BRICS, the G20, and the OECD framework to expand technical capacity while defending Global South representation in AI governance.

• Indonesia: Digital Sovereignty through Infrastructure and Regulation

Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest economy, is rapidly building AI capacity while confronting deepfakes, cyberattacks, data leaks, digital inequality, and a projected shortage of nine million digital workers by 2030. Its 2020–2045 National AI Strategy identifies health, education, food security, government reform, and smart cities as priorities, while the 2025 AI white paper proposes a Sovereign AI Fund. Indonesia has passed a personal data protection law, issued AI ethics guidelines, and begun drafting binding AI regulation. Cooperation with Chinese firms such as Huawei, Alibaba Cloud, and Tencent Cloud supports infrastructure and cloud capacity, while data-localization rules seek to preserve sovereignty.

• Shared Pattern: Open Autonomy for the Global South

Brazil and Indonesia show that Sovereign AI in the Global South is neither isolationist nor purely market driven. Both rely on strong state planning, regulatory reform, foreign technology, and local capacity-building. Their common goal is to open domestic markets without surrendering control, and to turn national AI development into a platform for greater Global South representation on the global stage.

4. China’s International Cooperation Strategy for Sovereign AI

Unlike many Global South countries focused on technological catch-up, China combines concerns over supply-chain security and AI governance with significant technological strengths in patents, research, models, and computing infrastructure. The article argues that China’s Sovereign AI strategy increasingly centers on helping other Global South countries build AI capacity, while promoting greater collective influence and representation in global AI governance. China is thus positioned not only as a practitioner of Sovereign AI, but also as a key partner in advancing it across the Global South.

• A Reciprocate Vision for the Global South

China’s AI cooperation model emphasizes respect for national sovereignty and non-zero-sum security. Unlike approaches that export regulatory standards, Beijing advocates allowing countries to choose their own development and governance paths. Through the 2023 Global AI Governance Initiative and the Global Security Initiative, China presents AI cooperation as a vehicle for shared development rather than technological containment or geopolitical rivalry.

• Empowering Sovereign AI through Capacity Building

China increasingly frames itself as a capacity builder for the Global South. The 2024 UN resolution on AI capacity-building and China’s AI Capacity-Building Action Plan promote infrastructure, talent development, data security, and digital connectivity. Open-source models such as DeepSeek, Qwen, ERNIE, and Pangu lower barriers to entry, while initiatives like the China–ASEAN AI Innovation Cooperation Center provide tailored solutions that combine technology transfer with local strategic autonomy.

• Expanding Global South Representation in AI Governance

China seeks to strengthen developing countries’ voice in global AI governance through platforms such as the Digital Silk Road, BRICS, and the United Nations. It advocates greater representation, equal participation in rulemaking, and opposition to governance fragmentation. Through BRICS declarations and UN-led initiatives, Beijing positions itself as a champion of a more inclusive, multipolar, and development-oriented AI governance order.

Conclusion

This article examines the theoretical logic and practical meaning of “sovereign artificial intelligence,” arguing that it reflects a broader return of the state in global AI governance. As a general-purpose technology marked by cross-border flows of data, capital, talent, and infrastructure, AI has reshaped the tasks of national security and expanded its spatial boundaries. Sovereign AI therefore entails both strategic coordination across policy domains and a delicate balance between openness and autonomy. Its ultimate value lies not in technological closure, but in respecting diverse national interests and development models, thereby advancing a more equal and inclusive international order.

For countries of the Global South, sovereign AI is a strategic response to asymmetric power structures and widening technological divides. The cases of Brazil and Indonesia show that this approach can enhance domestic technological capacity. Internally, both states have used strategic planning and regulation to manage the tension between innovation and oversight. Externally, they have pursued international cooperation to strengthen local industries and amplify developing countries’ voices in global rulemaking.

China’s practice further advances this agenda. By combining open-source strategies, capacity-building, customized technical assistance, and cooperation through the United Nations, the Digital Silk Road, and BRICS, China offers a model of AI cooperation that moves beyond geopolitical rivalry and strengthens the Global South’s role in shaping the future of AI governance.

Subscribe now

About the Author

ZHANG Shuyan(张书言): ZHANG Shuyan is a Ph.D candidate in Diplomacy at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University. He is research assistant at the Center for Global AI Innovative Governance Global Artificial Intelligence Innovation Governance Center and Rongchang Scholar. His research interests include AI technological power, global AI governance and sovereign AI, etc.

CHEN Zhimin(陈志敏): CHEN Zhimin is the Vice President of Fudan University and professor at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University. He is a Chang Jiang Scholars Program Distinguished Professor by the Ministry of Education, a Jean Monnet Chair Professor by the European Union, and a Leading Talent of the National “Ten Thousand Talents Program” in Philosophy and Social Sciences. He serves as the Chairman of the International Politics Sub-committee of the China Higher Education Association, the Deputy Director of the Teaching Guidance Committee for Political Science Majors under the Ministry of Education, and the Vice Chairman of the Shanghai Federation of Social Science Associations. His research interests include international relations theory, diplomatic studies, and EU studies.

About the Publication

The Chinese version of the article was published by International Security Studies (《国际安全研究》), a leading Chinese academic journal in the field of international security and strategic studies. Published as a bi-monthly journal, International Security Studies is dedicated to strengthening strategic thinking, examining international security issues, and safeguarding national interests. The journal promotes academic research and scholarly exchange while serving as a platform for theoretical innovation and policy-relevant analysis. Covering a wide range of topics in security, diplomacy, and international affairs, it has earned broad recognition among both scholars and practitioners for its academic rigor and practical relevance.

Share

Subscribe now

ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we present a collection curated by LI Yining and LI Yijie, Chinese Perspectives on the 250th Anniversary of the US, on how leading Chinese scholars evaluate America’s structural transition, its severe domestic polarization, and the enduring resilience of its institutions and technology.

Summary

This collection brings together four distinct Chinese assessments of America’s 250th anniversary. Zhang Tengjun describes the moment as a “historical halftime,” while the other contributors emphasize prolonged adjustment, institutional resilience, or the uncertain relationship between declining hegemony and national power.

Despite maintaining global leadership in technology and economics, the U.S. is plagued by structural dilemmas. The authors highlight a fractured national consensus fueled by severe political polarization, widening inequality, and intense culture wars over identity and historical narratives. The traditional “progressive narrative” is facing unprecedented internal challenges.

However, the essays caution against simplistic predictions of American collapse. Zhu Zhaoyi emphasizes the resilience and adaptive capacity of U.S. institutions. Da Wei, by contrast, questions whether the conventional idea of American “self-correction” adequately explains the country’s historical development. Meanwhile, the U.S.-led order commonly associated with “Pax Americana” is visibly eroding—often dismantled by the U.S. itself due to domestic constraints—while America’s technological frontier remains a possible engine for national renewal.

Taken together, the four essays portray a contested American transition. Their authors share concerns about polarization and structural strain, while differing over the resilience of U.S. institutions, the prospects for national renewal, and the future of American global leadership.

Why It Matters

As the United States approaches its 250th anniversary, understanding how several Chinese scholars assess America’s trajectory is useful. This collection moves beyond simplistic narratives of “American decline.” Instead, the selected authors offer a nuanced assessment, acknowledging both America’s severe internal fractures and its continuing institutional and technological strengths.

For global policymakers, businesses, and analysts, these insights are useful. They reveal how these authors interpret U.S. domestic polarization, shifting foreign policies, and the erosion of “Pax Americana.” This selection represents a cross-section of Chinese scholarly debate and carries no claim to official status.

Subscribe now

Key Points

1. CICIR Institute of American Studies Research Group: The United States at 250: How Did It Get Here, and Where Is It Headed?

Beneath the clamor of the celebrations marking the 250th anniversary of American independence on July 4, 2026, the two parties’ dispute over “what exactly should be celebrated” deepens public division. National pride has fallen to a 25-year low. Mainstream media and think tanks clash over core questions such as “What is America?” This prompts deep reflection on how the United States arrived at this point and where it is headed.

• The Development Course of the United States and the Evolution and Predicament of American-style Capitalism

From independence to the late 19th century, American laissez-faire capitalism developed gradually. From the late 19th century to the 1930s, it developed into monopoly capitalism. From the 1930s to the late Cold War, it moved from general monopoly capitalism toward state monopoly capitalism, with international hegemony fully taking shape. From the late Cold War to the first decade of the 21st century, state monopoly capitalism became rigid, and waves of privatization, marketization, and liberalization pushed the United States toward international financial monopoly capitalism.

• U.S. Structural Problems Keep Emerging, but Its Global Lead Is Hard to Overturn in the Short Term

The United States still leads globally in the economic, technological, security, and global governance spheres, but widening wealth gaps, erosion of the manufacturing base, a long-term decline in manufacturing employment, slowing marginal growth, and waning national identity are undermining its hegemony. The report argues that checks and balances have become increasingly dysfunctional, contributing to political gridlock. Ideological polarization deepens the dispute over “What is America?” With global leadership in decline, American hegemony is hard to sustain.

• Looking Ahead, the United States Will Enter a Prolonged Period of Adjustment Marked by Both Restructuring and Division

The relative decline of hegemony does not mean national power will collapse overnight, and some strength may be restored, but a return to the “golden age” is extremely difficult. Financial monopoly capital squeezes the real economy, entrenching industrial hollowing out. The tech-right and financial oligarchs are deeply embedded in politics, exacerbating polarization and K-shaped growth while the public grows disillusioned. The right wing is internally divided, and the two parties battle over major issues, with the public interest reduced to a casualty. These fundamental problems mean the United States can hardly replicate its past “greatness.”

2. ZHANG Tengjun: America at 250: Halftime of History

The U.S. marks its 250th anniversary amid mixed feelings. Zhang argues that a question long posed by Black Americans and other minority groups—“What does it mean to love a country that does not love you?”—is now confronting the broader American public.

• Two Bodies Vie for Control of the Celebrations, and Two Narratives Tear Apart National Consensus

In 2016, Congress created the “U.S. Semiquincentennial Commission” for the celebrations. In January 2025, Trump established Task Force 250 by executive order. Later that year, following a cooperative agreement with the National Park Service, the National Park Foundation created Freedom 250 LLC to help organize anniversary events. Zhang argues that the creation of the parallel structure shifted control over the celebrations and directed a larger share of federal funding toward Freedom 250. The competing arrangements push rival narratives: one of diversity and historical reflection, the other of national glory and “greatness again.” Polls show record-low national pride and deep pessimism about the “American Dream” and the country’s future. In 1976, similar difficulties helped forge national healing; today, grander celebrations expose a shattered basic consensus.

• An Inherent Contradiction Ignites a Culture War on Two Fronts: Identity Politics and Historical Narrative

The Declaration of Independence proclaimed that "all men are created equal" while slavery persisted, an inherent contradiction from America's very birth that comes into sharp focus on the 250th anniversary. For a long time, the "progressive narrative" could still be maintained — yet today it has become untenable. The culture wars unfold along two fronts: one is the battle over identity politics, with the two sides mirroring each other through "anti-wokeness" versus diversity and inclusion, squeezing the middle ground; the other is the clash over historical narratives, from the "1619 Project" to book bans and the removal of statues, where even the path of looking back at history has split in two.

• Ideological Divisions Spill into the Economic and Diplomatic Spheres, Driving a Transformation of American Power

Ideological divisions are now spilling over into the economic and diplomatic spheres: macro data is strong, yet public sentiment has hit rock bottom, and “affordability” has become the top concern. On the economic front, bipartisan consensus is driving manufacturing reshoring and supply chain security, a course correction from neoliberalism, but in the short term tariffs raise consumer prices, while fiscal subsidies add to federal debt pressures, with long-term competitiveness still in doubt. On the diplomatic front, the Monroe Doctrine is reviving, the Western Hemisphere is once again a priority, and allies face transactional pressure. The Economist argues that domestic polarization is being transmitted into foreign policy volatility, adding to global uncertainty.

• Pessimism and Optimism Coexist, and the "Republican Experiment" Stumbles Forward Through Detours and Corrections

Looking back from the 250th anniversary, pessimism and optimism coexist. The pessimistic case lies in political dysfunction, collapsed social trust, and generational value divides. The optimistic case rests on foundational innovation, demographic and immigrant vitality, and local civic energy that still fuel national self-renewal. The “republican experiment” launched 250 years ago has no destined endpoint and is bound to cycle through detours and corrections. This anniversary is merely a historical halftime. America will neither easily disintegrate nor swiftly become “great again,” but will keep stumbling forward in the tension between its ideals and reality. For the world, more meaningful than pronouncing its rise or fall is to soberly prepare for a more uncertain future.

3. ZHU Zhaoyi: America at 250: Roots, Institutions, and Fractures

Philadelphia is revisiting the founding history of 1776, while the San Francisco Bay Area is chasing technology and the future—the same country split by two different themes. But the reason the United States has not followed the historical trajectory of great powers from rise to decline after 250 years lies in an institutional root system that can self-correct, self-restructure, and continuously absorb new elements amid its fractures.

• The Span of Growth: Paradigm Shifts Every Half-Century to a Century and an Unfinished Project in the Public Mind

With roughly 4% of the world’s population, the United States accounts for 26% of global GDP. Over the past 25 years, it has received more than 60% of global venture-capital investment, and more than half of the world’s most important AI models have been developed there. Among countries with populations above 10 million, none has a higher GDP per capita. What truly sets it apart is that, despite repeated crises throughout its history, it has never been locked into decline. The key lies in the fact that its growth has never been dependent on a single industry; roughly every half-century to a century, it restructures its growth paradigm, replacing old engines with new ones. Majorities of Republicans, Democrats, and independents say the American Dream remains a work in progress. Zhu interprets this finding as evidence that many Americans still view the national project as unfinished, and this collective mindset is precisely the evidence that it continues to grow.

• Institutions Are the Primary Productive Force: Self-Correction, Restructuring, and Absorption That Keep Recombining Factors of Production

The foundation of America's long-cycle resilience lies in its institutions. Its political institutions disperse power through checks and balances, reduce the risk of systemic collapse, and provide room for error correction in times of crisis. Its economic institutions, built on property rights protection, contract enforcement, and deep capital markets, form the incentive foundation for long-term investment and innovation. Its social institutions, particularly an immigration system that attracts global talent and top-tier universities backed by substantial research funding, convert human capital into continuous innovative output. Together, these three layers endow American institutions with three rare qualities: the capacity to self-correct, to restructure, and to absorb. Land, capital, and technology are all factors of production, but the institution that enables the continuous recombination of these factors is the primary productive force.

• The Price of Hegemony: How Global Dominance Breeds Inequality, Partisan Rupture, and a Nation Divided Between Optimism and Despair

Zhu argues that America’s geographic security buffer has facilitated extensive overseas intervention while limiting the direct military risks to its homeland. Such interventions can still impose heavy fiscal, military, and political costs. He identifies the dollar system as a durable instrument of U.S. power. At home, the unequal distribution of globalization’s gains has intensified political and social divisions. In his assessment, these forces make the United States both a highly dynamic testing ground and a potentially dangerous source of instability.

• Zhu Argues That China Has Benefited from the Existing Order and Seeks a Greater Voice Within It

Zhu argues that China has been a major beneficiary of the U.S.-led international order and seeks greater institutional influence within that order. The core insight from America’s 250-year experience is that institutional resilience lies in maintaining the capacity for self-correction and continuous absorption. Zhu concludes that most states will continue to operate largely within the existing system, while the United States itself lacks the capacity to construct an entirely new international order.

4. DA Wei: The End of Hegemony and the Rebirth of Power: America on Its 250th Anniversary

The United States is in an interregnum marked by the end of the old "Pax Americana" order, uncertainty over the trajectory of its power, and a still-blurry new world of the "Post-American Era."

• The Rise and Fall of American Hegemony: How Two Traditions Pulled America from Dominance to Self-Dismantlement

Two traditions have always pulled at American foreign policy—the self-preserving republican tradition and the expansionist imperial tradition—driving its trajectory from a great power to a hegemon in a pattern of “two steps forward, one step back.” After World War II, the United States built an institutional order centered on the United Nations and a network of international institutions. During the Cold War, this order operated primarily within the Western bloc; after the Cold War, it expanded globally under U.S. unipolarity. Yet hegemony itself sows the seeds of decline; internal contradictions such as industrial hollowing out and strategic overreach erupted after 2008, giving rise to Trump’s “table-flipping” foreign policy. Today, the United States is ending its hegemony in a rare way—not by external defeat, but by actively dismantling the system it built, trapped in the core dilemma of being unwilling to bear the costs and constraints of liberal internationalist hegemony while still wanting to enjoy its benefits.

• The Rise and Fall of American Power: The Technological Frontier as the Most Realistic Remaining Path to Renewed Power, but Institutional Hegemony Hard to Rebuild

America’s leaps in national power have relied on geographical, institutional, and technological frontiers. The first two avenues are increasingly constrained, making the technological frontier the most realistic path to reviving its strength. Yet even if technological change grows the “pie,” it may fail to improve distribution and could intensify the concentration of wealth and power. America’s much-vaunted “capacity for self-correction” is in essence a reinterpretation of its founding ideals in different historical contexts; past success offers no guarantee of future victory. American power may rise again, but a “Pax Americana”-style institutional hegemony is now difficult to rebuild, owing to the absence of the overwhelming material advantage, international prestige, and domestic consensus that the United States possessed in 1945 or at the end of the Cold War.

Conclusion

Taken together, the four articles portray America at 250 as a formidable power navigating a painful, long-term transition rather than a failing state. They share concerns about domestic contradictions, partisan gridlock, and cultural fractures, but they differ over the resilience of U.S. institutions, the prospects for national renewal, and the future of American global leadership. The era of unquestioned “Pax Americana” is fading, yet America’s future trajectory remains contested rather than predetermined. As the U.S. stumbles forward as an “unfinished project,” it will continue to wrestle with the gap between its founding ideals and reality. For the rest of the world, the focus must shift from predicting America’s collapse to adapting to a more complex, uncertain international landscape defined by this ongoing transformation.

Share

Subscribe now

ChinAffairsplus shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions or criticisms may be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by NI Feng on China’s American Studies.

Subscribe now

Summary

In recent years, China’s research on area studies and the construction of an independent knowledge system have developed rapidly and yielded substantial results. China’s American Studies is a specialized field devoted to the systematic observation and understanding of the U.S. in all its dimensions, including China-U.S. relations. Its developmental trajectory reflects the evolution of modern Chinese scholarship and the continuous deepening of China’s understanding of the outside world.

However, China’s American Studies still faces several developmental bottlenecks, which call for coordinated efforts in research paradigms, disciplinary integration, talent development, and knowledge system construction.

Why It Matters

In 2022, area studies was officially established as a first-level discipline in China, laying a stronger institutional basis for the field within the national academic system. The core significance of this move lies in constructing China’s independent knowledge system to inform national strategy.

China-U.S. relations are widely regarded as one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world. Given this context, China’s American Studies has gained renewed significance as a field that seeks to systematically understand the U.S. and China-U.S. relations through interdisciplinary and comprehensive approaches.

It aims to develop a deeper understanding of the complex social and political dynamics of the U.S., grasp the underlying logic of its behavior, and respond to the practical challenges of China-U.S. relations, as well as the strategic need to rejuvenate the Chinese nation. Against this backdrop, this article critically reviews the achievements and limitations of China’s American Studies and offers reflections on the construction of this evolving field.

Subscribe now

Key Points

1. From Learning to Strategic Response and Disciplinary Subjectivity

   1. Origins and Foundation Building (1949-late 1970s)

      During this period, China’s American Studies was highly integrated into international situation assessments and foreign policy decision-making support. It was characterized by strong practical orientation and a degree of confidentiality. First, it focused on intelligence analysis and strategic assessment. The central task of research was to accurately assess U.S. intentions toward China and the trajectory of its policies. Second, early academic work began to take shape, especially in American history and the history of China-U.S. relations. Universities and research institutions began to conduct foundational studies on American history and the history of China-U.S. relations, laying the groundwork for later development of the discipline.

   2. Institutionalization and the Rise of a Research System (late 1970s-early 1990s)

      China’s reform and opening up, combined with the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the U.S., provided both motivation and conditions for developing American Studies. This period was marked by three major developments. First, the establishment of core research institutions. For example, the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences was founded in 1981. Specialized journals such as American Studies were launched. Second, the expansion of university-based research networks. Several leading universities established American Studies centers, drawing on strengths in history, political science, and international relations to form distinctive research orientations. Third, the broadening and deepening of research perspectives. Research agendas gradually expanded from China-U.S. relations and U.S. foreign policy to include domestic political institutions, economic models, history, and culture. Many American academic works and theoretical writings began to be introduced into China.

   3. Expansion and Deepening Phase (early 1990s-2017)

      Following the end of the Cold War and China’s accelerated integration into the world, American Studies entered a period of diversified expansion. In terms of research agendas, studies rapidly expanded from traditional “high politics” fields such as history, politics, and economics to “low politics” areas including society, culture, ethnicity, and religion, with the aim of constructing a comprehensive, panoramic understanding of the U.S. In terms of research networks, a structure centered on state institutions, affiliated research institutes, universities, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences system gradually took shape. In terms of methodology, scholars consciously introduced theories and methods from established disciplines such as international relations, political science, economics, sociology, history, and cultural studies, undertaking mid-range theoretical construction and case-based analysis.

   4. Transformation and Innovation Phase (2017-present)

      With the U.S. clearly shifting its China policy toward “strategic competition”, China’s American Studies has entered a new stage focused on responding to major-power competition and developing innovative research approaches. First, this phase is marked by an unprecedented strengthening of problem consciousness, with a sharper focus on real-world concerns and policy orientation. Issues such as “America First”“decoupling” “de-risking” and “U.S. technology containment of China” have rapidly become central topics of scholarly analysis. Second, understanding of internal changes in the U.S. has enhanced, including “political polarization”“culture wars” and “identity politics”. Third, self-awareness within the discipline has increased. China’s American Studies actively explores new interdisciplinary approaches, aiming to construct an independent knowledge system of American Studies with China’s characteristics.

2. Strategic Alignment, Real-Time Agenda Tracking, and Dual Research Perspectives

   1. Main Characteristics: Alignment with Strategic Needs, Emphasis on Dynamic and Strategic Agendas, and Duality of Research Perspectives

      First, China’s American Studies is closely aligned with national strategic needs and has consistently focused on major strategic priorities of national development. For example, scholars’ attention to the Taiwan question stems from the fact that it is the most important and sensitive issue in China-U.S. relations. Similarly, Chinese research on the U.S. Congress began in the context of the 1995 Taiwan Strait crisis.. Research on intellectual property rights was also closely linked to negotiations between China and the U.S. over China’s accession to the WTO.

      Second, there is a strong focus on dynamic developments and strategic issues. Chinese scholars have long paid attention to major debates within U.S. political, academic, and strategic circles, such as “economic globalization”, the thesis of “end of history” “clash of civilizations”“soft power”“smart power” and the “Thucydides Trap”. Through these discussions, scholars seek to understand shifts in U.S. strategic thinking while engaging in dialogue with American and international counterparts. In addition, China has continuously tracked the evolution of U.S. global strategy. For instance, the Clinton administration’s “enlargement and engagement”, the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia”, the Trump administration’s “trade war” and its strategy of great-power competition during the first term. China has also maintained close attention to changes in U.S. domestic politics, such as the 2008 financial crisis, the Occupy Wall Street movement, and the Tea Party movement. Related research has often developed in near real time alongside these events, responding promptly to emerging concerns.

      Third, there is a duality of research perspectives and an increasing methodological pluralism driven by interdisciplinary exploration. Research perspectives operate on two levels: first, an effort to understand the U.S. in itself - that is, what the U.S. is; and second, an inquiry into the relationship between the U.S., China, and the wider world - that is, what the U.S. means for China and for the world. The latter perspective has increasingly become more prominent. Ultimately, American Studies in China converges on the question of the challenges the U.S. poses to China and China’s responses to them. As understanding deepens, scholars have come to recognize that no single discipline is sufficient to grasp the complexity of a superpower. As a result, interdisciplinary integration has become a consensus within the field.

   2. Developmental Bottlenecks: Insufficient High-Quality Works, Limited Theoretical and Methodological Innovation, Disconnect between Research and Public Understanding...

      Compared with the goal of building a mature and independent knowledge system, China’s American Studies still faces several developmental bottlenecks.

      First, many studies remain descriptive and policy-responsive, and high-quality scholarly works are insufficient. Many studies are limited to immediate descriptions of changes in U.S. policies and corresponding policy-response analyses, with insufficient exploration of underlying historical and cultural roots. As a result, there is a lack of deep, long-term structural explanations with strong analytical penetration.

      Second, theoretical and methodological innovation remains limited. In terms of research methods, although quantitative research and data analysis have been strengthened, the field is still in the process of exploring how to organically integrate the holistic perspective and dialectical thinking rooted in China’s traditional scholarly approaches into modern scientific methods, to form a distinctive methodological framework.

      Third, there is a disconnect between academic research, policymaking, and public understanding. Effective channels for disseminating high-quality academic findings to the public remain limited, and the discipline has not fully played its role in guiding rational public understanding of the United States or shaping public opinion on U.S.-related issues.

      Fourth, interdisciplinary integration remains relatively shallow. In practice, political science, economics, history, and sociology largely continue to operate in parallel rather than in deep integration.

      Fifth, there is a shortage of talent and room for improvement in training mechanisms. The overall scale of China’s American Studies community remains insufficient, and talent cultivation mechanisms remain narrow and insufficiently systematic.

3. Reflections on Constructing an Independent Knowledge System in Social Science

   1. Emphasizing a China-Centered Perspective

      A China-centered research agenda is the foundation of an independent knowledge system. Agenda-setting should proceed from China’s national interests, development needs, and security concerns, rather than simply following topics set by American academia. Researchers should draw on China’s historical experience, philosophical thinking, and practical standpoint to produce original knowledge about the U.S. that can engage in dialogue with the international academic community.

   2. Promoting a Profound Transformation of Research Paradigms
      First, strengthening problem consciousness. Research should focus on changes within the U.S., with particular attention to internal divisions, crises, and conflicts. Existing knowledge should be updated in response to these developments. Second, strengthening comparative politics and transnational perspectives. The U.S. should be examined within a broader global context. Third, deepening historical, cultural, and ideational research, to understand the logic of U.S. behavior through its historical trajectory. Fourth, encouraging the application of interdisciplinary approaches and emerging methods. Big data, artificial intelligence, and other tools can be used to analyze U.S. public opinion, politics, and elections, while integrating economic models to form a comprehensive analytical toolkit. Fifth, placing greater emphasis on fieldwork and primary sources. Through on-site visits, archival research, and elite interviews, scholars can obtain deeper insights that go beyond publicly available reports.

   3. Strengthening the Three Pillars of Discipline, Data, and Talent
      First, promoting interdisciplinary integration. Relying on area studies as a foundation, research institutions and universities should genuinely establish research centers and training programs that break down disciplinary boundaries. Second, building independent and authoritative databases and case libraries. Systematically collecting, organizing, and translating primary materials on U.S. politics, economy, and society is essential. Third, innovating talent training models for interdisciplinary professionals. Emphasis should be placed on the integration of foreign language proficiency, disciplinary theory, area knowledge, research methods, and cross-cultural practice.

      At the same time, more flexible “revolving door” mechanisms should be explored, allowing scholars to gain experience in policy and practice-oriented institutions. Likewise, experienced practitioners from diplomacy, trade, and public communication fields should be encouraged to bring their practical experience into classrooms and research settings. Support should also be given to a more diverse range of research actors.

   4. Actively Participating In and Guiding the Formation of International Academic Discourse
      Chinese scholars should engage more confidently on the international academic stage, contribute Chinese conceptual frameworks to global discussions, and conduct equal, rational dialogue and cooperation with international peers, while actively helping to shape the agenda of global American Studies.

Conclusion

The goal of building an independent knowledge system for American Studies is to forge a new knowledge paradigm rooted in China, grounded in a deep understanding of the U.S., and capable of integrating Chinese and international perspectives. This requires a more confident and composed mindset, systematically analyzing the complex internal structure of the U.S. while continuously reflecting on and defining China’s own position and methodological approach as the research subject, thereby providing important intellectual support for interpreting changes in the U.S. and shaping China-U.S. relations.

Subscribe now

About the Author

NI Feng (倪峰): Senior Research Fellow, PhD supervisor, Former Director of the Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and President of the Chinese Association for American Studies (CAAS). His main research interests include U.S. domestic politics and China–U.S. relations.

About the Publication

The Chinese version of the article was published by the Journal of University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (《中国社会科学院大学学报》). The journal, administered by the University of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), was founded in 1981, at the early stage of China’s reform and opening up. The journal publishes academic articles by leading scholars and experts from China and abroad, with a focus on studies addressing major contemporary theoretical and practical issues.

Share

Subscribe now

Hosted by SUN Chenghao, we will invite scholars and experts to discuss major international issues from great power relations and global governance to emerging security and diplomatic challenges. Through these conversations, we hope to share diverse perspectives on China’s foreign policy and the evolving international landscape.

Over the past year, European discourse on China has increasingly prioritized concepts such as economic security, de-risking, and industrial resilience, reflecting a significant shift in bilateral dynamics. Since the European Union officially defined China as a partner, competitor and systemic rival in 2019, the relationship has navigated a complex and often turbulent path. What are the structural sources driving current tensions, and how do issues like trade imbalances, investment hesitations, and the Ukraine crisis complicate the landscape? To what extent is Europe’s cautious approach rooted in an over-securitization of economic issues, driven by internal anxieties over sluggish growth and declining industrial competitiveness? As the EU’s 27 member states navigate internal divisions to formulate a cohesive policy, maintaining pragmatic engagement remains crucial.

In this episode of ChinaVoice, we invited LIANG Linlin from the China Chamber of Commerce to the EU (CCCEU), deeply engaged in China-Europe relations, to dissect the realities of European policymaking, the operational environment for Chinese enterprises in Europe, the mechanisms needed to prevent frictions from escalating into strategic confrontation, and the enduring necessity for bilateral cooperation in global governance, green transition, and artificial intelligence.

Subscribe now

Experts in Today’s Dialogue:

Timestamp：

Key Points:

This episode focuses on the evolving trajectory of China-Europe relations, with SUN Chenghao and LIANG Linlin discussing how both sides should understand rising tensions, manage economic and technological frictions, and identify realistic areas for future cooperation.

SUN opens the discussion by placing current European debates on China in a broader comparative context. He observes that many conversations now taking place in Europe sound similar to debates in Washington about a decade ago, when U.S. policymakers increasingly concluded that engagement with China had failed and that competition should become the organizing principle of the relationship. In Europe today, he notes, China-related discussions increasingly revolve around economic security, de-risking, industrial resilience, technological sovereignty and the idea of a “China Shock 2.0.” Against this background, he asks whether China-Europe relations have reached a new turning point.

LIANG responds that China-Europe relations have been described as being “at a crossroads” many times in recent years. In her view, however, the more substantial turning point came in 2019, when the European Union redefined China simultaneously as a partner, a competitor, and a systemic rival. Since then, this three-part framework has shaped many policy debates in Brussels and across Europe. She argues that Europe is now once again at a moment of reflection: some policymakers and scholars are debating whether Europe should take a tougher approach toward China, while others are asking whether the EU has overemphasized rivalry and competition at the expense of partnership.

SUN then raises the question of whether Europe has become overly concerned about China. He points out that issues such as economic dependence, industrial competition, critical infrastructure, and national security have become much more prominent in European debates. From the Chinese perspective, some observers worry that Europe is increasingly viewing China through a security lens and may be exaggerating the risks associated with China.

LIANG notes that the EU’s threefold definition of China is difficult to implement in practice because the categories of partner, competitor, and systemic rival can contradict one another. In recent years, Brussels has often stressed the competitor and rival dimensions more than the partner dimension. However, she also observes that not all Europeans see China primarily as a rival. Many are more concerned with China as a powerful economic competitor, especially in manufacturing. She adds that China is not necessarily the central issue in all European political debates; Europe is also preoccupied with energy, defense, migration, and broader economic challenges. There is also a gap between discussions in Brussels and attitudes at the member-state or regional levels.

Turnning to the sources of tension between China and Europe, SUN suggests that current disagreements go beyond individual issues such as electric vehicles, trade disputes, market access, and the Ukraine crisis. They are increasingly connected to broader European concerns about economic security, technological dependence, industrial competitiveness, and Europe’s position in a more competitive international system. LIANG identifies trade and industrial policy, investment, and the Ukraine crisis as three major sources of tension. From Europe’s perspective, trade imbalances, Chinese industrial competitiveness, and market access have become central concerns. From China’s perspective, there is concern that Europe’s de-risking agenda could slide into protectionism or selective decoupling.

On the question of “anxiety” in Europe, LIANG argues that European concerns about China are deeply connected to Europe’s own economic difficulties. Europe is facing sluggish growth, pressure on employment, weakness in parts of its manufacturing sector, high energy prices, rising labor costs, and a complex regulatory environment. In this context, China’s manufacturing capacity can appear overwhelming. Some Europeans worry that China can produce almost everything at competitive prices and increasingly high quality, which raises deeper questions about Europe’s own competitiveness. LIANG believes that some of this anxiety is understandable, but it can become problematic when the concept of security is overstretched. She gives the example of fears that Chinese companies could control infrastructure or access data in unrealistic ways. In her view, such concerns are often not based on facts and reflect a lack of trust.

At the same time, LIANG emphasizes that Europe should not be overly pessimistic about itself. Europe still has a large consumer market, strong innovation capacity, a deep talent pool, and significant power in global standard-setting. For Chinese companies, Europe remains a highly attractive destination, and survey data from the China Chamber of Commerce to the EU suggest that Europe’s importance for Chinese companies’ overseas expansion has continued to rise.

Then, SUN and LIANG also discuss internal divisions within Europe. LIANG explains that the EU is not a single state but a bloc of 27 member states, each with different economic exposure to China, policy traditions, and political preferences. Some countries are more supportive of free trade, while others are more protectionist. Positions also vary between Brussels, national capitals, and regional governments. However, she stresses that EU decision-making mechanisms still matter: even if member states disagree, EU-level rules can still produce collective decisions, especially on trade defense measures.

On managing differences, SUN argues that China and Europe should not allow trade and technology disputes to define the entire relationship. Complete decoupling is neither realistic nor desirable. LIANG agrees and points out that China and the EU already have many dialogue mechanisms, including summits, high-level economic and trade dialogues, digital economy exchanges, climate and environment dialogues, and strategic dialogues. However, she believes that the frequency and effectiveness of communication are still insufficient. She welcomes discussions on a China-EU trade and investment consultation mechanism, which could help address concrete issues such as export controls, the implementation of the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation, trade defense instruments, and supply-chain-related measures. SUN adds that compared with the frequency of China-U.S. exchanges on trade and investment, China-EU communication still needs to become more regular and institutionalized.

Finally, the discussion turns to global governance. LIANG argues that China and Europe still have meaningful room for cooperation in areas such as energy security, green transition, food security, counterterrorism, climate change, multilateral governance, and third-party market cooperation. She notes that Chinese companies have contributed positively to Europe’s green transition and that there may be potential synergies between the Belt and Road Initiative and the EU’s Global Gateway, particularly in connectivity and third-party markets. However, she stresses that trust must be rebuilt first.

SUN concludes by highlighting artificial intelligence governance as a promising area for future China-Europe cooperation. He suggests that the two sides could explore official or Track 1 dialogues on issues such as the AI-nuclear nexus, the social impact of AI, and preventing the malicious use of AI by non-state actors. Overall, the episode suggests that China-Europe relations are becoming more complicated but also more important. The key question is not whether disagreements exist, but whether both sides can manage them while building more concrete, issue-based, and sustainable cooperation.

Subscribe now

Share

Follow ChinaVoice Now!

Apple Podcast

Spotify

RSS Feed

https://rss.com/podcasts/chinavoice/2948104/ (You can also copy this address from your browser’s address bar and paste it into any podcast app that supports RSS.)

Know more about our TEAM!

Executive Producer: SUN Chenghao

Producer: LI Yining, WANG Yinuo

Content Editor: ZHANG Xueyu, LI Yijie, WANG Yexu

Graphics Designer: ZHANG Xueyu

Subscribe now

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by Zhou Guiyin on From Crisis Management to Strategic Stability in China-U.S. Relations.

Summary

Since 2017, the United States has engaged in comprehensive strategic competition with China, leading to recurring crises in their bilateral relationship. Yet through the interaction of domestic and international factors on both sides, especially thanks to the efforts of the two countries’ leaders, relationship has repeatedly returned to a phase of relative stabilization after each period of tension, demonstrating a notable degree of resilience.

A comparative analysis of China-U.S. relations and historical cases of great-power competition in the modern era suggests that there is a positive relationship between stable great-power relations and a stable international order. The stability of international order, in turn, depends on two fundamental conditions: consensus among major powers, and commonly accepted rules and institutions for managing major bilateral and multilateral affairs.

Based on this argument, the article proposes a multi-level and multi-sector policy agenda aimed at shifting China-U.S. relations from crisis management toward strategic stability. At the bilateral level, China and the United States must respect each other’s core interests and seek mutual understanding on key disputes, including economic and trade relations, the Taiwan issue, the South China Sea, and technological competition. At the regional and global levels, both sides should take each other’s major concerns into account and work toward agreements on secondary issues such as reform of international organizations, regional security, nonproliferation, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity.

Why it Matters

As China-U.S. tensions continue to expand from trade and technology into security, artificial intelligence, and regional geopolitics, discussions about “strategic stability” have become increasingly important.

This article is valuable because it moves beyond the common “new Cold War” framing and instead examines whether major power competition can remain manageable under current international conditions. Rather than focusing only on political disputes, the article places current China-U.S. relations in a broader historical context.

By comparing today’s rivalry with cases such as the Concert of Europe, Anglo-German competition before World War I, and the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, it argues that the stability of international order often depends on whether major powers can maintain communication, crisis management mechanisms, and limited strategic consensus even during periods of intense competition.

The article is also closely connected to ongoing developments. Issues such as semiconductor restrictions, supply chain restructuring, Taiwan, the South China Sea, and AI governance are no longer isolated policy disputes; rather, they increasingly shape global economic and security structures. Against this backdrop, the article provides a useful framework for understanding why both competition and coexistence are likely to remain defining features of China-U.S. relations in the coming years.

Subscribe now

Key Points

As China-U.S. tensions continue to expand into trade, technology, AI, and regional security, discussions about “strategic stability” have become increasingly important. Rather than simply framing the relationship as a “new Cold War,” this article focuses on whether major power competition can remain manageable. By comparing current China-U.S. relations with historical cases such as the Concert of Europe and the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, the article argues that competition does not necessarily lead to direct conflict. Diplomacy, communication, and crisis management still matter.

I. The Expansion and Management of U.S. Strategic Competition with China

As China-U.S. tensions increasingly expand into trade, technology, AI, and regional security, discussions about “strategic stability” have become more important. This article is useful because it moves beyond the simple “new Cold War” narrative and instead focuses on whether competition between major powers can still be managed.

The article places current China-U.S. relations in a broader historical context by comparing them with cases such as the Concert of Europe, Anglo-German rivalry before World War I, and the U.S.-Soviet Cold War. It argues that competition does not automatically lead to direct conflict. Communication mechanisms, diplomacy, and limited strategic consensus can still help stabilize great power relations.

The discussion is also closely connected to current events. Issues such as semiconductor restrictions, supply chain restructuring, Taiwan, the South China Sea, and AI governance are increasingly affecting not only bilateral relations but also the wider international order. Against this background, the article provides a relatively clear framework for understanding why competition and coexistence are likely to continue at the same time in China-U.S. relations.

II. The Resilience of China-U.S. Relations

Since the United States began comprehensive strategic competition with China, China-U.S. relations have repeatedly moved through cycles of tension, negotiation, and partial stabilization. Major crises, including the 2018 trade war, the 2020 COVID-19 origins dispute, the 2022 Pelosi Taiwan visit, and the 2025 tariff war, all pushed bilateral ties into periods of instability. Yet after each crisis, both sides eventually resumed dialogue and crisis management, showing that the relationship still retains significant resilience.

This resilience comes from four main sources.

First, China and the United States remain deeply economically interdependent. For decades, economic ties have acted as a “ballast” in bilateral relations. Although recent trade wars and technology restrictions revealed the risks of mutual disruption, they also showed that neither side can fully absorb the costs of economic decoupling. This explains why both countries repeatedly returned to negotiations and eventually reached partial agreements.

Second, cooperation in regional and global governance, together with pressure from third parties, has helped prevent relations from collapsing completely. Even during periods of intense competition, China and the United States continued to cooperate on issues such as climate change, pandemic response, nonproliferation, AI governance, fentanyl control, and regional conflicts. At the same time, actors such as the European Union, ASEAN, and many Global South countries generally refused to fully choose sides, preferring strategic autonomy and hedging strategies instead. These external actors have indirectly moderated China-U.S. tensions.

Third, sustained diplomatic dialogue has remained essential. Although many bilateral dialogue mechanisms established during the Bush and Obama years were suspended, high-level communication channels survived. New consultation mechanisms were also created to handle trade disputes, security tensions, and strategic communication. Most importantly, leader- to- leader diplomacy between Chinese and American presidents has played a key role in stabilizing relations during moments of crisis.

Fourth, and most importantly, the resilience of China-U.S. relations ultimately rests on the balance of power between the two countries. The United States still possesses unmatched global military alliances, technological innovation capacity, and international influence. China, however, has rapidly expanded its military capabilities, built the world’s most comprehensive manufacturing system, and increased its international influence. This combination of competition, mutual constraints, and asymmetric strengths has prevented either side from fully dominating the other, creating the conditions for what the author describes as an “uncomfortable coexistence.”

Subscribe now

III. Comparing U.S.-China Competition with Historical Great Power Rivalries

The resilience of China-U.S. relations suggests that effective crisis management is possible, but long-term strategic stability remains uncertain. To better understand this issue, the article compares current U.S.-China competition with several historical cases, including Anglo-German rivalry before World War I, the Concert of Europe after the Congress of Vienna, and the U.S.-Soviet Cold War.

Stable great power relations are closely tied to a stable international order. Historically, international systems have always been hierarchical, meaning that relations among major powers largely determine the structure and stability of the world order. The comparison shows that a stable international order usually depends on two core conditions.

First, major powers must share at least a minimal consensus on preserving the overall international system. During both the Concert of Europe and later Cold War, rival powers still accepted certain rules, spheres of influence, and mechanisms for crisis management. Strategic stability was maintained not because conflict disappeared, but because competition remained bounded by shared understandings.

Second, diplomacy matters. Even during severe confrontations, major powers continued negotiations, maintained communication channels, and sought limited compromises. According to the article, diplomacy becomes more important, not less, during periods of high tension.

The article also highlights several historical lessons from failed great power competition. International order tends to collapse when rival states refuse to compromise over territory, economic competition, security interests, or prestige. Excessive pressure, ideological confrontation, arms races, and strategic overextension often push crises toward war. Historical examples such as Imperial Germany, Nazi Germany, and later stage Soviet expansion are presented as warnings about the dangers of aggressive rivalry and overreach.

Overall, the article argues that the future stability of China-U.S. relations will depend on whether both countries can maintain strategic restraint, preserve dialogue mechanisms, respect each other’s core interests and avoid turning competition into direct confrontation.

IV. The Possibility of Strategic Stability in China-U.S. Relations

Can China-U.S. relations move from crisis management toward long- term strategic stability? The article argues that despite growing competition, this possibility still exists because the relationship remains deeply interconnected and both sides still share an interest in maintaining overall international stability.

The author believes that U.S.-China competition is comprehensive but also asymmetric. The two countries compete in politics, economics, technology, military affairs and international influence, yet their strengths and goals are not identical. China repeatedly emphasizes that it does not seek to replace the United States, while the United States continues to view China as its main strategic competitor. At the same time, the two countries remain deeply connected through supply chains, global markets and international institutions.

According to the article, strategic stability requires both sides to clarify and respect each other’s core interests. For China, the most important issues include continued economic development, the Taiwan issue and political security. For the United States, major concerns include technological leadership, domestic political stability and maintaining its dominant position in the Asia Pacific.

The article suggests that future China-U.S. relations should focus on “managed competition” rather than confrontation. In the bilateral sphere, both sides should maintain dialogue, seek compromises on secondary issues, and avoid escalation on sensitive issues such as Taiwan and the South China Sea. Economically, trade agreements and supply chain cooperation could continue to serve as stabilizing forces. In the technology realm, competition will likely continue, but limited cooperation in areas such as AI governance and scientific research may still be possible.

At the regional and global level, the article argues that China and the United States should continue cooperating on issues including climate change, nuclear nonproliferation, global governance reform, cybersecurity and artificial intelligence. Ultimately, strategic stability will depend on whether both countries can maintain communication, exercise restraint and reach at least a minimal consensus on preserving international order.

Conclusion

Competition will likely remain a long-term feature of China-U.S. relations, but competition does not automatically mean confrontation or conflict. Whether the relationship can shift from repeated crisis management toward greater strategic stability will depend on continued dialogue, mutual restraint, and the ability of both sides to manage disagreements within a stable international framework.

Subscribe now

About the Author

ZHOU Guiyin(周桂银) is Professor at the School of International Relations/Research School for Southeast Asian Studies and the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Xiamen University. His research focuses on the intellectual history of international relations, the history of strategic thought, China’s neighborhood diplomacy, and China-U.S. relations.

About the Publication

Forum of World Economics & Politics is a bimonthly academic journal supervised by the Jiangsu Academy of Social Sciences and published by its Institute of World Economics. Since its founding in 1981, the journal has developed into an important academic platform in China for research on world economics and international politics. Since 2004, the journal has continuously been included in the Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index (CSSCI) and the Guide to Chinese Core Journals. It mainly publishes recent research on international relations, international politics, international security, international strategy, world economy, international trade and investment, and international finance.

Share

ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by Da Wei and Zhou Wuhua about China-U.S. Relations in the Era of “Dual-Core Multipolity”.

Summary

The international order defines the nature of state-to-state relations, while the nature of state-to-state relations shapes their contents. The post-Cold War global order has come to an end, and the international landscape is evolving toward a “Dual-Core Multipolar” order anchored in the pursuit of nation-state interests. Transformations in the international order have altered the nature of China-U.S. relations and necessitated a corresponding rebalancing of their contents. Since 2017, China and the United States have explored the new nature of bilateral relations amid strategic games. Over the past two years, this nature has become increasingly clear.

Accordingly, it is imperative to adjust the content of China-U.S. relations based on this evolving nature to forge a new state of stability. The decision by the Chinese and U.S. leaders to establish a “Constructive China-U.S. Relationship of Strategic Stability” as the new orientation of bilateral relations represents the latest effort to recalibrate the substance of China-U.S. relations. To this end, China and the United States need to establish an acceptable, predictable, and sustainable relationship of competitive coexistence across strategic perception, military security, economy, science, technology, and education, the Taiwan question, geopolitics, major country interactions, and global governance.

Why It Matters

Since Donald Trump first took office in 2017, the international order and the nature of China-U.S. relations have undergone a fundamental and profound shift. The international community, deeply troubled by geopolitical conflicts and a Cold War mentality, urgently requires the stabilization of major country interactions to inject certainty into the world. On May 14, 2026, the heads of state of China and the United States met in Beijing and reached a consensus on building a “Constructive China-U.S. Relationship of Strategic Stability” proposed by President Xi Jinping, providing the latest guidance for the future direction of bilateral relations.

From a structuralist perspective and borrowing the concept of equilibrium from thermodynamic systems, this article breaks away from the traditional equilibrium theory’s pursuit of absolute symmetry. It profoundly demonstrates how, amidst profound transformations in the international order, China and the United States can achieve a dynamic equilibrium, which may not be entirely symmetrical yet remains acceptable, predictable, and sustainable, through the adjustment of internal variables.

This offers a rational framework for crisis management to prevent major country competition from sliding into the Thucydides Trap. Furthermore, it provides an actionable logic for how both nations, in their future interactions, can translate macro strategic stability into cooperation across fields such as the economy, climate change, science, and technology, and how they can gradually accumulate mutual trust and recalibrate their relations to forge a relatively stable, healthy, and sustainable bilateral relationship.

Subscribe now

Key Points

• China-U.S. Relations and International Order Shifts since 1972

1. Strategic Collaboration in the Cold War Era: Under the US-Soviet bipolar structure, the nature of China-U.S. relations was a strategic collaborative relationship between a relatively defensive United States and China as a crucial third party, driven by a shared external threat from the Soviet Union. Despite vastly different institutional systems and limited social exchanges, the two nations engaged in deep strategic coordination. This was achieved through the issuance of the three joint communiqués, a blurred handling of the sensitive Taiwan question, and cooperation on military intelligence and regional affairs. In the 1980s, as China initiated reform and opening up, the original strategic collaboration was superimposed by economic and social engagement, propelling bilateral relations into a stable and positive honeymoon period.

2. Interdependence in the Post-Cold War Era: Amid neoliberal globalization defined by a unipolar landscape with multiple great powers, the nature of China-U.S. relations transformed into a relationship of high interdependence and mutual development between the largest developing country and the largest developed country. As the United States pursued an engagement strategy and China integrated into the international system, economic and trade relations became the ballast stone of bilateral stability. Both nations became the primary beneficiaries of globalization, significantly raising their shares of global economic output. Despite major divides over ideology, Taiwan, and the South China Sea mid-air collision, both sides derived maximum benefits because the content of their relations closely matched their nature.

3. Order Reshaping and Landscape Transformation in the New Era: Western skepticism toward globalization and a political shift to the right have driven a fundamental reversal of the international order, forcing a passive restructuring of China-U.S. relations. Following the 2008 financial crisis, the surge of populism and economic nationalism in the United States triggered a strategic debate that completely repudiated the engagement strategy, turning China-U.S. relations into the primary scapegoat for Western internal contradictions. Concurrently, US global strategy evolved in three stages, moving from America versus China under Trump’s first term, to the West versus China under Biden, and ultimately to America versus the whole world in Trump’s second term. Driven by the failure of domestic interest redistribution in the West, the rise of China under an alternative system, and the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the old globalization order has ended after nine years of systemic disruption. The current deterioration of China-U.S. relations is the inevitable impact of this systemic collapse rather than a mere policy mistake.

• Reconfirming the Nature of China-U.S. Relations

  The international order has irreversibly shifted from a US-led liberal unipolar order to a nationalist new order under a dual-core multipolar framework, and the nature of China-U.S. relations has consequently transformed into a competitive coexistence between two independent major powers within a multipolar landscape.

  1. Structural Characteristics of the New International Order

     1. Ideological Shift Toward Sovereignty and Nationalism: The new order rejects the liberal logic of the old order that pursued the maximization of economic efficiency on a global scale and instead increases the analytical weight of other elements such as national security, national capacity, and civilizational identity narratives. At present, the United States pursues making America great again, China advocates for running parallel without conflict and achieving common prosperity, India strives for a developed and self-reliant vision through “Viksit Bharat@2047” and “Atmanirbhar Bharat”, Russia emphasizes its identity as a state-civilization and a sovereign center of global development, and the European Union proposes concepts such as European sovereignty and strategic autonomy. This reflects that all major power centers in the international community view their own sovereignty, security, autonomy, and identity as the fundamental starting point and ultimate destination of strategic planning.

     2. Gradual Formation of a Dual-Core Multipolar Landscape: Although the distribution of global power centers is becoming more balanced, the relationships among these centers are being restructured, and multipolar features are highly prominent. The power of the two poles, China and the United States, occupies a relatively more vital position within this framework. This is because the economic aggregates, advanced technology research and development, such as artificial intelligence, and military expenditures of China and the United States are far greater than those of other power centers. Furthermore, the bilateral relationship exerts a driving effect on other poles, and the contradictions between the two nations constitute the primary contradiction among all poles, creating a dual-core multipolar mixed power structure beneath the basic dimension of a multipolar landscape.

     3. Three-Stage Catalysis of U.S. Global Strategy: The formation of this landscape has undergone a nine-year evolution. The first Trump administration adopted a unilateral coercive competition strategy, attempting to maintain a hegemonic unipolarity through tariffs, technology restrictions, and hard power pressure. The Biden administration attempted to use the Ukraine crisis to promote a bipolarized and bloc-oriented organizational competition to construct a downsized version of the liberal order. It was not until 2025, when the second Trump administration launched a multi-front offensive and restructured its relationships with allies and international institutions, that the dual-core multipolar trend re-emerged. Concurrently, several factors have rendered it difficult for the United States to restore the old system, despite having the desire to do so. These include the persistence of domestic nationalism and unequal wealth distribution, the serious damage Trump’s two terms did to liberal international institutions and alliance systems, and the loss of the unprecedented economic and military advantages the U.S. enjoyed at the end of the Cold War. As a result, the shift toward a dual-core multipolar order is irreversible in the foreseeable future.

  2. Fundamental Restructuring of the Nature of China-U.S. Relations and the Path Toward Equilibrium

     1. Comprehensive Transformation of the Nature and Positioning of Relations: With the collapse of the old order, China-U.S. relations are no longer a profound interdependence between the largest developing country and the largest developed country in the context of globalization. Instead, the relationship has transformed into one between two major powers that are strategically independent of each other and may even lean towards opposition within a multipolar landscape.

     2. Compatibility Conflicts of Strategic Goals: Under the previous two orders, the nature or goals of China-U.S. relations were either identical or compatible. However, after entering the new landscape in 2017, both the Trump and Biden administrations placed outcompeting China at the core of their global strategies. Although China rejects defining bilateral relations in terms of competition, it acknowledges the presence of competitive elements within the relationship. China pursues the full realization of Chinese modernization and seeks to become one of the world’s primary powers, while the United States strives to maintain its unchallenged position as the world’s most powerful pole. The collision of these grand goals has driven bilateral relations toward a highly competitive and confrontational state.

     3. Path Choice Between Active Transformation and Passive Equilibrium: Faced with this monumental shift in bilateral relations, the content of China-U.S. relations must be restructured. On the one hand, China and the United States can actively coordinate and adjust their strategic directions to proactively establish a new equilibrium of interests through interaction, thereby transforming bilateral relations as quickly as possible - a path that is ideal but fraught with difficulties. Alternatively, they will be forced to gradually grope their way toward a new equilibrium through continuous, uninterrupted gray-zone games, frictions, and painful confrontations. Given the massive aggregates of both China and the United States, such a blind race to the bottom would not only be extremely painful but would also bring immense systemic risks and catastrophic challenges to both nations and the entire world.

  3. Five Marginal Conditions Constraining a “Race to the Bottom” in China-U.S. Relations

     Through repeated exploration, China and the United States are forming a new normal. Faced with comprehensive confrontation, both nations are rigidly constrained by five deep marginal conditions, preventing a complete race to the bottom. While neither side is fully satisfied, these constraints steer them toward a mutually acceptable state of competitive coexistence, namely, a new type of major power relations 2.0.

     1. Mutual Assured Destruction in the Military Sphere: Traditional nuclear deterrence remains effective despite emerging technological challenges. Because a hot war would bring unbearable costs for both sides and the world, neither country will risk pushing the other toward nuclear escalation. This reality forced the United States to pragmatically seek a decent peace in its 2026 National Defense Strategy, signaling that absolute military victory is unviable and a mutually acceptable equilibrium must be pursued.

     2. Respective Strong Resilience at the Political and Economic Levels: A decade of extreme strategic competition proves that unilaterally crushing the opponent is a strategic illusion. The United States remains powerful and technologically vibrant, while China has withstood containment, maintaining domestic unity and achieving major high-tech breakthroughs that force U.S. industry to reconsider the costs of decoupling. This mutually unbeatable reality has prompted successive U.S. administrations to declare they do not seek conflict, a new Cold War, or regime change.

     3. Mutual Assured Disruption along Supply Chains: Decades of globalization cemented China as the global manufacturing core and the United States as the demand core, making full decoupling impossible despite ongoing sanctions. By 2025, China’s export controls over critical raw materials such as rare earths demonstrated its reverse disruption capability against U.S. industrial chains. When both actors possess the means to severely disrupt each other’s economic lifelines, their confrontation is strongly constrained by objective economic laws.

     4. Strategic Independence of External Multipolar Actors: As the dual cores of a multipolar world, neither China nor the United States can dictate global alignment, thus hindering bloc-oriented polarization. While Europe pursues strategic autonomy and middle powers strengthen cooperation for self-preservation, the Global South adopts a posture of active non-alignment and multi-hedging, refusing to choose sides. This independent multi-alignment prevents either superpower from pulling the rest of the world into a joint race to the bottom.

     5. Rigid Demand for Collaboration in Cutting-Edge High-Tech Governance: While traditional global governance has severely shriveled, the rise of artificial intelligence is fundamentally reshaping state-to-state relations. As the absolute leaders in AI, complete non-cooperation between China and the United States carries devastating global risks that far exceed traditional fields. This shared technological crisis serves as the ultimate driving force pushing both nations to abandon a race to the bottom and embrace parallel progress under competitive coexistence.

• Rebalancing the Content of China-U.S. Relations

  A fundamental shift in the international order and the nature of relations necessitates a profound adjustment of the content of China-U.S. relations. With 2026 serving as a crucial milestone for bilateral relations, both nations are committed to advancing a “Constructive China-U.S. Relationship of Strategic Stability” at the macro level. This implies the pursuit of an acceptable, predictable, and sustainable state of stability where both sides move toward each other and engage in deep integration, even if it is not the absolute optimal solution. To achieve this, the content of the relationship must be recalibrated across the following eight fields.

  1. Rebalancing Strategic Perception: The logic of mutual expectation from the globalization era - where the United States expected China to Westernize and China expected the United States to accommodate its rise - has collapsed, leading to the American narrative of engagement failure and acute Chinese strategic apprehensions. The new equilibrium must shift from mutual expectation to mutual recognition. Through psychological and emotional recalibration, both sides must transition from attempting to change the other to managing coexistence. This requires acknowledging the long-term nature of each other’s institutions, values, and strategic choices, while accepting the objective reality that neither side can easily reshape or overwhelm the other.

  2. Rebalancing Military Relations: As China’s military capacity extends toward the Western Pacific, the two militaries have transitioned from isolation to direct opposition and face-to-face standoffs, facing systemic risks of accidental friction. To operationalize the principle of non-conflict and non-confrontation amid chronic strategic mistrust, both sides should draw on U.S.-Soviet historical experience to establish rigid institutional arrangements. These mechanisms must cover military communication channels, the prevention of nuclear miscalculation, the reduction of nuclear risks, ballistic missile launch pre-notifications, and air and maritime encounter rules. Concurrently, emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, unmanned warfare, and missile defense must be fully integrated into the security dialogue.

  3. Rebalancing Economic Relations: Although the role of economic and trade ties as the ballast stone of bilateral relations has significantly declined, the new equilibrium does not mean comprehensive decoupling. Instead, both nations must preserve economic ties to the greatest extent possible under conditions acceptable to national security. In the near future, the focus lies in achieving a series of stable deliverables sequenced by difficulty through bilateral consultations in procurement, tariffs, investment, and export controls. The core of this effort lies not in the size of the yard or the height of the wall within the small yard and high wall approach, but rather in establishing the stability and predictability of the position of the wall.

  4. Rebalancing Science, Technology, and Education Exchanges: Societal exchanges have been comprehensively securitized and disrupted, making a full return to the absolute openness of the globalization era unrealistic. Rebalancing these exchanges requires an internal consensus within each country regarding the trade-offs between benefits and risks, formulating clear, enforceable rules to secure their respective safety. Provided that government departments maintain a unified policy framework, both sides should expand connections through consultation in non-sensitive areas like study abroad, tourism, think tank dialogues, and subnational exchanges to ensure their societies maintain mutual familiarity and connectivity.

  5. Rebalancing the Taiwan Question: As the most sensitive core issue, the Taiwan question is complicated by an American one-China policy that essentially treats the status of Taiwan as undetermined, in addition to a hollowing out of its policy that sends strategically ambiguous signals to the Taiwan authorities. Rebalancing demands from both countries makes stabilizing the situation their shared pursuit. The U.S. side needs to provide clarity regarding the Taiwan question and stop sending wrong signals, thereby creating favorable external conditions for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as well as the peaceful development of cross-strait relations.

  6. Rebalancing Geopolitics: The Western Pacific serves as the primary theater where China’s rising power collides with the strategic priorities of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, triggering regional polarization amid U.S. strategic contraction and domestic political unpredictability. The core of geopolitical rebalancing lies in mutually allowing adequate space and comfort for all actors. The U.S. side must view China’s military growth normally and reduce the anti-China coloration of its alliances, while the Chinese side must respect the legitimate interests of the United States in the Asia-Pacific. Concurrently, both sides should understand and accommodate the hedging strategies adopted by third-party states.

  7. Rebalancing Major Country Interactions: Within the dual-core multipolar framework, a zero-sum approach to other power centers will accelerate bloc-oriented division and drastically increase strategic pressure on both nations. The basic principle of rebalancing is to recognize that other power centers, such as the European Union and the Global South, are independent actors possessing strategic autonomy rather than passive objects or bargaining chips. Both sides should handle relations with other poles with an open posture, refrain from viewing third parties through the prism of dual-core contradictions, avoid constructing a closed strategic triangle, and allow flexible combinations across different issues to prevent relationships among poles from being negatively locked in.

• Rebalancing Global Governance: Against the background of weakened multilateral mechanisms and heightened major power tensions, the global governance deficit cannot be redressed in the short term, threatening the international community with the Kindleberger Trap due to the absence of public goods provision. In this environment, the rebalancing of global governance adopts a basic policy of selective cooperation rather than an all-encompassing framework. China and the United States should select specific areas of rigid mutual demand, such as artificial intelligence governance, international financial stability, public health, climate change, and food security, driving global governance through bilateral collaboration to send a signal of stability to the world.

Conclusion

Over the past nine years, although bilateral relations have suffered through extreme games of fierce winds and raging waves, this strategic friction has also allowed deep-seated structural factors of stability to gradually manifest. These elements, including nuclear deterrence, respective national resilience, interwoven supply chains, multipolar strategic autonomy, and the rigid demand for artificial intelligence governance, have effectively constrained a mutual race to the bottom.

At present, China-U.S. relations stand at a critical crossroads of destiny, and the future direction depends entirely on current choices. With 2026 serving as a crucial window of opportunity, the two nations must bid farewell to their nostalgia for the old order, shifting their fundamental approach from attempting to change the other to focusing on managing coexistence.

By moving toward each other across the eight pivotal fields, including strategic perception, military security, economy and trade, and the Taiwan question, and by proactively adjusting the content of bilateral relations to adapt to the new international order, it will be possible for China and the United States to weather the storm. Only through these concerted efforts can they usher in a longer cycle of a “Constructive Relationship of Strategic Stability” and ultimately forge a path toward running parallel without conflict and achieving peaceful coexistence under a “New Type of Major Country Relations 2.0”.

Subscribe now

About the Author

DA Wei 达巍: Da Wei is the director of the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua, and Professor at the Department of International Relations, School of Social Science, Tsinghua University. Professor Da’s research expertise covers China-U.S. relations and US security & foreign policy. He has worked in China’s academic and policy community for more than two decades. He has written hundreds of policy papers for the Chinese government, and published dozens of academic papers on journals in China, the US and other countries. He was a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States from 2006 to 2007, and a Visiting Senior Associate at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University from 2008 to 2009.

ZHOU Wuhua 周武华: Ph.D. candidate in the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University, primary research focus on China-U.S. relations.

About the Publication

The Chinese Version of this article was published on Contemporary International Relations（《现代国际关系》）. First established in 1981, the Contemporary International Relations (a monthly journal) is a central-level, comprehensive academic monthly publication in the field of international studies, sponsored by the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. Adhering to its mission of providing high-quality services to readers across the party, government, military, academic, and business sectors to deeply understand and perceive the world, the journal strives to fully exhibit the latest and finest research achievements of experts and scholars on major international strategic issues, the global landscape, international relations theory, international economy, major hot spots, as well as vital developmental shifts in the politics, diplomacy, economy, technology, society, and military affairs of various regions and nations.

Subscribe now

Share

China Scholar Insights is a feature which aimed at providing you with the latest analysis on issues that Chinese scholars and strategic communities are focusing on. We will carefully select commentary articles and highlight key points. Questions or criticisms can be directed to sch0625@gmail.com

I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University. ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu.

Background

On May 14, Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump met in Beijing and agreed to work toward a constructive trategic stability of the bilateral relationship. The meeting came amid years of mistrust, trade and technology frictions, and renewed tensions over Taiwan, the most sensitive issue in the relationship. For Beijing and Washington, the summit offered a framework for keeping competition within bounds. For the wider Asia-Pacific, it sent a key signal about whether the two powers could manage rivalry without destabilizing the region.

Subscribe now

SUN Chenghao: Great Power Rivalry, Shared Responsibilities

The Practical Foundation for China-U.S. Cooperation is Stronger than Current Discussions Suggest

Present discussions between China and the United States largely focus on trade disputes, technology controls and regional crises, while global governance is temporarily overlooked yet crucial. Cooperation in this domain is not only possible but also essential. Against the backdrop of intensifying strategic competition between the two countries, the structural forces that necessitate close collaboration have not disappeared.

Today’s global challenges are increasingly complex and deeply interconnected—no single nation, no matter how powerful, can address them alone. China and the U.S. remain pivotal actors in effectively tackling various global issues, and many international initiatives would struggle to achieve real impact without their participation. Other countries, including the “Global South”, also look to China and the U.S. to provide a certain degree of international public goods and stability.

The Core of the China-U.S. divide lies in how Cooperation should be Defined

China-U.S. differences are not as irreconcilable as they are commonly perceived. In fact, both sides harbor certain expectations of each other, leading to a form of cooperation that is functional rather than ideological. This type of collaboration rests on a more limited but stable foundation: certain global risks would be difficult to manage effectively without at least some degree of coordination between China and the U.S.

The intersection of artificial intelligence and nuclear issues presents a promising yet underdeveloped starting point for cooperation. The integration of AI into nuclear deterrence systems could introduce new risks of miscalculation and unintended escalation. Against this backdrop, even limited consensus between the two countries carries significant importance. Both have already affirmed the fundamental principle that decisions regarding nuclear weapons must always remain under human control. Moving forward, the two sides could explore ways to extend this initial agreement beyond bilateral relations, incorporating more nuclear-armed states into the framework.

Competition and Interdependence often Coexist within the same Relationship

The above cooperative path aligns with the fundamental interests of both China and the U.S.. This logic of cooperation also applies to areas such as climate governance and public health. Even in more competitive fields like digital governance, there remains room for dialogue between the two countries.

Cooperation does not mean that China-U.S. relations will return to the previous phase of comprehensive engagement. Meaningful collaboration need not be all-encompassing; in an increasingly fragmented international system, even narrow and limited coordination can have a positive effect on stabilizing the situation.

China and the U.S. remain key actors in the functioning of the global system. Global governance is not a secondary concern but a structural necessity for both countries. While dialogue between the two leaders may not fundamentally resolve deep-seated differences, it could create space for more constructive interactions. Such limited yet pragmatic cooperation might well be the most realistic option—and an indispensable foundation for maintaining global stability.

ZHAO Minghao: The New Positioning of China–U.S. Relations: From Strategic Stability to Constructive Strategic Stability

From Strategic Stability to Constructive Strategic Stability

Since 2017, the U.S. has viewed China as a “strategic competitor,” anchoring its China policy in great power rivalry—a stance reinforced by Biden and later reframed by Trump’s second term. Trump prioritized domestic security and industrial revival, recognizing internal challenges as key to national strategy, while initially escalating trade tensions with China. China maintained a firm position on core interests, leading the U.S. to realize that pressure tactics were ineffective and that constructive engagement was needed. High-level talks in 2025, including two telephone conversations between the Presidents, signaled a shift toward negotiation and cooperation. From “strategic stability” to “constructive strategic stability”, this transformation reflects the arduous and tortuous process in which both China and the United States have continuously corrected their mutual perceptions through competition and gradually moved towards a new equilibrium point in their relations. This evolution marks a cautious but significant recalibration and stabilization in China–U.S. relations.

The New Positioning in China-U.S. Relations are of Great Significance

Breaking away from its past obsession with “great power competition,” the Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy adopts “flexible realism.” Its willingness to embrace “constructive strategic stability” as the new positioning for bilateral ties marks a hard-won and major adjustment. Driven by the economic backlash of tariffs and the recognition of China as a near-peer, Washington increasingly acknowledges the necessity of mutually beneficial cooperation. Specifically, in the economic sphere, the U.S. rejects complete “decoupling” in favor of “de-risking,” proposing a new formulation to maintain a “genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship.” In the security domain, the U.S. aims for a “decent peace.” Defense Secretary Hegseth’s unprecedented inclusion in the presidential visit to China signals a pragmatic willingness to expand military-to-military dialogue, avoid direct conflict, and jointly promote strategic stability.

Mutual Action Is Needed

In 2026, as China launches its 15th Five-Year Plan and the U.S. celebrates its 250th anniversary, both countries will host major summits, creating opportunities for more direct engagement between their leaders. Xi Jinping and Donald Trump’s recent meetings underscored “constructive strategic stability” as a guiding principle and the importance of candid, high-level dialogue, especially on core issues like Taiwan. The greatrejuvenation ofthe Chinese nation and making America great again need not be in conflict, and that healthy competition and cooperation are preferable to zero-sum rivalry. As President Xi Jinping has stated, a China-US relationship of constructive strategic stability is not just a slogan, but requires concrete actions from both sides moving toward each other.

WU Qicong: What is the perception of neighboring countries toward the China-US presidential summit?

A Clear Dividing Line Between “At Ease” and “Anxious” Over the Summit

The 2026 China-US summit has drawn a clear line across the region: nations that see US-China stability as an opportunity are relieved, while those that rely on US-China confrontation for their strategic relevance are troubled.

The “At Ease” Bridge

Seoul is notably positive. President Lee Jae-myung stated that stable US-China relations benefit the entire world. As an export-driven nation, South Korea relies heavily on stable industrial chains between the two powers. Lee pragmatically chose a bridge-building role, believing that picking a side is less rewarding than becoming a neutral platform between China and the US.

ASEAN nations feel reassured by the reduced risk of economic spillovers and less pressure to take sides. However, caution remains, as structural disputes—such as those over the South China Sea—are unresolved. The prevailing sentiment is best captured by an ASEAN diplomat’s remark: “A handshake between China and the US is better than a fight, but who can guarantee they won’t fall out again tomorrow?”

The Anxious Outsider：

Tokyo is deeply uneasy. Japan had hoped Trump would visit Japan first to showcase its “core ally” status, but the plan fell through. The underlying anxiety is that Japan’s long-standing strategic role as America’s “forward bastion” is depreciating now that China-U.S. relations are moving toward constructive strategic stability. China-U.S. relations are moving toward constructive strategic stability.

The Taiwan region is even more anxious than Japan. As long as the direct communication channel between China and the US is open, the influence of “Taiwan independence” maneuvering will only grow weaker. Moreover, the US side appears unsatisfied with the recent defense budget passed by the Taiwan legislative body — raising the question of whether Washington is willing to risk itself for an unreliable pawn.

India finds itself in a predicament: it seeks to ride on the coattails of the U.S.-proposed Indo-Pacific Strategy while remaining economically reliant on trade ties with China; it attempts to take an aggressive stance on border issues yet cannot afford the costs of confrontation with China. India finds itself in a predicament: it seeks to ride on the coattails of the U.S.-proposed Indo-Pacific Strategy while remaining economically reliant on trade ties with China; it attempts to take an aggressive stance on border issues yet cannot afford the costs of confrontation with China. The deeper fear is that when China and the US engage directly, India’s perceived strategic autonomy becomes constrained in the face of genuine power politics.

Cautious Balancing Continues：

Australia is continuing its dual-track strategy: relying on the US for security while maintaining strong economic ties with China. The summit did not alter Canberra’s calculus — if anything, it reinforced the belief that for medium powers, maintaining strategic balance between giants is the only viable way forward.

Russia adopted a cautious and restrained stance. Russian experts assessed that the main outcome of the visit was to consolidate the previously reached trade “truce.” Russia is closely watching whether China and the US discussed the Ukraine conflict and what understandings they reached, as these will directly affect Russia’s strategic choices on the Ukrainian battlefield.

A Changing Order Sidelining Smaller Powers

The divergent responses from neighboring countries reveal the dawning shape of a multipolar Asia-Pacific. Within this new landscape, there exist no everlasting allies or rigid blocs, only continuous realignments grounded in national interests and tangible power dynamics. The region’s future hinges on whether all stakeholders can forge a more stable balance between security competition, economic and trade cooperation, and crisis management.

WANG Yingjin: The Taiwan Strait in the New China-U.S. Framework

Taiwan Question at the Center of the Relationship

On May 15, Foreign Minister Wang Yi briefed the press on the meeting between Chinese and U.S. Presidents and the consensus reached. He stated:”During the meeting, we felt that the U.S. side understands China’s position, attaches importance to China’s concerns, and, just like the international community, does not stand for or accept Taiwan moving toward independence.There are three messages from Wang Yi’s briefing after the summit. First, the Taiwan question is China’s internal affair. Second, it is the most important and most sensitive issue in China-U.S. relations, with consequences for the relationship as a whole. Third, maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is the largest area of common ground between the two sides.

A New Framework for Stability

The agreement to build a constructive relationship of strategic stability as the most important political consensus reached at the summit. For years,some political forces in the United States have treated China mainly as a strategic competitor and have tried to contain it through pressure in trade, technology, diplomacy and geopolitics. Yet China’s continued development has shown that such pressure cannot reverse the broader historical trend. The new positioning therefore reflects a move from extreme pressure to pragmatic engagement, and from confrontation to communication and management.Any assessment of the Taiwan Strait must now be placed within this new China-U.S. framework. Trump’s remarks on Taiwan during his return flight from Beijing. When asked whether the United States would militarily defend Taiwan, Trump did not offer an affirmative commitment. Wang reads this as a clear signal. Taken together with other U.S. statements after the summit, Washington’s position shows a stronger tendency to restrain Taiwan independence forces.

Two Conditions for Peace

Peace across the Taiwan Strait depends on two basic conditions. The first is that the United States must handle the Taiwan question prudently, abide by the one-China principle, and honor the three China-U.S. joint communiqués. Continued arms sales to Taiwan, upgrades official exchanges, or supports Taiwan independence forces would enrode the foundation for peace in the Strait and the new framework of constructive strategic stability between China and the United States will also be undermined.

The second condition is firm opposition to Taiwan independence. Taiwan independence forces are the most immediate source of danger to peace across the Strait.Taiwan independence and peace cannot coexist. Therefore, resolutely containing “Taiwan independence” and safeguarding peace across the Taiwan Strait serves the common interests of China and the United States and represents the broadest common ground between the two sides. Therefore, resolutely containing “Taiwan independence” and safeguarding peace across the Taiwan Strait serves the common interests of China and the United States and represents the greatest common divisor for both sides.

The Larger Trend

China-U.S. strategic relations are undergoing a historic adjustment, while the balance of overall strength across the Taiwan Strait continues to shift toward the mainland.The only viable path is to follow this trend, embrace peace, and return cross-Strait relations to the proper track.

Conclusion

The new positioning gives China-U.S. relations a clearer operating logic: competition should stay bounded, communication should remain open, and sensitive issues should be managed before they turn into crises. Its durability will depend on follow-up on trade, technology, military communication, and Taiwan question. For China, the summit helps shape a steadier external environment while keeping core interests at the center of the relationship. For the Asia-Pacific, greater predictability between Beijing and Washington could ease regional pressure and leave more room for development and practical cooperation. The real test is whether the consensus reached in Beijing can become a sustained pattern of restraint, coordination, and risk control.

Subscribe now

Share

ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me. Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com.

In this newsletter, we address concerns about China’s positions through a Q&A format, while also presenting key points of leading Chinese scholars’ commentaries. Through this series, we aim to provide policymakers, think tanks, and strategic communities overseas with access to Chinese scholars’ views, accompanied by curated academic perspectives that help readers better understand the considerations underlying China’s foreign policy choices.

Background

At President Xi Jinping’s invitation, U.S. President Donald Trump paid a state visit to China from May 13 to 15. It was the first face-to-face meeting between the two heads of state since Busan last October, and the first China visit by a U.S. president in nine years. The year 2026 holds special significance for both countries: China begins its 15th Five-Year Plan, while the United States marks the 250th anniversary of its independence. This renewed “handshake across the Pacific” has drawn global attention.

Subscribe now

The constructive and strategically stable China-U.S. relationship is the highest-level political consensus reached at the China-U.S. presidential meeting in Beijing on May 14, 2026. Centered on the “four dimensions of stability,” this new positioning sets a new framework for China-U.S. relations in the coming three years and beyond.

President Xi Jinping defined “constructive strategic stability” from four perspectives. First, it should be positive stability with cooperation as the mainstay. China and the United States should make cooperation, not confrontation, the mainstream of their relationship, and expand common interests in climate change, public health, economic and trade exchanges, and other areas.

Second, it should be healthy stability with competition within proper limits. Competition between major countries is not unusual, but it should not define the whole of China-U.S. relations. Even where competition exists, it should be healthy competition in which the two sides learn from each other, positive competition in which both strive to do better, and fair competition that follows rules.

Third, it should be constant stability with manageable differences. Both sides should maintain policy continuity and stability, and in particular honor the commitments they have made. A positive expectation for China-U.S. cooperation will provide greater certainty for the development of both countries and for the international situation.

Fourth, it should be lasting stability with expectable peace. China and the United States must not slide into conflict, confrontation or war. Peaceful coexistence is the greatest common denominator between the two countries. The consequences of China-U.S. conflict would be unbearable for both sides and the world. The key lies in abiding by the three China-U.S. joint communiqués, respecting each other’s social systems and development paths, respecting each other’s core interests and major concerns, and respecting each other’s right to development.

Compared with previous formulations of China-U.S. relations, this new positioning carries important practical and theoretical significance. In practical terms, it first gives a clear answer to the fundamental question of whether China and the United States are partners or rivals. It rejects the erroneous logic of defining China-U.S. relations by “strategic competition.” The new positioning is not only a correction of misguided policies of the past few years, but also a reshaping of the future direction of China-U.S. relations. Under this new paradigm, the world may move out of the trap of zero-sum rivalry and toward a more stable, cooperative and just future.

Next, the new positioning demonstrates a shared sense of international responsibility. China and the United States are both permanent members of the UN Security Council and the world’s two largest economies. China-U.S. relations have long gone beyond the bilateral scope. They are a key variable affecting world peace, stability, development, cooperation and global governance. In this sense, a stable China-U.S. relationship is itself an important contribution to world peace and development.

Moreover, the new positioning reflects a sober understanding of each country’s development path. In 2026, both countries are entering important stages of development. China is at the start of the 15th Five-Year Plan period and is advancing Chinese modernization through high-quality development. The United States is marking the 250th anniversary of its independence. The two sides recognize that realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and making America great again can proceed in parallel and benefit the world. This consensus rejects ideological bias and shows that countries with different civilizations, systems and paths can live in peace and achieve common development.

In theoretical terms, the new positioning enriches the theory and practice of international relations. Firstly, it fully reflects the core essence and development of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy. Secondly, this new concept represents the latest summary of China-U.S. relations. Lastly, this new formulation updates the traditional concept of “strategic stability.” Traditional strategic stability originated in U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control during the Cold War and focused mainly on preventing nuclear war and avoiding an uncontrolled arms race. By contrast, a constructive and strategically stable China-U.S. relationship expands the concept beyond military and nuclear security to a comprehensive view of stability covering politics, economy, science and technology, people-to-people exchanges, and global governance.

Looking ahead, the new positioning will have significant implications. Above all, it provides a basic framework for China-U.S. relations and safeguards international security. One important element of a constructive and strategically stable relationship is to establish regular high-level communication and crisis-management mechanisms, so as to prevent accidents and misjudgments from escalating into confrontation. The two sides agreed to strengthen military-to-military communication and exchange views on major international and regional issues. This creates necessary strategic space for addressing regional hotspots, preventing nuclear proliferation, and responding to non-traditional security threats.

Besides, it injects certainty into the global economy and helps reduce the systemic risks of “decoupling” and supply-chain disruption. The Beijing meeting sent a positive signal that China-U.S. relations are moving from confrontation toward cooperation. This helped boost market confidence, stabilize expectations, and reduce volatility in commodity prices, major stock indexes and exchange rates.

Furthermore, it will help improve global governance and promote an equal and orderly multipolar world and a universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization. A stable China-U.S. relationship is itself a global public good. If the constructive and strategically stable relationship is implemented, it will contribute to world economic recovery, better global governance, and more effective management of regional hotspot issues.

There are three important pathways to realizing this relationship. First, the two sides should improve institutional mechanisms, including regular meetings between the presidents, dialogue channels at all levels, and crisis-management arrangements. Second, both should advance cooperation in multiple fields, giving priority to climate change, public health, nuclear non-proliferation and other global governance issues, while restoring economic, trade, scientific, technological and people-to-people exchanges. Third, political bottom lines must be upheld. The Taiwan question is at the very core of China’s core interests. The United States must honor its commitment of not supporting “Taiwan independence.” Both sides should respect each other’s sovereignty, security and development interests, and refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs.

For decades, economic interdependence was widely regarded as the anchor of peace in the US–China relations. Trade, investment, and deeply integrated supply chains created substantial mutual benefits that confrontation seems irrational. Yet in recent years, this assumption is breaking down as tariffs, export controls, technology restrictions, and supply chain restructuring have transformed economic ties into tools of strategic competition. Thus, the question is no longer whether economics matters in US–China relations, but whether economic interdependence can still function as a restraint on geopolitical rivalry once it has become weaponized.

The answer is positive, but in a more limited and fragile way than before. The recent US–China summit in Beijing reached an agreement to pursue a “constructive strategic stable relationship,” alongside discussions on trade conditions, bilateral investment, supply chain stability, agricultural exports, and energy cooperation, despite the intensifying strategic competition. This reflects a shared recognition that complete economic rupture would be profoundly costly. Even after years of tariffs and mutual restrictions, the economic interdependence between the two countries remains structurally deep. China remains a critical manufacturing center, an essential market, and an increasingly significant technological and industrial power. Meanwhile, the United States continues to offer capital, innovation ecosystems, agricultural exports, and global financial influence. Modern globalization makes supply chain interdependence far more complex than traditional bilateral trade balances suggest. No major economy can truly achieve total “decoupling and chain-breaking.”

Yet the character of this interdependence has changed fundamentally. Economic ties are increasingly seen as sources of vulnerability. Washington has weaponized tariffs, semiconductor export controls, and investment restrictions to constrain China’s technological rise. Beijing, in turn, has demonstrated its own leverage through strategic resources, supply chain positioning, and targeted countermeasures. Economic interdependence has shifted from being purely an anchor of peace to becoming part of the battlefield itself.

Economic entanglement now may no longer generate trust, but it still generates restraint. The old assumption was that trade would produce political convergence and reduce rivalry. That expectation has clearly failed. The US and China are now strategic competitors despite being deeply economically connected. But economic interdependence can still serve another purpose, which is to raise the cost of escalation. The greater the level of mutual exposure, the stronger the incentive to prevent confrontation from spiraling into systemic rupture.

Current geopolitical conditions reinforce this logic. The instability in the Middle East and uncertainty surrounding the Strait of Hormuz remind both Washington and Beijing that global energy security remains deeply interconnected. Inflationary pressures, supply disruptions, and financial volatility affect the global economy as a whole. In such an environment, economic cooperation becomes less about friendship and more about crisis management.

At the same time, the US domestic politics complicate the stabilizing role of economic ties. One of the most insightful arguments from the source material is that America’s turn toward protectionism is not simply about China, but about internal structural discontent. Globalization became politically toxic not because it failed to generate wealth, but because its gains were unevenly distributed. Trump’s embrace of tariffs partly aims to reduce the negative effects brought by globalization. It is widely supported by American blue collar workers even though the policy is widely criticised for not being able to solve the problem. This suggests that economic reasons alone cannot guarantee stability, because trade policy is increasingly shaped by electoral incentives rather than pure economic calculation. This is why economic ties can no longer be seen as a sufficient guarantee of peace.

In this sense, US–China economic relations can still serve as an anchor of peace, because in an era of weaponized interdependence, the costs of losing control have become too dangerous for either side to ignore. More importantly, Chinese development can create many opportunities for the US. The two economies need to identify new engines of growth together in order to seek a win-win situation where economic ties between them create greater values than what they can obtain on their own.

The establishment of a “constructive strategic stability relationship” between China and the United States will fundamentally reshape the strategic environment surrounding Europe’s China “de-risking” policy. It does not mean Europe will abandon de-risking, but it will weaken the external drivers pushing Europe toward further securitization, bloc confrontation, and quasi-decoupling, while creating greater room for policy recalibration.

First, the new China–U.S. framework weakens the external pressure for Europe to approach China through a Cold War-style bloc framework and high-intensity de-risking measures. In recent years, Europe’s China policy has been heavily influenced by Washington’s narrative of “systemic competition”. After the Russia–Ukraine conflict, Europe became more dependent on the United States for security, making it more likely to align with U.S. restrictions on China in areas such as technology, supply chains, and industrial security. However, following the May 2026 Beijing summit, China–U.S. relations were elevated from “overall stability” to “constructive strategic stability,” emphasizing stronger strategic trust, managed competition, and reduced risks of miscalculation in order to establish controllable boundaries for long-term rivalry. Under these conditions, the political and strategic basis for Europe to maintain a highly confrontational de-risking agenda is likely to weaken.

Second, this shift creates a new adjustment window for Europe’s China policy. Da Wei argued that there is now an opportunity to “recalibrate” China–U.S. relations, while Wu Xinbo noted that bilateral ties are entering “a more stable new phase”. Greater stability in China–U.S. relations reduces European concerns over uncontrolled great-power confrontation and lowers pressure to fully align with escalating strategic rivalry. Previously, Europe’s de-risking agenda was driven not only by concerns over industrial security and technological dependence, but also by defensive reactions to deteriorating China–U.S. ties. As Beijing and Washington move toward a more stable framework for interaction, pragmatic voices in Europe are likely to gain influence, arguing that China policy should balance competition, cooperation, and limited risk prevention rather than comprehensive containment. In areas such as green transition, climate governance, macroeconomic coordination, and civilian supply chains, Europe has neither the capacity nor the economic incentive to pursue long-term exclusion of China. As a result, Europe’s de-risking policy is likely to become narrower, more targeted, and more technical.

Third, the new China–U.S. positioning further exposes Europe’s structural dilemma: security dependence on the United States, economic reliance on China, and aspirations for strategic autonomy. Europe’s security architecture remains closely tied to Washington, while its economy still depends heavily on China’s market, manufacturing capacity, and green supply chains. Zheng Yongnian described this as not only a “new positioning” for China–U.S. relations, but also a“new paradigm” for international relations, reflecting recognition that China and the United States remain long-term competitors yet must coexist. Huang Jing and Ding Yifan similarly framed the shift as a move from “zero-sum rivalry” to “coexistence-based competition”. In this context, a highly securitized de-risking strategy would impose growing economic and strategic costs on Europe. While the United States may still maintain strategic coordination and red-line management with China through summit diplomacy, European firms risk losing access to Chinese markets and industrial opportunities because of rigid policies. As a result, Europe may increasingly redefine “strategic autonomy” around its own interests rather than simply extending Washington’s China strategy.

At the same time, Europe is unlikely to abandon de-risking entirely. European concerns about China stem not only from U.S. pressure, but also from anxieties over industrial competition, critical technologies, data security, market access, economic dependence, and Taiwan-related geopolitical risks. The more likely outcome is therefore not the disappearance of de-risking, but its moderation, narrowing, and technocratization. Europe will probably maintain restrictions and screening mechanisms in sensitive sectors such as semiconductors, AI, critical minerals, and data security, while becoming increasingly reluctant to expand de-risking into comprehensive decoupling or serve as the front line of prolonged China–U.S. confrontation.

In short, a “constructive strategic stability relationship” between China and the United States is unlikely to end Europe’s de-risking policy, but it may gradually shift it away from broad geopolitical securitization toward a narrower, more targeted, and more pragmatic form of risk management and strategic rebalancing.

The constructive strategic stability framework established at the Beijing summit carries significant structural implications for the Asia-Pacific and the broader international order. Its importance lies less in resolving the fundamental tensions between China and the United States than in redefining the terms on which great-power competition is conducted, with consequences that ripple outward to shape the strategic calculations of Asia-Pacific states, Europe, and the Global South alike.

In the Asia-Pacific, the power balance between China and the United States has shifted substantially over the past nine years. The region is moving away from a period of clear American primacy toward something closer to genuine Sino-American parity, and with that shift comes a more fluid regional order in which national interest increasingly takes precedence over durable allegiance. The reactions across the region have been sharply divergent. South Korea and ASEAN have greeted the development with broad relief: sustained bilateral dialogue raises the prospect of more effective crisis management in contested areas such as the South China Sea, reduces the economic spillover from trade disputes, and, perhaps most importantly, eases the pressure on smaller states to commit to one side. Japan‘s response has been rather more troubled. Its strategic value to Washington has long rested on the assumption of enduring China-US competition, and a more managed relationship between the two powers inevitably raises questions about what role Japan is meant to play. Cutting across all of these reactions is the underlying reality of deep supply chain integration between China and the United States, spanning precision manufacturing, electric vehicles, and related sectors, which makes the decoupling that some advocate considerably more disruptive in practice than it tends to appear in theory.

On Europe, the prevailing view is that the China-US-Europe triangle has become an essential framework for making sense of how the international system is being reorganized. Europe’s push for strategic autonomy signals that it no longer accepts the role of a passive variable in Sino-American competition, and the old hub-and-spoke structure centered on Washington is giving way to a more genuinely multipolar dynamic. That said, European China policy has long been shaped by American preferences, and the habits of deference built up over decades are not easily shed. The more immediate change is that transatlantic relations are under considerable strain, enough so that Europe is actively exploring greater room for maneuver in its engagement with Beijing. The trilateral relationship stands at an inflection point. Washington retains its structural advantage, and both Brussels and Beijing remain largely reactive, yet that still leaves meaningful space for the two to define the relationship on their own terms. In practical terms, this argues for reviving substantive China-Europe economic dialogue, treating existing trade frictions as an opening for negotiation rather than a source of grievance, and addressing what has become a conspicuous gap in the broader trilateral dynamic. Ultimately, Europe’s ability to play a meaningful role in managing Sino-American competition depends on developing a genuinely independent strategic judgment, something that goes beyond defense spending and touches on how Europe conceives of its interests and its place in the world.

For ASEAN and the Global South, the implications of China-US stability are tangible and pressing. The gains from a more settled bilateral relationship are not confined to Shanghai and San Francisco; they extend across the full length of global value chains, from Ho Chi Minh City to Hamburg and from São Paulo to Nairobi, with the benefits falling most heavily on smaller, trade-dependent economies with little buffer against the shocks that great-power confrontation tends to generate. One of the less remarked costs of sustained China-US tension has been the pressure it exerts on third countries to declare their allegiances. Across much of Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, this has amounted to a chronic and unwelcome predicament, at once economically costly and politically awkward. A more stable China-US relationship goes some way toward relieving that pressure. There is also a broader dimension. Across the Global South, there remains a widespread expectation that China and the United States will together provide the international public goods and the baseline of predictability that smaller states are simply not positioned to supply for themselves. The challenges of climate change, public health, food security, and emerging technology governance are inherently transnational, and experience suggests that meaningful progress on any of them is very difficult to achieve without substantive engagement from both Beijing and Washington.

Share

Subscribe now

Hosted by SUN Chenghao, we will invite scholars and experts to discuss major international issues from great power relations and global governance to emerging security and diplomatic challenges. Through these conversations, we hope to share diverse perspectives on China’s foreign policy and the evolving international landscape.

Over the past ten years, the narrative of strategic competition has dominated the development of the Sino-U.S. relationship. But at the same time, both China and the U.S. need to cooperate to solve the geopolitical conflicts and promote global governance. During U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to China after 9 years, a new concept proposed by China, a constructive relationship of strategic stability, was accepted by the U.S. and laid the foundation for the development of the future bilateral relationship.

What are the goals and evaluation for China and the U.S. regarding this Summit? Can this new strategic positioning improve the Sino-U.S. relationship? As the Sino-U.S. relationship has become one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world, keeping high-level and institutional communication may itself inject momentum into global peace and development.

In the first episode of the ChinaVoice, scholars with China-U.S. study experience analyze the outcomes of the summit, the expectations of both countries, the significance of the new strategic positioning, the balance between strategic competition and cooperation on global governance, as well as the prospects for the bilateral relationship.

Subscribe now

Experts in today’s dialogue:

Key Points:

Assessing the Outcome: A “Framework Summit”

SUN Chenghao and SUN Bingyan agree that both sides got something out of the summit. Most notably, for the first time in approximately a decade, China and the US have agreed on a new formal framework for managing their relationship—“the constructive strategic stability”. Under this framework, bilateral competition is expected to be more manageable and predictable, with institutional mechanisms such as the trade commission and the investment commission now on the table. That said, SUN Bingyan characterizes the summit as a “temporary easing” rather than a structural breakthrough, cautioning that long-term strategic competition continues to run beneath the surface of the relationship.

SUN Bingyan also delivers his opinion on the G2 concept. President Trump appears drawn to a “G2” approach, expecting “the top two powers” can govern the world through realpolitik. China, however, continues to reject the framing. Beijing remains committed to a multipolar world order and prefers reforming existing multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations, rather than either dismantling them through a G2 arrangement or sustaining American hegemony by being a responsible stakeholder.

China Should Seize the Window Under Trump

The Trump administration brings a distinctive policy style that China may be able to leverage. Led by President Trump, the US is now focused heavily on “deals” and commercial outcomes. As SUN Chenghao observes, Trump seemed much more focused on concrete deliverables that he could present politically at home, such as aircraft, agricultural export, etc. SUN Bingyan further notes a meaningful distinction in how Trump approaches China compared to his treatment of traditional allies. With Beijing, Trump appears more willing to compromise based on reciprocal value. Therefore, China should take the chance to hold more conferences with the Trump administration, actively seizing opportunities to negotiate and bargain while the window remains open.

Future Outlook

Looking ahead, SUN Bingyan highlights two points that may shape the trajectory of the relationship. The first is whether a new trade truce can be reached by November of this year, which would significantly determine the future course of the trade war. The second is the end of the Trump administration, at which point the relationship will face renewed pressure from the mainstream of US politics and US politicians committed to sustained strategic competition with Beijing.

On specific flashpoints, SUN Chenghao warns that there are still too many sensitive issues that are now interconnected at the same time. Among all these risks, first, Taiwan remains the most dangerous and sensitive flashpoint. A major new US arms sale to Taiwan or any move that China interprets as upgrading official or military ties could trigger a very sharp reaction. Second, domestic politics inside the US can push the administration towards a tougher China policy. Third, Deeper US involvement in overseas military conflicts, particularly in the Middle East or Indo-Pacific, may cause tensions to spill over into a broader strategic confrontation.

SUN Bingyan equally underscores the centrality of Taiwan’s stability. He assesses that the Trump administration will likely maintain public declarations against Taiwan independence to avoid any direct provocation of Beijing’s redlines, while sustaining support for Taiwan’s deterrence capabilities. Beyond Taiwan, SUN Bingyan also flags that more Chinese high technology entities may become the target of restrictions, which may further escalate the bilateral tech war.

Follow ChinaVoice Now:

Apple Podcast:

or you can follow our podcast by URL in Apple Podcast library:

https://media.rss.com/chinavoice/feed.xml

Spotify:

https://open.spotify.com/show/033qa6uMWD1jNGWsipxOkV?si=6fc01dcb39cf4771

RSS feed:

https://media.rss.com/chinavoice/feed.xml. (You can also copy this address from your browser’s address bar and paste it into any podcast app that supports RSS.)

Subscribe now

Share

ChinAffairsplus shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions or criticisms may be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by Liao Baizhi, Tang Zhichao, Chen Wenxin, Lu Ruquan, and Chen Qinghong, which focuses on Geopolitical Rivalry in the Middle East and Its Global Impact.

Subscribe now

Summary

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a joint war of aggression against Iran. Currently, the development on the battlefield has far exceeded the control of both nations. The US and Israel have failed in their goal of regime change in Iran. Consequently, Trump’s “Donroe Doctrine” has suffered its first major setback, and the U.S. strategy of low-cost hegemony maintenance has become unsustainable.

The military confrontation between the U.S.-Israeli alliance and Iran has impacted the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East. The U.S.-Israeli military alliance has seen unprecedented strengthening, and Gulf states have drifted back toward confrontation with Iran, while simultaneously recognizing the immense risks of over-reliance on US security guarantees.

The war has rapidly spilled over, triggering a global chain reaction. Security issues regarding strategic corridors have become further pronounced, and global energy and supply chain security face significant challenges. This conflict has delivered a severe shock to the global geopolitical order, exposing what is perceived as the inherent fragility and erratic nature of American hegemony, thereby shattering the myth of U.S. military invincibility.

Furthermore, the war has intensified domestic inflation and fiscal issues within the United States, eroding its economic dominance. It has deepened fractures within the U.S. alliance system, weakened mutual trust between the United States and Europe, and catalyzed new changes in major country relations. By deliberately violating international law and the fundamental norms of international relations, the U.S. has exacerbated the fragmentation of the international order.

Why It Matters

This symposium examines the U.S.-Israel war on Iran through several global shifts: the reordering of the Middle East, changes in U.S. hegemony, disruptions to energy security, and the evolution of global governance. The article shows that this conflict matters far beyond the regional battlefield. Through five interconnected lines of analysis, it explains how the war has reached into global strategic, economic, and institutional domains. Today, this war serves as a key test for U.S. strategic power, the unity of U.S. alliances, the resilience of energy networks, and the future of international norms.

Subscribe now

Key Points

1. The War Is Accelerating the Reconfiguration of Middle Eastern Geopolitics

   1. U.S.-Israel Strategic Overreach in the “New Middle East” Agenda

      The United States and Israel have spent recent years trying to shape a “new Middle East.” The campaign against Iran was intended as a decisive step in that agenda. In practice, however, the operation was constrained by poor preparation, weak coordination, and the lack of a credible post-strike plan. As the battlefield moved beyond U.S.and Israeli control, the war exposed the limits of American military power. It also revealed the erosion of U.S. credibility and Washington’s weakening ability to rally allies. In this sense, the conflict may mark the beginning of a more visible “post-American” moment in the Middle East.

   2. Israel’s Military Ascendance and the Risk of Strategic Overstretch

      Since the latest round of the Palestine-Israel conflict began, Israel has tried to turn strategic vulnerability into regional initiative by using military force to reshape its security environment. The article suggests that Israel will remain a major driver of geopolitical change in the Middle East, regardless of how the war ends, yet this position still depends heavily on U.S.material and political support. If that support weakens or becomes more contested, Israel may face growing risks of strategic overstretch.

   3. Gulf Security Outsourcing Under Pressure

      For Gulf states and other regional actors, the war has blurred the boundary between a “Middle East of war” and a “Middle East of peace.” Countries that had focused on economic diversification and domestic transformation now face renewed exposure to regional conflict. Their model of outsourcing security to the United States is therefore under serious strain. The U.S. security umbrella has become not only a source of protection, but also a channel through which strategic risk is transmitted. Iran, meanwhile, has been weakened militarily but has become more hardline politically. This combination could produce a more unstable regional security environment after the war.

2. The War Is the Culmination of a Long Structural Confrontation

   1. From the “Twelve-Day War” to Structural Confrontation

      The current conflict is not only a continuation of the “Twelve-Day War” of June 2025 but the accumulated result of U.S.-Israeli confrontation with Iran since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Washington and Tel Aviv have pointed to Iran’s alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-standing “support for terrorism” to justify the war. However, these are proximate justifications rather than root causes. The deeper drivers lie in the contest over the Middle East order, political and ideological antagonism, and a fundamental clash over security concepts and policies.

   2. Two Conflicts Within One Triangle

      The U.S.-Iran conflict is different from the Israel-Iran conflict. The former is mainly about Iran’s resistance to U.S. hegemony, external interference, and foreign control in the Middle East. The latter is more directly driven by ideological hostility and mutual threat perceptions. Although both the United States and Israel seek regime change in Iran, their calculations differ.Israel’s objectives are more uncompromising, while the United States remains more opportunistic and conditional, wary of being drawn into another prolonged Middle Eastern war.

   3. Law, Geopolitics, and Ideology

      The authors describe the war as aggressive and unjust. Legally, the U.S.-Israeli strikes lacked U.N. Security Council authorization and did not meet the conditions for self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Geopolitically, the war is an attempt to preserve U.S.-Israeli regional hegemony and reshape the Middle East order. Ideologically, it is a confrontation among Trump’s “Donroe Doctrine,” Israel’s right-wing religious Zionism, and Iranian Khomeinism.

3. The Collapse of Washington’s “Low-Cost” Hegemony

   1. The Logic of Hegemony on a Budget

      During his second term, Trump sought to preserve U.S. hegemony through a strategy of domestic renewal, global burden-shedding, and strategic focus. This “low-cost” model emerged in the post-Cold War era as a way for the U.S. to maintain dominance despite its relative decline. The core logic is to maximize strategic gains with minimal direct investment by relying on ally burden-sharing, asymmetric military tools, and financial leverage.

   2. Failure of the “Quick-Win” in Iran
      The Trump administration attempted to replicate the “Venezuela model” in Iran, aiming for a rapid, overwhelming operation that would secure regime change without dragging the U.S. into a long war. The plan relied on Israel as the front-line force, while the U.S. provided intelligence, logistics, and air support. They expected limited strikes to dismantle Iran’s nuclear and command structures while avoiding a ground war, but the reality of the conflict quickly shattered these hopes.

   3. Asymmetric Drain and Strategic Blowback
      Iran’s “mosaic defense” and regional countermeasures trapped Washington in a high-cost, low-return dilemma. High-end U.S.military advantages became fiscal liabilities as expensive defense systems were depleted by low-cost Iranian drones and swarm attacks. The conflict also fractured the alliance system. Most European partners refused to join the strikes, while Gulf states began to view the U.S. security umbrella as a lightning rod for risk rather than a safeguard.

   4. America’s “Suez Moment”
      The war proves that “low-cost hegemony” is no longer sustainable in a multipolar world. Before the conflict, Washington could still lead by relying on the residual credibility of its power. With that credibility now spent, the cost of maintaining global dominance is set to skyrocket. This failure may be remembered as America’s “Suez moment,” a permanent turning point for U.S. influence in the Middle East.

4. The War Has Disrupted the Global Energy Order

   1. Hormuz as the Epicenter of the Global Energy Shock
      The conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran has sent severe shockwaves through the global energy order. After the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the impact rippled rapidly through the entire oil and gas value chain, spreading from the Middle East to the global market. As the world’s most critical energy chokepoint, the Strait handled approximately 35% of global seaborne crude oil and 20% of the world’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply in 2025. This blockade has effectively severed a primary lifeline of the global economy.

   2. Supply Paralysis and the Shift to Land Routes
      The closure of the Strait has caused the global market to pivot sharply from abundance to extreme supply tightness. With tankers and LNG carriers stranded, major Middle Eastern producers have been forced to slash output as their storage capacity reaches its limits. This crisis has triggered an urgent search for alternative energy routes. Gulf states are now prioritizing overland pipelines that bypass the Strait, as the war has exposed the inherent vulnerability of maritime energy corridors. Over the long term, this shift may drive significant investment into land-based pipeline networks and more diversified transport routes.

   3. The “Security Turn” in Asian Energy Policy
      The conflict is forcing a radical redesign of energy policies across Asia. Because the vast majority of energy flowing through Hormuz is destined for Asian markets, these importers have been hit the hardest. In the short term, energy security has become the absolute priority for nations dependent on these imports. In the medium and long term, these countries are expected to accelerate supply diversification, expand strategic reserves, and view their energy transitions primarily through a security lens.

   4. China’s Resilience and Structural Exposure
      For China, the war serves as both a stress test and a stark reminder of its structural vulnerabilities. China has shown strong resilience, supported by coal as a stabilizing base, leadership in renewable energy, and the use of strategic oil and gas reserves. However, its dependence on foreign energy remains high, with a significant share of its imports still relying on the Strait of Hormuz. To mitigate these risks, China should strengthen domestic energy production, enhance its ability to secure allocate global resources, and take a more active role in global energy governance.

5. The War Reveals Deeper Changes in Global Governance

   1. The Structural Tensions of Governance
      The U.S.and Israel war on Iran is more than a high intensity regional conflict. It is a revealing window into the structural tensions of global governance. The war challenges three long standing assumptions: hegemony produces stability, alliances ensure security, and international rules are irrelevant in the face of power politics. A hegemonic power can shift from being the guardian of the international system to its primary disruptor. It also demonstrates how military alliances can become channels for risk transmission and why international rules remain foundational despite repeated violations.

   2. The Credibility Crisis of U.S. Hegemony
      The war has further eroded the credibility and narrative foundations of U.S.hegemony. While Washington has long positioned itself as the defender of global order and rules, its conduct in this conflict has reinforced perceptions of U.S. power as selective, unilateral, and destabilizing. Launching sudden strikes during a diplomatic window undermined legal legitimacy and destroyed diplomatic trust. Furthermore, the shifting and ambiguous war aims of Washington have left its international credibility in tatters.

   3. Alliances as Channels of Risk
      The conflict has exposed the inherent dangers of traditional military alliances. Gulf states that relied on U.S. protection found themselves vulnerable to direct retaliation, while European and NATO members showed marked reluctance to get involved. This reflects the classic alliance dilemma of entrapment and abandonment, where states are either dragged into conflicts by their allies or find themselves abandoned when they need support most. In an era of long-range precision strikes and autonomous warfare, these risks have become even more acute.

   4. Toward a More Stable International Order
      Despite the rise of unilateralism, the war has highlighted the enduring value of international law. The conflict has triggered renewed calls to defend sovereignty and the UN centered international system. The article concludes that the international community must reject hegemonic thinking and bloc confrontation in favor of a more just and practical global governance system. In this context, the Global Governance Initiative proposed by President Xi is presented as a vital framework. Its emphasis on sovereign equality, the rule of law, and multilateralism is seen as a possible pathway toward building a stable and functional international order.

Conclusion

Overall, the U.S.-Israel war on Iran as a significant event in the deepening transformation of the international system. It has accelerated the reconfiguration of Middle Eastern geopolitics and generated systemic shocks for U.S. hegemony, alliance politics, the global energy order, and the international rules system. Washington and Tel Aviv had hoped to use a rapid military campaign to force regime change, reshape the Middle East order, and sustain U.S. hegemony at low cost. Instead, the war has revealed Iran’s resilience, the security concerns of regional states, the fractures within the U.S.-led alliance system,and the vulnerability of global energy markets.

From a longer historical perspective, the significance of the war lies not only in its impact on the Middle Eastern battlefield, but also in its exposure of the deeper contradictions of the existing international order. The sustainability of unipolar hegemony is declining. The security promises of traditional alliance systems are increasingly facing questioning. The vulnerabilities of global energy and supply-chain systems have become more visible.

At the same time, the foundational role of international law and multilateral rules has become more important. The article therefore stresses the need for the international community to oppose hegemonism and power politics while advancing a more equitable, inclusive, and effective global governance system.

Subscribe now

About the Author

Liao Baizhi廖百智: Research Professor, Director of the Institute of Middle East Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations(CICIR).

Tang Zhichao 唐志超: Director of the Department of Political Studies and the Middle East Development and Governance Research Center at the Institute of West Asian and African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS).

Chen Wenxin陈文鑫: Fellow and Director of the Institute of American Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations(CICIR).

Lu Ruquan陆如泉: Senior Economist, President of CNPC Economics & Technology Research Institute.

Chen Qinghong陈庆鸿: Deputy Director and Research Professor of Institute of World Political Studies at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations(CICIR).

About the Publication

The Chinese version of this article was published in Contemporary International Relations （《现代国际关系》）, No.4, 2026. Contemporary International Relations, a policy-oriented research journal, has been published by China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations since 1990. A primary purpose of its journal is to present the views of CICIR researchers on international politics and international relations. The journal’s scope of publication also includes papers by scholars and researchers from other institutes in China and from around the world. It covers analysis of changes in international relations and prominent world events.

Share

Subscribe now

China Scholar Insights is a feature which aimed at providing you with the latest analysis on issues that Chinese scholars and strategic communities are focusing on. We will carefully select commentary articles and highlight key points. Questions or criticisms can be directed to sch0625@gmail.com

I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University. ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu.

In the lead-up to and aftermath of the leaders’ summit, I was interviewed by a wide range of international and Chinese media outlets, including the Associated Press, Reuters, The New York Times, Bloomberg, Politiken, Berlingske, Japan Broadcasting Corporation NHK, Tokyo Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun, The Straits Times, Lianhe Zaobao, China-US Focus, China Review News Agency, South China Morning Post, Sing Tao Daily, HK01, Xinhua News Agency, CGTN, China Daily, China News Service, The Paper, and Jiemian News.

The questions raised by these media organizations were wide-ranging, thoughtful, and deeply engaging, prompting me to reflect on the summit from multiple perspectives. I am also sincerely grateful to the many journalists and friends in the media community who have followed this newsletter over time. It is through these ongoing exchanges and interactions that we have been able to jointly deepen our understanding and interpretation of major international developments.

Subscribe now

From China’s perspective, the central objective of the summit was not to resolve any single issue, but rather to use leader-level diplomacy to reestablish a relatively stable and predictable framework for China-U.S. relations. Today, the relationship is no longer defined simply by traditional trade frictions; it has evolved into a broader and more complex strategic competition. In this sense, the summit was fundamentally a “tone-setting” meeting aimed at preventing bilateral relations from sliding into uncontrolled confrontation.

The new formulation of a “constructive relationship of strategic stability” sends an important and highly positive signal, and its significance can be understood on three levels.

First, it emphasizes the importance of peace and stability in China-U.S. relations. “Strategic stability” is originally a concept rooted in military and nuclear strategy, extending this concept to the China-U.S. relationship suggests that both sides hope to establish a stable and manageable framework for bilateral ties, even amid intensifying competition. Second, “strategic stability” is itself a very weighty concept. Applying it to China-U.S. relations indicates that both sides attach significant importance to the bilateral relationship and recognize that China-U.S. interactions are central to global order and international security. Third, the phrase also contains an expectation of dynamic development. The inclusion of the word “constructive” suggests that strategic stability is not merely a minimal baseline for avoiding conflict, nor a static balance, but rather an evolving process with room for further development.

As for whether China considers the summit a “success,” I do not think success should be measured by whether the two sides reached a grand bargain. The structural contradictions in China-U.S. relations cannot be resolved in a single meeting. Rather, success should be assessed in three ways.

First, whether both sides were able to reaffirm basic bottom lines: not seeking conflict, not pursuing full decoupling, and not allowing competition to spiral out of control. Second, whether the two countries could restore or strengthen concrete communication mechanisms, particularly in trade, finance, military security, artificial intelligence, and regional crisis management. Third, whether they could achieve limited but practical progress in specific areas, such as easing trade tensions, stabilizing supply chains, restoring people-to-people exchanges, and maintaining crisis communication channels.

Overall, China’s expectations for the summit were pragmatic and limited. The goal was neither to revive the era of comprehensive engagement nor to eliminate strategic competition altogether, but rather to place competition within a more manageable framework. In that sense, if the summit helped stabilize the broader relationship, clarify bottom lines, manage risks, and preserve space for future cooperation, it could already be regarded as a meaningful and positive outcome for Beijing.

China hopes the summit can help bring a degree of phased stability to China-U.S. economic relations. Recent communications between Vice Premier He Lifeng, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer all emphasized continued dialogue, dispute management, and pragmatic cooperation, while China also expressed serious concerns over recent U.S. restrictive trade measures. This suggests that trade and economic issues remain among the few areas where the two sides may still achieve limited but tangible progress.

Overall, I believe the summit discussions focused on four major issues.

First, preventing further escalation of economic frictions. The defining feature of current China-U.S. economic relations is no longer simply trade imbalance, but the growing “securitization” of trade and technology. Beijing is particularly concerned that Washington may continue expanding technology restrictions and further politicize normal economic relations. China therefore hopes the United States will avoid introducing additional restrictive measures and prevent the formation of an escalating cycle.

Second, supply-chain and industrial-chain stability. Although both sides continue discussing “de-risking” and supply-chain restructuring, the reality is that the Chinese and American economies remain deeply interconnected, especially in consumer goods, manufacturing, energy, and parts of the high-tech sector. China is therefore closely watching whether the United States will continue promoting “de-China” supply chains or preserve space for pragmatic cooperation in selected areas.

Third, tariffs and market access. If the Trump administration continues intensifying tariff measures, costs will rise not only for China, but also for American companies and consumers. Beijing hopes both sides can at least avoid another large-scale tariff escalation, while also paying attention to whether Washington may send more positive signals regarding investment, financial cooperation, and people-to-people exchanges.

Fourth, maintaining communication mechanisms. Both governments increasingly recognize that even amid long-term strategic competition, minimum communication channels remain essential. Without them, market uncertainty and geopolitical risks would continue to expand.

On technology issues, the participation of Jensen Huang in the delegation underscored how semiconductors and AI have become especially prominent topics. His visit fueled speculation over whether there could be progress regarding NVIDIA’s H200 chip sales to China. However, while limited commercial arrangements may emerge, I do not expect any fundamental shift in the overall direction of U.S. export controls on advanced AI chips and semiconductor equipment. Washington will likely continue treating advanced chips, computing power, and semiconductor technologies as core components of strategic competition.

A more realistic outcome would be renewed AI governance dialogue between the two sides, including discussions on military AI, nuclear risks, model safety, and the misuse of AI by non-state actors. From China’s perspective, the key priority is to prevent AI cooperation from becoming merely another instrument of technological containment, while establishing a more equal communication mechanism on AI risk governance. In other words, there may be small commercial breakthroughs and new regulatory dialogue, but the broader background of technological competition will remain unchanged.

Regarding rare earths, the United States’ primary objective can be summarized in two words: “stable supply.” Washington does not necessarily expect China to fully remove export controls, but it does hope China will maintain predictable and uninterrupted commercial supply, particularly for rare earth oxides, metals, and high-performance magnets that are essential for U.S. automotive, electronics, semiconductor, energy, and defense industries.

Rare earths possibly became one of the most important concrete issues in the economic negotiations surrounding the summit. The U.S. business community is particularly focused on China’s export-license approval process and whether Beijing will continue the relative “rare earth truce” that has existed since last year. The Trump administration hopes China will continue and potentially expand export licenses, improve approval transparency and efficiency, and ensure basic supply for both civilian and dual-use industries.

China’s most likely response is to continue granting export licenses to qualified American firms, particularly in civilian sectors such as electric vehicles, consumer electronics, and green energy. Beijing may also moderately expand exports of certain magnets and processed rare-earth products in exchange for positive U.S. responses on tariffs, market access, or broader economic mechanisms.

However, China is unlikely to fully remove export controls. Rare earths remain one of the few areas where China retains a significant strategic advantage, particularly in refining, separation, and heavy rare-earth processing. From Beijing’s perspective, rare earths are not simply a trade issue, but also a matter of national security, industrial competition, and strategic leverage. China may demonstrate flexibility to stabilize bilateral economic relations and signal willingness to cooperate, but it is unlikely to relinquish control over such a strategically important resource.

Taiwan was undoubtedly one of the most sensitive and consequential issues discussed during the summit. One of Beijing’s main frustrations in recent years has been what it sees as a contradiction in U.S. policy: while Washington publicly reiterates adherence to the One-China policy, it has simultaneously expanded arms sales, official exchanges, and security cooperation with Taiwan. From China’s perspective, this gradually “hollows out” the One-China framework.

In this context, China likely conveyed three main messages during the summit.

First, Beijing hopes the United States will avoid further upgrading official and military ties with Taiwan, including reducing high-level political exchanges, avoiding new large-scale arms sales, and refraining from sending destabilizing security signals in the region. China believes rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait are closely linked to increasing external involvement.

Second, China wants Washington to translate its statement of “not supporting Taiwan independence” into more concrete policy restraint. Beijing is increasingly concerned that Taiwan is becoming more deeply integrated into the broader framework of U.S.-China strategic competition, including discussions around using Taiwan as a strategic lever against China.

Third, China also emphasized the importance of crisis management. As military and security activities by both sides around the Taiwan Strait continue to increase, Beijing hopes communication mechanisms can prevent accidental incidents from escalating into direct China-U.S. confrontation.

Before Trump’s visit to China, many in Washington’s strategic and Taiwan policy circles worried that he might approach the Taiwan issue in an overly transactional manner. In this context, the “Six Assurances” and the Taiwan Relations Act remain important political and institutional constraints that Trump must take into account, although they are not the sole determinants of his policy approach.

From my observation, Trump’s diplomatic style is highly personalized and transactional, focusing more on broader negotiating outcomes than on rigid diplomatic language. Nevertheless, even if Trump wished to introduce tactical flexibility on Taiwan, he would still face substantial constraints from Congress, the military, and the broader U.S. policy establishment.

After concluding his state visit to China, Trump publicly stated in an interview with Fox News that he “Does Not Wish to See Anyone Move Toward Independence” in Taiwan. From Beijing’s perspective, this was already viewed as a relatively positive signal. Although Trump’s motivation may primarily be to avoid a costly conflict, the statement also suggests that China’s emphasis on the Taiwan issue did resonate with him.

That said, Beijing does not expect any fundamental shift in U.S. Taiwan policy. Strategic competition with China now commands broad bipartisan consensus in Washington, and Congress, the military, and the U.S. strategic community all place growing importance on Taiwan. China’s more realistic objective is therefore not to force a complete reversal of U.S. policy, but rather to prevent Washington from crossing further perceived red lines and turning Taiwan into the primary trigger point for comprehensive China-U.S. confrontation.

The current Iran crisis has significantly reshaped both the broader atmosphere and the agenda of the summit. With the escalation of military tensions involving Iran, the summit has increasingly taken place against the backdrop of a wider global security crisis.

From China’s perspective, the Iran issue affects the summit on at least three levels.

First, it has strengthened the summit’s crisis-management dimension. The international community is concerned not only about Iran itself, but also about the risk of broader regional spillover, including instability in the Strait of Hormuz, disruptions to global energy markets, and the possibility of wider conflict across the Middle East. In this sense, the summit is no longer simply about how China and the United States compete, but also about how they prevent further destabilization of the international system.

Second, the crisis has elevated the importance of energy security and global supply chains. China remains a major importer of Middle Eastern energy, and the Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most critical energy corridors. A prolonged escalation would affect oil prices, global shipping, and financial markets. Beijing is therefore closely watching whether Washington intends to further expand military operations or preserve diplomatic space for de-escalation.

Third, the Iran issue also directly affects China-U.S. relations. In recent years, Washington has increasingly accused Chinese companies of maintaining energy and trade ties with Iran and has expanded sanctions accordingly. China, however, believes that the extensive use of unilateral sanctions and extraterritorial measures by the United States has itself contributed to rising international tensions. Beijing is therefore likely to emphasize that regional crises should not be further instrumentalized or turned into new tools for strategic pressure against China.

I do not believe the Iran issue completely overshadowed bilateral topics during the summit, but it certainly became an important strategic issue. The Middle East crisis is now no longer just a regional matter—it has implications for global energy security, financial stability, and major-power coordination. The United States likely hopes China can play a constructive role in stabilizing the situation, particularly in preventing a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz, since continued escalation would ultimately damage not only China’s economy, but also the United States and global markets more broadly.

At the same time, significant differences remain between China and the United States regarding Iran policy. Washington continues to rely more heavily on sanctions and military deterrence, while Beijing emphasizes political settlement, diplomatic mediation, and multilateral coordination under the United Nations framework. As a result, the two sides may be able to reach limited consensus on preventing escalation, but they are unlikely to fully align on specific Iran policies.

As for China’s likely position, I believe it can be summarized in four points: promoting de-escalation and a ceasefire; emphasizing diplomatic negotiations over military solutions; maintaining the security of international energy routes and global economic stability, especially the reopening and stability of the Strait of Hormuz; and opposing unilateral sanctions and extraterritorial jurisdiction, which Beijing believes further aggravate global instability at an already fragile moment.

If the two presidents are indeed able to maintain such a high frequency of interaction this year—including the possibility of four meetings—it would itself reflect a shared recognition that China-U.S. relations have entered a stage requiring continuous management. One of the major problems in recent years has been that when high-level communication declines, the risks of miscalculation and geopolitical spillover rise very quickly. The U.S. side has already indicated that President Xi may be invited to visit the United States in September, which also suggests that both governments recognize the importance of sustained leader-level diplomacy.

Looking ahead to a second Trump administration, I believe China-U.S. relations are likely to display several defining characteristics.

First, competition will become increasingly long-term and structural. Compared with Trump’s first term, one major change is that Washington has now developed a much broader bipartisan consensus on strategic competition with China. Across trade, technology, supply chains, artificial intelligence, defense, finance, and security, much of the U.S. strategic community increasingly views China as America’s primary long-term competitor. As a result, even if high-level dialogue continues, the relationship is unlikely to return to the earlier era where engagement itself was the dominant framework.

Second, the “transactional diplomacy” style of the Trump administration will likely become even more pronounced. Unlike more traditional U.S. presidents, Trump tends to place multiple issues within a single negotiating framework. Trade, Taiwan, technology, energy, Iran, and broader Middle East issues could all become interconnected bargaining elements. This creates both opportunity and uncertainty. On the one hand, Trump may be more willing than other administrations to pursue short-term deals or tactical compromises. On the other hand, the volatility of his policymaking style may also increase concerns about the consistency and predictability of U.S. policy.

Third, China-U.S. relations may enter a phase of intense competition combined with limited stability. Strategic rivalry will likely continue—and in some areas intensify—but both sides will also place greater emphasis on crisis-management mechanisms. Whether in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, or global supply chains, the risks of escalation are now significant. Both Beijing and Washington understand that direct confrontation would carry extremely high costs. As a result, even amid growing competition, both sides will still need to preserve communication channels across military, diplomatic, and economic domains.

Fourth, China-U.S. relations will become increasingly intertwined with global hotspots and governance challenges. The Iran crisis already demonstrates that China-U.S. relations are no longer simply bilateral in nature, but are deeply embedded within broader questions of regional security and global governance. In the future, issues such as the Middle East, Ukraine, energy security, AI governance, and global financial stability will likely involve simultaneous competition and coordination between the two countries.

Overall, I do not believe China-U.S. relations under a second Trump administration will move toward comprehensive rapprochement, but neither do I think they are destined to become a full-scale “new Cold War.” A more likely outcome is long-term coexistence under conditions of sustained strategic competition. Both sides will remain highly cautious at the strategic level, while still recognizing the necessity of maintaining minimum cooperation on global economic stability, crisis management, and international order. In this sense, the central question for future China-U.S. relations is no longer whether competition exists, but rather how to prevent competition from spiraling out of control. I believe that will become one of the core missions of China-U.S. summit diplomacy in the years ahead.

I think it is important to avoid two extremes when evaluating this summit. One extreme is to fully adopt Trump’s narrative and describe it as a “fantastic deal.” The other is to dismiss the meeting entirely simply because no highly detailed or comprehensive agreement was announced. More accurately, this was not a “breakthrough summit,” but rather a “stabilization summit” or a “framework summit.”

From the public information available, the Trump side clearly emphasized commercial outcomes, including reported agreements involving Boeing aircraft purchases and expanded trade cooperation. However, many details—including delivery schedules, contract specifics, and implementation timelines—remain uncertain. Similarly, while there were reports that a limited number of Chinese firms could potentially purchase NVIDIA H200 chips, there has been no clear indication of large-scale delivery or any fundamental easing of U.S. technology restrictions. In many ways, Trump’s description of a “fantastic deal” reflects a combination of domestic political messaging and commercial branding.

China’s presentation of the summit outcomes was notably more restrained. Chinese officials emphasized “balanced and positive” progress in economic dialogue, including the establishment of trade and investment consultation mechanisms, discussions on agricultural market access, and continued efforts to stabilize bilateral trade under a reciprocal tariff framework. In other words, the United States focused more on specific “deals,” while China emphasized longer-term “frameworks” and mechanisms.

If we look at what each side gained, the United States achieved several objectives. Trump obtained outcomes that can be presented domestically as political and economic successes, including narratives surrounding Boeing, agriculture, energy, and market access. U.S. businesses also saw signs of potential stabilization in China-U.S. relations, particularly in aviation, agriculture, energy, and parts of the technology sector. In addition, Washington secured continued communication space with Beijing on broader issues such as Iran, the Strait of Hormuz, and supply-chain stability.

China’s gains were more strategic in nature. First, Beijing promoted the new concept of a “constructive strategic stability relationship,” which I believe was the summit’s most important political outcome. China sees this as a new strategic framework that could guide bilateral relations over the coming years. Second, China succeeded in reducing the immediate risk of simultaneous escalation across trade, technology, Taiwan, and Middle East-related tensions. Third, Beijing demonstrated its ability to shape the diplomatic agenda: Trump visited China, but China also used the summit to introduce its own broader vision for managing bilateral relations.

At the same time, both sides clearly failed to achieve certain goals. The United States did not secure major breakthroughs on Iran, AI governance, or export-control issues. China, meanwhile, did not obtain any fundamental change in U.S. policy regarding advanced chip restrictions, Taiwan, or the broader framework of strategic competition. Washington will continue maintaining significant technology controls and security-oriented policies toward China.

Overall, the summit did not produce a grand bargain. Rather, it resulted in limited practical deals combined with a broader strategic framework. And I do not think it is productive to view the summit purely through a zero-sum “winner versus loser” framework. China-U.S. relations are not a game in which one side can simply defeat the other. In many ways, this is now a “defensive match” in which both sides are primarily trying to avoid losing control.

If I had to use a sports analogy, I would say the United States was looking for visible “goals” it could present to domestic audiences—Boeing orders, agricultural purchases, energy cooperation, or market access narratives. China’s approach, however, was less about scoring a specific commercial victory and more about controlling the pace and rules of the game itself.

The concept of a “constructive relationship of strategic stability” essentially reflects that logic: the two sides may continue competing, but they should avoid turning competition into direct confrontation. There can be rivalry, but not collision; disagreement, but not systemic breakdown.

So, while neither side achieved everything it wanted, both sides gained something important: the United States obtained several politically useful deliverables, China advanced a broader strategic framework, and both countries achieved a degree of short-term stability. In today’s China-U.S. relationship, that may already be one of the most realistic forms of “win-win.”

Subscribe now

Share

China Scholar Insights is a feature which aimed at providing you with the latest analysis on issues that Chinese scholars and strategic communities are focusing on. We will carefully select commentary articles and highlight key points. Questions or criticisms can be directed to sch0625@gmail.com

I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University. ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu.

Background

Cross-Strait relations bear great significance to regional peace and stability. In early 2026, high-level dialogue between the CPC and the KMT resumed on the basis of the 1992 Consensus and opposition to “Taiwan independence,” creating limited but important momentum for easing tensions and maintaining channels of communication across the Strait.

At the same time, Taiwan-related moves by Japan has brought new uncertainties into the regional security environment. Against this background, the recent high-profile visit to mainland China by Kuomintang Chair Cheng Li-wun has further highlighted the growing complexity of Taiwan’s internal political landscape. With Donald Trump expected to visit China in the near future, considerable attention has been focused on the future trajectory of the Taiwan issue and on whether it will emerge as a key topic during a potential leaders’ meeting.

Subscribe now

Taiwan Remains the Underlying Tension in China-U.S. Relations

The high-profile visit to mainland China by Cheng Li-wun has once again drawn broad attention to the Taiwan issue. With Donald Trump set to arrive in Beijing tomorrow, whether Taiwan will appear on the “list” during the upcoming China-U.S. leaders’ meeting has also become a subject of intense discussion.

From the current perspective, although the Taiwan issue remains highly important, economic and trade issues will still rank first on the summit agenda. The American business delegation accompanying Trump reportedly includes individuals connected to Boeing, which sends a clear signal that both sides still hope to achieve a certain degree of stability in economic relations and potentially reach partial purchasing agreements. Compared with the Taiwan issue, the summit is more likely to produce concrete outcomes in the economic sphere, including efforts to cool the tariff war and partially restore bilateral trade relations. In addition, the two sides are also expected to exchange views on AI-related risks, fentanyl and China-U.S. counternarcotics cooperation, as well as the Iran issue.

On Taiwan itself, if Trump were to once again explicitly state that the United States “opposes” unilateral moves toward Taiwan independence or reiterate support for the “peaceful resolution,” this would undoubtedly be welcomed by Beijing. Particularly at a time when China-U.S. relations remain defined by simultaneous competition and limited cooperation, any relatively positive signal from Washington on Taiwan could help create a more constructive and less confrontational political atmosphere for the summit.

At the same time, however, Beijing also maintains a relatively sober understanding of Trump. Chinese policymakers are unlikely to focus excessively on the precise wording of his statements alone, but rather on the broader tendencies and practical policy direction behind them. Even if Trump releases more conciliatory signals on Taiwan, this would not necessarily indicate any fundamental change in long-standing U.S. Taiwan policy. Nevertheless, such gestures could still leave additional room for maneuver in China-U.S. interactions.

Compared with summit-level rhetoric, the issue that raises greater concern is U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Prior to Cheng Li-wun’s visit to mainland China, the Kuomintang under her leadership had attempted to temporarily shelve sensitive arms-sale issues by demanding that the United States first provide a formal pricing document before approving additional procurement-related spending. Ahead of Trump’s Beijing trip, the White House also appeared to intentionally delay arms sales in order to avoid directly disrupting the summit atmosphere. However, on May 8, Taiwan’s legislative body passed the DPP authorities’ special defense budget bill worth approximately $25 billion, leaving the U.S. State Department the “final approach” before the previously suspended $13 billion arms package could move forward. As a result, if Trump concludes that the summit has failed to produce the outcomes he expected, or if he faces mounting domestic political pressure in Washington, the possibility of the White House reviving arms sales to Taiwan remains extremely high.

In addition, Japan’s current trajectory on Taiwan-related issues also deserves close attention. During her mainland visit, Cheng Li-wun repeatedly referenced Japan while in Nanjing. Although some of the more aggressive Taiwan-related rhetoric associated with the Takaichi government was reportedly restrained to some extent under pressure from Trump, the United States in practice continues to tolerate Japan’s military expansion. Meanwhile, there are indeed growing tendencies within Japan to use the current geopolitical environment to further advance the country’s transformation into a “normal state.” From China’s perspective, this constitutes a major security concern. For East Asian countries more broadly, if Japan were eventually to further strengthen its military capabilities, seek potential nuclear capabilities, and deepen its involvement in Taiwan affairs while effectively performing a “good cop-bad cop” role alongside the United States, regional insecurity would increase substantially.

Finally, the Iran issue is also beginning to shape how the American strategic community views Taiwan. One important lesson exposed by the current Iran situation is the critical importance of wartime military supply stability. In the eyes of many American strategists, mainland China possesses exceptionally strong large-scale industrial production capacity and sustained military supply capabilities, which is generating growing concern in Washington regarding a hypothetical Taiwan contingency. To some extent, the Iran issue is pushing the United States to rethink Taiwan increasingly through the lens of protracted warfare and supply-chain resilience. This could in turn influence future U.S. arms sales decisions and broader deterrence planning in the Indo-Pacific. For example, Washington may place greater emphasis on maintaining wartime production stability while developing weapons systems that are both highly precise and relatively inexpensive, in order to avoid repeating the “cost asymmetry” exposed in the Iran case.

Safeguarding Peaceful Development Across the Taiwan Strait: Public Consensus, Party Dialogue, and Taiwan’s Future

Mainstream Public Opinion Drives Peaceful Development of Cross-Strait Relations

In early April 2026, a delegation led by Cheng Li-wen, Chairperson of the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT), visited the Chinese mainland, marking the resumption of high-level dialogue between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the KMT after a 10-year hiatus. Rooted in the 1992 Consensus and opposition to “Taiwan independence,” this engagement responds to mainstream public opinion in Taiwan calling for peaceful cross-strait development and the resumption of exchanges.

Dialogue Resumed: Reaffirming the Cornerstone of Stability

Looking back on the development of cross-strait relations, inter-party dialogue and exchanges have consistently served as an significant bridge for overcoming impasses and moving forward.The 1992 Consensus enabled landmark talks from the 1993 Wang-Koo meeting to the 2015 leaders’ summit, proving that adherence to the One-China principle and rejection of separatism are prerequisites for stability. Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, met with Zheng Liwen and put forward four proposals on cross-Strait relations, making significant and far-reaching influence across the Taiwan Strait and internationally.

The Mainstream Public Opinion: Rejecting Confrontation, Demanding stability

Currently, Taiwan’s economy is facing downward pressure, and livilihood issues are drawing heightened public attention.The current administration in Taiwan has maintained a persistent adherence to a separatist platform and a confrontational cross-strait policy. This approach has increasingly distanced the leadership from mainstream public demands for stability and the practical socioeconomic needs of the population. A late 2025 poll by Taiwan’s United Daily News Group showed that 63% of local residents oppose the current Taiwan authorities’ cross-strait policies. Hence Zheng Liwen’s “2026 Peace Visit” aligns with prevailing public sentiment in Taiwan.

Ten Policies for Shared Prosperity: Positive Drivers for Economic and Practical Benefits

Coinciding with the visit, the mainland authorities announced ten policy measures to facilitate practical cooperation，which cover normalized cross-Strait direct flights, individual travel to Taiwan, youth exchange programs, and agricultural, fishery and cultural cooperation.These initiatives target specific economic pressures in Taiwan, such as the tourism sector’s deficit, which exceeded 700 billion New Taiwan dollar in 2025. They can not only inject economic vitality into Taiwan’s traditional industries, domestic service sectors and grassroots people, but also provide it with strong support in a turbulent geopolitical environment, guarantee the security of its energy and other resource supplies, and protect people’s hard-earned wealth.

Resolving differences through political mutual trust and consultation remains the cornerstone of regional stability. This high-level interaction not only upholds historical consensus but also establishes a pragmatic roadmap for future peaceful development and shared prosperity.

2025 Taiwan Policy: Restraint as the Core Trait

The Trump administration’s Taiwan policy in 2025 is marked by three key features: restraint, anxiety and extortion, with restraint standing out as the most prominent. Trump prioritizes China-US trade negotiations and sees Taiwan as far less strategically important than the Chinese mainland, so he has avoided risky moves on the Taiwan question. Unlike the Biden administration, there have been no inappropriate remarks about Taiwan from Trump or his cabinet that require clarification, nor has he resumed high-risk interactions with Taiwan authorities. Firm and effective countermeasures from China against US-Taiwan contacts have also deterred the US from taking radical steps, forcing Taiwan’s leader to cancel planned transit visits to the US and other regions.

Military Anxiety and Transactional Extortion

Driven by growing anxiety over the unfavorable military balance between China and the US in the Western Pacific, the US has stepped up military deterrence against China, including boosting troop deployment in the Asia-Pacific, pressing allies to raise defense budgets and enhancing military cooperation with regional countries. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has resorted to extorting Taiwan for economic and technological benefits. It has demanded Taiwan pay more “protection fees” through larger arms purchases, increased imports of US goods and more investment in the US, with a $11 billion arms sale plan as a typical move. More importantly, it is pressuring Taiwan’s semiconductor industry to relocate factories to the US, seeking to hollow out Taiwan’s core semiconductor sector.

2026 Policy Outlook: Strategic Ambiguity and Sustained Restraint

The US will maintain its long-standing strategic ambiguity on Taiwan, with the core goal of preserving the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. The military challenges brought by US deterrence are generally controllable, as Trump is highly cautious about military conflicts with major powers and respects China’s comprehensive national strength. With intensive high-level diplomatic exchanges between China and the US, the administration’s restrained approach is likely to continue in 2026. While there is uncertainty if China-US trade talks stall, the overall restrained stance will remain unchanged for the time being.

Takahashi Sanae’s “Offering Without Worship” as Political Opportunism

Takahashi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in the form of “offering without worship” constitutes a disguised compromise and act of political opportunism. She seeks to consolidate her right-wing base while avoiding the severe repercussions that a prime ministerial visit would entail, rendering her expressed intent to pay homage a mere political performance. Irrespective of the form taken, such actions represent a blatant challenge to historical justice, and in essence constitute denial and glorification of the history of aggression, reflecting her distorted view of history and opportunistic character.

Revision of the “Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment” Signals Japan’s Accelerated “Remilitarization” and Arms Exports

The Japanese government’s resolution permitting the export of lethal weapons has the core objective of shedding the constraints of the peace constitution, advancing the security strategy from “exclusively defense-oriented” toward proactive external intervention, and seeking great military power status. It also has an economic dimension: sharing R&D costs and enhancing the competitiveness of the military industry through arms trade. By reinforcing military-technical cooperation with the United States and exporting weapons to the Indo-Pacific region, the intention is to align with the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” to contain China. The new rules permit weapon exports to countries in conflict, which could undermine regional peace, fuel an arms race, and deviate from Japan’s post-war peace commitments.

The Roots of Successive Provocations Lie in Japan’s Rightward Political Shift and the Erroneous Framing of China as a Threat

The deliberate passage of a vessel through the Taiwan Strait on the 131st anniversary of the Treaty of Shimonoseki’s signing, taking far longer than normal transit time, was a premeditated political provocation. It aimed to sting China’s historical memory, test China’s bottom line, cater to domestic right-wing public opinion, and send erroneous signals to “Taiwan independence” forces. The invocation of “freedom of navigation” is a distortion of the concept and a grave violation of the One-China Principle. These successive provocations reflect severe right-wing drift in Japanese politics. Takahashi is eager to advance a right-wing agenda to cast off post-war constraints and divert attention from domestic socio-economic difficulties, while externally exploiting the U.S. strategy of containing China to accelerate military unfettering. The root cause lies in Japan erroneously viewing China’s development as a threat and attempting to contain China through military expansion and diplomatic encirclement, with historical revisionism providing legitimacy for military buildup and expansion.

“Most Hostile Toward China” Has a Realistic Basis, But Long-Term Excessive Pessimism Is Unwarranted

The deterioration in relations is a spillover effect of extreme political rightward drift and populism in Japan. Right-wing forces have seized comprehensive power, moderates are marginalized, and the negative dimensions of China policy are amplified. Takahashi is pushing constitutional revision and military expansion while challenging the political foundation of Sino-Japanese relations; the hollowing out of the peace constitution and the lingering toxic legacy of militarism leave the right wing unchecked. The current relationship faces the gravest situation since normalization of diplomatic ties, and the characterization of Japan as “most hostile toward China” is factually grounded and unlikely to change in the short term. However, domestic opposition within Japan is growing, economic circles are dissatisfied with hardline China policies, and the massive stock of economic and trade ties means that right-wing agendas are by no means a national consensus; continued pursuit will generate a backlash. While resolutely struggling, strategic composure should be maintained to steer the relationship back onto a rational track; the future still holds possibilities for improvement.

The U.S. and its allies focus more on Greenland than on Taiwan

The objective world remains unchanged, yet perspectives differ. The U.S.–China trade war has not ceased; the two sides have only reached a temporary consensus on raising universal tariffs. Trade, technology and broader strategic competition continue unabated. The trade war has changed in form but not in nature—it has not ended. High-level meetings will not calm bilateral relations; competition persists. A Trump visit to China would not guarantee long-term stability, only the resolution of immediate difficulties or specific issues such as crisis management and preventing escalation into armed conflict. It cannot be assumed that a 2026 visit would put ties on a positive new trajectory. Instead, discussions would center on preventing war over Taiwan. For 2026–2027, the U.S. and its allies are more preoccupied with whether Greenland will be acquired by peaceful or military means; Taiwan is not their central focus.

Sanae Takaichi misjudged Trump’s Taiwan policy: the U.S. seeks to prevent war, not win one

Japan’s conservative Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi provoked tensions by crossing red lines on Taiwan soon after taking office, possibly reflecting a misunderstanding of Donald Trump’s policy. Trump’s approach is to prevent war over Taiwan, not to prepare to win one. Takaichi’s stance runs counter to this. Moreover, U.S. allies, including Japan, cannot restore their pre-Trump relationships. Economic friction between the U.S. and its allies continues to intensify, and on security, European nations are particularly alarmed by Trump’s declared determination to take Greenland—whether peacefully or by force. This preoccupation far outweighs their attention to other issues. For Japan, the earlier “Abe line” of balancing security ties with the U.S. and economic ties with China is unlikely to persist. The Takaichi government will maintain the U.S.–Japan alliance as its foundation, and the next administration is unlikely to change course significantly. Unlike European countries, Japan’s reliance on the U.S. security guarantee commands bipartisan consensus. During Takaichi’s tenure, room for improving Sino-Japanese relations will remain limited; opportunities may emerge only after one or two more prime ministers have come and gone.

U.S.–East Asia allied relations depend on leaders’ ties rather than national interests

South Korea’s progressive President Lee Jae-myung has actively sought to improve relations with China. His first overseas visit of the year was to Beijing, where he expressed willingness to cooperate not only on economic and technological fronts but also to fully restore bilateral ties, including security cooperation. Under Lee, China–ROK relations are likely to advance beyond economic and technical collaboration into the security domain. The future of relations among China, Japan and Korea—and in Northeast Asia more broadly—will largely hinge on the policies adopted by decision-makers. Notably, Japanese media have observed that Takaichi’s confrontational approach is driven not by national interest but by her personal need to create favorable conditions for her leadership, illustrating how individual interests can override the national interest in shaping policy.

As long as the U.S. does not want war with China, there is no war risk between Japan and China

Over the next decade, East Asia is likely to remain one of the most peaceful regions in the world. There is little risk of war between China and Japan, and a Sino-American war within ten years is unlikely. As the Cambodia–Thailand border conflict demonstrates, as long as China and the U.S. decide not to go to war in East Asia, no military clash in the region can escalate into a large-scale conflict. Both powers have sufficient capability to prevent small-scale frictions from spiraling into war. If the U.S. has no intention of fighting China, it can—and will—restrain Japan from doing so. Washington has no desire to see a war between Japan and China.

Subscribe now

Share

As another China-U.S. leaders’ meeting approaches, artificial intelligence is likely to be one of the issues on the agenda. Official engagement between Beijing and Washington on AI did not begin from scratch. Over the past two years, the two sides have already established an intergovernmental dialogue and reached an important consensus that decisions on the use of nuclear weapons should always remain under human control.

Yet under President Trump’s second term, technological competition between China and the United States has intensified, raising a fundamental question: does sharper rivalry mean that the two countries no longer share interests in AI governance?

I believe the answer is clearly no.

Even amid strategic competition, China and the United States remain co-risk bearers in the age of AI. Beyond broad principles, there is still considerable room to expand practical cooperation through Track Two dialogues, multilateral institutions, joint risk assessments, and collaboration on AI applications that serve global public goods.

In an article I wrote earlier this February and published today in China-US Focus, I explore why AI cooperation remains both possible and necessary, and outline several concrete pathways through which Beijing and Washington can continue to build a more stable and responsible framework for governing this transformative technology.

Questions and feedback are always welcome at: sch0625@gmail.com

Subscribe now

Looking back over the past period, even as technological competition between China and the U.S. has intensified, the two sides have also made some constructive progress in cooperation on artificial intelligence (AI).

In May 2024, China and the U.S. held the first meeting of the inter-governmental dialogue on AI in Geneva, Switzerland. The discussions focused on risks associated with AI technologies, global governance mechanisms and issues of mutual concern. This meeting marked the formal inclusion of artificial intelligence as a standing item in China-U.S. governmental dialogue, signaling a cautious but meaningful step toward managing emerging technological risks through direct communication.

Subsequently, in November 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping and then U.S. President Joe Biden met and reached an important consensus on the principle of ensuring that nuclear weapons are always under human control. This shared understanding drew a clear red line with respect to the potential militarization of artificial intelligence, particularly in nuclear-related domains. It also laid an important foundation for bilatera, and potentially global efforts to strengthen risk management and strategic communication in the face of rapidly advancing technologies.

Following Donald Trump’s return to office, competition between China and the U.S. in the field of artificial intelligence has remained intense. Yet after the 2025 leaders’ meeting in Busan, both sides stated that they would continue to advance mutually beneficial cooperation in AI. This signal suggests that, regardless of whether a Democratic or Republican administration is in power, there is a shared recognition in Washington of the necessity to maintain engagement and coordination with China on artificial intelligence-related issues.

That said, under the current political climate in China-U.S. relations, pursuing deeper and more concrete cooperation in areas related to artificial intelligence and the AI-nuclear nexus continues to face significant practical constraints. Nuclear weapons and other key strategic capabilities remain highly sensitive, making mutual transparency difficult to achieve in the near term. Challenges related to verification and persistent deficits in strategic trust in the arms control domain further complicate dialogue between the two sides. Even so, China and the U.S. still have a strong incentive to explore cooperation to the greatest extent possible in less sensitive areas.

Subscribe now

On military-related issues, both sides could focus on promoting and deepening existing principled consensus, rather than rushing into substantive military dialogues or technical cooperation. In non-military domains, however, there remains considerable room and necessity for China and the U.S. to engage in dialogue and cooperation on assessing technological risks, addressing ethical concerns, and guiding the development and application of artificial intelligence toward beneficial and responsible ends.

The consensus that nuclear weapons must remain under human control provides a solid foundation for the next stage of cooperation, especially in managing AI-related risks in the military domain. President Trump is also trying to shape his image as a peace president, which opens space for both expansion and deepening of this consensus.

In terms of expanding cooperation, China and the U.S. can move in two directions. First, they can encourage other nuclear powers, such as the U.K., France, and Russia, to adopt the same principle, gradually transforming a bilateral understanding into a multilateral one. They could also take this issue to the UN framework and jointly promote statements reaffirming the principle of human control over nuclear weapons and emphasizing responsible deployment of military AI. Second, they could extend the principle beyond nuclear weapons to other strategic systems with high deterrence potential. The definition and scope, however, require further discussion and could begin in Track-2 dialogues.

On deepening cooperation, both sides can work on more detailed risk assessments and management mechanisms, breaking down nuclear weapon systems and conflict scenarios into deployment and decision-making steps to identify specific risks. A complete ban on AI in NC3 (Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications) systems is unrealistic, and both sides should also consider the potential benefits of AI-nuclear integration. Therefore, identifying mutually acceptable red lines is crucial.

Against this backdrop, Track Two dialogue serves as an important supplementary channel. Think tanks, scholars and retired military officers can continue discussions on risk assessment, ethical norms, and crisis decision-making. These efforts help sustain communication and build expert consensus that can eventually support official talks.

In non-military domains, China and the U.S. could also work together to advance global governance of artificial intelligence. To begin with, both sides could focus on the cross-border risks generated by AI and seek to promote risk-tiering, classification, and assessment frameworks that are acceptable to a broader range of countries, while jointly exploring possible responses.

These governance challenges are shared by both countries. At the technical level, they include risks related to loss of control over advanced AI systems, the limited interpretability of large models, and so-called “hallucinations” in model outputs. At the application level, they encompass AI-related biosecurity risks, the potential for AI to “enable” terrorist organizations and other non-state actors, and the erosion of social trust caused by deepfakes. All of these issues transcend national boundaries and cannot be effectively addressed by any single country acting alone.

Subscribe now

Approaching cooperation from a risk-based perspective may also help reframe China and the U.S. from mutual “technological competitors” into “co-risk bearers.” Even under conditions of strategic competition, this reframing could enable the two sides to identify shared concerns and practical areas for cooperation in AI risk assessment and management.

Second, China and the U.S. could engage in dialogue on the profound impact of artificial intelligence on economic and social structures. AI is reshaping labor–capital relations and transforming traditional modes of production. Across a growing number of sectors, trends toward unmanned operations and high levels of automation are becoming increasingly visible. While these developments may significantly enhance productivity, they also carry the risk of structural unemployment.

A shared challenge for both countries is how to ensure that AI improves people’s livelihoods rather than exacerbating disparities in the distribution of social resources. Closely related are questions of how to enhance societal adaptability to technological change through policy measures such as education reform, skills transformation, and more inclusive access to digital infrastructure. These issues represent areas of common concern for China and the United States. By taking the lead in advancing such dialogue, China and the U.S. could also offer useful reference points for other countries grappling with similar challenges, thereby contributing to broader international discussions on the societal governance of artificial intelligence.

Third, China and the U.S. could further explore how AI might be leveraged to provide new solutions for global public governance. In the field of climate governance, AI can be applied to disaster forecasting, extreme weather modeling and emergency response. In the realm of international peace and security, AI technologies may help support conflict mediation, optimize peacekeeping deployments and enhance early warning of crises. In global development, efforts to promote open-source technologies and the sharing of foundational algorithms could also contribute to narrowing the technological gap between the Global North and the Global South.

Building on existing United Nations frameworks, China and the U.S. could embed cooperation on AI as a global public good into multilateral agendas. This could include launching pilot projects in areas such as climate monitoring, disaster management, public health early-warning systems, smart agriculture, cross-border infectious disease forecasting and the digitalization of basic education. Cooperation in these fields would not only highlight the positive potential of artificial intelligence, but also help inject elements of collaboration into a bilateral relationship otherwise characterized by intense technological competition, thereby contributing to a modest improvement in overall China–U.S. relations.

Subscribe now

Finally, China and the U.S. should also jointly address the ethical and legal challenges posed by AI. The rapid development of AI technologies has brought fundamental ethical questions into sharper focus, including how to define human identity and how to preserve human agency and a sense of value in an era of increasingly autonomous systems. How to maintain effective human control over critical decision-making processes, how to establish baseline ethical principles for the development and deployment of AI, and how to clarify responsibility and accountability mechanisms in cases of harm have all become issues of global concern. Dialogue on these questions could help further build mutual trust between China and the U.S., while also contributing to the exploration and consolidation of normative consensus within the international community on technological development.

It should be emphasized that cooperation between China and the U.S. on global AI governance is not intended to construct any form of a “G2” model. Rather, it reflects the responsibilities that arise from the two countries’ respective capabilities in technological innovation, industrial capacity and international influence. Any effective framework for global technology governance cannot function without the participation of both China and the United States.

As a paradigmatic disruptive technology, AI will not only profoundly reshape economic, social, and security landscapes, but will also help define the rules and governance structures of the future international order. If China and the U.S. can take early cooperative steps in areas such as risk perception, ethical principles, and public-interest applications, such efforts would carry important demonstrative value and reflect the responsibility of major powers to lead by example.

About the Author

SUN Chenghao 孙成昊: Dr. SUN Chenghao is Senior Fellow,and head of U.S.-EU program at Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS), Tsinghua University. He is a member of Munich Young Leaders with Munich Security Conference, visiting scholar at Yale Law School (2024), visiting fellow at Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (2025) and fellow at Arms Control Negotiation Academy (2025-2026). His research interests include U.S. domestic and foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, transatlantic relations, AI and International security, etc. He teaches a graduate-level course on Transatlantic Relations in the School of Social Sciences, Tsinghua University. Dr. Sun has co-authored dozens of reports and books. He is the Top 1% Highly Cited Scholar (2024 & 2025) in China according to statistics of China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI). Dr. Sun is also Council Member of both the Chinese Association of American Studies and China International Economic Relations Association.

Subscribe now

Share

Recently, I was interviewed by Isobel Li from the U.S.-China Perception Monitor at the Carter Center (). We discussed the evolving priorities reflected in the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and exchanged views on the U.S.-China competition across key regions of the world. We also explored the dynamics of bilateral technological competition and reflected on potential pathways for future cooperation.

Questions and feedback are always welcome at: sch0625@gmail.com

                                  But the days in which the Middle East dominated American
                                                                             foreign policy…are thankfully over.

National Security Strategy of the United States of America, November 2025

Released by the Trump administration last December, Washington’s most recent National Security Strategy was a break from traditional U.S. foreign policy in its open promotion of America First policies and dominance in the Western Hemisphere. But as the war in Iran tests these proclamations in real time, how is China perceiving U.S. security priorities? How has the framing of U.S.-China competition changed over time, and how do present-day energy security and data infrastructure imperatives complicate the picture? The Carter Center spoke with Dr. Sun Chenghao to understand the intricacies of U.S.-China competition and its impacts on the rest of the world, contextualized by war in Iran and the energy crisis.

Dr. Sun Chenghao is a fellow, associate professor, and head of the U.S.-Europe program at the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University in Beijing, as well as a member of Munich Young Leaders with the Munich Security Conference and fellow at Arms Control Negotiation Academy. He previously served as a visiting scholar at Yale Law School and visiting fellow at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. He has co-authored dozens of reports and books, most recently Profound Changes Unseen in a Century and the U.S.-Europe Alliance published by Popular Science Press in 2023. Dr. Sun is the Top 1% Highly Cited Scholar (2024 & 2025) in China according to China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI). He is also the founder of the newsletter ChinAffairsplus.

Isobel Li: I saw that you wrote an analysis of the 2025 National Security Strategy, which was released by the Trump administration last December. What are the most notable elements or themes in the document?

Sun Chenghao: I think what strikes me most is that it is not simply another America First document. It is really an attempt to redefine what national security means for the United States, because the strategy argues very clearly that past U.S. policy overextended itself and took on too many global burdens and became disconnected from domestic strength and sovereignty. So this is not just about foreign policy priorities, it is about restructuring the relationship between domestic order, economic power, and external strategy. So I would like to highlight four particularly notable themes from the document.

First of all, the document places domestic order at the center of national security in much more explicit way than previous strategies. Border control, migration, drug flows, and internal cohesion are treated not as secondary domestic issues, but as strategic priorities. That is important because it shows that the NSS is not built around maintaining a liberal international order in a traditional sense. It starts from the idea that national security begins at home. From a Chinese perspective, this is one of the clearest signs that Washington is redefining security in more sovereignist and nationalist terms.

Second, the strategy makes economic security the organizing principle of competition, especially competition with China. The document repeatedly emphasizes trade imbalances, supply chains, industry capacity, technology, and production. In other words, the key arena is not only military rivalry or ideological confrontation with China, it is who controls the material and technological foundations of power. This suggests that under Trump the second, China-U.S. competition is being framed even more directly through economics, industry, and technology.

Thirdly, the document also signals a more transactional approach to alliances, especially in Europe. For example, it calls for burden sharing and burden shifting, and it makes clear that U.S. support should not be unconditional. But what is notable is that this is not just about asking allies to spend more on defense. The document also implies a broader political redefinition of the alliance relationship. So also from a Chinese perspective, this suggests that Trump’s alliance policy is not only cost-cutting, it is also about renegotiating the political basis of U.S. leadership.

Last but not least, the NSS still treats the Indo-Pacific as the decisive long-term theater, but it does so in a more selective and instrumental way than some people expected. It emphasizes deterrence, the Taiwan question, supply chains, and the strategic competition with China, but it does not frame the competition as a fully comprehensive ideological struggle. I can say that the difference has been noticed in Chinese policy circles. So some Chinese scholars see this as evidence that Washington is not abandoning competition, but narrowing it around the economic, technological core of power and a few critical geopolitical flashpoints.

IL: Although the NSS cannot be taken as a binding guarantee for how the U.S. will act internationally, I am curious if the Iran war has affected Chinese interpretations of U.S. security strategy.

SC: From the Chinese perspective, I would say yes, the Iran war has affected Chinese interpretations of the U.S. strategy, but not in a way that fundamentally overturns earlier interpretations of the U.S. The war has of course reinforced one of the main Chinese conclusions about the 2025 NSS, namely that it should not be read as a rigid guide to day-to-day U.S. diplomacy. The document clearly suggested that the Middle East should no longer dominate American strategic attention, but the war has shown how quickly that assumption can be disrupted.

I think Iran will highlight some broader points. Number one, it confirms that a Trump-era strategy is highly personalized and flexible. The NSS matters, but presidential instinct, crisis politics, and perceived bargaining opportunities can very quickly reshape actual policy. That is consistent with what many Chinese scholars already believed, that is, under Trump, written strategy documents are useful but they do not fully capture how U.S. foreign policy is actually made. Second, the war reminds Chinese analysts that the U.S. still faces the old problem of strategic distraction. Even if Washington wants to prioritize China and the Indo-Pacific region, crisis in the Middle East can still absorb military resources, diplomatic attention, and also maybe political bandwidth. So from Beijing’s point of view, this is another reminder that the U.S. is still a global power with global liabilities, not a state that can simply pivot at will. Thirdly, however, I do not think Chinese analysts will conclude that the U.S. has abandoned its broader strategic shift. Instead, many would probably say that the Iran war reveals a deeper contradiction inside Trump’s worldview. On the one hand, he wants retrenchment, burden shifting, and reducing long-term commitments. On the other hand, he also appears to believe that forceful coercive actions can quickly restore order, but in reality, coercion can create the very instability that drags the U.S. back in. The war does not invalidate the NSS, it exposes the tension inside it.

IL: You wrote that the U.S. framing of competition has pivoted towards economic power. From the perspective of Chinese national policy or Chinese scholars, how has the framing of competition changed as well?

SC: That is a very important question because I think one of the biggest misunderstandings in Washington is the assumption that China has always framed competition with the U.S. in the same way. In reality, the framing has changed quite significantly over time. China’s framing has shifted from trying to avoid competition as the defining logic of the relationship to increasingly accepting U.S. long term competition strategy as a structural reality. But China still tries to prevent that competition from becoming a total confrontation.

In the earlier period, especially from the reform and opening up era through much of the post-Cold War period, the dominant “competition” framing was still one of development first— integration into the international economy or international system and maintaining a relatively stable external environment even when there were major crises, for example, after the Taiwan Strait crisis, the embassy bombing in Belgrade, or the EP-3 incident. The broader policy instinct in Beijing was still to prevent those shocks from redefining the entire relationship. The Chinese strategic mindset was still shaped by a fairly basic assumption that China needed time, stability, and access to the global system in order to continue its modernization, so the emphasis was less on competing with the U.S. and more on avoiding premature strategic conflict.

That began to change more clearly in the late 2010s, especially after the Trump administration’s first term. I think many in China saw that period as a turning point. The trade war, technology restrictions, and the broader shift in Washington towards openly framing China as a so-called strategic competitor convinced a growing number of Chinese policymakers and scholars that the U.S. approach was no longer about limited friction within engagements, but about a more durable, competitive structure. At that point, China’s framing started to evolve. Instead of assuming that competition could be avoided if China remained sufficiently cautious, the thinking increasingly became “competition is here, whether China likes it or not.” But even then, the Chinese framing was still not identical to the American one in U.S. policy discourse where strategic competition often became the master concept that organized almost everything— trade, technology, alliances, military posture, ideology, even academic exchange. In China, the official framing has usually been more cautious and more layered. Beijing has generally tried to avoid fully legitimizing the term strategic competition as the sole definition of the bilateral relationship, because from the Chinese perspective, once competition becomes the only accepted frame, it becomes much easier for the relationship to slide into so-called zero sum confrontation.

Over time, China’s national framing has moved towards something more like this: “Competition is real, it is long-term, and it is structural, but it should still be managed and prevented from dominating every domain.” I think that is where we are now and in recent years, especially under the pressure of export controls like semiconductor restrictions and what Beijing sees as growing U.S. efforts at technological and industry containment, China’s policy framing has become much more centered on resilience, self-reliance, and strategic endurance. That is a major change and the focus is no longer simply on participating in globalization like during the post-Cold War era, it is increasingly on surviving and adapting to the conditions of external pressure.

Subscribe now

IL: Middle powers such as ASEAN adopt various hedging strategies to manage risks associated with U.S.-China competition. Is the war in Iran increasing the difficulty of this posture, for example with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz creating an international energy crisis disproportionately felt by oil import-reliant Asian economies?

SC: The war in Iran is making hedging more difficult for many middle powers in Asia, but not because it suddenly eliminates their strategic agency, but rather it changes the cost structure of hedging. For the past several years, many middle powers, especially in Southeast Asia but also more broadly in Asia, have tried to avoid being pulled into a rigid binary choice between China and the U.S. Their basic strategy has been to preserve room for maneuver, like deepening economic ties with China, maintaining security relations with the U.S., and avoiding letting either side fully define their strategic options. So in that sense, hedging meant selective alignment without total commitment. The Iran war does not make that logic disappear, but it makes it much harder to sustain because it links China-U.S. competition to a third domain that is immediately material and politically costly, that is, energy security.

That means a great deal for Asia. For example, the Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints. I checked the data: the IEA, the International Energy Agency, notes that in 2025, nearly 20 million barrels per day of oil and oil products moved through the Strait, and roughly 8% of that was destined for Asia. China and India alone accounted for about 44% of crude exports transiting the Strait, while Japan and South Korea are also heavily dependent on those flows. That means the Iran war introduces a new layer of pressure on Asian middle powers because their hedging strategies were designed for a world in which strategic rivalry was serious but still somewhat separated. They could separate trade from security or economics from geopolitics, at least to some extent. But an energy shock of this kind makes separation much harder.

I would say there are maybe three ways this increases the difficulty of hedging. First, it raises the pressure for short-term strategic alignment. When energy prices spike, shipping routes are disrupted and inflation risks rise. Governments have less room to think in long-term abstract terms about so-called strategic autonomy because they have to focus on immediate stability, like securing the fuel supplies, managing domestic prices, or preventing industry disruptions. So in those moments, the question becomes less about how do we preserve maximum flexibility, and more about who can actually help us right now. That naturally creates pressure to rely more heavily either towards U.S.-led security arrangements or towards China-led economic and supply chain solutions. In other words, crisis conditions compress strategic ambiguity or autonomy.

Second, the Iran war exposes the limits of relying on functional separation, the idea that our country can work with China economically and with the U.S. strategically while keeping those tracks relatively distinct, a formula that has been central to ASEAN-style hedging. When an external war triggers an energy shock or shipping disruption or financial volatility, I think those policy domains become more tightly connected. Energy, maritime security or inflation, naval presence, sanctions, and supply chains all begin to overlap. So middle powers are forced into a more integrated strategic environment, which is exactly what hedging tries to avoid.

Thirdly, which is especially important, the war reinforces a broader perception in Asia that the international system is becoming less predictable and less separated overall. This is not just about Iran, it is about the cumulative effect of multiple overlapping crises— the war in Ukraine, supply chain securitization, technology controls, and now Middle East conflict feeding directly into Asian economic vulnerability for many Asian states. The concern is not simply which side we should choose, it is that the external environment is becoming structurally more volatile and therefore harder to hedge against in the first place.

Having said that, I do not think the conclusion is that hedging is ending. The more accurate conclusion is that hedging is becoming more expensive, more issue-specific, and less comfortable.

IL: Pivoting back to the 2025 NSS, the United States stated that they want to refocus on the Western Hemisphere, which coincides with China’s ambition for Global South cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean. How does this change the geographies and intricacies of U.S.-China interaction in LAC states?

SC: This is a very important shift. If we take the latest version of the NSS seriously, one of its most notable features is the renewed emphasis on the Western Hemisphere as a broader strategic space tied to migration, economic resilience, supply chains, and geopolitical influence. At the same time, you’re right that China has clearly deepened its engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean through trade, infrastructure, finance, development cooperation, and increasingly what Beijing would describe as Global South partnership. So what we are seeing is not simply China entering America’s backyard, which is the old Cold War-style framing. We are seeing that Latin America and the Caribbean are becoming a more active arena, where the changing priorities of both China and the U.S. now overlap much more directly, and I think that changes both the geography and the logic of China-U.S. interaction. Broader global rivalry now becomes translated into very concrete questions like, who builds infrastructure? Who controls logistics nodes? Who shapes digital ecosystems and who provides development financing? Or who dominates critical mineral supply chains and who offers political partnership without too many conditions? That is important because for a long time many people still treated China-U.S. competition as mainly concentrated in East Asia, but increasingly the competition is also about who has influence over the connective tissue of globalization like ports, energy, mining, telecommunications, industry, supply chains, and development governance. Latin America is central to many of those questions.

From the Chinese perspective, engagement with Latin America is usually not framed as a military or ideological project. It is framed as part of so-called “South-South cooperation” or “development partnership” and diversification of China’s global economic ties. Beijing has repeatedly emphasized cooperation in infrastructure, energy transition, grid development, digital economy, and also political coordination with developing countries. So in Chinese discourse, Latin American countries are important not only economically but also symbolically as part of a broader effort to show that China is not isolated and that it can still build international coalitions and partnerships outside the Western Alliance system. But from Washington’s point of view, especially under the logic of the 2025 NSS document, this same process is increasingly seen through a strategic lens. The U.S. now tends to view Chinese economic presence in the Western Hemisphere as something that could affect resilience, political influence, supply chains, and even strategic access over time. That is why the Western Hemisphere is becoming more central in American strategic thinking again.

China-U.S. interaction in Latin America is becoming less about isolated bilateral projects and more about embedded strategic ecosystems. And competition in Latin American countries is likely to be more indirect, more negotiated, and more state-contingent than in East Asia. Many Latin American and Caribbean states are trying to do something very similar to what Southeast Asian countries have done— maintaining diversified relations, extracting benefits from both sides, and avoiding being forced into rigid alignment. That means the intricacy of China-U.S. interaction in the region lies partly in the fact that Latin American countries are also strategic actors trying to maximize room for maneuver. And this is where things get interesting, because unlike in some Asian security settings, the key battleground in Latin America is often not military posture first. It is governance, development, and infrastructure choice that makes the competition both less visible and in some ways more durable.

The China-U.S. dynamic in Latin America has increasingly intersected with the broader politics of the Global South, which matters because many countries in Latin America do not interpret the world primarily through a China-U.S. rivalry lens. They often see themselves as responding to long-standing development challenges, debt constraints, industry dependency, climate vulnerability, and also unequal integration into the global economy. So when China presents itself as a partner for development or industry, that message can resonate not necessarily because countries want to align with China strategically, but because they want alternatives. From a Chinese scholar’s perspective, I will say the future of China-U.S. interaction in this region will likely be shaped by competitive coexistence under conditions of local bargaining.

IL: The war in Iran has sharpened the focus on Latin America’s energy resources. How do you see the U.S. and China calibrating their regional strategies in response to the ongoing energy crisis?

SC: Yes, the war in Iran has made Latin America’s energy relevance much more visible. But I would frame it carefully. This is not just about oil, it is about how a Middle East shock is pushing both the U.S. and China to see Latin America less as a secondary diplomatic space and more as a part of a broader energy security and resilience map. In other words, the region matters not only because it has hydrocarbons but also because it has LNG potentials, biofuels, electricity, interconnection opportunities, and the critical minerals that matter for the energy transition. So the strategic value of Latin America is broadening and I think Washington and Beijing will calibrate their regional strategies in quite different ways.

From the U.S. side, the likely response might be a stronger emphasis on hemispheric resilience and trusted supply chains. The Iran war and instability around the Strait remind Washington that global energy security is still vulnerable to distant chokepoints, even if the U.S. itself is less dependent on Middle Eastern oil than many Asian economies, because the U.S. still cares deeply about global price shocks, domestic inflation, shipping disruption, and strategic vulnerability. That is why Latin America becomes more important not only as an energy source, but as part of a more secure regional economic space. The U.S. will likely focus on several things. First, it will try to strengthen regional energy and industry supply chains, not only in oil and gas, but also in copper and other materials linked to energy security and industry competitiveness. Second, Washington will probably place more emphasis on infrastructure security like ports, LNG facilities, grids, pipelines, and logistics. In the context of the Iran war, energy infrastructure is once again seen as a strategic issue. Third, the U.S. will increasingly view Latin American energy cooperation through a competition lens. In other words, the question will not only be whether a project is commercially useful, but also who finances it and who builds it, and whether it expands Chinese influence in the hemisphere.

China, from my perspective, will calibrate differently. Beijing is unlikely to frame its regional strategy primarily in military or security terms. Instead, China will respond by what we might call geoeconomic diversification. The Iran war is a reminder for China that overreliance on any single external energy corridor is risky. So from Beijing’s perspective, Latin America matters as part of a broader effort to diversify supply, reduce vulnerability, and build a more resilient portfolio of long-term partnerships. So I would highlight some features of China’s approach. First, China will likely prioritize long-term access. That means stable purchasing relationships, upstream investments, infrastructure and financing arrangements that help secure future access. Second, Beijing will likely define energy cooperation in broader terms than the U.S. often does. For China, Latin America is not only about fossil fuels, it is increasingly about green industry chains— copper batteries, grid equipment, renewables, and electric mobility. And in that sense, China may actually see the energy transition side of this crisis as well one its advantages. Third, I think China will probably continue to present its regional engagement through the language of “development partnership” and “South-South cooperation” rather than strategic rivalry, which matters politically in Latin America where many governments do not want to be treated merely as geopolitical instruments. Last but not least, Beijing will likely prefer quiet entrenchment. In other words, China will probably try to deepen its regional footprint without making it look like a direct geopolitical challenge to the United States.

IL: With this idea of building up energy infrastructure in the digital age, data center infrastructure is now another critical strategic asset that also presents major security vulnerabilities. How is China thinking about domestic data infrastructure resilience?

SC: In earlier stages, data infrastructure in China was mainly discussed in terms of the digital economy like platforms, e-commerce, smart governance, or smart cities. But in recent years, especially under intensified China-U.S. competition, technology restrictions, and the rapid rise of AI technologies, the framing has shifted quite significantly. Today, data infrastructure is increasingly understood in China as something that sits at the intersection of economic development, state capacity, and national security. So China is now thinking about data infrastructure through the idea that security is a precondition for development, and resilience is a precondition for security.

And there are three key aspects to this. First, China increasingly treats data as a strategic resource, not just an information flow. This is a major conceptual change. Data is no longer seen only as supporting digital services. It is now seen as a foundational input for industry upgrading, AI development, logistics, finance, and governance. As a result, data infrastructure including data centers, cloud systems, cross-regional data networks, and computing capacity is increasingly viewed as critical infrastructure similar to energy or transport. That is why China has invested heavily in what it calls new infrastructure, including large-scale computing networks and projects designed to distribute data processing capacity across regions.

Second, China defines data infrastructure risks in systemic terms, not just cybersecurity terms. In many discussions, data risk is mainly about hacking or cyberattacks. China certainly cares about that, but its perspective is broader. From a Chinese policy standpoint, vulnerability can come from dependence on foreign technology, supply chain disruptions, concentration of data or computing power, or even the risk that a digital system could amplify social instability if disrupted. That is why China has emphasized data security laws, critical information infrastructure protection, and stronger governance over digital platforms and algorithms. The goal is reducing structural vulnerability.

Third, in the AI era, data infrastructure resilience is increasingly tied to long-term strategic competition. As AI becomes central to economic and security competition, data and compute are part of national capability. So resilience now includes questions like, can key sectors keep operating under disruption? Can data flow securely across regions? And how dependent is the system on foreign inputs? From this perspective, resilience is not only about protection, it is about continuity of competition. This also helps explain a feature of China’s approach that sometimes looks contradictory from the outside. On one hand, China is building larger and more advanced digital systems. On the other hand, it is strengthening regulation and state oversight. But from Beijing’s perspective, these two things are connected. The concern is that digital expansion without control creates vulnerability, while control without capacity limits development. For the Chinese government, the objective now is to pursue both at the same time.

IL: On the U.S. side, how is technological advancement and a focus on what you’ve described as the “tech-industrial complex” reshaping competition with China?

SC: The key point is that the U.S. is no longer competing with China in technology simply through firms, markets or or innovation ecosystems alone. What is increasingly emerging is what I describe as a techno-political complex, a structure in which state power, technological capital, industry policy, and national security institutions are becoming much more tightly integrated. And that matters because it changes not just the intensity of competition with China, but its basic logic. In earlier periods, there was still a widespread assumption that tech competition would remain largely market-driven; governments might regulate at the margins, but firms, capital, and innovation networks would do most of the work. That is no longer the case. In the U.S., sectors including semiconductors, AI, cloud infrastructure, and advanced manufacturing are increasingly treated as strategic capability domains. So when I use the term techno-political complex, I mean that technology has become a central arena where the state’s capital industry production and security strategy are increasingly fused.

This is making the competition much more systemic and durable. If competition were only about tariffs or trade disputes, in theory it could be adjusted relatively quickly, but once technology, industry policy, export controls, finance, and national security institutions are all linked together, the competition becomes much harder to reverse. That is one of the most important changes of recent years. The U.S. is no longer only reacting to specific Chinese behavior. It is increasingly trying to restructure the strategic environment so that China faces long term constraints in key technological and industry domains. This shifts the competition towards control over bottlenecks and enabling infrastructures. The contest has become about who controls the chokepoints, such as advanced chips, AI training infrastructure, critical software layers, and the rules and standards around them— so the U.S. is not only trying to outperform China, it is also trying to shape the architecture of technological dependence itself. From a Chinese perspective, that is a major shift because it means the challenge is no longer simply catching up, it is also whether China can continue to function, scale and innovate under conditions of externally-imposed constraints.

The techno-political complex is making competition much harder to separate from national security. In the past, there was at least some meaningful distinction between commercial competition and security competition. Today, that boundary is much weaker. AI, semiconductors, cloud computing, advanced manufacturing, and even data infrastructure are all increasingly understood as having strategic or dual-use significance. The more that sectors become treated as security relevant, the more that forms of interdependence start to look like vulnerability. That has a profound effect on China-U.S. relations. And from the Chinese side, this has reinforced a growing belief that the U.S. is no longer trying to compete with China within globalization, but rather is trying to reengineer globalization itself in ways that preserve U.S. technological primacy and strategic leverage. Whether or not Washington would describe its own strategy that way, that is a very important Chinese perception because it shapes how China responds. And China’s response has already become quite clear— more emphasis on self-reliance, industry upgrading, innovation, and supply chain security. So in a paradoxical way, the rise of the U.S. techno-political complex is not only increasing pressure on China, but it is also accelerating China’s own shift towards a more security-driven model of technological development.

Subscribe now

Share

ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by QIN Yaqing and FU Qing on logic of relationality and evolution of U.S.-Russia interdependence before weaponization.

Summary

Weaponized interdependence has become a highly salient research issue. However, much existing literature focuses primarily on the outcomes of “weaponized interdependence and its aftermath”, neglecting the pre-weaponization process. Interdependence is an objective fact in international society, which has no inherent tendency towards either weaponization or de-weaponization, and its trajectory is contingent upon the overall relations between states.

The world is shaped by relations. Relations shape state identities, identities define state interests, interests guide state behaviors, and behaviors follow the logic of relationality. When the interstate relationship is characterized by generalized trust, states tend to positively define their mutual identities and interests, thereby facilitating the de-weaponization of interdependence. Conversely, if generalized distrust dominates, states are more likely to negatively define their mutual identities and interests, thereby fostering the weaponization of interdependence. The pre-weaponization process is fundamentally about relations. Interdependence itself is more a permissive mediator than an explanatory variable, capable of evolving towards either weaponization or de-weaponization. Eventually, relations shape state behaviors.

This article empirically tests this proposition by examining the evolution of U.S.-Russia relations and the divergent trajectories of their interdependence from 1991 to 2022, confirming that the pre-weaponization process is fundamentally about relations. Consequently, the fundamental avenues for constraining, managing and resolving the problem of weaponized interdependence lie in improving overall interstate relations and enhancing the level of generalized trust between states.

Why It Matters

In the current international context of intensifying power politics, interdependence is undergoing a profound paradigm shift from a bond of cooperation to a strategic weapon. This weaponized turn has become the core logic for understanding great power competition. The significance of this article lies in the fact that it departs from the limitations of existing research which often treats weaponization as a mere rational choice or a given outcome. By innovatively introducing a relational perspective, it reveals the underlying law that the nature of relations determines the direction of evolution.

Through an in-depth empirical analysis of the three-decade evolution of U.S.-Russia relations, the article demonstrates that interdependence itself is a neutral and irreversible relational fact. Its trajectory towards weaponization or de-weaponization fundamentally depends on the identities and interests defined by the level of generalized trust between states. When the overall relations shift from trust to distrust, originally mutually beneficial economic, trade, and technological networks are rapidly securitized and evolve into tools of suppression for asymmetric power.

This research provides solid academic support for assessing the exercise of networked power in great power competition. It also profoundly points out that the fundamental path to alleviating the dilemma of weaponization lies in improving the overall relationship environment between states rather than restructuring the interdependence itself. Amidst the resurgence of Cold War thinking, this analytical approach starting from the relational origin offers a highly insightful policy perspective for managing great power competition and preventing interdependence from being completely alienated into a bargaining chip for conflict.

Subscribe now

Key Points

1. The Turn Toward Weaponized Interdependence and Empirical Evidence from U.S.-Russia Competition

• From Mutually Beneficial Networks to Strategic Tools: In the current context of intensifying power politics, interdependence is undergoing a profound paradigm shift from a bond of cooperation to a strategic weapon. While traditional logic views global integration as a prerequisite for development, the resurgence of geopolitics has prompted dominant states to exploit asymmetric power structures. Consequently, originally mutually beneficial economic or technological networks are being transformed into coercive tools for curbing rivals.

• The Representativeness and Research Path of the U.S.-Russia Case: This shift is particularly salient in U.S.-Russia relations, which moved from a post-Cold War honeymoon of de-weaponization to an era of all-encompassing weaponized confrontation. This evolution reveals how interdependence manifests differently across temporal conditions. The core research task is exploring the specific mechanisms that trigger this turn. Specifically, it examines why a party with lower vulnerability chooses to forgo cooperative gains to securitize relational networks as bargaining chips for conflict. By assessing this triggering path, the explanatory power of relational theory regarding networked power in great power competition can be effectively verified.

2. Evolution and Shift in Existing Research Paradigms

• Liberal Expectations for Cooperation: Keohane and Nye established the foundation of interdependence theory in Power and Interdependence, arguing that it involves both mutual influence and the incurrence of costs. Under complex interdependence, multi-channel connections reduce the salience of military force and security issues. This paradigm maintains an optimistic outlook on cooperation. For instance, Rosecrance emphasizes that interdependence increases war costs, while Wendt suggests it facilitates collective identities, driving international relations toward de-securitization and de-weaponization.

• Realist Payoff Games: In contrast, Waltz offers a realist critique, arguing that in an anarchic system, states must remain vigilant regarding relative gains and the unequal distribution of benefits. Since power is the fundamental means of ensuring security, states seek relative advantages in interactions. Gilpin further reveals that economic ties do not eliminate mistrust and may catalyze competition under certain conditions. Under this logic, interdependence fails to effectively constrain state behavior and may be alienated into a fuse for conflict due to power struggles.

• The Weaponized Turn and Research Limitations: As great power competition intensifies, Farrell and Newman introduced the concept of weaponized interdependence, emphasizing that asymmetric, networked characteristics allow states to utilize networked power for strategic coercion. This transforms neutral economic or trade links into strategic instruments. Although research has expanded into various fields, existing literature often treats weaponization as a given outcome or choice. In fact, interdependence serves as a permissive mediator, and its evolution toward weaponization or de-weaponization fundamentally depends on the overall relations between states.

3. Relational Logic and the Evolution of Interdependence

   1. The Logical Origin of Relationalism

      To resolve the differences in strategic attributes exhibited by interdependence, this article introduces a relational perspective exploring the logic that the nature of relations determines the definition of interests. Interdependence is essentially a relational state, and its weaponized trajectory depends on the development of relational processes. Relational networks serve as both the prerequisite for power generation and the physical field for weaponized operations. Since the exercise of power is fundamentally an interaction to adjust mutual relations, differences in relationship types directly determine whether interdependence evolves into weaponized confrontation or de-weaponized cooperation.

      1. The Ontological Turn of Relationalism: Relationalism posits that the world is composed of fluid relations rather than isolated entities, viewing relations as the fundamental units of the world. Unlike mainstream Western theories that treat states as independent entities with pre-existing interests and self-sufficient attributes, relationalism emphasizes that individuals are “relationals” deeply embedded in networks from the beginning. The existence, meaning, and behavior of actors are defined by their relational environment. This perspective shifts the research focus from isolated individual rationality to dynamic relational processes, suggesting that relations provide meaning to an actor’s existence while constantly shaping and constraining choices through the interactive operation of their circles and networks.

      2. Relational Definition of Identity and Interests: In relational theory, an individual’s identity gains substantive meaning only within specific relational scenarios, presenting multiplicity and variability as networks flow and are reconstructed. Because identity determines motivation, interests are not given a priori but are derived from identities defined by relations. This logic explains why the same level of interdependence carries different strategic implications. For example, when interstate relations are friendly, mutual identities are defined as friends and cooperation is the interest. Once relations deteriorate into rivals, curbing the other party becomes a core interest, and originally non-sensitive low-level issues are redefined as high-level security threats.

      3. Actor Agency and Relational Rationality: The actions of actors are rooted in the relational logic of social networks rather than a simple logic of consequences or appropriateness. Although interests drive behavior, their connotations and implementation paths must be defined within specific relational contexts, meaning the essence of rationality manifests as relational rationality. Simultaneously, actors possess significant agency within networks, capable of managing and weaving relational circles to achieve functional goals or adjust the relations themselves. Consequently, an actor's strategic choices are determined not only by objective structures but also by the relational reality perceived through subjective cognition.

   2. Criteria for Determining Generalized Trust

      After establishing the ontology of relationalism, trust is introduced as a core variable to transform the abstract relational field into an evaluable analytical tool.

      1. The Dual Connotations of Trust: Trust is a relational concept deeply embedded in social networks, possessing both instrumental rationality and emotional attributes. It involves rational weighing based on cost-benefit analysis alongside emotional expectations of goodwill. These dual attributes collectively constitute positive expectations for mutual behavior, reflecting current interactions while indicating a future vision of shared interests and emotional resonance.

      2. Classification of Trust Relationships: From a relational perspective, interstate relations are classified into two core forms: generalized trust and generalized distrust. This “generalized” nature represents a comprehensive evaluation across all fields rather than a strategic trade-off for a specific event. Generalized trust signifies positive interactions and expectations, whereas generalized distrust reflects negative anticipations based on non-goodwill information and negative emotions, with both dynamically transforming as interactions change

      3. Trust as a Diagnostic Indicator of Identity: Interstate relationship types provide the field for identity generation, and the level of trust directly defines a state’s relational identity. Generalized trust facilitates the identification of “partners or friends,” promoting interest fusion and shared risks. Conversely, generalized distrust defines the other party as a “rival or threat,” leading to security self-help and interest isolation. Consequently, the qualitative descriptions of identity in official state documents serve as key explicit indicators for determining relationship types and predicting policy behavior.

   3. The Direction of Interdependence Evolution

      1. Sources of Power Under Multiple Forms of Dependence: Weaponized interdependence involves an initiating state utilizing relational asymmetries to harm a target. In the contemporary context, state power originates from both networked power based on specific positions and traditional bilateral asymmetric dependence. These forms create a superposition state of interdependence, allowing states to access power tools from multiple channels. Conversely, de-weaponization occurs when a state voluntarily renounces such repressive power to seek conflict reduction and cooperation.

      2. Evolutionary Choices Driven by Relational Rationality: As a relational fact, interdependence possesses no inherent evolutionary tendency. Its transformation depends on the agency of sovereign states following relational rationality, where identities and interests are defined by relations. This means a state’s perception of interests in interdependence is not fixed but deeply embedded in the overall relational context.

      3. Core Hypotheses on Generalized Trust and Evolutionary Direction: The overall relationship is the core variable determining the evolutionary direction of interdependence. Two core hypotheses are proposed:

         ① Hypothesis 1: In a relationship of generalized trust, states view dependence through absolute gains and promote evolution toward de-weaponization.

         ② Hypothesis 2: In a relationship of generalized distrust, states view dependence through relative gains and promote evolution toward weaponization.

4. U.S.-Russia Relations and the Evolution of Interdependence

   Based on the relationalism framework, the post-Cold War U.S.-Russia competition illustrates how overall relations define identities and interests, driving interdependence toward weaponization or de-weaponization. As the dominant actor, the United States leveraged asymmetric power to shape the relationship. The 2014 Ukraine crisis marked a watershed, shifting the relationship from generalized trust to generalized distrust. This qualitative change fundamentally transformed their strategic interactions, moving from cooperative integration to the systematic weaponization of interdependence.

   1. 1991 - 2013: Generalized Trust and De-weaponization

      From the dissolution of the Soviet Union to the 2014 Ukraine crisis, the United States tended to define Russia as a positive partner. Although local frictions existed on issues such as NATO’s eastward expansion and anti-missile systems in Eastern Europe, the overall nature of the bilateral relationship remained within the scope of trust. Under this relationship mode, U.S. behavioral expectations toward Russia remained positive, driving U.S.-Russia interdependence to exhibit significant characteristics of de-weaponization.

      1. De-securitization and the Shift Toward Cooperation in the Security Field: In the relational field of generalized trust, the United States and Russia promoted the evolution of security interdependence toward a positive dimension by de-emphasizing competition and strengthening cooperation. Both sides voluntarily ceased the Cold War-style arms race and successively signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) and the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). Through large-scale reductions in strategic nuclear armaments and the establishment of rigorous treaty verification mechanisms, they achieved security risk-sharing based on trust. Regarding sensitive security issues such as NATO’s eastward expansion, both sides consciously managed competition through the establishment of mechanisms like the NATO-Russia Council and engaged in deep collaboration in the field of counter-terrorism, including intelligence sharing, airspace opening, and the signing of military contracts, transforming potential conflict issues into functional cooperation vehicles.

      2. Deep Integration and Institutional Acceptance in Non-security Fields: Guided by generalized trust, Russia began to deeply embed itself into the U.S.-led international economic and trade network, and the level of non-security interdependence between the two sides continued to rise. Through policy tools such as the Freedom Support Act, the United States provided large-scale assistance for Russia’s economic reforms while actively guiding it to establish a market economy system. Both sides established a series of partnerships in the fields of the International Space Station, strategic energy dialogues, and technical investment, and continuously strengthened economic links through bilateral statements. Furthermore, the United States promoted and accepted Russia’s entry into the International Monetary Fund, the G8, and the WTO, transforming international mechanisms from tools of suppression into platforms for multilateral cooperation. During this period, the trust relationship became the core driver of de-weaponization, effectively suppressing the motivation to transform interdependence into strategic chips.

   2. 2014 - 2022: Generalized Distrust and the Weaponization of Interdependence

      Since 2014, U.S.-Russia relations have deteriorated sharply as the U.S. redefined Russia from a partner to a “rival actor” and “acute threat,” marking an era of generalized distrust. In this field, the United States viewed previously deep interdependence as a security liability and initiated a comprehensive weaponization strategy.

      1. Suspension of Security Cooperation and Competitive Evolution: Under generalized distrust, original cooperation mechanisms collapsed as the security boundary moved forward. Citing Russia’s actions in Ukraine, the United States suspended military cooperation and trade investment dialogues. The 2019 withdrawal from the INF Treaty terminated long-term arms control collaboration. Furthermore, by cutting network security channels and planning cyberattacks, the U.S. shifted security interdependence from positive cooperation to negative competition.

      2. Unilateral Sanctions and the Blockade of Bilateral Dependence: The United States utilized its power advantage to implement weaponized strikes through multiple rounds of unilateral sanctions. This evolved from freezing assets of financial and military entities under the Obama administration to the severe 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. Following the 2022 conflict, sanctions upgraded to a comprehensive blockade, using administrative and legal means to forcefully obstruct bilateral interdependence.

      3. Multilateral Linkage and the Isolation of Global Dependence: Beyond unilateral strikes, the United States urged allies to join sanctions to decouple Russia from global markets. Targeting Russia’s energy pillar, the U.S. legislated assistance for Central and Eastern Europe to diversify supplies while pressuring countries like the United Kingdom, Japan, and India to reduce Russian imports. This strategy seeks strategic isolation by blocking Russia’s global interdependence paths.

      4. Exclusion from the International System and the Weaponization of Networked Power: Leveraging asymmetric dominance in global networks, the United States systematically excluded Russia from the international system. Measures included suspending Russia from the G8, terminating its OECD accession, and revoking its “most-favored-nation” status. The most severe blow was prohibiting Russian banks from the SWIFT system, effectively weaponizing global financial infrastructure to contain Russia’s development.

         Driven by generalized distrust, security became the primary policy consideration. Any cooperation enhancing Russian interests was viewed as a threat, prompting the United States to transform bilateral and global network advantages into weapons of strike, turning interdependence into a breeding ground for suppression.

Conclusion

Through the empirical examination of the historical process of U.S.-Russia competition, this article confirms the decisive role of the nature of overall relations in the evolutionary direction of interdependence. This evolutionary logic profoundly reveals that security and weaponization are, to a large extent, derivatives of relations, rooted in the underlying mechanism where relations define identity and identity defines interests. Interdependence, as a neutral and irreversible relational fact, is not in itself an inevitable incentive for weaponization. The true driving force lies in the overall relations between states. Specifically, generalized trust allows security issues to be processed through de-securitization, while generalized distrust transforms non-security issues into existential threats. Consequently, the fundamental path to resolving the problem of weaponization lies not in changing the structure of dependence but in improving interstate relations and enhancing the level of generalized trust.

About the Author

QIN Yaqing 秦亚青: Dr. QIN Yaqing is former President and Professor of International Studies of China Foreign Affairs University and Chancellor of China Diplomatic Academy. He is Executive Vice President of China National Association for International Studies, Associate Member of the Royal Academy of Belgium, and Global Fellow of Peace Research Institute, Oslo. He was on the resource team for the UN High Panel for Challenges, Threats, and Changes (2003-04) and worked as Special Assistant to the Chinese Eminent Person, China-ASEAN Eminent Persons Group (2005). His main academic interests include international relations theory and global governance. He has published extensively, including Power, Institutions, and Culture (Peking University Press), Relations and Processes (Shanghai People’s Publishing House), and A Relational Theory of World Politics (Cambridge University Press). He got his Ph.D. and M.A. in Political Science at the University of Missouri-Columbia, U.S.

FU Qing付清：PhD Candidate, School of Political Science and Public Management, Shandong University.

About the Publication

The Chinese Version of this article was published on Northeast Asia Forum（《东北亚论坛》）. The journal, managed by the Jilin University, is a comprehensive bimonthly periodical in politics, military, and law. Founded in 1992, the magazine focuses on analyzing the current situation, development strategies, economic cooperation, friendly exchanges and theoretical research in various countries and regions of Northeast Asia. It also evaluates new trends and developments in industry, agriculture, science and technology, finance, commerce, and foreign trade in the Asia Pacific region.

Share

Subscribe now

ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me. Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com.

In this newsletter, we address concerns about China’s positions through a Q&A format, while also presenting key points of leading Chinese scholars’ commentaries. Through this series, we aim to provide policymakers, think tanks, and strategic communities overseas with access to Chinese scholars’ views, accompanied by curated academic perspectives that help readers better understand the considerations underlying China’s foreign policy choices.

Background

On 28 February 2026, the United States, in coordination with Israel, launched large-scale air strikes against Iran. Iran immediately retaliated by targeting U.S. military assets in the Middle East and Israel, further escalating the turmoil in the Middle East. Washington had intended to replicate the model of its strikes against Venezuela at the beginning of the year, seeking to achieve its preset goals through a string of “low-cost” air operations. Yet the conflict has not turned into a quick campaign as expected. Confronted with Iran’s effective counterattacks, the war costs have kept mounting, with spillover effects rippling into the economic and geopolitical domains. How does China perceive this U.S.-Iran conflict? What implications does it carry for China, China-U.S. competition, and the Gulf states? In this episode of Ask China, we bring you the views of Chinese scholars on these issues.

Subscribe now

The stated justifications for the U.S.-Israeli military operation against Iran are Iran’s alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons, long-standing “support for terrorism,” and threats to U.S. and Israeli security. In reality, however, this war is an unjust unilateral U.S. military action to maintain its Middle East hegemony and contain its regional influence.

Politically, the war exemplifies hegemonism and power politics, driven by four key factors. The First factor is the anxiety over a Nuclear-Armed Iran. The U.S. and Israel, adhering to absolute security, view Iran’s nuclear program as a grave threat. The second factor is the regional hegemony competition. Iran, a major regional power opposing U.S. hegemony and Israeli aggression, has built a “Shia Crescent” to challenge them, prompting the U.S. and Israel to aim at weakening Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.” The third factor is the control of energy routes. The U.S. seeks control over key energy routes like the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea shipping lanes, a core interest highlighted in its 2025 National Security Strategy. The fourth is the lobbying efforts of Israel, which also served as an accelerator for the outbreak of the war. The last factor is the U.S. domestic political calculation. While the war has objectively harmed the Republican Party’s electoral prospects, Trump’s decision to launch strikes against Iran—with fantasies of a quick, decisive victory—was partially motivated by a desire to boost Republican support.

Legally, the U.S. military action against Iran constitutes an illegal act of aggression under international law. Above all, the U.S.-Israeli military strikes were launched without any authorization from the UN Security Council, violating the fundamental UN Charter principle prohibiting the use of force in international relations. This lack of legitimacy is underscored by European allies publicly refusing to cooperate with U.S. military deployments and maintaining distance from the operation, as well as the surge in anti-war sentiment within the U.S. itself—both clear indicators that this is a “war that should never have been fought.” What’s more, the conflict stems from the U.S. claim that Iran is on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons, making it a classic case of preventive war, failing to meet the strict criteria for legitimate self-defense under international law. Finally, the war resulted in significant loss of life, including senior Iranian leadership figures, sparking international concerns about potential war crimes.

Historically, the war stems from decades of U.S.-Iranian tensions. Following Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, the country adopted an explicitly anti-American foreign policy, transforming the U.S.-Iranian relationship from alliance to enmity. The U.S. imposed long-term sanctions on Iran, laying the groundwork for decades of subsequent tensions. The Trump administration’s 2018 unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and reinstatement of “maximum pressure” policies further escalated hostilities, setting the stage for military confrontation. The collapse of nuclear negotiations in Geneva in February 2026 served as the immediate trigger, with the U.S. demanding Iran’s complete abandonment of its nuclear program and Iran refusing to transfer enriched uranium abroad.

Additionally, the U.S. and Israel chose this particular moment to strike because they judged Iran to be at its weakest point, seeing an opportunity to potentially overthrow the current Iranian government. Domestically, Iran has faced near-economic stagnation and growing hardship due to prolonged U.S. economic sanctions and military threats, leading to periodic public protests. Externally, senior leadership and military capabilities of Hamas and Hezbollah had been severely damaged by consecutive Israeli attacks, leaving Iran in a precarious position with its regional “Resistance Front” significantly weakened. This combination of internal fragility and external setbacks created what the U.S. and Israel perceived it as a window of opportunity to use force against Iran and pursue regime change.

China maintains a clear and principled position on this conflict, insisting that the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of Iran and all Gulf states must be respected and inviolable, advocating that all parties should resolve differences through equal dialogue and negotiation. To implement this principled position with concrete actions, China has dispatched its Special Envoy for Middle Eastern Affairs to carry out shuttle mediation in the Middle East, aiming to de-escalate tensions and facilitate peace talks between relevant parties.

Middle East conflicts, particularly the recent U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, have reignited debate over whether such crises could reshape the trajectory of U.S.–China strategic competition. While these developments undeniably introduce new uncertainties into the international system, their impact is better understood as a disruption of the pace of competition rather than a transformation of its structure.

In the short term, the conflict creates a reallocation of strategic attention and resources. The United States, already engaged in Ukraine, now faces another flashpoint in the Middle East, which may appear to dilute its focus on the Indo-Pacific. This could temporarily ease pressure on China. However, such an effect is inherently unstable. If the situation in Iran evolves in a way that serves U.S. interests—whether through containment or regime weakening—Washington could quickly redirect its strategic resources back to Asia. In this sense, the Middle East won’t permanently distract the United States but instead functions as a flexible theater within a broader global strategy.

For China, the situation is far from advantageous. The Iran conflict not only threatens its overseas interests—particularly its energy security and economic presence in the region—but also exposes the limits of its ability to safeguard strategic partners under conditions of escalating conflict. China’s restrained posture, evident in both the Iran and Venezuela cases, has fueled external skepticism about its willingness and capacity to defend its partners. As a result, Beijing finds itself in a somewhat awkward position: seeking to balance risk avoidance with the expectations attached to its growing global role.

At a structural level, the conflict does not alter the essential nature of U.S.–China competition. Instead, it reinforces an ongoing shift toward a more complex, multi-dimensional rivalry. The United States is increasingly integrating military action, economic sanctions, financial controls, and alliance networks into a coordinated strategic toolkit. This approach, demonstrated in the Middle East, extends beyond the region and has implications for China’s global interests. As a result, the competition is not fundamentally changed but rather intensified in its scope and sophistication.

Simultaneously, heightened tensions in the Middle East also underscore a shared reluctance between the United States and China to allow regional crises to escalate into bilateral confrontation. China has responded to the Iran issue with restraint, refraining from a forceful reaction or direct involvement while adopting a mediating posture and calling for de-escalation. The United States, for its part, has likewise shown little interest in letting the Iran crisis significantly disrupt broader U.S.–China relations, maintaining channels for high-level engagement with Beijing. Furthermore, U.S. military action against Iran does not necessarily tilt the balance of negotiations in Washington’s favor. If the conflict were to escalate into a prolonged ground war, it could significantly drain U.S. military resources and strategic focus. These risks further reduces the probability of the US engaging in a direct confrontation with China in the short term. Taken together, these dynamics suggest that both sides seek to prevent external conflicts from spilling over into strategic tensions between them.

The old bargain has been badly shaken, but not fully replaced. The 2026 U.S.–Israel–Iran war exposed the core weakness of the Gulf security model: American bases in Gulf monarchies became magnets for retaliation rather than reliable shields, critical infrastructure and shipping routes came under direct pressure, and the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz threatened the economic foundation of Gulf states. At the same time, Iran’s political system proved more resilient than a simple regime-collapse scenario assumed, which means Gulf capitals cannot count on a decisive American military solution to eliminate their main regional challenge. Their likely trajectory is therefore neither full emancipation nor deeper submission, but selective strategic autonomy under continued hard-security dependence.

First, the “oil-for-security” formula has lost much of its credibility. As Jin Liangxiang argues, the model was always asymmetrical: Gulf states recycled oil wealth through the dollar system and U.S. arms purchases, while Washington’s security commitment grew increasingly selective. That credibility problem was visible in the 2019 attacks on Saudi oil facilities and became unmistakable in 2026, when the United States used Gulf bases for operations against Iran, leaving Gulf partners exposed to retaliation and with little real say over escalation.

Second, Gulf states are likely to seek stronger strategic autonomy in diplomacy. But this autonomy will be uneven, not uniform. Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait have stronger incentives to de-escalate and preserve mediation channels, while Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain remain more threat-sensitive toward Iran. Even so, the shared lesson is clear: Iran is a permanent neighbor, while American protection is contingent and reversible. That is why hedging, selective engagement with Tehran, and broader regional dialogue will become more attractive than a pure bloc-based posture.

Third, stronger diplomatic autonomy will not eliminate security dependence. The Hormuz crisis and the possibility of Red Sea spillover show that Gulf security now spans missiles, drones, shipping lanes, ports, and energy infrastructure. Analyses of Houthi restraint also suggest how fragile this environment remains: their calculations were shaped by domestic priorities, leadership risk, and the danger of reopening the Saudi front. This points to a hybrid future in which Gulf monarchies still need outside support for air and missile defense, maritime security, intelligence, and advanced systems, even as they resist exclusive alignment with any single patron.

Finally, the most plausible destination is a layered regional order. Gulf states are unlikely to abandon the U.S. umbrella overnight, but they are also unlikely to keep treating it as sufficient. The direction of change points instead toward a “GCC+” approach: more intra-Gulf coordination, limited reconciliation with Iran, and broader security cooperation with regional actors such as Turkey and Egypt, while keeping U.S. ties as insurance rather than destiny.

In sum, the old “security in exchange for protection” model has failed as a strategic belief system, even if Gulf states still rely on parts of the U.S. security architecture. The region is moving not toward full independence or deeper subordination, but toward more autonomy in diplomacy and diversification, combined with continued dependence on external powers for the hardest security tasks. In that sense, the Gulf’s future is neither post-American nor fully American-led. It is hedging by design.

Subscribe now

In the “ceasefire without peace” phase following the 2026 U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict, the Middle East is entering a prolonged state of intensified surface conflict and frozen structural contradictions. China’s medium- to long-term strategy should therefore focus on four priorities: resilience, balance, diversification, and strategic stability.

First, China must treat energy security as a structural risk. Key chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb have become geopolitical weapons. China should diversify supply routes (e.g., pipelines via Russia and Central Asia), expand strategic reserves, and strengthen cross-border energy cooperation to build a robust energy security shield.

Second, China should pursue calibrated geopolitical balancing amid the emerging “two Middle Easts”. While maintaining coordination with Iran, it should deepen ties with Gulf states adjusting beyond the oil-for-security model, promoting common security and development-based stability without direct alignment.

Third, China should focus on building an integrated energy–technology–finance security framework, as modern warfare increasingly relies on AI and critical infrastructure. AI capability depends on stable energy supply, making energy the physical foundation of digital conflict. If energy trade remains dollar-dominated, sanctions could disrupt both payments and supply, threatening computing systems. Expanding RMB-based energy settlement is therefore key to securing an independent resource base. At the same time, China should strengthen core technologies while deepening cooperation with Middle Eastern partners in digital infrastructure and AI governance. By linking Chinese technology standards with RMB-based systems, China can build a closed-loop structure connecting energy, digital operations, and decision-making, reducing reliance on Western systems and hedging against the joint weaponization of the dollar and advanced technology.

Finally, China should anticipate the spillover effects within the United States and shift from avoiding crises to structurally protecting its overseas interests. This conflict has become an amplifier of American politics, and military actions related to Iran have become a “second front” influenced by electoral pressure, which has increased the security risks to Chinese ports, energy routes, and personnel. China should not adopt a passive response attitude but should deepen the “Belt and Road” cooperation, embed its own interests into the regional economy and governance structure, and build a network that combines development with risk buffering. As the region gradually moves towards a long-term “small Cold War“, China should provide a more predictable and development-based security approach to strengthen regional stability and the resilience of its own overseas interests.

The most immediate and measurable impact lies in the disruption of critical energy transit routes. Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has reportedly declined by as much as 95%. Should the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait also become operationally constrained, the simultaneous disruption of these two maritime chokepoints would represent the most severe interruption to global trade flows since World War II. Industrialized countries with concentrated energy structures and high external dependence, particularly in Europe, Japan, and South Korea, are expected to face elevated inflationary pressures and supply chain disruptions.

At the regional level, the conflict is increasingly characterized by decentralized and asymmetric escalation. Following the death of Khamenei, Shia-aligned armed groups across multiple theaters have reportedly intensified cross-factional retaliation. The erosion of previously observed informal “red lines” has reduced predictability and increased the risk of uncontrolled escalation. At the same time, perceptions of U.S. security guarantees are shifting among regional partners. Gulf states are showing signs of reassessing their reliance on the United States, as U.S. military presence, traditionally viewed as a stabilizing force, is increasingly seen as a potential liability in a high-intensity conflict environment. More broadly, the initiation of military operations during an ongoing negotiation process with Iran has contributed to skepticism about the reliability of diplomatic engagement. For smaller and medium-sized states, this may reinforce perceptions that formal negotiations offer limited protection against coercive actions, thereby weakening confidence in existing international mechanisms.

The most consequential long-term risk lies in the potential erosion of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Iran’s reported stockpile of approximately 450 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% purity places it within closer proximity to weapons-grade capability, heightening concerns about rapid escalation under crisis conditions. Should nuclear weapons be introduced into the conflict, the implications would extend beyond immediate military effects. Such a development would represent the most severe systemic shock to the global non-proliferation architecture since the establishment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, with implications for both horizontal proliferation and strategic stability.

Share

Subscribe now

China Scholar Insights is a feature which aimed at providing you with the latest analysis on issues that Chinese scholars and strategic communities are focusing on. We will carefully select commentary articles and highlight key points. Questions or criticisms can be directed to sunchenghao@tsinghua.edu.cn.

I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University. ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu.

Background

Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae recently made her first visit to the United States. This was the second face-to-face meeting between the leaders of the two countries since Trump’s visit to Japan in October 2025. On the day Takaichi set off for the U.S., ODNI released the “2026 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community”. The report noted that Takaichi’s remarks last November, which hinted at the possibility of Japanese military intervention in the Taiwan Strait, represented a major policy shift. It also warned that that China would take further countermeasures if tensions continued to rise, which has already led to sustained friction in China-Japan relations. Meanwhile, in the Middle East, the U.S. and Israel launched a military strike against Iran. Iran threatened to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, which accounts for 90% of Japan’s crude oil imports.

Summary

The inherent structural contradictions within the U.S.-Japan alliance will not be resolved by a visit. No matter how elegant the diplomatic rhetoric is or how warm the interactions between leaders are, the asymmetry of the U.S.-Japan alliance is presenting in a more straightforward and utilitarian manner during Trump’s tenure. Furthermore, Japan’s strategic investment on the path of “relying on the U.S. to contain China” is causing it to be trapped in multiple predicaments such as increased financial burden, reduced autonomy, and deteriorating regional relations.

On one hand, Japan sacrifices the China-Japan relationship to increase its strategic autonomy within the U.S.-Japan alliance, and will ultimately become increasingly self-degraded in the trilateral relationship of China-U.S.-Japan.On the other, Japan is gradually becoming a “paying ally” of the U.S., and the alliance is continuously oscillating between differences and contradictions. The U.S.’s indication that it does not want to get involved in the China-Japan conflict is a clear warning to Japan. This incoherence in China policy affects the mutual trust between the U.S. and Japan.

Subscribe now

Insights

LI Nan, CAO Cong: The “Reconstruction” of the U.S.-Japan Alliance by the Trump Government

Since Trump returned to power, he has emphasized “America First” and “shared responsibility” towards allies. This aligns with the actions of the Japanese right wing in pushing for the revision of the “Peace Constitution” and in striving to become a “normal country”. As a result, the U.S.-Japan alliance is undergoing a historic reformation.

The Alliance Reaches a New Level

Although Trump’s second term implements a “Western Hemisphere First” global strategy, the U.S. maintains its strong presence in the Indo-Pacific region, focusing on supporting Japan. Firstly, Japan, under the guise of meeting U.S. requirements, strives to increase its defense spending. Secondly, U.S.-Japan security cooperation is shifting from “U.S. attack, Japan defense” to collaborative operations. Thirdly, the extension of U.S.-Japan nuclear deterrence is continuously escalating. In order to control the cost of the alliance system, Trump encourages Japan to play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific multilateral mechanisms and coordinates Japan to increase military security assistance to countries in the Global South.

“America First” : Economic Cooperation between the United States and Japan

In October 2025, the bilateral agreement signed by the U.S. and Japan emphasized supply-side and demand-side cooperation in the field of rare earth mining and processing, aiming to exclude China from the rare earth supply chain of the U.S. and its allies. The two sides also actively promote cooperation in shipbuilding, AI, nuclear energy, U.S. power infrastructure and defense industry. These collaborations are almost entirely prioritized by American interests, further highlighting Japan’s role as a “vassal” to the United States.

Structural Bottlenecks in the Reconstruction of the Alliance

Trump’s efforts to strengthen Japan are confronted with three structural constraints. Firstly, Japan’s fiscal capacity is insufficient, with its government debt reaching 230% of GDP. Secondly, the contradiction between Japan’s strategic autonomy and its dependence on the US is difficult to resolve. Thirdly, the inconsistent policies towards China have undermined the mutual trust between the US and Japan. The Taiwan question could either serve as a binding agent for the cooperation or become a point of contention, depending on the expectations of the US policies towards China and the evolution of the Taiwan question itself.

Overall Assessment

The restructured alliance between the U.S. and Japan is an integrated institutional arrangement deeply embedded in the U.S. strategy to contain China. The systematic upgrade of the U.S.-Japan alliance will increase the difficulty and cost for China to promote its own development and maintain stability in its surrounding regions. In the long run, the structural contradictions in the China-Japan relationship will inevitably continue to deteriorate.

YAO Zeyu: Sanae Takaichi’s Washington Visit Lays Bare the Deep Divisions in U.S.-Japan Relation

The Facade of Mutual Trust

On March 19, 2026, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi held her inaugural summit with President Trump at the White House, their second face-to-face encounter since late 2025. While Tokyo has sought to frame the visit as a “highly productive” testament to deep mutual trust, the reality is far more complex. An analysis of the agenda, interactive nuances, and resulting agreements reveals that the summit served not to deepen the alliance, but rather to further manifest its asymmetric structure. Particularly against the backdrop of a volatile Middle East, Japan has evidently lapsed into a state of strategic passivity across several critical issues.

Takaichi’s Multifaceted Gambit

The timing of Takaichi’s visit was far from incidental, reflecting a calculated geopolitical strategy formalized in late 2025. Tokyo’s objectives were fourfold: to synchronize its China policy and avoid marginalization within the U.S.-China-Japan triangle; to anchor U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific against the tide of “Western Hemisphere First” isolationism; to mitigate “supply-chain anxiety” by restructuring critical mineral networks to reduce structural dependence on China; and to secure policy leverage in trade and security by meeting Washington’s demands for increased defense procurement and burden-sharing.

The Disparity Gap

The Middle East escalation has pivoted Takaichi’s visit from a proactive strategic layout to a reactive, passive response. A pronounced “policy temperature gap” has emerged: while Tokyo prioritized pressuring Beijing, Washington’s shift toward regional energy stability resulted in a profound strategic misalignment. This is exacerbated by the Strait of Hormuz crisis, where U.S. demands for maritime participation clash with Japan’s constitutional constraints, forcing Tokyo into a strategic quagmire.

The summit underscores a structure of asymmetric reciprocity where Japanese capital functions as a direct subsidy to American re-industrialization. This lopsided division of labor, characterized by Japan assuming primary fiscal risks while the U.S. retains strategic dominance, serves as a definitive manifestation of structural inequality. Ultimately, by trading massive resources for elusive security guarantees, Japan has significantly compressed its strategic maneuverability and capacity for independent diplomacy.

ZHANG Yun: Sanae Takaichi’s U.S. Visit Amid China-U.S. Strategic Competition: Calculated Motives Behind the Political Spectacl

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s White House visit became a political show, as the two leaders exchanged lavish praise and projected an image of close alliance. However, it was all surface gloss, with real shocks beneath.

Surface Gloss: High-Level Reception, Rare Reciprocal Visits, and Pro-Japan Messaging

The “outward gloss” of Takaichi’s U.S. visit was reflected in three ways. First, the diplomatic protocol was exceptionally high. Second, there was a breakthrough in scheduling. It is extremely rare for U.S. and Japanese leaders to visit each other within less than six months. Third, the public messaging was tilted in Japan’s favor, while belittling Europe.

Yet behind this glossy exterior, the Takaichi’s visit to the U.S. has in essence exposed severe “Trump shocks,” as reflected in the following three aspects.

The U.S. Indirectly Undercuts Takaichi’s Taiwan Remarks

On March 18, the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence released its 2026 Threat Assessment, rejecting the widely circulated claim that mainland China would attack Taiwan in 2027 and warned that any military conflict would inflict unprecedented damage on the U.S., China, and the global economy. In recent years, Japan has used this “2027 attack” scenario to justify treating China as an unprecedented strategic challenge, lifting arms-export limits, raising defense spending, and expanding military capabilities. By dismissing that claim, Washington indirectly undercut the logic behind Takaichi’s Taiwan remarks on November 7, 2025.

The U.S. Does Not Want to Be Drawn Into a China-Japan Conflict

The report said that Takaichi’s remarks, which stated that a Taiwan contingency could place Japan in a survival-threatening situation and justify the use of force, were “a major shift by a sitting Japanese prime minister.” This clearly rejected Japan’s claim that her comments had not changed the government’s long-standing position on Taiwan. This shows that the U.S. does not want to be dragged into a China-Japan conflict initiated by Japan itself.

A Sudden Shift in the Diplomatic Agenda

Takaichi had wanted to center her U.S. visit on strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance and boosting deterrence against China, especially by securing some sign of Trump’s support for her Taiwan remarks. But U.S. military action against Iran moved the focus to the Middle East.

The United States wants a controllable, predictable Japan, not a reckless ally. If Japan seeks greater strategic autonomy at the expense of China-Japan relations, it will only further diminish itself in the trilateral U.S.-China-Japan relationship.

JIANG Shuiyao: Japan’s $73 Billion “Investment Gift”: Economic Concessions for a Hollow Alliance

A Conspicuous Offer That Defies Global Caution Toward Washington

After the US “reciprocal tariff” policy was ruled unconstitutional, most nations adopted a cautious stance. Japan did the opposite. During Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s first US visit in March 2026, Tokyo announced a $73 billion investment package – the second batch of a $550 billion commitment. The timing and scale of this “gift” are strikingly abrupt.

Three Forms of Entanglement: Energy, Mega-Projects, and Mineral Decoupling

The “grand investment gift” offered by Takaichi is mainly characterized by three aspects. First, the deepening energy integration between Japan and the U.S.. Japan seeks to further embed itself in the U.S. supply chain system by cooperating with the U.S. in energy initiatives such as boosting crude oil production in Alaska. Second, the large-scale investment projects, with the total investment of the three core projects expected to reach up to 73 billion U.S. dollars. Third, cooperation on critical mineral supply chains, with the introduction of a “minimum price system” to reduce reliance on China.

Security Anxiety Behind Generosity: Flattery Met with a Pearl Harbor Quip

Japan is trying to buy US security guarantees with economic sacrifices. When Trump demanded Japanese naval deployment to the Hormuz Strait, Takaichi gave only a vague response, citing constitutional constraints under Article 9. Her overture – “Only Donald can bring peace and prosperity to the world” – was met with Trump’s dismissive retort. Asked why the US did not notify Japan before striking Iran, Trump replied: “Who knows better about surprise than Japan? Why didn’t you tell me about Pearl Harbor?” This reveals Washington always prioritizes its own interests, never treating allied consultation as a necessity.

Tangible Costs Yield Only Symbolic Returns, Not Substantive Concessions

Japan’s “attack as defense” strategy failed. The US response was limited to Trump’s verbal praise, a welcome for Alaska oil purchases, and ceremonial courtesies. On Japan’s three core concerns – trade policy, security commitments, and coordination toward China – Washington made no substantive concessions. Japan’s payments are concrete and quantifiable; America’s returns are symbolic and gestural.

The Fundamental Asymmetry: Japan Trapped as a “Paying Ally”

The US-Japan alliance is an asymmetric interdependence. Japan’s security lifeline is held by the US, which values Tokyo only for its strategic location and economic resources. Under Trump, the more Japan pays, the hollower US assurances become. Whether such a one-sided model can lead to a “new golden age” is self-evidently doubtful. Japan’s dilemma remains: how to avoid being a “paying ally” while preserving its own interests within deep dependency on Washington.

Conclusion

Looking ahead, the U.S.-Japan alliance is unlikely to achieve the “new golden age” that both sides have claimed. Although the U.S. still regards Japan as the most important pivot for containing China in the Indo-Pacific region, the underlying logic of the Trump’s “America First” policy determines the instrumental and conditional nature of its commitment to Japan. This structural asymmetry of “Japan needs certainty while the U.S. retains uncertainty” will repeatedly test the stability of the alliance. The upgrading and reconstruction of the U.S.-Japan alliance will continue to pose strategic pressure on China, and may weaken the long-term efforts of Asian countries to promote stability and cooperation in the region.

Share

Subscribe now

Editor for Today’s Newsletter: SUN Chenghao, WEI Zongqin, WU Kexi, LI Yining, CHEN Weng U and BAI Xuhan.

ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by Jin Liangxiang, which deals with the unraveling of Iran’s “Resistance Strategy” under U.S. and Israeli pressure.

Summary

The setback in Iran’s resistance strategy is one of the most significant spillover effects of the new round of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Iran’s resistance strategy is fundamentally based on maintaining national security rather than exporting revolutionary ideology, adopting a defensive posture rather than offensive stance, using anti - American and anti - Israeli stances as a unifying force, and employing missile deterrence as a key tool. Following the outbreak of the new round of the Israeli - Palestinian conflict in 2023, Iran and its resistance front suffered military strikes from Israel and the United States, resulting in a major setback for its resistance strategy. This was mainly manifested in the severe damage to the resistance network, a significant weakening of its domestic foundation, and a severe compression of its strategic space. The reasons for this setback are threefold: first, Iran’s economic strength is insufficient to support its vast resistance strategic network; second, domestic political maneuvering leads to its wavering between resistance and de - escalation, preventing it from fully implementing its deterrence strategy: and third, the long - term weakening efforts of the US and Israel, along with their repeated breaches of moral boundaries, have given them the upper hand. This setback will have many profound impacts on the regional order: first, it will lead to a new round of regional power fragmentation and reorganization; second, it will further undermine regional rules and norms; and third, the regional agenda structure will undergo new adjustments. The resistance strategy is a crucial component of Iran’s national security strategy, and its setback could intensify to a severe systematic political and security crisis in Iran. If such a scenario occurs, the geopolitical landscape of West Asia and Central Asia could become even more complex.

Why it Matters

On February 28, 2026, the international community was shaken by a coordinated U.S.-–Israeli military operation against Iran known as “Operation Epic Fury.” The strikes targeted Iranian military infrastructure and senior leadership, reportedly killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei along with several high-ranking officials and triggering Iranian missile and drone retaliation across the Middle East. This dramatic escalation has pushed the region into one of its most volatile crises in decades and raised urgent questions about the durability of deterrence and the future of Iran’s long-standing strategy of projecting influence through allied networks across the Middle East.

We selected this article because it examines the evolution and apparent decline of Iran’s “Resistance Strategy” from a Chinese academic perspective. Such an approach moves beyond dominant Western narratives that often frame Iran primarily through the lens of proxy warfare, instead situating its strategy within broader questions of state survival, strategic depth, and developmental constraints. Chinese international relations scholars frequently interprets regional conflicts within the broader dynamics of global power transition and the growing political agency of states in the Global South. Within this framework, China increasingly presents itself as a partner to Global South countries seeking greater strategic autonomy in a more multipolar order.

By engaging this perspective, the article sheds light not only on Iran’s strategic predicament but also on how Chinese scholars interpret conflict, sovereignty, and order in an increasingly fragmented international system.

Subscribe now

Key Points

1. Tehran’s Strategic Retrenchment: The Eroding “Axis of Resistance”

Following the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” sustained Israeli-U.S. pressure has severely degraded Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” and compromised its domestic deterrence. Originally a reactive formation following the 2002 “Axis of Evil” designation, the “Resistance Front” , has evolved into the cornerstone of Iranian national security, merging the doctrines of “Offensive Defense” and “Forward Defense.”

Iran’s strategy relies on projecting power through non-state actors to neutralize threats before they reach Iranian soil. While Western discourse dismisses these as mere “proxies,” Supreme Leader Khamenei viewed this transnational strategic depth as a vital necessity, often prioritized over domestic concerns. However, the current degradation of this network, coupled with Iran’s late-2025 political crisis, marks a profound failure of its regional architecture. This shift signals a historic inflection point for the Middle Eastern order as Iran’s primary mechanism for regional influence faces unprecedented structural erosion.

2. The Defining Attributes of Iran’s Strategy of Resistance

Iran’s resistance strategy has evolved from revolutionary export into a sophisticated security architecture that leverages “offensive defense,” anti-Western ideology, and missile deterrence to ensure regime survival. Grounded in a unique Shiite strategic culture of defiance, this framework functions simultaneously as a defensive shield against U.S.-Israeli containment and Tehran’s primary mechanism for projecting regional influence.

• Driven by National Security, Not Exporting Revolution

Contrary to Western assumptions that frame Iran as an ideological crusade, Tehran’s contemporary “Resistance Strategy” is fundamentally a state-centric security doctrine. Since 1989, regime survival and state-building have eclipsed the export of revolution. The August 2025 reappointment of veteran politician Ali Larijani to the Supreme National Security Council following the “12-Day War” underscores this institutional prioritization. Consequently, Iran’s cultivation of regional non-state actors functions essentially as a “forward defense strategy,” designed to insulate the Iranian homeland from direct conflict.

• A Fundamentally Defensive Posture

Despite hostile rhetoric, Iran’s strategic posture is structurally defensive. Proxies like Hezbollah compensate for Iran’s geographic distance and military-technological asymmetry vis-à-vis Israel. Iran’s calibrated retaliatory missile strikes throughout 2024—following the assassinations of key officials and allied leaders—aimed to re-establish deterrence and project strength rather than inflict substantive casualties or provoke uncontrolled escalation.

• Bound by Shared Ideology, Not Direct Control

The “Axis of Resistance” is united by a shared anti-U.S. and anti-Israel ideology, reacting directly against perceived regional hegemony and territorial occupation. As Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi noted in December 2024, these non-state actors–including Hamas, Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and the Houthis–possess highly developed political autonomy. Iran does not exercise direct control; rather, this anti-hegemonic alignment serves as the network’s connective tissue.

• Underpinned by Domestic Missile Deterrence

Iran’s forward defense network is inextricably linked to its domestic missile capabilities. Constrained by sanctions, Tehran systematically prioritized asymmetric missile deterrence at the expense of its conventional air force. While this capability has historically deterred preemptive strikes against Iranian high-value targets, the “12-Day War” exposed critical vulnerabilities in Iran’s air defense architecture, highlighting the structural risks of over-relying on missile deterrence while ceding air superiority.

3. Impact of the Israel-Hamas Conflict on Iran’s Resistance Strategy

By leveraging the Gaza conflict to link Hamas directly to Tehran, Israel is executing a dual strategy to dismantle both the group’s local control and Iran’s regional influence. This concerted military and diplomatic pressure has effectively compromised the “Axis of Resistance,” resulting in a severe degradation of Iran’s strategic depth and its doctrine of forward defense.

• Severe Damage to the Regional Axis

The “Axis of Resistance” has suffered major structural setbacks. Israel has systematically dismantled the leadership and military infrastructure of Hamas and Hezbollah. Furthermore, the December 2024 collapse of the Assad regime in Syria–a critical logistical bridge between Iran and Hezbollah–severed the network’s vital supply lines. While localized remnants of these groups survive and reorganize, the overarching network’s operational connectivity and primary nodes have been critically degraded.

• Degradation of Domestic Deterrence

Israel strategically escalated from targeting Iranian proxies to dismantling Iran’s domestic military foundation. The unprecedented 12-day Israeli air campaign in June 2025 severely degraded Iran’s air defense systems, radar arrays, and critical missile production and launch facilities. By eliminating key IRGC commanders and stripping Tehran of its airspace control, Israel effectively neutralized the domestic missile deterrence that previously underpinned Iran’s forward defense strategy.

• Radical Contraction of Geopolitical Space

Iran’s regional footprint is actively being rolled back. Capitalizing on the weakened Axis, Israel is seizing territory in southern Lebanon and the Golan Heights, while pushing to disarm proxy militias in Lebanon and Iraq. Simultaneously, regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Turkey are moving to fill the power vacuums left in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. Consequently, while Iran remains a significant regional power, the geographic depth required to sustain its Resistance Strategy has drastically contracted, diminishing Tehran’s capacity to project power and counter U.S.-Israeli hegemony at historical levels.

4. Causes of the Setbacks to Iran’s Strategy of Resistance

While ostensibly triggered by Israeli military strikes, the unraveling of Iran’s resistance strategy is fundamentally rooted in deep-seated domestic, economic, and structural power constraints–a vulnerability underscored by the post- “12-Day War” overhaul of the Supreme National Security Council–with three key internal drivers warranting closer examination.

• Insufficient Economic Foundation to Sustain Resistance

Crippled by structural inefficiencies–such as costly subsidies and military monopolies over resources–and compounded by crushing Western sanctions, Iran’s economy cannot bankroll its expansive regional strategy. The stark economic disparity with Israel, whose 2024 GDP is 1.25 times larger despite having a fraction of the population, severely limits the “Axis of Resistance.” Proxies like Hezbollah, almost entirely dependent on Iranian funding, have struggled to modernize their arsenals since 2006. Similarly, the economic collapse of the Assad regime underscores this systemic fragility. Domestically, financial constraints forced Tehran to over-invest in asymmetric missile deterrence at the expense of conventional air defense, leaving Iranian airspace critically vulnerable to Israeli air superiority during the recent “12-Day War.”

• Domestic Political Fissures Undermining Strategic Deterrence

Effective deterrence requires both military capability and the demonstrated political will to inflict unacceptable damage. While Iran possesses the requisite retaliatory capabilities, domestic political fragmentation–specifically the divide between conservatives advocating decisive retaliation and reformists pursuing de-escalation with Washington–has paralyzed its strategic resolve. Operations “True Promise 1” (April 2024) and “True Promise 2” (October 2024) were heavily calibrated to avoid high-value targets and minimize Israeli casualties. Rather than re-establishing deterrence, these restrained, compromise-driven responses exposed Tehran’s lack of resolve. This hesitation effectively punctured Iran’s “deterrence credit bubble,” eroding its credibility and inviting further Israeli escalation.

• Long-Term U.S.-Israeli Suppression and Asymmetrical Warfare

Iran’s current setbacks are the culmination of a decades-long U.S.-Israeli grand strategy aimed at systematically dismantling anti-hegemonic regional powers (following the playbook used against Iraq, Libya, and Syria) through relentless economic and military pressure. In the current conflict, this structural pressure is exacerbated by a stark operational asymmetry. While Iran has largely adhered to conventional rules of engagement to avoid massive escalation, Israel and the U.S. have employed unconstrained, boundary-pushing tactics. By utilizing state-sponsored assassinations of Axis leadership and scientists, weaponizing everyday communication devices, and striking IAEA-monitored nuclear facilities during active negotiations, Israel has weaponized unpredictability. This disregard for traditional operational and ethical boundaries has left the Resistance Axis permanently off-balance, unable to anticipate the scope of adversary strikes.

5. The Impact of Iran’s Geopolitical Shifts on the Regional Order

The severe degradation of Iran’s resistance strategy–a fragile counter-hegemonic force that emerged amid U.S. retrenchment–will inevitably restructure Middle Eastern power dynamics, emboldening hegemonic actors and exacerbating regional disorder.

• Triggering a New Round of Regional Power Realignment

The dismantling of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” has ignited a retaliatory scramble among regional powers–namely Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel–to partition Tehran’s former spheres of influence across Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. However, as the perceived “Iranian threat” recedes, the strategic momentum driving the Abraham Accords will likely stall. Concurrently, Israel’s unchecked military ascendancy and unprecedented reliance on state-sponsored extraterritorial assassinations are generating profound unease across the Middle East. This shifting threat matrix is expected to foster a new, tacit strategic coordination against Israeli hegemony among Arab states, Turkey, and Iran. Consequently, frameworks like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) may find renewed purpose, and the foundational logic of the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement will recalibrate to address the complexities of Israel’s expanded military footprint.

• Further Erosion of Fundamental Norms of Regional State Interaction

Historically, Iran’s resistance network provided a fragile check on Israeli overreach, enforcing a tenuous adherence to sovereignty norms in a highly volatile region. With this deterrence heavily degraded, the regional strategic balance has shattered. Israel is now pursuing its objectives with unprecedented impunity, violating international law and sovereignty norms to a degree unseen in modern regional history–evidenced by extrajudicial strikes in Qatar and its active support for separatist movements in Syria and Somaliland. This normalization of state violence will generate a dangerous demonstration effect. As other regional actors inevitably emulate these aggressive, cross-border tactics, the Middle East faces an accelerating trajectory of geopolitical fragmentation and lawlessness.

• Catalyzing a Restructuring of Regional Agendas and Renewed Instability

For decades, the U.S. and its allies helped construct the “Iranian Threat” (encompassing nuclear, missile, and proxy agendas) as the Middle East’s paramount security focus, which drew attention to the Palestinian issue. As Iran’s hard power diminishes, this agenda structure may now begin to shift. The Palestinian crisis and the realities of unchecked Israeli military hegemony will reclaim their primacy in regional discourse. Furthermore, the degradation of the Resistance Axis will not pacify the Middle East. Instead of capitulating, non-state actors like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis will continue to evolve and reorganize under existential pressure. Ultimately, the destruction of the fragile regional balance–which had briefly stabilized following the 2023 diplomatic détentes–guarantees a new phase of heightened fragmentation and instability.

About the Author

Jin Liangxiang金良祥：Dr. Jin Liangxiang serves as Director and Senior Fellow of the Center for Middle East Studies of SIIS. He is also an Executive Council Member of the Chinese Association of Middle East Studies and a Council Member of the Chinese Association of Asian and African Studies. His research focuses on major regional political security issues and current hotspots. Dr. Jin is the author of the book Domestic Sources of Iran’s Foreign Policy, published by World Affairs Press in April 2015. He has published nearly 30 academic articles in leading Chinese journals such as Contemporary International Relations, West Asia and Africa, and Journal of the Arab World Studies. He has also contributed multiple articles to influential international publications.

About the Publication

The Chinese version of the article was published by West Asia and Africa (《西亚非洲》). The academic journal founded in 1980, is published by the Institute of West Asian and African Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). West Asia and Africa emphasizes in-depth exploration of political, economic, international relations, historical, religious, cultural, and social issues related to the regions of West Asia and Africa, balancing foundational theoretical research with major contemporary issues. The journal highlights research that is theoretical, forward-looking, and innovative. It has long been a prestigious academic resource for Chinese scholars in Middle Eastern and African studies and serves as an essential reference for relevant government agencies, institutions of higher learning, and research organizations engaged in international affairs, as well as professionals in foreign trade and market analysis. West Asia and Africa is listed as an A-rated journal in the AMI evaluation of Chinese humanities and social sciences journals, a CSSCI source journal by Nanjing University, and a core journal in Chinese by Peking University.

Subscribe now

Share

ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by Cui Shoujun, which focuses on the Trump Administration’s Cryptocurrency Strategy.

Subscribe now

Summary

Trump is attempting to make turning the United States into a sglobal cryptocurrency hub a national strategy. The author argues that the U.S. is not merely supporting an industry; rather, it is seeking to use cryptocurrencies and blockchain to extend the dollar’s influence from the traditional financial system into the “on-chain world.” The Trump administration’s approach broadly includes three elements: first, loosening regulation and changing key rules to promote the growth of the industry; second, advancing federal legislation to establish the legal status and regulatory framework for stablecoins; and third, creating national-level digital assets and Bitcoin strategic reserves—effectively “nationalizing” crypto assets such as Bitcoin—to attract capital, boost market confidence, and frame them as a tool to hedge against pressure on the dollar’s credibility.

The author argues that this approach can indeed deliver results in the short term: the U.S. crypto sector will become more prosperous, markets more active, and America’s global influence stronger. Over the long term, however, uncertainty remains. Externally, strict regulatory regimes in regions such as the European Union have become strong barriers to U.S. crypto development. Internally, the United States still faces confused remits among state and federal governments, as well as among different regulatory agencies. In addition, the trajectory of “de-dollarization” remains uncertain, and the volatility of crypto markets and potential systemic risks are difficult to resolve. Taken together, these factors could create significant resistance to the practical implementation of the U.S.’ crypto strategy.

Why It Matters

Competition among major global economies for leadership in digital currency and digital financial governance is accelerating. China, the European Union, and others are more inclined to strengthening financial sovereignty and institutional influence through central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). As of July 2025, 137 countries and jurisdictions have explored CBDCs; three have formally launched them, and 49 are in pilot programs. Meanwhile, some BRICS members and other emerging economies are using the U.S. dollar less in bilateral trade, accelerating the trend toward de-dollarization.

Against this backdrop, the Trump administration has chosen to use the market-driven, decentralized cryptocurrency industry as a lever—seeking to seize the high ground in technical standards, payment networks, and regulatory rules—and thereby reinforce the dollar’s dominance in the digital economy. Only by systematically mapping the administration’s strategic motivations and policy package, and understanding how the United States aims to reshape global financial governance in the era of digital finance, can we grasp the changing structure of global monetary power and the future direction of the development of digital finance in China.

Subscribe now

Key Points

1. Overall Objectives and Operating Logic of the Trump Administration’s “Global Crypto Hub” Strategy

(1) Combining Institutions and Technology

The United States’ policy choices in the era of digital finance follow a path that fuses institutions with technology. Through federal legislation, innovative regulatory rules, and multilateral coordination, the U.S. provides sovereign-credit backing for privately developed technological outcomes such as dollar-pegged stablecoins and blockchain infrastructure, thereby lowering the political and financial risks for other countries adopting U.S.-style standards. At the same time, as these platforms expand into cross-border payments, asset tokenization, and decentralized finance, their technical standards are likely to gradually evolve into international norms—thereby reinforcing, in reverse, the U.S.’s rulemaking capacity and agenda-setting power. The mechanism through which the U.S. sustains financial hegemony is a closed loop: national interests, institutional arrangements, and technological embedding. National interests drive institutional design; institutional arrangements promote the embedding of technical standards into the international system; and technological advantages, in turn, strengthen institutional influence.

(2) Spillover of the Monetary System and Rules

On the one hand, the Trump administration leverages decentralized mainstream cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin to enhance global liquidity and attract capital inflows. On the other hand, it uses dollar stablecoins as everyday instruments for payment and settlement, building—within a compliance framework—a privately led yet comprehensively regulated global payment network. After overseas users purchase stablecoins, issuers must hold an equivalent amount of U.S. dollars in cash or U.S. Treasury securities to ensure stablecoin liquidity, thereby extending demand for the dollar into the blockchain-based world. Internationally, the U.S. seeks to use multilateral mechanisms such as the G7 and G20 to promote the harmonization of digital-asset regulatory standards and technical specifications, ensuring that the emerging digital financial system continues to operate around the dollar. Through rule alignment and stablecoin clearing arrangements, Washington aims to export U.S. crypto-asset rules outward and secure U.S. leadership in digital-asset rulemaking.

2. Main Motivations Behind Trump’s Push for a Cryptocurrency Strategy

(1) Debt Pressures and Industrial Competitiveness

As of the first quarter of 2025, total U.S. federal debt had reached USD 36.21 trillion—about 120.87% of GDP—and international investors were also adjusting their allocations to U.S. dollar assets. By proposing a strategic reserve of digital assets such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, the Trump administration aims to send a positive policy signal, attract international capital, and explore unconventional ways to mitigate debt-related risks. At the same time, it uses financial liberalization as a lever to promote the integration of traditional finance and crypto assets, encourage the tokenization of real-world assets (RWA), and build decentralized capital markets, thereby strengthening the international competitiveness and market appeal of the U.S. financial sector.

(2) Alignment of Political and Commercial Interests

From a political-economy perspective, the Trump family has significant interests in the crypto industry. Trump reportedly holds a substantial amount of crypto assets privately and has been involved in promoting projects such as “World Liberty Financial” (WLFI). During the 2024 election cycle, the crypto industry and related firms invested more than USD 238 million in Trump’s campaign activities; accordingly, one purpose of the administration’s strong push for crypto assets in a second term is to reciprocate support from the sector.

(3) Preserving Dollar Hegemony

In terms of monetary power, while the U.S. dollar still ranks first in global foreign-exchange reserves—57.74% in the first quarter of 2025—its share has been trending downward. The Trump administration seeks, through legislation and digital-asset reserve policies, to bring major crypto assets onto a dollar-centric track and build a “Digital Fort Knox” in order to offset de-dollarization pressures.

3. Policy Measures: Legislative and Regulatory Reset, Stablecoin Compliance, and Strategic Reserves in Parallel

(1) Federal Regulation and Legislation: Establishing an Institutional Foundation

In its second term, the Trump administration has vigorously advanced several key legislative initiatives and regulatory adjustments. On July 18, 2025, President Trump signed the GENIUS Act into law, establishing a legal and regulatory framework for stablecoins. The Act emphasizes using stablecoins to modernize the U.S. dollar payment system, consolidate the dollar’s international position, and create additional demand for U.S. Treasury securities. At the same time, the administration has strongly promoted the FIT21 Act and the Lummis–Gillibrand (L-G) bill, seeking to reduce market uncertainty by clarifying regulatory jurisdictions and improving inter-agency coordination. On the regulatory front, in January 2025 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rescinded SAB 121, significantly lowering the institutional barriers for banks and financial institutions in entering crypto custody and related businesses.

Aligned with this legislative framework, stablecoin policy is positioned to “connect the credit base of U.S. fiat money with blockchain payment networks.” Through compliance-driven expansion and international promotion, Trump aims to turn U.S. dollar stablecoins into a de facto “digital dollar” public good—expanding dollar influence in cross-border payments and trade settlement, while also accelerating the digital expansion of traditional financial assets through asset tokenization.

(2) Establishing Strategic Reserves

On March 2, 2025, Trump announced that BTC, ETH, XRP, SOL, and ADA would be included in a new national strategic reserve of digital assets. He also proposed accumulating 200,000 bitcoins per year, reaching a total of 1 million bitcoins over five years. The government further audited and formally consolidated management over an existing stockpile of roughly 200,000 bitcoins, emphasizing that these holdings would not be liquidated or sold and positioning them as long-term strategic assets comparable to gold.

(3) Advancing Reform of Regulatory Institutions

Organizationally, Trump nominated Paul Atkins—widely known for his light-touch regulatory stance—as SEC chair and established a “Crypto 2.0 Task Force.” In addition, the administration created a White House–directed “Digital Asset Markets Working Group” within the National Economic Council, with White House AI and crypto advisor David Sacks tasked with driving cross-departmental legislative and regulatory coordination. Notably, the relevant executive order explicitly prohibits government agencies from establishing, issuing, or promoting a central bank digital currency (CBDC), while prioritizing support for the private-sector, U.S. dollar–stablecoin pathway instead.

4. Implementation Challenges: External Regulatory Competition, a Crisis of Confidence in the U.S. Dollar, and Domestic Regulatory Fragmentation

(1) The Weakening Effect of International Regulatory Competition on U.S. Rule-Export

U.S. regulatory loosening stands in sharp contrast to the EU’s MiCA framework, which sets stricter compliance requirements and higher entry thresholds for stablecoins and other crypto assets. South Korea, Japan, and Singapore have also developed their own prudential regulatory regimes. Divergent regulatory standards increase cross-border compliance costs for firms and intensify market fragmentation. This may push global digital finance toward a multipolar landscape dominated by regional standards, thereby narrowing the space for the United States to lead in rule-setting and to shape governance norms in the crypto domain.

(2) Regulatory fragmentation between the U.S. federal government and the states persists.

Long-standing disputes between the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) over the legal classification of crypto assets and jurisdictional authority remain unresolved, while regulatory standards also vary across states. As a result, the crypto market continues to face elevated uncertainty and compliance costs. Fragmented rules can further amplify regulatory arbitrage and systemic financial risks. If coordination problems cannot be effectively addressed, market stability in the crypto sector will remain difficult to secure.

(3) Constraints Posed by the Crisis of Confidence in the Dollar-Dominated System

With U.S. debt levels high and the U.S. government frequently deploying financial sanctions, the international system’s trust deficit toward the dollar continues to widen. More countries are seeking payment and settlement systems independent of the dollar. BRICS member countries and other emerging economies are vigorously advancing the mBridge local-currency settlement platform and the BRICSPay decentralized payment system, while China is also promoting the digital renminbi in cross-border payments and trade settlement. De-dollarization efforts are likely to deepen further, potentially weakening the United States’ attempt to achieve “re-dollarization” through stablecoins and Bitcoin reserves, and may even lead international markets to view Bitcoin more as a safe-haven asset independent of the dollar.

5. Outlook Assessment and Implications for China

(1) Paying Close Attention to the Spillover Effects of Compliant USD Stablecoins and the Expansion Path of the “Digital Dollar.”

Stablecoins create a closed loop of U.S. dollar liquidity through the linkage to reserve assets and the expansion of payment networks. China should continuously assess the implications for cross-border payments, capital flows, and financial sanction tools. In parallel, drawing on its own e-CNY and cross-border settlement practices, China should improve controllable digital payment infrastructures.

(2) Grasping the Trend toward Bloc Formation and Fragmentation in Global Digital-Finance Governance.

Global digital-finance regulation can broadly be grouped into three approaches: laissez-faire, stringent control, and sovereignty-and-security oriented. Competition over data sovereignty will further raise compliance and operating thresholds. China can strengthen tracking and research on digital-asset regulatory rules, data-governance standards, and cross-border compliance mechanisms under multilateral and bilateral frameworks, increase its level of participation, and safeguard its rule-shaping capacity.

(3) Striking a Balance between Innovation and Risk, and between Sovereignty and Openness.

The expansion of stablecoins, asset tokenization, and market volatility may generate systemic financial risks. The future direction of the global financial landscape will depend on whether countries can find new institutional balances in their policy design. China can, in light of its regulatory system and the needs of industrial development, advance the standardization of blockchain and digital-finance applications, strengthen risk assessment and bottom-line governance, and ensure domestic financial stability in the face of external shocks.

Conclusion

The Trump administration is actively advancing a cryptocurrency strategy by pursuing regulatory liberalization, expanding strategic reserves of crypto assets, and building a compliant framework for stablecoins. These measures represent a new attempt by the United States to sustain its monetary power in the era of digital finance. By providing sovereign backing to private-sector technology platforms and allowing this support to spill over into international norms, the administration seeks to extend the dollar’s advantages from traditional finance into blockchain-based and digital financial systems. In the short term, this approach may further stimulate the growth of the crypto industry and strengthen U.S. agenda-setting power in digital finance. However, international regulatory competition, efforts toward de-dollarization, constraints on the dollar’s credibility, and fragmented domestic regulation will also pose major challenges to America’s crypto-asset strategy.

Subscribe now

About the Author

Ma Bo 马博: An Associate Professor in the Department of International Politics at the School of International Studies, Nanjing University, and holds a Ph.D. in Political Science. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy theory, the intersection of international law and international relations, and Sino–U.S. foreign policy. He received a B.A. in Public Administration from Beijing Normal University, an M.Sc. in Comparative Politics from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), an M.A. in International Relations from New York University (NYU), and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the City University of New York (CUNY). From 2014 to 2022, he conducted full-time research at Nanjing University’s South China Sea Institute, and has served in his current position since 2022. He also previously worked as an adjunct lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Queens College, CUNY.

Tu Yaling 涂亚玲: Master’s student at the School of International Studies, Nanjing University.

About the Publication

World Economics and Politics Forum（《世界经济与政治论坛》） is a scholarly bimonthly journal supervised by the Jiangsu Academy of Social Sciences and sponsored by the Institute of World Economics of the Jiangsu Academy of Social Sciences. Since its launch in 1981, the journal has continuously advanced and has become an important academic platform in China for research on world economics and politics. Since 2004, it has been consistently indexed as a source journal in the Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index (CSSCI) and included in the Guide to the Core Journals of China, among other major listings. At present, the journal primarily publishes the latest research in fields such as international relations, international politics, international security, international strategy, world economy, international trade and investment, and international finance, and it operates a double-blind peer-review system. The journal advocates academic freedom and equality, and is committed to fostering academic innovation, promoting scholarly exchange, and advancing academic prosperity.

Share

Subscribe now

China Scholar Insights is a feature that aims to provide you with the latest analysis on issues that Chinese scholars and strategic communities are focusing on. We will carefully select commentary articles and highlight key points. Questions or criticisms can be directed to sch0625@gmail.com

I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University. ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu.

Background

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched joint airstrikes on Iran, killing several senior officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Iran responded by striking U.S. bases across the region and, on March 1, announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. A day later, Donald Trump signalled a willingness to engage with Iran’s new leadership, but Tehran rejected the overture.

However, the Trump administration’s resort to force against Iran appears to lack a clearly articulated strategic end state, and bears signs of being significantly shaped—if not driven—by Israeli threat perceptions and operational preferences. As the conflict unfolds, Washington is showing increasing difficulty in shaping escalation dynamics and terminating the war on favorable terms, raising concerns that it may become drawn into a protracted and costly entanglement.

The ongoing U.S.–Iran confrontation has already had far-reaching consequences: it has destabilized the Middle East security environment, triggered volatility in global energy markets, and provoked intense domestic debate within the United States, thereby constraining the administration’s broader strategic flexibility and bandwidth.

At the same time, observers have begun to question whether the U.S. approach to Iran, when viewed alongside the earlier Venezuela episode, reflects a broader pattern in the Trump administration’s use of military intervention. In this regard, the extent to which these cases reveal an emerging logic—characterized by opportunistic intervention, ambiguous objectives, and reactive escalation—has become an increasingly salient subject of analysis.

Subscribe now

Insights

Guo Hai： Three Critical Questions Urgently to Be Answered in the Wake of Khamenei’s Assassination

No Imminent Collapse of Iran’s Islamic Republic

In light of the structural characteristics of Iran’s political system and its domestic conditions, the assassination of the Supreme Leader is unlikely to lead to the disintegration of the Iranian polity under conditions of armed conflict. Institutional continuity is maintained through constitutional mechanisms, with the Assembly of Experts responsible for selecting a successor and an interim authority already in place. Besides, Iran features a highly decentralised governance system, and its power structure, underpinned by the separation of three powers, demonstrates strong institutional resilience in the face of internal and external turbulence. Furthermore, there is no severe political rift among Iran’s political elites that could lead to regime change. Meanwhile, the operation by the U.S. and Israel has significantly stoked Persian nationalism in Iran, and Khamenei’s death will also push Iran’s new leadership to adopt a tougher policy stance toward the U.S. and Israel. Although economic hardship has generated public discontent, in the absence of elite division, it is unlikely to develop into organised regime change.

Strait Closure Triggers “Inflation Shock and Growth Slowdown”

In general, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz will impose dual global economic pressures: short-term inflationary shocks and a medium-term growth slowdown. As a critical transit point for global energy flows, even partial disruption—through rising transport risks, insurance costs, and market expectations—can drive significant oil price volatility. The surge in energy prices will quickly be transmitted through global industrial chains via fuels, power generation, chemical raw materials and other channels, triggering widespread imported inflationary pressures. At the same time, financial markets may shift toward risk aversion, with downward revision of global growth expectations. Energy-import-dependent economies face compounded pressures on domestic demand, while sustained high prices could delay monetary easing and weaken global growth prospects.

“Fighting While Talking” as the Likely Future Paradigm

Despite Iran’s tough stance, interactions among the United States, Israel, and Iran are likely to evolve into a pattern of “fighting while talking,” in which trade blockades, localised clashes, proxy wars, cyberattacks, targeted assassinations, and diplomatic engagement proceed in parallel. The United States seeks to prevent Iran’s nuclear weaponization and uphold Israel’s regional predominance, yet reservations expressed by its domestic and Western allies over the Trump administration’s actions have constrained the room for direct conflict escalation. Accordingly, the Trump administration is more likely to persist with the offshore balancing model, using Israel as its proxy. Iran, for its part, takes its own political survival as its paramount objective, and aims to impose maximum cost pressures on the United States and its allies through countermeasures, with a view to bringing the United States to the negotiating table. This dynamic is likely to give rise to a prolonged war of attrition, until both sides recognize that further escalation cannot enable them to achieve their respective purpose, at which point a degree of strategic equilibrium may emerge in the Middle East.

The Risks of a “High-to-Low” Conflict Model

It is worth noting that Trump’s targeted decapitation strikes against the leaders of Venezuela and Iran have largely reshaped the paradigm of modern warfare. The “high-to-low” conflict model, which opens with high-intensity strikes to anchor the opponent’s perception of conflict costs at a high level, before pursuing incremental de-escalation through “fighting and talking”, carries extreme risks. Its core premise is accurate judgment of the opponent’s cost tolerance and political will; miscalculations will trigger fiercer countermeasures. A deeper flaw is the lack of a clear exit mechanism, with military operations unmatched to a defined end state. This model risks dragging the United States and the wider world into a deeper quagmire of warfare.

ZHU Feng: The Conflict in Iran as an Extension of Trump’s Neo-Monroe Doctrine

A Comparative Analysis: The Iranian Conflict vs. the Venezuelan Incident

The disparities lie primarily in Iran’s larger population, formidable military strength, and its long-standing defiance of the West, with its aggregate power far exceeding that of Venezuela. Conversely, the commonalities reside in the U.S. ambition to achieve regime change through surgical military strikes, install pro-American figures, and pivot foreign policy toward Washington within a condensed timeframe.

Yet, the fundamental objective of the U.S.-Israeli strikes is not merely short-term deterrence, but the assertion of de facto control over Iran to fulfil Trump’s personal geopolitical agenda. Significant uncertainties persist regarding the so-called “Venezuelanization” of the Iranian issue.

The Trajectory of the Iranian Crisis and its Implications for Global Energy Supply and East Asian Economies

The trajectory of the current military operations remains inherently uncertain. Primarily, it is contingent upon Iran’s indigenous armaments, including its defensive posture and sustained military resilience. Furthermore, Iran is not Venezuela; the threshold for Trump to conclude strikes within four weeks, dismantle the current regime, and extract substantive concessions is formidable. This strategy necessitates the cultivation of new pro-American factions within Iran and a wholesale reversal of the nation’s foundational anti-U.S. policy orientation. Thirdly, Iran has initiated retaliatory measures aimed at escalating the global costs of the conflict to elicit international intervention and support.

Presently, there is a risk that the hostilities may spill over into other Arab nations in the Middle East, potentially igniting a broader regional conflagration. Should the war persist, and the Strait of Hormuz remain blockaded, it would deal a severe blow to the energy imports of East Asian nations. Concurrently, this would destabilize currency markets, drive up energy prices, and induce volatility across international financial and capital markets.

Novel Characteristics of the Military Operation and the Extension of the Neo-Monroe Doctrine

This military operation exhibits several novel characteristics compared to historical conflicts. In terms of military technology, the U.S. and Israel initially deployed large-scale information suppression, utilizing AI and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that epitomize contemporary warfare. Following the Russia-Ukraine conflict, UAVs have emerged as a pivotal instrument and weapon on the front lines of military engagement. Additionally, the sophisticated anti-missile systems of the U.S. and Israel played a critical role in this engagement.

Beyond these factors, the current U.S.-Iran confrontation is essentially an extension of Trump’s “Neo-Monroe Doctrine.” Diverging from the logic of the 2003 Iraq War, this operation represents the overt exercise of power politics through coercive military force. It employs a strategy of “simultaneous engagement and suppression” to compel Iran into a geopolitical settlement aligned with U.S. interests.

Wu Bingbing: A Three-Way Game and Seven Key Variables: Is the Iranian Situation Becoming Protracted?

Domestic mobilization and social cohesion in Iran remain relatively stable. Meanwhile, the United States faces challenges. Combined with fluctuations in oil and gas prices and shifting alliances within the Middle East, the current situation increasingly points to a risk of protracted confrontation.

Iran: Asymmetric Warfare and Strategic Pressure via the Strait of Hormuz

First, Iran continues to rely on asymmetric retaliation. It possesses over 2,000 ballistic missiles with a range of up to 2,000 kilometers, along with a vast arsenal of drones, many of which are stored in underground facilities. This enables Iran to sustain a prolonged resistance. Second, Iran is exerting pressure through the Strait of Hormuz. Instead of being fully closed, the strait has seen restricted vessel passage, significantly disrupting global oil and gas supplies. Third, Iran has struck back at U.S. military bases and even diplomatic facilities in the region, such as in Erbil or Saudi diplomatic posts. This is considered to be a reminder to Gulf states that the presence of U.S. installations on their soil could make them targets. Although Saudi Arabia and others have voiced opposition to strikes on Iran, they have taken no concrete action, adding to regional risks. Fourth, Iranian patriotism has been stirred, preventing internal divisions. This sentiment could support a prolonged resistance.

The United States: Strategic Confusion and Constraints

First, U.S. objectives and the means to achieve them remain unclear. After the initial Israeli strike that killed Iran’s Supreme Leader, there was no clear strategy for regime change. At the same time, unseating the Iranian leadership would be extremely difficult for U.S. without preparation for a ground war. Second, the U.S. is not prepared for a long war. Initial expectations of a conflict is lasting from one to four weeks. Ammunition stockpiles, especially interceptors crucial for defense, are significantly lower than during the 2003 Iraq War, suggesting sustainability for only one to two weeks. Third, there is no clear U.S. exit strategy if Iran mounts a sustained, methodical resistance. Iran’s interim leadership council has been functioning effectively, maintaining policy continuity, which leaves the U.S. with no clear path to end the conflict.

Fourth, U.S. and Israeli strategic timelines diverge. Israel’s goal of regime change is more direct, and it may continue its campaign even if the U.S. decides to scale back, with no mechanism in place to align its actions. Fifth, the timing of the U.S. strike, coming amid diplomatic negotiations, has dimmed prospects for a deal. Past talks yielded Iranian concessions on nuclear enrichment. Following the military attack and the killing of its leader, Iran is unlikely to make further concessions on its nuclear or missile programs. Sixth, disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have already driven up energy prices. Prolonged conflict would risk fueling inflation in the U.S. Seventh, the stance of neutral Gulf states remains uncertain. While they oppose Israeli expansion and favor diplomacy, attacks affecting their territory could shift their position.

In conclusion, the Iranian issue is unlikely to be resolved quickly. The risk of a prolonged conflict is clear, when U.S. is also facing a higher risk, and how the U.S. might end such a conflict remains an open question.

ZHENG Yongnian: Lessons from the Iran Conflict: Guarding Against Japan Becoming an “Israel of East Asia”

Israel as the ‘Tail that Wags the Dog’ in Driving U.S. Action

The motive for the strike on Iran originated more with Israel than with the United States. Israel serves as America’s strategic pivot in the Middle East. Despite Trump’s claims of control, the reality is that U.S. policy is being significantly driven by Israeli interests, using American power to settle regional scores. The attack occurred not despite diplomacy, but because the U.S. and Iran fundamentally distrust each other, making negotiation impossible.

Iran’s Future: Potential for Moderation or Risk of Chaos

The outcome hinges on Iran’s internal dynamics. While the U.S. seeks regime change, it will not occupy Iran. In the medium to long term, Iran may evolve toward a more moderate or secular governance model, which could ultimately stabilize the Middle East. However, if the existing political structure collapses without a viable replacement, the country could descend into chaos, breeding extremism that threatens the entire region—a scenario reminiscent of post-invasion Iraq or Afghanistan.

The ‘No-Exit’ Trap: Why Trump May Not Be Able to End This War

Trump likely hoped for a quick, limited strike—a “shock and awe” campaign similar to the Gulf War. However, once a war begins, it follows its own logic. By targeting Iran’s leadership, the U.S. may have triggered a response that prevents it from simply “cutting and running.” Iran has strong incentives to keep the U.S. engaged, potentially forcing Trump into a deeper, longer-term occupation similar to the later Iraq War model, an outcome he likely did not intend.

A Key Lesson for China: Preventing Japan from Becoming ‘an Israel of East Asia’

While China is not a direct party to the conflict, it must learn from it. China should proactively work to prevent Japan (and potentially the Philippines) from assuming a role in East Asia analogous to Israel’s in the Middle East. The risk is that these U.S. allies could manipulate Washington’s strategic focus, dragging U.S. into conflicts to serve their own national interests, thereby forcing China into a war it does not want.

A Warning on Tech: China Must Reorient AI Toward National Security, Not Just Entertainment

The strike on Iran represents a new generation of warfare, merging Silicon Valley with the Pentagon. While AI remains a tool, its application in warfare is now immediate and lethal. Recently, China’s tech sector has focused too heavily on entertainment and consumer apps, whereas the U.S. prioritizes military applications. If China possesses AI capabilities but fails to integrate them into national defense, it risks strategic obsolescence in future conflicts.

Editor for Today’s Newsletter: SUN Chenghao, ZHANG Xinyue, CHEN Didi, FAN Jiaji, LIU Zhuofan and ZHANG Xueyu.

Subscribe now

Share