ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me. Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com.

In this newsletter, we address concerns about China’s positions through a Q&A format, while also presenting key points of leading Chinese scholars’ commentaries. Through this series, we aim to provide policymakers, think tanks, and strategic communities overseas with access to Chinese scholars’ views, accompanied by curated academic perspectives that help readers better understand the considerations underlying China’s foreign policy choices.

Background

On 28 February 2026, the United States, in coordination with Israel, launched large-scale air strikes against Iran. Iran immediately retaliated by targeting U.S. military assets in the Middle East and Israel, further escalating the turmoil in the Middle East. Washington had intended to replicate the model of its strikes against Venezuela at the beginning of the year, seeking to achieve its preset goals through a string of “low-cost” air operations. Yet the conflict has not turned into a quick campaign as expected. Confronted with Iran’s effective counterattacks, the war costs have kept mounting, with spillover effects rippling into the economic and geopolitical domains. How does China perceive this U.S.-Iran conflict? What implications does it carry for China, China-U.S. competition, and the Gulf states? In this episode of Ask China, we bring you the views of Chinese scholars on these issues.

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The stated justifications for the U.S.-Israeli military operation against Iran are Iran’s alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons, long-standing “support for terrorism,” and threats to U.S. and Israeli security. In reality, however, this war is an unjust unilateral U.S. military action to maintain its Middle East hegemony and contain its regional influence.

Politically, the war exemplifies hegemonism and power politics, driven by four key factors. The First factor is the anxiety over a Nuclear-Armed Iran. The U.S. and Israel, adhering to absolute security, view Iran’s nuclear program as a grave threat. The second factor is the regional hegemony competition. Iran, a major regional power opposing U.S. hegemony and Israeli aggression, has built a “Shia Crescent” to challenge them, prompting the U.S. and Israel to aim at weakening Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.” The third factor is the control of energy routes. The U.S. seeks control over key energy routes like the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea shipping lanes, a core interest highlighted in its 2025 National Security Strategy. The fourth is the lobbying efforts of Israel, which also served as an accelerator for the outbreak of the war. The last factor is the U.S. domestic political calculation. While the war has objectively harmed the Republican Party’s electoral prospects, Trump’s decision to launch strikes against Iran—with fantasies of a quick, decisive victory—was partially motivated by a desire to boost Republican support.

Legally, the U.S. military action against Iran constitutes an illegal act of aggression under international law. Above all, the U.S.-Israeli military strikes were launched without any authorization from the UN Security Council, violating the fundamental UN Charter principle prohibiting the use of force in international relations. This lack of legitimacy is underscored by European allies publicly refusing to cooperate with U.S. military deployments and maintaining distance from the operation, as well as the surge in anti-war sentiment within the U.S. itself—both clear indicators that this is a “war that should never have been fought.” What’s more, the conflict stems from the U.S. claim that Iran is on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons, making it a classic case of preventive war, failing to meet the strict criteria for legitimate self-defense under international law. Finally, the war resulted in significant loss of life, including senior Iranian leadership figures, sparking international concerns about potential war crimes.

Historically, the war stems from decades of U.S.-Iranian tensions. Following Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, the country adopted an explicitly anti-American foreign policy, transforming the U.S.-Iranian relationship from alliance to enmity. The U.S. imposed long-term sanctions on Iran, laying the groundwork for decades of subsequent tensions. The Trump administration’s 2018 unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and reinstatement of “maximum pressure” policies further escalated hostilities, setting the stage for military confrontation. The collapse of nuclear negotiations in Geneva in February 2026 served as the immediate trigger, with the U.S. demanding Iran’s complete abandonment of its nuclear program and Iran refusing to transfer enriched uranium abroad.

Additionally, the U.S. and Israel chose this particular moment to strike because they judged Iran to be at its weakest point, seeing an opportunity to potentially overthrow the current Iranian government. Domestically, Iran has faced near-economic stagnation and growing hardship due to prolonged U.S. economic sanctions and military threats, leading to periodic public protests. Externally, senior leadership and military capabilities of Hamas and Hezbollah had been severely damaged by consecutive Israeli attacks, leaving Iran in a precarious position with its regional “Resistance Front” significantly weakened. This combination of internal fragility and external setbacks created what the U.S. and Israel perceived it as a window of opportunity to use force against Iran and pursue regime change.

China maintains a clear and principled position on this conflict, insisting that the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of Iran and all Gulf states must be respected and inviolable, advocating that all parties should resolve differences through equal dialogue and negotiation. To implement this principled position with concrete actions, China has dispatched its Special Envoy for Middle Eastern Affairs to carry out shuttle mediation in the Middle East, aiming to de-escalate tensions and facilitate peace talks between relevant parties.

Middle East conflicts, particularly the recent U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, have reignited debate over whether such crises could reshape the trajectory of U.S.–China strategic competition. While these developments undeniably introduce new uncertainties into the international system, their impact is better understood as a disruption of the pace of competition rather than a transformation of its structure.

In the short term, the conflict creates a reallocation of strategic attention and resources. The United States, already engaged in Ukraine, now faces another flashpoint in the Middle East, which may appear to dilute its focus on the Indo-Pacific. This could temporarily ease pressure on China. However, such an effect is inherently unstable. If the situation in Iran evolves in a way that serves U.S. interests—whether through containment or regime weakening—Washington could quickly redirect its strategic resources back to Asia. In this sense, the Middle East won’t permanently distract the United States but instead functions as a flexible theater within a broader global strategy.

For China, the situation is far from advantageous. The Iran conflict not only threatens its overseas interests—particularly its energy security and economic presence in the region—but also exposes the limits of its ability to safeguard strategic partners under conditions of escalating conflict. China’s restrained posture, evident in both the Iran and Venezuela cases, has fueled external skepticism about its willingness and capacity to defend its partners. As a result, Beijing finds itself in a somewhat awkward position: seeking to balance risk avoidance with the expectations attached to its growing global role.

At a structural level, the conflict does not alter the essential nature of U.S.–China competition. Instead, it reinforces an ongoing shift toward a more complex, multi-dimensional rivalry. The United States is increasingly integrating military action, economic sanctions, financial controls, and alliance networks into a coordinated strategic toolkit. This approach, demonstrated in the Middle East, extends beyond the region and has implications for China’s global interests. As a result, the competition is not fundamentally changed but rather intensified in its scope and sophistication.

Simultaneously, heightened tensions in the Middle East also underscore a shared reluctance between the United States and China to allow regional crises to escalate into bilateral confrontation. China has responded to the Iran issue with restraint, refraining from a forceful reaction or direct involvement while adopting a mediating posture and calling for de-escalation. The United States, for its part, has likewise shown little interest in letting the Iran crisis significantly disrupt broader U.S.–China relations, maintaining channels for high-level engagement with Beijing. Furthermore, U.S. military action against Iran does not necessarily tilt the balance of negotiations in Washington’s favor. If the conflict were to escalate into a prolonged ground war, it could significantly drain U.S. military resources and strategic focus. These risks further reduces the probability of the US engaging in a direct confrontation with China in the short term. Taken together, these dynamics suggest that both sides seek to prevent external conflicts from spilling over into strategic tensions between them.

The old bargain has been badly shaken, but not fully replaced. The 2026 U.S.–Israel–Iran war exposed the core weakness of the Gulf security model: American bases in Gulf monarchies became magnets for retaliation rather than reliable shields, critical infrastructure and shipping routes came under direct pressure, and the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz threatened the economic foundation of Gulf states. At the same time, Iran’s political system proved more resilient than a simple regime-collapse scenario assumed, which means Gulf capitals cannot count on a decisive American military solution to eliminate their main regional challenge. Their likely trajectory is therefore neither full emancipation nor deeper submission, but selective strategic autonomy under continued hard-security dependence.

First, the “oil-for-security” formula has lost much of its credibility. As Jin Liangxiang argues, the model was always asymmetrical: Gulf states recycled oil wealth through the dollar system and U.S. arms purchases, while Washington’s security commitment grew increasingly selective. That credibility problem was visible in the 2019 attacks on Saudi oil facilities and became unmistakable in 2026, when the United States used Gulf bases for operations against Iran, leaving Gulf partners exposed to retaliation and with little real say over escalation.

Second, Gulf states are likely to seek stronger strategic autonomy in diplomacy. But this autonomy will be uneven, not uniform. Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait have stronger incentives to de-escalate and preserve mediation channels, while Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain remain more threat-sensitive toward Iran. Even so, the shared lesson is clear: Iran is a permanent neighbor, while American protection is contingent and reversible. That is why hedging, selective engagement with Tehran, and broader regional dialogue will become more attractive than a pure bloc-based posture.

Third, stronger diplomatic autonomy will not eliminate security dependence. The Hormuz crisis and the possibility of Red Sea spillover show that Gulf security now spans missiles, drones, shipping lanes, ports, and energy infrastructure. Analyses of Houthi restraint also suggest how fragile this environment remains: their calculations were shaped by domestic priorities, leadership risk, and the danger of reopening the Saudi front. This points to a hybrid future in which Gulf monarchies still need outside support for air and missile defense, maritime security, intelligence, and advanced systems, even as they resist exclusive alignment with any single patron.

Finally, the most plausible destination is a layered regional order. Gulf states are unlikely to abandon the U.S. umbrella overnight, but they are also unlikely to keep treating it as sufficient. The direction of change points instead toward a “GCC+” approach: more intra-Gulf coordination, limited reconciliation with Iran, and broader security cooperation with regional actors such as Turkey and Egypt, while keeping U.S. ties as insurance rather than destiny.

In sum, the old “security in exchange for protection” model has failed as a strategic belief system, even if Gulf states still rely on parts of the U.S. security architecture. The region is moving not toward full independence or deeper subordination, but toward more autonomy in diplomacy and diversification, combined with continued dependence on external powers for the hardest security tasks. In that sense, the Gulf’s future is neither post-American nor fully American-led. It is hedging by design.

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In the “ceasefire without peace” phase following the 2026 U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict, the Middle East is entering a prolonged state of intensified surface conflict and frozen structural contradictions. China’s medium- to long-term strategy should therefore focus on four priorities: resilience, balance, diversification, and strategic stability.

First, China must treat energy security as a structural risk. Key chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb have become geopolitical weapons. China should diversify supply routes (e.g., pipelines via Russia and Central Asia), expand strategic reserves, and strengthen cross-border energy cooperation to build a robust energy security shield.

Second, China should pursue calibrated geopolitical balancing amid the emerging “two Middle Easts”. While maintaining coordination with Iran, it should deepen ties with Gulf states adjusting beyond the oil-for-security model, promoting common security and development-based stability without direct alignment.

Third, China should focus on building an integrated energy–technology–finance security framework, as modern warfare increasingly relies on AI and critical infrastructure. AI capability depends on stable energy supply, making energy the physical foundation of digital conflict. If energy trade remains dollar-dominated, sanctions could disrupt both payments and supply, threatening computing systems. Expanding RMB-based energy settlement is therefore key to securing an independent resource base. At the same time, China should strengthen core technologies while deepening cooperation with Middle Eastern partners in digital infrastructure and AI governance. By linking Chinese technology standards with RMB-based systems, China can build a closed-loop structure connecting energy, digital operations, and decision-making, reducing reliance on Western systems and hedging against the joint weaponization of the dollar and advanced technology.

Finally, China should anticipate the spillover effects within the United States and shift from avoiding crises to structurally protecting its overseas interests. This conflict has become an amplifier of American politics, and military actions related to Iran have become a “second front” influenced by electoral pressure, which has increased the security risks to Chinese ports, energy routes, and personnel. China should not adopt a passive response attitude but should deepen the “Belt and Road” cooperation, embed its own interests into the regional economy and governance structure, and build a network that combines development with risk buffering. As the region gradually moves towards a long-term “small Cold War“, China should provide a more predictable and development-based security approach to strengthen regional stability and the resilience of its own overseas interests.

The most immediate and measurable impact lies in the disruption of critical energy transit routes. Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has reportedly declined by as much as 95%. Should the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait also become operationally constrained, the simultaneous disruption of these two maritime chokepoints would represent the most severe interruption to global trade flows since World War II. Industrialized countries with concentrated energy structures and high external dependence, particularly in Europe, Japan, and South Korea, are expected to face elevated inflationary pressures and supply chain disruptions.

At the regional level, the conflict is increasingly characterized by decentralized and asymmetric escalation. Following the death of Khamenei, Shia-aligned armed groups across multiple theaters have reportedly intensified cross-factional retaliation. The erosion of previously observed informal “red lines” has reduced predictability and increased the risk of uncontrolled escalation. At the same time, perceptions of U.S. security guarantees are shifting among regional partners. Gulf states are showing signs of reassessing their reliance on the United States, as U.S. military presence, traditionally viewed as a stabilizing force, is increasingly seen as a potential liability in a high-intensity conflict environment. More broadly, the initiation of military operations during an ongoing negotiation process with Iran has contributed to skepticism about the reliability of diplomatic engagement. For smaller and medium-sized states, this may reinforce perceptions that formal negotiations offer limited protection against coercive actions, thereby weakening confidence in existing international mechanisms.

The most consequential long-term risk lies in the potential erosion of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Iran’s reported stockpile of approximately 450 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% purity places it within closer proximity to weapons-grade capability, heightening concerns about rapid escalation under crisis conditions. Should nuclear weapons be introduced into the conflict, the implications would extend beyond immediate military effects. Such a development would represent the most severe systemic shock to the global non-proliferation architecture since the establishment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, with implications for both horizontal proliferation and strategic stability.

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China Scholar Insights is a feature which aimed at providing you with the latest analysis on issues that Chinese scholars and strategic communities are focusing on. We will carefully select commentary articles and highlight key points. Questions or criticisms can be directed to sunchenghao@tsinghua.edu.cn.

I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University. ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu.

Background

Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae recently made her first visit to the United States. This was the second face-to-face meeting between the leaders of the two countries since Trump’s visit to Japan in October 2025. On the day Takaichi set off for the U.S., ODNI released the “2026 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community”. The report noted that Takaichi’s remarks last November, which hinted at the possibility of Japanese military intervention in the Taiwan Strait, represented a major policy shift. It also warned that that China would take further countermeasures if tensions continued to rise, which has already led to sustained friction in China-Japan relations. Meanwhile, in the Middle East, the U.S. and Israel launched a military strike against Iran. Iran threatened to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, which accounts for 90% of Japan’s crude oil imports.

Summary

The inherent structural contradictions within the U.S.-Japan alliance will not be resolved by a visit. No matter how elegant the diplomatic rhetoric is or how warm the interactions between leaders are, the asymmetry of the U.S.-Japan alliance is presenting in a more straightforward and utilitarian manner during Trump’s tenure. Furthermore, Japan’s strategic investment on the path of “relying on the U.S. to contain China” is causing it to be trapped in multiple predicaments such as increased financial burden, reduced autonomy, and deteriorating regional relations.

On one hand, Japan sacrifices the China-Japan relationship to increase its strategic autonomy within the U.S.-Japan alliance, and will ultimately become increasingly self-degraded in the trilateral relationship of China-U.S.-Japan.On the other, Japan is gradually becoming a “paying ally” of the U.S., and the alliance is continuously oscillating between differences and contradictions. The U.S.’s indication that it does not want to get involved in the China-Japan conflict is a clear warning to Japan. This incoherence in China policy affects the mutual trust between the U.S. and Japan.

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Insights

LI Nan, CAO Cong: The “Reconstruction” of the U.S.-Japan Alliance by the Trump Government

Since Trump returned to power, he has emphasized “America First” and “shared responsibility” towards allies. This aligns with the actions of the Japanese right wing in pushing for the revision of the “Peace Constitution” and in striving to become a “normal country”. As a result, the U.S.-Japan alliance is undergoing a historic reformation.

The Alliance Reaches a New Level

Although Trump’s second term implements a “Western Hemisphere First” global strategy, the U.S. maintains its strong presence in the Indo-Pacific region, focusing on supporting Japan. Firstly, Japan, under the guise of meeting U.S. requirements, strives to increase its defense spending. Secondly, U.S.-Japan security cooperation is shifting from “U.S. attack, Japan defense” to collaborative operations. Thirdly, the extension of U.S.-Japan nuclear deterrence is continuously escalating. In order to control the cost of the alliance system, Trump encourages Japan to play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific multilateral mechanisms and coordinates Japan to increase military security assistance to countries in the Global South.

“America First” : Economic Cooperation between the United States and Japan

In October 2025, the bilateral agreement signed by the U.S. and Japan emphasized supply-side and demand-side cooperation in the field of rare earth mining and processing, aiming to exclude China from the rare earth supply chain of the U.S. and its allies. The two sides also actively promote cooperation in shipbuilding, AI, nuclear energy, U.S. power infrastructure and defense industry. These collaborations are almost entirely prioritized by American interests, further highlighting Japan’s role as a “vassal” to the United States.

Structural Bottlenecks in the Reconstruction of the Alliance

Trump’s efforts to strengthen Japan are confronted with three structural constraints. Firstly, Japan’s fiscal capacity is insufficient, with its government debt reaching 230% of GDP. Secondly, the contradiction between Japan’s strategic autonomy and its dependence on the US is difficult to resolve. Thirdly, the inconsistent policies towards China have undermined the mutual trust between the US and Japan. The Taiwan question could either serve as a binding agent for the cooperation or become a point of contention, depending on the expectations of the US policies towards China and the evolution of the Taiwan question itself.

Overall Assessment

The restructured alliance between the U.S. and Japan is an integrated institutional arrangement deeply embedded in the U.S. strategy to contain China. The systematic upgrade of the U.S.-Japan alliance will increase the difficulty and cost for China to promote its own development and maintain stability in its surrounding regions. In the long run, the structural contradictions in the China-Japan relationship will inevitably continue to deteriorate.

YAO Zeyu: Sanae Takaichi’s Washington Visit Lays Bare the Deep Divisions in U.S.-Japan Relation

The Facade of Mutual Trust

On March 19, 2026, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi held her inaugural summit with President Trump at the White House, their second face-to-face encounter since late 2025. While Tokyo has sought to frame the visit as a “highly productive” testament to deep mutual trust, the reality is far more complex. An analysis of the agenda, interactive nuances, and resulting agreements reveals that the summit served not to deepen the alliance, but rather to further manifest its asymmetric structure. Particularly against the backdrop of a volatile Middle East, Japan has evidently lapsed into a state of strategic passivity across several critical issues.

Takaichi’s Multifaceted Gambit

The timing of Takaichi’s visit was far from incidental, reflecting a calculated geopolitical strategy formalized in late 2025. Tokyo’s objectives were fourfold: to synchronize its China policy and avoid marginalization within the U.S.-China-Japan triangle; to anchor U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific against the tide of “Western Hemisphere First” isolationism; to mitigate “supply-chain anxiety” by restructuring critical mineral networks to reduce structural dependence on China; and to secure policy leverage in trade and security by meeting Washington’s demands for increased defense procurement and burden-sharing.

The Disparity Gap

The Middle East escalation has pivoted Takaichi’s visit from a proactive strategic layout to a reactive, passive response. A pronounced “policy temperature gap” has emerged: while Tokyo prioritized pressuring Beijing, Washington’s shift toward regional energy stability resulted in a profound strategic misalignment. This is exacerbated by the Strait of Hormuz crisis, where U.S. demands for maritime participation clash with Japan’s constitutional constraints, forcing Tokyo into a strategic quagmire.

The summit underscores a structure of asymmetric reciprocity where Japanese capital functions as a direct subsidy to American re-industrialization. This lopsided division of labor, characterized by Japan assuming primary fiscal risks while the U.S. retains strategic dominance, serves as a definitive manifestation of structural inequality. Ultimately, by trading massive resources for elusive security guarantees, Japan has significantly compressed its strategic maneuverability and capacity for independent diplomacy.

ZHANG Yun: Sanae Takaichi’s U.S. Visit Amid China-U.S. Strategic Competition: Calculated Motives Behind the Political Spectacl

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s White House visit became a political show, as the two leaders exchanged lavish praise and projected an image of close alliance. However, it was all surface gloss, with real shocks beneath.

Surface Gloss: High-Level Reception, Rare Reciprocal Visits, and Pro-Japan Messaging

The “outward gloss” of Takaichi’s U.S. visit was reflected in three ways. First, the diplomatic protocol was exceptionally high. Second, there was a breakthrough in scheduling. It is extremely rare for U.S. and Japanese leaders to visit each other within less than six months. Third, the public messaging was tilted in Japan’s favor, while belittling Europe.

Yet behind this glossy exterior, the Takaichi’s visit to the U.S. has in essence exposed severe “Trump shocks,” as reflected in the following three aspects.

The U.S. Indirectly Undercuts Takaichi’s Taiwan Remarks

On March 18, the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence released its 2026 Threat Assessment, rejecting the widely circulated claim that mainland China would attack Taiwan in 2027 and warned that any military conflict would inflict unprecedented damage on the U.S., China, and the global economy. In recent years, Japan has used this “2027 attack” scenario to justify treating China as an unprecedented strategic challenge, lifting arms-export limits, raising defense spending, and expanding military capabilities. By dismissing that claim, Washington indirectly undercut the logic behind Takaichi’s Taiwan remarks on November 7, 2025.

The U.S. Does Not Want to Be Drawn Into a China-Japan Conflict

The report said that Takaichi’s remarks, which stated that a Taiwan contingency could place Japan in a survival-threatening situation and justify the use of force, were “a major shift by a sitting Japanese prime minister.” This clearly rejected Japan’s claim that her comments had not changed the government’s long-standing position on Taiwan. This shows that the U.S. does not want to be dragged into a China-Japan conflict initiated by Japan itself.

A Sudden Shift in the Diplomatic Agenda

Takaichi had wanted to center her U.S. visit on strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance and boosting deterrence against China, especially by securing some sign of Trump’s support for her Taiwan remarks. But U.S. military action against Iran moved the focus to the Middle East.

The United States wants a controllable, predictable Japan, not a reckless ally. If Japan seeks greater strategic autonomy at the expense of China-Japan relations, it will only further diminish itself in the trilateral U.S.-China-Japan relationship.

JIANG Shuiyao: Japan’s $73 Billion “Investment Gift”: Economic Concessions for a Hollow Alliance

A Conspicuous Offer That Defies Global Caution Toward Washington

After the US “reciprocal tariff” policy was ruled unconstitutional, most nations adopted a cautious stance. Japan did the opposite. During Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s first US visit in March 2026, Tokyo announced a $73 billion investment package – the second batch of a $550 billion commitment. The timing and scale of this “gift” are strikingly abrupt.

Three Forms of Entanglement: Energy, Mega-Projects, and Mineral Decoupling

The “grand investment gift” offered by Takaichi is mainly characterized by three aspects. First, the deepening energy integration between Japan and the U.S.. Japan seeks to further embed itself in the U.S. supply chain system by cooperating with the U.S. in energy initiatives such as boosting crude oil production in Alaska. Second, the large-scale investment projects, with the total investment of the three core projects expected to reach up to 73 billion U.S. dollars. Third, cooperation on critical mineral supply chains, with the introduction of a “minimum price system” to reduce reliance on China.

Security Anxiety Behind Generosity: Flattery Met with a Pearl Harbor Quip

Japan is trying to buy US security guarantees with economic sacrifices. When Trump demanded Japanese naval deployment to the Hormuz Strait, Takaichi gave only a vague response, citing constitutional constraints under Article 9. Her overture – “Only Donald can bring peace and prosperity to the world” – was met with Trump’s dismissive retort. Asked why the US did not notify Japan before striking Iran, Trump replied: “Who knows better about surprise than Japan? Why didn’t you tell me about Pearl Harbor?” This reveals Washington always prioritizes its own interests, never treating allied consultation as a necessity.

Tangible Costs Yield Only Symbolic Returns, Not Substantive Concessions

Japan’s “attack as defense” strategy failed. The US response was limited to Trump’s verbal praise, a welcome for Alaska oil purchases, and ceremonial courtesies. On Japan’s three core concerns – trade policy, security commitments, and coordination toward China – Washington made no substantive concessions. Japan’s payments are concrete and quantifiable; America’s returns are symbolic and gestural.

The Fundamental Asymmetry: Japan Trapped as a “Paying Ally”

The US-Japan alliance is an asymmetric interdependence. Japan’s security lifeline is held by the US, which values Tokyo only for its strategic location and economic resources. Under Trump, the more Japan pays, the hollower US assurances become. Whether such a one-sided model can lead to a “new golden age” is self-evidently doubtful. Japan’s dilemma remains: how to avoid being a “paying ally” while preserving its own interests within deep dependency on Washington.

Conclusion

Looking ahead, the U.S.-Japan alliance is unlikely to achieve the “new golden age” that both sides have claimed. Although the U.S. still regards Japan as the most important pivot for containing China in the Indo-Pacific region, the underlying logic of the Trump’s “America First” policy determines the instrumental and conditional nature of its commitment to Japan. This structural asymmetry of “Japan needs certainty while the U.S. retains uncertainty” will repeatedly test the stability of the alliance. The upgrading and reconstruction of the U.S.-Japan alliance will continue to pose strategic pressure on China, and may weaken the long-term efforts of Asian countries to promote stability and cooperation in the region.

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Editor for Today’s Newsletter: SUN Chenghao, WEI Zongqin, WU Kexi, LI Yining, CHEN Weng U and BAI Xuhan.

ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by Jin Liangxiang, which deals with the unraveling of Iran’s “Resistance Strategy” under U.S. and Israeli pressure.

Summary

The setback in Iran’s resistance strategy is one of the most significant spillover effects of the new round of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Iran’s resistance strategy is fundamentally based on maintaining national security rather than exporting revolutionary ideology, adopting a defensive posture rather than offensive stance, using anti - American and anti - Israeli stances as a unifying force, and employing missile deterrence as a key tool. Following the outbreak of the new round of the Israeli - Palestinian conflict in 2023, Iran and its resistance front suffered military strikes from Israel and the United States, resulting in a major setback for its resistance strategy. This was mainly manifested in the severe damage to the resistance network, a significant weakening of its domestic foundation, and a severe compression of its strategic space. The reasons for this setback are threefold: first, Iran’s economic strength is insufficient to support its vast resistance strategic network; second, domestic political maneuvering leads to its wavering between resistance and de - escalation, preventing it from fully implementing its deterrence strategy: and third, the long - term weakening efforts of the US and Israel, along with their repeated breaches of moral boundaries, have given them the upper hand. This setback will have many profound impacts on the regional order: first, it will lead to a new round of regional power fragmentation and reorganization; second, it will further undermine regional rules and norms; and third, the regional agenda structure will undergo new adjustments. The resistance strategy is a crucial component of Iran’s national security strategy, and its setback could intensify to a severe systematic political and security crisis in Iran. If such a scenario occurs, the geopolitical landscape of West Asia and Central Asia could become even more complex.

Why it Matters

On February 28, 2026, the international community was shaken by a coordinated U.S.-–Israeli military operation against Iran known as “Operation Epic Fury.” The strikes targeted Iranian military infrastructure and senior leadership, reportedly killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei along with several high-ranking officials and triggering Iranian missile and drone retaliation across the Middle East. This dramatic escalation has pushed the region into one of its most volatile crises in decades and raised urgent questions about the durability of deterrence and the future of Iran’s long-standing strategy of projecting influence through allied networks across the Middle East.

We selected this article because it examines the evolution and apparent decline of Iran’s “Resistance Strategy” from a Chinese academic perspective. Such an approach moves beyond dominant Western narratives that often frame Iran primarily through the lens of proxy warfare, instead situating its strategy within broader questions of state survival, strategic depth, and developmental constraints. Chinese international relations scholars frequently interprets regional conflicts within the broader dynamics of global power transition and the growing political agency of states in the Global South. Within this framework, China increasingly presents itself as a partner to Global South countries seeking greater strategic autonomy in a more multipolar order.

By engaging this perspective, the article sheds light not only on Iran’s strategic predicament but also on how Chinese scholars interpret conflict, sovereignty, and order in an increasingly fragmented international system.

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Key Points

1. Tehran’s Strategic Retrenchment: The Eroding “Axis of Resistance”

Following the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” sustained Israeli-U.S. pressure has severely degraded Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” and compromised its domestic deterrence. Originally a reactive formation following the 2002 “Axis of Evil” designation, the “Resistance Front” , has evolved into the cornerstone of Iranian national security, merging the doctrines of “Offensive Defense” and “Forward Defense.”

Iran’s strategy relies on projecting power through non-state actors to neutralize threats before they reach Iranian soil. While Western discourse dismisses these as mere “proxies,” Supreme Leader Khamenei viewed this transnational strategic depth as a vital necessity, often prioritized over domestic concerns. However, the current degradation of this network, coupled with Iran’s late-2025 political crisis, marks a profound failure of its regional architecture. This shift signals a historic inflection point for the Middle Eastern order as Iran’s primary mechanism for regional influence faces unprecedented structural erosion.

2. The Defining Attributes of Iran’s Strategy of Resistance

Iran’s resistance strategy has evolved from revolutionary export into a sophisticated security architecture that leverages “offensive defense,” anti-Western ideology, and missile deterrence to ensure regime survival. Grounded in a unique Shiite strategic culture of defiance, this framework functions simultaneously as a defensive shield against U.S.-Israeli containment and Tehran’s primary mechanism for projecting regional influence.

• Driven by National Security, Not Exporting Revolution

Contrary to Western assumptions that frame Iran as an ideological crusade, Tehran’s contemporary “Resistance Strategy” is fundamentally a state-centric security doctrine. Since 1989, regime survival and state-building have eclipsed the export of revolution. The August 2025 reappointment of veteran politician Ali Larijani to the Supreme National Security Council following the “12-Day War” underscores this institutional prioritization. Consequently, Iran’s cultivation of regional non-state actors functions essentially as a “forward defense strategy,” designed to insulate the Iranian homeland from direct conflict.

• A Fundamentally Defensive Posture

Despite hostile rhetoric, Iran’s strategic posture is structurally defensive. Proxies like Hezbollah compensate for Iran’s geographic distance and military-technological asymmetry vis-à-vis Israel. Iran’s calibrated retaliatory missile strikes throughout 2024—following the assassinations of key officials and allied leaders—aimed to re-establish deterrence and project strength rather than inflict substantive casualties or provoke uncontrolled escalation.

• Bound by Shared Ideology, Not Direct Control

The “Axis of Resistance” is united by a shared anti-U.S. and anti-Israel ideology, reacting directly against perceived regional hegemony and territorial occupation. As Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi noted in December 2024, these non-state actors–including Hamas, Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and the Houthis–possess highly developed political autonomy. Iran does not exercise direct control; rather, this anti-hegemonic alignment serves as the network’s connective tissue.

• Underpinned by Domestic Missile Deterrence

Iran’s forward defense network is inextricably linked to its domestic missile capabilities. Constrained by sanctions, Tehran systematically prioritized asymmetric missile deterrence at the expense of its conventional air force. While this capability has historically deterred preemptive strikes against Iranian high-value targets, the “12-Day War” exposed critical vulnerabilities in Iran’s air defense architecture, highlighting the structural risks of over-relying on missile deterrence while ceding air superiority.

3. Impact of the Israel-Hamas Conflict on Iran’s Resistance Strategy

By leveraging the Gaza conflict to link Hamas directly to Tehran, Israel is executing a dual strategy to dismantle both the group’s local control and Iran’s regional influence. This concerted military and diplomatic pressure has effectively compromised the “Axis of Resistance,” resulting in a severe degradation of Iran’s strategic depth and its doctrine of forward defense.

• Severe Damage to the Regional Axis

The “Axis of Resistance” has suffered major structural setbacks. Israel has systematically dismantled the leadership and military infrastructure of Hamas and Hezbollah. Furthermore, the December 2024 collapse of the Assad regime in Syria–a critical logistical bridge between Iran and Hezbollah–severed the network’s vital supply lines. While localized remnants of these groups survive and reorganize, the overarching network’s operational connectivity and primary nodes have been critically degraded.

• Degradation of Domestic Deterrence

Israel strategically escalated from targeting Iranian proxies to dismantling Iran’s domestic military foundation. The unprecedented 12-day Israeli air campaign in June 2025 severely degraded Iran’s air defense systems, radar arrays, and critical missile production and launch facilities. By eliminating key IRGC commanders and stripping Tehran of its airspace control, Israel effectively neutralized the domestic missile deterrence that previously underpinned Iran’s forward defense strategy.

• Radical Contraction of Geopolitical Space

Iran’s regional footprint is actively being rolled back. Capitalizing on the weakened Axis, Israel is seizing territory in southern Lebanon and the Golan Heights, while pushing to disarm proxy militias in Lebanon and Iraq. Simultaneously, regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Turkey are moving to fill the power vacuums left in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. Consequently, while Iran remains a significant regional power, the geographic depth required to sustain its Resistance Strategy has drastically contracted, diminishing Tehran’s capacity to project power and counter U.S.-Israeli hegemony at historical levels.

4. Causes of the Setbacks to Iran’s Strategy of Resistance

While ostensibly triggered by Israeli military strikes, the unraveling of Iran’s resistance strategy is fundamentally rooted in deep-seated domestic, economic, and structural power constraints–a vulnerability underscored by the post- “12-Day War” overhaul of the Supreme National Security Council–with three key internal drivers warranting closer examination.

• Insufficient Economic Foundation to Sustain Resistance

Crippled by structural inefficiencies–such as costly subsidies and military monopolies over resources–and compounded by crushing Western sanctions, Iran’s economy cannot bankroll its expansive regional strategy. The stark economic disparity with Israel, whose 2024 GDP is 1.25 times larger despite having a fraction of the population, severely limits the “Axis of Resistance.” Proxies like Hezbollah, almost entirely dependent on Iranian funding, have struggled to modernize their arsenals since 2006. Similarly, the economic collapse of the Assad regime underscores this systemic fragility. Domestically, financial constraints forced Tehran to over-invest in asymmetric missile deterrence at the expense of conventional air defense, leaving Iranian airspace critically vulnerable to Israeli air superiority during the recent “12-Day War.”

• Domestic Political Fissures Undermining Strategic Deterrence

Effective deterrence requires both military capability and the demonstrated political will to inflict unacceptable damage. While Iran possesses the requisite retaliatory capabilities, domestic political fragmentation–specifically the divide between conservatives advocating decisive retaliation and reformists pursuing de-escalation with Washington–has paralyzed its strategic resolve. Operations “True Promise 1” (April 2024) and “True Promise 2” (October 2024) were heavily calibrated to avoid high-value targets and minimize Israeli casualties. Rather than re-establishing deterrence, these restrained, compromise-driven responses exposed Tehran’s lack of resolve. This hesitation effectively punctured Iran’s “deterrence credit bubble,” eroding its credibility and inviting further Israeli escalation.

• Long-Term U.S.-Israeli Suppression and Asymmetrical Warfare

Iran’s current setbacks are the culmination of a decades-long U.S.-Israeli grand strategy aimed at systematically dismantling anti-hegemonic regional powers (following the playbook used against Iraq, Libya, and Syria) through relentless economic and military pressure. In the current conflict, this structural pressure is exacerbated by a stark operational asymmetry. While Iran has largely adhered to conventional rules of engagement to avoid massive escalation, Israel and the U.S. have employed unconstrained, boundary-pushing tactics. By utilizing state-sponsored assassinations of Axis leadership and scientists, weaponizing everyday communication devices, and striking IAEA-monitored nuclear facilities during active negotiations, Israel has weaponized unpredictability. This disregard for traditional operational and ethical boundaries has left the Resistance Axis permanently off-balance, unable to anticipate the scope of adversary strikes.

5. The Impact of Iran’s Geopolitical Shifts on the Regional Order

The severe degradation of Iran’s resistance strategy–a fragile counter-hegemonic force that emerged amid U.S. retrenchment–will inevitably restructure Middle Eastern power dynamics, emboldening hegemonic actors and exacerbating regional disorder.

• Triggering a New Round of Regional Power Realignment

The dismantling of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” has ignited a retaliatory scramble among regional powers–namely Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel–to partition Tehran’s former spheres of influence across Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. However, as the perceived “Iranian threat” recedes, the strategic momentum driving the Abraham Accords will likely stall. Concurrently, Israel’s unchecked military ascendancy and unprecedented reliance on state-sponsored extraterritorial assassinations are generating profound unease across the Middle East. This shifting threat matrix is expected to foster a new, tacit strategic coordination against Israeli hegemony among Arab states, Turkey, and Iran. Consequently, frameworks like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) may find renewed purpose, and the foundational logic of the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement will recalibrate to address the complexities of Israel’s expanded military footprint.

• Further Erosion of Fundamental Norms of Regional State Interaction

Historically, Iran’s resistance network provided a fragile check on Israeli overreach, enforcing a tenuous adherence to sovereignty norms in a highly volatile region. With this deterrence heavily degraded, the regional strategic balance has shattered. Israel is now pursuing its objectives with unprecedented impunity, violating international law and sovereignty norms to a degree unseen in modern regional history–evidenced by extrajudicial strikes in Qatar and its active support for separatist movements in Syria and Somaliland. This normalization of state violence will generate a dangerous demonstration effect. As other regional actors inevitably emulate these aggressive, cross-border tactics, the Middle East faces an accelerating trajectory of geopolitical fragmentation and lawlessness.

• Catalyzing a Restructuring of Regional Agendas and Renewed Instability

For decades, the U.S. and its allies helped construct the “Iranian Threat” (encompassing nuclear, missile, and proxy agendas) as the Middle East’s paramount security focus, which drew attention to the Palestinian issue. As Iran’s hard power diminishes, this agenda structure may now begin to shift. The Palestinian crisis and the realities of unchecked Israeli military hegemony will reclaim their primacy in regional discourse. Furthermore, the degradation of the Resistance Axis will not pacify the Middle East. Instead of capitulating, non-state actors like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis will continue to evolve and reorganize under existential pressure. Ultimately, the destruction of the fragile regional balance–which had briefly stabilized following the 2023 diplomatic détentes–guarantees a new phase of heightened fragmentation and instability.

About the Author

Jin Liangxiang金良祥：Dr. Jin Liangxiang serves as Director and Senior Fellow of the Center for Middle East Studies of SIIS. He is also an Executive Council Member of the Chinese Association of Middle East Studies and a Council Member of the Chinese Association of Asian and African Studies. His research focuses on major regional political security issues and current hotspots. Dr. Jin is the author of the book Domestic Sources of Iran’s Foreign Policy, published by World Affairs Press in April 2015. He has published nearly 30 academic articles in leading Chinese journals such as Contemporary International Relations, West Asia and Africa, and Journal of the Arab World Studies. He has also contributed multiple articles to influential international publications.

About the Publication

The Chinese version of the article was published by West Asia and Africa (《西亚非洲》). The academic journal founded in 1980, is published by the Institute of West Asian and African Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). West Asia and Africa emphasizes in-depth exploration of political, economic, international relations, historical, religious, cultural, and social issues related to the regions of West Asia and Africa, balancing foundational theoretical research with major contemporary issues. The journal highlights research that is theoretical, forward-looking, and innovative. It has long been a prestigious academic resource for Chinese scholars in Middle Eastern and African studies and serves as an essential reference for relevant government agencies, institutions of higher learning, and research organizations engaged in international affairs, as well as professionals in foreign trade and market analysis. West Asia and Africa is listed as an A-rated journal in the AMI evaluation of Chinese humanities and social sciences journals, a CSSCI source journal by Nanjing University, and a core journal in Chinese by Peking University.

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ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by Cui Shoujun, which focuses on the Trump Administration’s Cryptocurrency Strategy.

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Summary

Trump is attempting to make turning the United States into a sglobal cryptocurrency hub a national strategy. The author argues that the U.S. is not merely supporting an industry; rather, it is seeking to use cryptocurrencies and blockchain to extend the dollar’s influence from the traditional financial system into the “on-chain world.” The Trump administration’s approach broadly includes three elements: first, loosening regulation and changing key rules to promote the growth of the industry; second, advancing federal legislation to establish the legal status and regulatory framework for stablecoins; and third, creating national-level digital assets and Bitcoin strategic reserves—effectively “nationalizing” crypto assets such as Bitcoin—to attract capital, boost market confidence, and frame them as a tool to hedge against pressure on the dollar’s credibility.

The author argues that this approach can indeed deliver results in the short term: the U.S. crypto sector will become more prosperous, markets more active, and America’s global influence stronger. Over the long term, however, uncertainty remains. Externally, strict regulatory regimes in regions such as the European Union have become strong barriers to U.S. crypto development. Internally, the United States still faces confused remits among state and federal governments, as well as among different regulatory agencies. In addition, the trajectory of “de-dollarization” remains uncertain, and the volatility of crypto markets and potential systemic risks are difficult to resolve. Taken together, these factors could create significant resistance to the practical implementation of the U.S.’ crypto strategy.

Why It Matters

Competition among major global economies for leadership in digital currency and digital financial governance is accelerating. China, the European Union, and others are more inclined to strengthening financial sovereignty and institutional influence through central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). As of July 2025, 137 countries and jurisdictions have explored CBDCs; three have formally launched them, and 49 are in pilot programs. Meanwhile, some BRICS members and other emerging economies are using the U.S. dollar less in bilateral trade, accelerating the trend toward de-dollarization.

Against this backdrop, the Trump administration has chosen to use the market-driven, decentralized cryptocurrency industry as a lever—seeking to seize the high ground in technical standards, payment networks, and regulatory rules—and thereby reinforce the dollar’s dominance in the digital economy. Only by systematically mapping the administration’s strategic motivations and policy package, and understanding how the United States aims to reshape global financial governance in the era of digital finance, can we grasp the changing structure of global monetary power and the future direction of the development of digital finance in China.

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Key Points

1. Overall Objectives and Operating Logic of the Trump Administration’s “Global Crypto Hub” Strategy

(1) Combining Institutions and Technology

The United States’ policy choices in the era of digital finance follow a path that fuses institutions with technology. Through federal legislation, innovative regulatory rules, and multilateral coordination, the U.S. provides sovereign-credit backing for privately developed technological outcomes such as dollar-pegged stablecoins and blockchain infrastructure, thereby lowering the political and financial risks for other countries adopting U.S.-style standards. At the same time, as these platforms expand into cross-border payments, asset tokenization, and decentralized finance, their technical standards are likely to gradually evolve into international norms—thereby reinforcing, in reverse, the U.S.’s rulemaking capacity and agenda-setting power. The mechanism through which the U.S. sustains financial hegemony is a closed loop: national interests, institutional arrangements, and technological embedding. National interests drive institutional design; institutional arrangements promote the embedding of technical standards into the international system; and technological advantages, in turn, strengthen institutional influence.

(2) Spillover of the Monetary System and Rules

On the one hand, the Trump administration leverages decentralized mainstream cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin to enhance global liquidity and attract capital inflows. On the other hand, it uses dollar stablecoins as everyday instruments for payment and settlement, building—within a compliance framework—a privately led yet comprehensively regulated global payment network. After overseas users purchase stablecoins, issuers must hold an equivalent amount of U.S. dollars in cash or U.S. Treasury securities to ensure stablecoin liquidity, thereby extending demand for the dollar into the blockchain-based world. Internationally, the U.S. seeks to use multilateral mechanisms such as the G7 and G20 to promote the harmonization of digital-asset regulatory standards and technical specifications, ensuring that the emerging digital financial system continues to operate around the dollar. Through rule alignment and stablecoin clearing arrangements, Washington aims to export U.S. crypto-asset rules outward and secure U.S. leadership in digital-asset rulemaking.

2. Main Motivations Behind Trump’s Push for a Cryptocurrency Strategy

(1) Debt Pressures and Industrial Competitiveness

As of the first quarter of 2025, total U.S. federal debt had reached USD 36.21 trillion—about 120.87% of GDP—and international investors were also adjusting their allocations to U.S. dollar assets. By proposing a strategic reserve of digital assets such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, the Trump administration aims to send a positive policy signal, attract international capital, and explore unconventional ways to mitigate debt-related risks. At the same time, it uses financial liberalization as a lever to promote the integration of traditional finance and crypto assets, encourage the tokenization of real-world assets (RWA), and build decentralized capital markets, thereby strengthening the international competitiveness and market appeal of the U.S. financial sector.

(2) Alignment of Political and Commercial Interests

From a political-economy perspective, the Trump family has significant interests in the crypto industry. Trump reportedly holds a substantial amount of crypto assets privately and has been involved in promoting projects such as “World Liberty Financial” (WLFI). During the 2024 election cycle, the crypto industry and related firms invested more than USD 238 million in Trump’s campaign activities; accordingly, one purpose of the administration’s strong push for crypto assets in a second term is to reciprocate support from the sector.

(3) Preserving Dollar Hegemony

In terms of monetary power, while the U.S. dollar still ranks first in global foreign-exchange reserves—57.74% in the first quarter of 2025—its share has been trending downward. The Trump administration seeks, through legislation and digital-asset reserve policies, to bring major crypto assets onto a dollar-centric track and build a “Digital Fort Knox” in order to offset de-dollarization pressures.

3. Policy Measures: Legislative and Regulatory Reset, Stablecoin Compliance, and Strategic Reserves in Parallel

(1) Federal Regulation and Legislation: Establishing an Institutional Foundation

In its second term, the Trump administration has vigorously advanced several key legislative initiatives and regulatory adjustments. On July 18, 2025, President Trump signed the GENIUS Act into law, establishing a legal and regulatory framework for stablecoins. The Act emphasizes using stablecoins to modernize the U.S. dollar payment system, consolidate the dollar’s international position, and create additional demand for U.S. Treasury securities. At the same time, the administration has strongly promoted the FIT21 Act and the Lummis–Gillibrand (L-G) bill, seeking to reduce market uncertainty by clarifying regulatory jurisdictions and improving inter-agency coordination. On the regulatory front, in January 2025 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rescinded SAB 121, significantly lowering the institutional barriers for banks and financial institutions in entering crypto custody and related businesses.

Aligned with this legislative framework, stablecoin policy is positioned to “connect the credit base of U.S. fiat money with blockchain payment networks.” Through compliance-driven expansion and international promotion, Trump aims to turn U.S. dollar stablecoins into a de facto “digital dollar” public good—expanding dollar influence in cross-border payments and trade settlement, while also accelerating the digital expansion of traditional financial assets through asset tokenization.

(2) Establishing Strategic Reserves

On March 2, 2025, Trump announced that BTC, ETH, XRP, SOL, and ADA would be included in a new national strategic reserve of digital assets. He also proposed accumulating 200,000 bitcoins per year, reaching a total of 1 million bitcoins over five years. The government further audited and formally consolidated management over an existing stockpile of roughly 200,000 bitcoins, emphasizing that these holdings would not be liquidated or sold and positioning them as long-term strategic assets comparable to gold.

(3) Advancing Reform of Regulatory Institutions

Organizationally, Trump nominated Paul Atkins—widely known for his light-touch regulatory stance—as SEC chair and established a “Crypto 2.0 Task Force.” In addition, the administration created a White House–directed “Digital Asset Markets Working Group” within the National Economic Council, with White House AI and crypto advisor David Sacks tasked with driving cross-departmental legislative and regulatory coordination. Notably, the relevant executive order explicitly prohibits government agencies from establishing, issuing, or promoting a central bank digital currency (CBDC), while prioritizing support for the private-sector, U.S. dollar–stablecoin pathway instead.

4. Implementation Challenges: External Regulatory Competition, a Crisis of Confidence in the U.S. Dollar, and Domestic Regulatory Fragmentation

(1) The Weakening Effect of International Regulatory Competition on U.S. Rule-Export

U.S. regulatory loosening stands in sharp contrast to the EU’s MiCA framework, which sets stricter compliance requirements and higher entry thresholds for stablecoins and other crypto assets. South Korea, Japan, and Singapore have also developed their own prudential regulatory regimes. Divergent regulatory standards increase cross-border compliance costs for firms and intensify market fragmentation. This may push global digital finance toward a multipolar landscape dominated by regional standards, thereby narrowing the space for the United States to lead in rule-setting and to shape governance norms in the crypto domain.

(2) Regulatory fragmentation between the U.S. federal government and the states persists.

Long-standing disputes between the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) over the legal classification of crypto assets and jurisdictional authority remain unresolved, while regulatory standards also vary across states. As a result, the crypto market continues to face elevated uncertainty and compliance costs. Fragmented rules can further amplify regulatory arbitrage and systemic financial risks. If coordination problems cannot be effectively addressed, market stability in the crypto sector will remain difficult to secure.

(3) Constraints Posed by the Crisis of Confidence in the Dollar-Dominated System

With U.S. debt levels high and the U.S. government frequently deploying financial sanctions, the international system’s trust deficit toward the dollar continues to widen. More countries are seeking payment and settlement systems independent of the dollar. BRICS member countries and other emerging economies are vigorously advancing the mBridge local-currency settlement platform and the BRICSPay decentralized payment system, while China is also promoting the digital renminbi in cross-border payments and trade settlement. De-dollarization efforts are likely to deepen further, potentially weakening the United States’ attempt to achieve “re-dollarization” through stablecoins and Bitcoin reserves, and may even lead international markets to view Bitcoin more as a safe-haven asset independent of the dollar.

5. Outlook Assessment and Implications for China

(1) Paying Close Attention to the Spillover Effects of Compliant USD Stablecoins and the Expansion Path of the “Digital Dollar.”

Stablecoins create a closed loop of U.S. dollar liquidity through the linkage to reserve assets and the expansion of payment networks. China should continuously assess the implications for cross-border payments, capital flows, and financial sanction tools. In parallel, drawing on its own e-CNY and cross-border settlement practices, China should improve controllable digital payment infrastructures.

(2) Grasping the Trend toward Bloc Formation and Fragmentation in Global Digital-Finance Governance.

Global digital-finance regulation can broadly be grouped into three approaches: laissez-faire, stringent control, and sovereignty-and-security oriented. Competition over data sovereignty will further raise compliance and operating thresholds. China can strengthen tracking and research on digital-asset regulatory rules, data-governance standards, and cross-border compliance mechanisms under multilateral and bilateral frameworks, increase its level of participation, and safeguard its rule-shaping capacity.

(3) Striking a Balance between Innovation and Risk, and between Sovereignty and Openness.

The expansion of stablecoins, asset tokenization, and market volatility may generate systemic financial risks. The future direction of the global financial landscape will depend on whether countries can find new institutional balances in their policy design. China can, in light of its regulatory system and the needs of industrial development, advance the standardization of blockchain and digital-finance applications, strengthen risk assessment and bottom-line governance, and ensure domestic financial stability in the face of external shocks.

Conclusion

The Trump administration is actively advancing a cryptocurrency strategy by pursuing regulatory liberalization, expanding strategic reserves of crypto assets, and building a compliant framework for stablecoins. These measures represent a new attempt by the United States to sustain its monetary power in the era of digital finance. By providing sovereign backing to private-sector technology platforms and allowing this support to spill over into international norms, the administration seeks to extend the dollar’s advantages from traditional finance into blockchain-based and digital financial systems. In the short term, this approach may further stimulate the growth of the crypto industry and strengthen U.S. agenda-setting power in digital finance. However, international regulatory competition, efforts toward de-dollarization, constraints on the dollar’s credibility, and fragmented domestic regulation will also pose major challenges to America’s crypto-asset strategy.

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About the Author

Ma Bo 马博: An Associate Professor in the Department of International Politics at the School of International Studies, Nanjing University, and holds a Ph.D. in Political Science. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy theory, the intersection of international law and international relations, and Sino–U.S. foreign policy. He received a B.A. in Public Administration from Beijing Normal University, an M.Sc. in Comparative Politics from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), an M.A. in International Relations from New York University (NYU), and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the City University of New York (CUNY). From 2014 to 2022, he conducted full-time research at Nanjing University’s South China Sea Institute, and has served in his current position since 2022. He also previously worked as an adjunct lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Queens College, CUNY.

Tu Yaling 涂亚玲: Master’s student at the School of International Studies, Nanjing University.

About the Publication

World Economics and Politics Forum（《世界经济与政治论坛》） is a scholarly bimonthly journal supervised by the Jiangsu Academy of Social Sciences and sponsored by the Institute of World Economics of the Jiangsu Academy of Social Sciences. Since its launch in 1981, the journal has continuously advanced and has become an important academic platform in China for research on world economics and politics. Since 2004, it has been consistently indexed as a source journal in the Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index (CSSCI) and included in the Guide to the Core Journals of China, among other major listings. At present, the journal primarily publishes the latest research in fields such as international relations, international politics, international security, international strategy, world economy, international trade and investment, and international finance, and it operates a double-blind peer-review system. The journal advocates academic freedom and equality, and is committed to fostering academic innovation, promoting scholarly exchange, and advancing academic prosperity.

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China Scholar Insights is a feature that aims to provide you with the latest analysis on issues that Chinese scholars and strategic communities are focusing on. We will carefully select commentary articles and highlight key points. Questions or criticisms can be directed to sch0625@gmail.com

I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University. ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu.

Background

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched joint airstrikes on Iran, killing several senior officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Iran responded by striking U.S. bases across the region and, on March 1, announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. A day later, Donald Trump signalled a willingness to engage with Iran’s new leadership, but Tehran rejected the overture.

However, the Trump administration’s resort to force against Iran appears to lack a clearly articulated strategic end state, and bears signs of being significantly shaped—if not driven—by Israeli threat perceptions and operational preferences. As the conflict unfolds, Washington is showing increasing difficulty in shaping escalation dynamics and terminating the war on favorable terms, raising concerns that it may become drawn into a protracted and costly entanglement.

The ongoing U.S.–Iran confrontation has already had far-reaching consequences: it has destabilized the Middle East security environment, triggered volatility in global energy markets, and provoked intense domestic debate within the United States, thereby constraining the administration’s broader strategic flexibility and bandwidth.

At the same time, observers have begun to question whether the U.S. approach to Iran, when viewed alongside the earlier Venezuela episode, reflects a broader pattern in the Trump administration’s use of military intervention. In this regard, the extent to which these cases reveal an emerging logic—characterized by opportunistic intervention, ambiguous objectives, and reactive escalation—has become an increasingly salient subject of analysis.

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Insights

Guo Hai： Three Critical Questions Urgently to Be Answered in the Wake of Khamenei’s Assassination

No Imminent Collapse of Iran’s Islamic Republic

In light of the structural characteristics of Iran’s political system and its domestic conditions, the assassination of the Supreme Leader is unlikely to lead to the disintegration of the Iranian polity under conditions of armed conflict. Institutional continuity is maintained through constitutional mechanisms, with the Assembly of Experts responsible for selecting a successor and an interim authority already in place. Besides, Iran features a highly decentralised governance system, and its power structure, underpinned by the separation of three powers, demonstrates strong institutional resilience in the face of internal and external turbulence. Furthermore, there is no severe political rift among Iran’s political elites that could lead to regime change. Meanwhile, the operation by the U.S. and Israel has significantly stoked Persian nationalism in Iran, and Khamenei’s death will also push Iran’s new leadership to adopt a tougher policy stance toward the U.S. and Israel. Although economic hardship has generated public discontent, in the absence of elite division, it is unlikely to develop into organised regime change.

Strait Closure Triggers “Inflation Shock and Growth Slowdown”

In general, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz will impose dual global economic pressures: short-term inflationary shocks and a medium-term growth slowdown. As a critical transit point for global energy flows, even partial disruption—through rising transport risks, insurance costs, and market expectations—can drive significant oil price volatility. The surge in energy prices will quickly be transmitted through global industrial chains via fuels, power generation, chemical raw materials and other channels, triggering widespread imported inflationary pressures. At the same time, financial markets may shift toward risk aversion, with downward revision of global growth expectations. Energy-import-dependent economies face compounded pressures on domestic demand, while sustained high prices could delay monetary easing and weaken global growth prospects.

“Fighting While Talking” as the Likely Future Paradigm

Despite Iran’s tough stance, interactions among the United States, Israel, and Iran are likely to evolve into a pattern of “fighting while talking,” in which trade blockades, localised clashes, proxy wars, cyberattacks, targeted assassinations, and diplomatic engagement proceed in parallel. The United States seeks to prevent Iran’s nuclear weaponization and uphold Israel’s regional predominance, yet reservations expressed by its domestic and Western allies over the Trump administration’s actions have constrained the room for direct conflict escalation. Accordingly, the Trump administration is more likely to persist with the offshore balancing model, using Israel as its proxy. Iran, for its part, takes its own political survival as its paramount objective, and aims to impose maximum cost pressures on the United States and its allies through countermeasures, with a view to bringing the United States to the negotiating table. This dynamic is likely to give rise to a prolonged war of attrition, until both sides recognize that further escalation cannot enable them to achieve their respective purpose, at which point a degree of strategic equilibrium may emerge in the Middle East.

The Risks of a “High-to-Low” Conflict Model

It is worth noting that Trump’s targeted decapitation strikes against the leaders of Venezuela and Iran have largely reshaped the paradigm of modern warfare. The “high-to-low” conflict model, which opens with high-intensity strikes to anchor the opponent’s perception of conflict costs at a high level, before pursuing incremental de-escalation through “fighting and talking”, carries extreme risks. Its core premise is accurate judgment of the opponent’s cost tolerance and political will; miscalculations will trigger fiercer countermeasures. A deeper flaw is the lack of a clear exit mechanism, with military operations unmatched to a defined end state. This model risks dragging the United States and the wider world into a deeper quagmire of warfare.

ZHU Feng: The Conflict in Iran as an Extension of Trump’s Neo-Monroe Doctrine

A Comparative Analysis: The Iranian Conflict vs. the Venezuelan Incident

The disparities lie primarily in Iran’s larger population, formidable military strength, and its long-standing defiance of the West, with its aggregate power far exceeding that of Venezuela. Conversely, the commonalities reside in the U.S. ambition to achieve regime change through surgical military strikes, install pro-American figures, and pivot foreign policy toward Washington within a condensed timeframe.

Yet, the fundamental objective of the U.S.-Israeli strikes is not merely short-term deterrence, but the assertion of de facto control over Iran to fulfil Trump’s personal geopolitical agenda. Significant uncertainties persist regarding the so-called “Venezuelanization” of the Iranian issue.

The Trajectory of the Iranian Crisis and its Implications for Global Energy Supply and East Asian Economies

The trajectory of the current military operations remains inherently uncertain. Primarily, it is contingent upon Iran’s indigenous armaments, including its defensive posture and sustained military resilience. Furthermore, Iran is not Venezuela; the threshold for Trump to conclude strikes within four weeks, dismantle the current regime, and extract substantive concessions is formidable. This strategy necessitates the cultivation of new pro-American factions within Iran and a wholesale reversal of the nation’s foundational anti-U.S. policy orientation. Thirdly, Iran has initiated retaliatory measures aimed at escalating the global costs of the conflict to elicit international intervention and support.

Presently, there is a risk that the hostilities may spill over into other Arab nations in the Middle East, potentially igniting a broader regional conflagration. Should the war persist, and the Strait of Hormuz remain blockaded, it would deal a severe blow to the energy imports of East Asian nations. Concurrently, this would destabilize currency markets, drive up energy prices, and induce volatility across international financial and capital markets.

Novel Characteristics of the Military Operation and the Extension of the Neo-Monroe Doctrine

This military operation exhibits several novel characteristics compared to historical conflicts. In terms of military technology, the U.S. and Israel initially deployed large-scale information suppression, utilizing AI and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that epitomize contemporary warfare. Following the Russia-Ukraine conflict, UAVs have emerged as a pivotal instrument and weapon on the front lines of military engagement. Additionally, the sophisticated anti-missile systems of the U.S. and Israel played a critical role in this engagement.

Beyond these factors, the current U.S.-Iran confrontation is essentially an extension of Trump’s “Neo-Monroe Doctrine.” Diverging from the logic of the 2003 Iraq War, this operation represents the overt exercise of power politics through coercive military force. It employs a strategy of “simultaneous engagement and suppression” to compel Iran into a geopolitical settlement aligned with U.S. interests.

Wu Bingbing: A Three-Way Game and Seven Key Variables: Is the Iranian Situation Becoming Protracted?

Domestic mobilization and social cohesion in Iran remain relatively stable. Meanwhile, the United States faces challenges. Combined with fluctuations in oil and gas prices and shifting alliances within the Middle East, the current situation increasingly points to a risk of protracted confrontation.

Iran: Asymmetric Warfare and Strategic Pressure via the Strait of Hormuz

First, Iran continues to rely on asymmetric retaliation. It possesses over 2,000 ballistic missiles with a range of up to 2,000 kilometers, along with a vast arsenal of drones, many of which are stored in underground facilities. This enables Iran to sustain a prolonged resistance. Second, Iran is exerting pressure through the Strait of Hormuz. Instead of being fully closed, the strait has seen restricted vessel passage, significantly disrupting global oil and gas supplies. Third, Iran has struck back at U.S. military bases and even diplomatic facilities in the region, such as in Erbil or Saudi diplomatic posts. This is considered to be a reminder to Gulf states that the presence of U.S. installations on their soil could make them targets. Although Saudi Arabia and others have voiced opposition to strikes on Iran, they have taken no concrete action, adding to regional risks. Fourth, Iranian patriotism has been stirred, preventing internal divisions. This sentiment could support a prolonged resistance.

The United States: Strategic Confusion and Constraints

First, U.S. objectives and the means to achieve them remain unclear. After the initial Israeli strike that killed Iran’s Supreme Leader, there was no clear strategy for regime change. At the same time, unseating the Iranian leadership would be extremely difficult for U.S. without preparation for a ground war. Second, the U.S. is not prepared for a long war. Initial expectations of a conflict is lasting from one to four weeks. Ammunition stockpiles, especially interceptors crucial for defense, are significantly lower than during the 2003 Iraq War, suggesting sustainability for only one to two weeks. Third, there is no clear U.S. exit strategy if Iran mounts a sustained, methodical resistance. Iran’s interim leadership council has been functioning effectively, maintaining policy continuity, which leaves the U.S. with no clear path to end the conflict.

Fourth, U.S. and Israeli strategic timelines diverge. Israel’s goal of regime change is more direct, and it may continue its campaign even if the U.S. decides to scale back, with no mechanism in place to align its actions. Fifth, the timing of the U.S. strike, coming amid diplomatic negotiations, has dimmed prospects for a deal. Past talks yielded Iranian concessions on nuclear enrichment. Following the military attack and the killing of its leader, Iran is unlikely to make further concessions on its nuclear or missile programs. Sixth, disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have already driven up energy prices. Prolonged conflict would risk fueling inflation in the U.S. Seventh, the stance of neutral Gulf states remains uncertain. While they oppose Israeli expansion and favor diplomacy, attacks affecting their territory could shift their position.

In conclusion, the Iranian issue is unlikely to be resolved quickly. The risk of a prolonged conflict is clear, when U.S. is also facing a higher risk, and how the U.S. might end such a conflict remains an open question.

ZHENG Yongnian: Lessons from the Iran Conflict: Guarding Against Japan Becoming an “Israel of East Asia”

Israel as the ‘Tail that Wags the Dog’ in Driving U.S. Action

The motive for the strike on Iran originated more with Israel than with the United States. Israel serves as America’s strategic pivot in the Middle East. Despite Trump’s claims of control, the reality is that U.S. policy is being significantly driven by Israeli interests, using American power to settle regional scores. The attack occurred not despite diplomacy, but because the U.S. and Iran fundamentally distrust each other, making negotiation impossible.

Iran’s Future: Potential for Moderation or Risk of Chaos

The outcome hinges on Iran’s internal dynamics. While the U.S. seeks regime change, it will not occupy Iran. In the medium to long term, Iran may evolve toward a more moderate or secular governance model, which could ultimately stabilize the Middle East. However, if the existing political structure collapses without a viable replacement, the country could descend into chaos, breeding extremism that threatens the entire region—a scenario reminiscent of post-invasion Iraq or Afghanistan.

The ‘No-Exit’ Trap: Why Trump May Not Be Able to End This War

Trump likely hoped for a quick, limited strike—a “shock and awe” campaign similar to the Gulf War. However, once a war begins, it follows its own logic. By targeting Iran’s leadership, the U.S. may have triggered a response that prevents it from simply “cutting and running.” Iran has strong incentives to keep the U.S. engaged, potentially forcing Trump into a deeper, longer-term occupation similar to the later Iraq War model, an outcome he likely did not intend.

A Key Lesson for China: Preventing Japan from Becoming ‘an Israel of East Asia’

While China is not a direct party to the conflict, it must learn from it. China should proactively work to prevent Japan (and potentially the Philippines) from assuming a role in East Asia analogous to Israel’s in the Middle East. The risk is that these U.S. allies could manipulate Washington’s strategic focus, dragging U.S. into conflicts to serve their own national interests, thereby forcing China into a war it does not want.

A Warning on Tech: China Must Reorient AI Toward National Security, Not Just Entertainment

The strike on Iran represents a new generation of warfare, merging Silicon Valley with the Pentagon. While AI remains a tool, its application in warfare is now immediate and lethal. Recently, China’s tech sector has focused too heavily on entertainment and consumer apps, whereas the U.S. prioritizes military applications. If China possesses AI capabilities but fails to integrate them into national defense, it risks strategic obsolescence in future conflicts.

Editor for Today’s Newsletter: SUN Chenghao, ZHANG Xinyue, CHEN Didi, FAN Jiaji, LIU Zhuofan and ZHANG Xueyu.

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ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by ZHANG Rui and YUE Fengli on Trump’s obsession and limitations with “energy dominance” strategy.

Summary

During Trump’s second term, the “energy dominance” strategy was revitalized, reinforcing the supremacy of fossil fuels and nuclear power domestically, while utilizing energy to uphold America’s hegemonic position in the global order.

This strategy focuses on five key areas: enhancing domestic fossil fuel development, strengthening oil and gas exports and global market influence, advancing nuclear power capacity and technology exports, reducing support for energy transition policies, and restructuring domestic energy governance. Strategic motivations include the realization of energy power, the construction of energy export hegemony, surging energy demands in the age of artificial intelligence, and considerations related to domestic electoral politics. This strategy significantly disrupts both U.S. and global energy transitions, exacerbates the geopolitical nature of the global energy system, and poses challenges to China’s energy security.

The Trump administration also faces considerable obstacles in reversing the U.S. energy transition, manipulating oil and gas market dynamics, and expanding geopolitical influence, while trade wars may generate counterproductive effects. Current U.S.-China energy cooperation is limited, necessitating flexible cooperation strategies from China to strengthen energy security, enhance support for the new energy industry, and engage more effectively in global energy governance.

Why it Matters

Energy issues consistently occupied a central role in the Trump administration’s policy agenda. The “Energy Dominance” strategy proposed during Trump’s first term aimed to translate the energy power amassed since the shale revolution into energy authority, thereby expanding U.S. international influence and leadership. During his 2024 campaign, Trump prominently revived the slogan of former Republican presidential candidate John McCain, “Drill, baby, drill,” signaling his unwavering preference for and strategic reliance on the fossil fuel industry.

On January 20, 2025, at the beginning of his second term, Trump initiated a series of significantly symbolic energy policy shifts: unilaterally re-exiting the Paris Agreement, declaring a national “energy emergency,” and issuing four executive orders aimed at “enhancing America’s dominance in the global energy sector,” systematically reversing the Biden administration’s zero-carbon political stance. Clearly, the new administration not only fully reinstated the “Energy Dominance” strategic framework but also expanded the boundaries of energy power and external action paths through the intensive introduction of supporting policies.

Currently, the U.S. is the largest energy producer, consumer, and exporter globally, and its energy strategy has far-reaching implications not only for national competitiveness and domestic welfare but also for the evolution of global energy order and low-carbon transition. This paper systematically examines the focus of Trump’s energy policy during his second term, deeply analyzes the motivations driving his commitment to energy dominance, and anticipates the negative impacts and limitations of this strategy.

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Key Points

1. Focus Areas of Trump’s Energy Strategy During His Second Term

Trump’s pursued notion of “energy dominance” represents a dual-dominance objective: maintaining the primacy of fossil fuels and nuclear energy within the domestic energy system, while leveraging energy resources to assert U.S. dominance in the global order. This reflects new characteristics shaped by changes in the international energy landscape and U.S. medium- to long-term strategic needs. The key foci of the energy strategy during Trump’s second term can be categorized into five areas:

• Promoting Domestic Fossil Fuel Development

The Trump administration largely disregarded global climate governance and low-carbon transition calls, designating coal as a critical mineral for “national security and energy stability,” thus granting it a special status for federal funding and regulatory relief, alongside diverse systemic support. With respect to oil and gas, Trump aimed to create a more conducive environment for resource development, issuing three pivotal executive orders: Unleashing American Energy, Declaring a National Energy Emergency, and Unlocking Alaska’s Extraordinary Resource Potential. The Trump administration planned to invest $20 billion to enhance the U.S. strategic petroleum reserve to stimulate domestic crude oil production.

• Enhancing Oil and Gas Exports and Global Market Control

Trump explicitly positioned the expansion of oil and gas exports as a core policy tool to improve trade balance and strengthen national power. This involved pressuring major global economies, such as the EU and India, to increase imports of American oil and gas; compelling Japan and South Korea to invest in Alaskan LNG export projects; and intensifying efforts against rival oil-exporting countries like Iran and Venezuela to gain structural power in manipulating the international energy market.

• Advancing Nuclear Power Capacity and Technology Exports

As the world’s largest nuclear power producer, there is bipartisan consensus regarding nuclear energy expansion in the U.S. Nonetheless, Trump asserted that “the U.S. has failed to deploy nuclear technology at the required pace and scale to meet national urgent security demands, while strategic competitors are rapidly exporting and deploying these technologies worldwide.” On May 23, 2025, Trump signed four executive orders aimed at revitalizing the nuclear sector, emphasizing nuclear technology exports as a focal point of energy diplomacy.

• Reducing Policy Support for Energy Transition

Trump consistently resisted low-carbon transitions in the energy sector, ideologically asserting that clean energy lacks stability and economic viability. Under the framework of his energy dominance strategy, Trump weakened policy support for energy transitions, allowing the U.S. to absolve itself of climate governance responsibilities while focusing on developing fossil fuels with resource advantages, delaying the global low-carbon transition process, and reinforcing other countries’ dependence on U.S. fossil fuels.

• Restructuring Domestic Energy Governance

Eager to transcend the constraints of the existing governance framework to facilitate the energy dominance strategy, Trump announced the U.S. was entering an “energy emergency,” thereby categorizing conventional policy issues as “existential threats,” which provided a legal basis for expanding executive power. Additionally, he formed a multi-agency energy decision-making body, the National Energy Dominance Council, reflecting a “whole-of-government” governance model while underscoring the profound interconnections between energy policy and diplomatic security matters. This structure seeks to translate the outcomes of energy governance into foreign influence efficiently.

2. Major Motivations Behind Trump’s Energy Strategy

• Accelerating the Realization of Energy Power Benefits

With a surge in production capacity, the U.S. has undergone a significant role shift in the global oil and gas trade, emerging as a net oil exporter and the world’s leading LNG exporter. U.S. LNG possesses a notable price advantage, coupled with considerable flexibility in destination and contract duration. Consequently, from the 2024 campaign through to his presidency, Trump and his core team have consistently emphasized the strategic economic value of oil and gas resources, attempting to use energy supply expansions to manage domestic inflation and reduce the substantial trade deficit while reinforcing the mutual dependency between “energy and the dollar”, thus consolidating U.S. dominance within the global financial system. Trump also hopes to generate economic returns and political dividends based on nuclear technology prowess.

• Constructing a Strategic Framework for Energy Export Hegemony

As the U.S. has become a major global oil and gas exporter, the strategic logic of its energy diplomacy is undergoing fundamental changes, shifting from the traditional “energy import security” paradigm to a more expansive “energy export hegemony” paradigm. This shift demonstrates three key characteristics:

(1) the strategic objective has transitioned from securing supply safety to enhancing export volume and seeking global oil and gas market dominance;

(2) the strategic perspective has broadened from primarily focusing on key oil and gas import sources (especially in the Middle East) to encompassing major consumer countries across all global regions;

(3) the strategic measures increasingly emphasize the geopolitical utility of energy trade to maintain U.S. hegemonic status.

• Appeasing the Fossil Fuel Industry and Voter Base

Trump’s Republican Party has long maintained a symbiotic relationship with the fossil fuel industry. In the 2024 presidential election, Trump achieved significant victories in oil and gas-producing states such as Texas and Louisiana. Naturally, matters of mutual benefit align with Trump’s ongoing favor towards fossil fuel policies. Moreover, Trump is keen to disseminate populist rhetoric within the energy sector, catering to the conservative political demands of right-wing voters by attributing various energy challenges faced by the U.S. to the policy failures of the Democratic administration, painting energy transition negatively. Recent increases in electricity prices have influenced public sentiment on energy costs and transitions, further bolstering support for some of Trump’s policy stances.

• Addressing the Energy Challenges of the Artificial Intelligence Era

Considering the exponential growth of the AI industry in the U.S., the Trump administration has recognized that “the energy sector is an essential prerequisite for the sustained development of AI technology.” Ensuring a steady energy supply for AI industries has become a significant agenda for maintaining American hegemony, providing legitimate support for its energy strategy. AI is expected to drive the development of several energy-intensive industries, ushering the U.S. into an era marked by the resurgence of electricity-intensive industries. Concurrently, the U.S. AI sector faces acute challenges regarding electricity shortages, with the accessibility of power supply emerging as a key limitation against enhancing domestic computational capabilities. Data center developers are actively seeking solutions to overcome supply bottlenecks, such as directly connecting to power generation facilities, but face three constraints:

(1) regulatory restrictions on non-traditional energy supply methods;

(2) technical challenges related to the cost allocation of backup capacity in electricity market mechanisms;

(3) compliance with environmental and social standards.

3. Impacts and Limitations of Trump’s Energy Strategy

• Adverse Impacts

(1) Stalling the U.S. Decarbonization Process

The Trump administration’s stance on climate governance remains passive, and its pro-fossil fuel strategy will undoubtedly impede the U.S. energy sector’s emission reduction efforts, potentially reversing gains made during the Biden administration. Estimates from British energy research institutions show that a second Trump term could thwart the U.S. from achieving previously set carbon reduction goals. Additionally, due to the prospects of subsidy eliminations and tariff wars inflating raw material and equipment import costs, U.S. clean energy investments face a contraction trend, and plans for grid modernization and storage deployment may be delayed or scaled back.

(2) Disrupting Global Energy Transition

Trump’s energy strategy will affect the decarbonization processes of multiple countries. First, withdrawing from international climate financing initiatives and exiting the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) restricts channels for climate financing, weakening support for developing countries’ transitions. Additionally, the strategy promotes the abandonment or modification of energy transition strategies among smaller countries to open overseas fossil fuel markets. For U.S. interests, this includes stoking internal discord in European energy strategies and encouraging energy-weak Central and Eastern European countries to shift away from Western European low-carbon guidance towards high-carbon development reliant on U.S. resources and technologies. Lastly, the strategy provides leniency for resource-dependent economies to delay their low-carbon transitions; many analysts expect Middle Eastern oil and gas nations to embrace Trump’s pro-oil policies, promoting a “comprehensive” energy development strategy emphasizing the priority of fossil fuel development over clean energy deployment.

(3) Exacerbating Geopolitics in the Global Energy Framework

Historically, the U.S. has shown a tradition of politicizing energy matters, and with the current backdrop of significant domestic energy security, Trump’s energy strategy is poised to reflect even more audacious geopolitical tendencies. This may involve frequent market manipulation through geopolitical means, pushing a new form of energy colonialism characterized by strong-arm practices and possibly utilizing or exacerbating geopolitical turmoil to acquire market shares. Additionally, energy issues are increasingly becoming instrumental in counteracting China’s rise, particularly in the oil, gas, nuclear, and renewable energy sectors, with potential tactics including “long-arm jurisdiction,” “small yard high fence,” and “decoupling chains.”

• Strategic Limitations

In response to the deep transformation of the global energy structure and the accelerating restructuring of energy powers among nations, Trump’s “energy dominance” strategy faces substantial limitations in implementation, with a significant gap between its policy goals and actual outcomes.

(1) Challenging the Reversal of U.S. Energy Transition

The U.S. energy low-carbon transition is driven by profound market mechanisms, technological iterations, and industrial interests, surpassing political cycles, making Trump’s energy strategy ineffective in reversing its achievements and processes. First, reviving coal power is unlikely. Its decline reflects market decisions following the shale revolution, with Trump’s past support proving ineffective, and varying fossil fuels failing to thrive while state environmental regulations and transition trends discourage investment in coal power expansion. Second, halting clean energy development faces substantial resistance. Solar and wind power now constitute America’s lowest-cost electricity sources, squeezing out fossil fuel generation. State governments possess energy decision-making authority under the federal system and have deployed litigation, legislation, and high transition targets to counteract Trump’s oppressive actions. Third, altering the already established U.S. new energy industry landscape is improbable. The new energy sector, having developed over a decade, is deeply integrated into the U.S. economy, transcending political divides, while Biden’s green new deal spurs transformative momentum, with some Republican figures adopting “pro-green” stances. Investments in the wind power supply chain further hinder policy reversals.

(2) Inability to Manipulate Oil and Gas Market Trends

First, Trump’s oil and gas expansion confronts rigid constraints stemming from global market dynamics. The slowdown in oil demand growth, coupled with production increases from oil-exporting nations, leads U.S. oil companies to adopt conservative strategies amid oversupply. Additionally, the LNG market faces dual pressures from supply and demand, potentially entering a phase of structural surplus by 2027, with limited capacity and export growth.

Second, the Trump administration’s influence over oil and gas import and export states is bounded. On the export side, OPEC+ can adjust markets, while Middle Eastern oil producers compete on the basis of low-cost and CCUS technologies. On the import side, although the EU and Japan may align with the U.S., they are committed to diversifying energy supplies and are hesitant to accept long-term contracts and significant investments without clear benefits.

(3) Limited Expansion of Geopolitical Influence

Trump’s efforts to leverage growing energy power for enhanced geopolitical influence are constrained by various factors. Firstly, global energy transition inhibits U.S. geopolitical potential based on oil and gas; the relative reduction of energy scarcity significantly erodes the energy power of producer nations. Secondly, as competition in global oil and gas exports intensifies, U.S. attention and control over Middle Eastern producer nations are bound to wane as Gulf countries pursue strategic autonomy and more diversified security partnerships. Thirdly, the shale oil strength of the U.S. cannot be effectively transformed into geopolitical power, as fragmented and self-interested producers fail to become reliable supplementary powers for U.S. diplomatic strategies. Finally, the marginal effectiveness of U.S. energy sanctions has been declining; nations such as Russia and Iran have adopted counterstrategies, making it challenging for the U.S. to extract further strategic value from energy-related leverage.

(4) Trade Wars Inducing Counterproductive Effects on Energy Strategy

First, the imposition of tariffs significantly disrupts the global economy, restraining energy demand and indirectly constituting a barrier to U.S. expansion in overseas oil and gas markets. Second, retaliatory measures by countries like China and Canada during the trade wars impose costs on the U.S. energy sector and energy security. Third, these tariffs elevate development costs for the U.S. energy sector, shrinking profit margins.

Conclusion

The energy strategy of Trump’s second term adheres to the belief of “dominating the world through energy,” allocating substantial support to fossil fuel development and exports, while minimizing support for clean energy policies and emphasizing the potential of nuclear power. This results in a complex policy framework that caters to traditional energy interest groups while simultaneously addressing emerging energy technologies. The strategy seeks to construct a framework that corresponds to the interests of energy export hegemony, maximizing the benefits of energy trade and geopolitical capital. Although Trump’s “energy dominance” strategy may create short-term disruptions in global energy market dynamics and pose adverse impacts on China’s energy security and international cooperation, its effectiveness is constrained by multiple factors, including the irreversible nature of global energy transition, the increasing resilience and strategic maneuverability of major economies, and the “boomerang” effect of unilateral U.S. policies.

Considering the current circumstances, it is evident that the space for U.S.-China energy collaboration during Trump’s second term is quite limited, with both sides lacking strategic trust and a common platform for energy policy dialogue or cooperation in emerging technologies based on global climate governance. For China, it is crucial to remain vigilant against potential risks manufactured by the U.S. in collaboration with allies or individual countries concerning oil and gas import channels and critical mineral supplies. In light of this study, the following policy recommendations are proposed: first, maintain a flexible stance towards cooperation with the U.S.; second, solidify the foundations of national energy security; third, intensify support for the overseas expansion of the “new three items” industries; and fourth, actively engage in global energy governance.

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About the Author

ZHANG Rui (张锐): Researcher at the Economic and Technological Research Institute of the Global Energy Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organization, specializing in international energy politics, climate change, and other related fields.

YUE Fengli(岳锋利): Researcher at the Economic and Technological Research Institute of the Global Energy Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organization.

About the Publication

The Chinese Version of this article was published on Northeast Asia Forum（《东北亚论坛》）. The journal, managed by the Jilin University, is a comprehensive bimonthly periodical in politics, military, and law. Founded in 1992, the magazine focuses on analyzing the current situation, development strategies, economic cooperation, friendly exchanges and theoretical research in various countries and regions of Northeast Asia. It also evaluates new trends and developments in industry, agriculture, science and technology, finance, commerce, and foreign trade in the Asia Pacific region.

ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by YUE Shengsong on Securitization Expansion in U.S. and European policies toward China.

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Summary

The U.S. and European policies toward China are undergoing a profound evolution from traditional “securitization” to “securitization expansion,” wherein non-traditional security issues, such as economy, technology, supply chains, and even people-to-people exchanges, are increasingly incorporated into security considerations. This constitutes a new reality for understanding the interaction and divergence between the two sides.

Based on securitization theory, this study constructs a three-dimensional analytical framework centered on “security reference‑identity framing‑agenda setting” to systematically examine the interactive trajectory of the U.S. and European policies toward China since the 1990s. The research finds that their interaction is essentially an ongoing and expanding collusion: both sides jointly construct China’s development in institutional, economic, technological, and geopolitical dimensions as “systemic challenges”; reinforce the narrative of “othering” China by leveraging the collective identity of the “transatlantic alliance of values”; and subsequently promote the formation of an institutionalized and coordinated agenda covering economic, trade, technological, and geostrategic domains.

However, intrinsic differences in threat perception intensity, prioritization of interests, and strategic culture result in their interaction exhibiting distinct characteristics of “limited coordination” and “instrumentalization.” While this securitization expansion interaction poses systemic regulatory pressure on China in the short term, its inherent limitations also present strategic opportunities. The study argues that China should accurately identify the differences in logic and interests within U.S.-Europe interactions and adopt “resilience-centrism” as a strategic guide. By deepening institutional expansion, constructing a cooperative network within the Global South, and strengthening China’s voice in international affairs, China can effectively counter joint containment and steer major country relations back onto a track of rational competition and necessary cooperation.

Why It Matters

U.S. and European policies toward China have increasingly blurred the lines between economic, technological and security concerns, shaping an international environment where every major policy decision carries geopolitical weight. This shows the trend of securitization expansion, which entails the substitution and suppression of market and cooperation logic by an overarching security logic.

How does securitization logic continue to generate endogenous momentum for U.S. and European policies toward China? What patterns characterize their securitized interactions, and how will these dynamics affect China-U.S.-EU trilateral relations, as well as regional and global orders more broadly?

To address these questions, this article develops a three-dimensional analytical framework centered on “security reference”, “identity framing” and “agenda setting”, revealing the internal mechanisms through which China-related issues are systematically constructed as security threats and translated into coordinated policy agendas.

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Key Points

1. Security Reference, Identity Framing and Agenda Setting: An Analytical Framework Based on Securitization Expansion

First, decision makers construct the “existential threat” that policy actions are intended to address. The core of identifying the threat include three aspects, which are simplifying complex realities, linking the reference to core values and interests, amplifying the immediate destructiveness of the threat and emphasizing the urgency of action. The key strategy is to package the subjective perceptions as indisputable “facts”, providing a cognitive basis of legitimacy. Second, identifying threats requires a distinction between “victims” (“self”) and “perpetrators” (“other”).

Identity framing is used to simplify complex international relations through a binary logic, transforming them into a narrative of confrontation between “victims” and “perpetrators”. By mobilizing such narratives, a community of “victims” is constructed, where a hierarchical structure and collective obligation within “partnership” or “alliance” are formed. Third, the agenda is set in three dimensions: constructing a selection of policy toolkits, concentrating particular strategic resources, and ensuring coherence and legitimacy of collective action across alliances. Thus, discursive power is transformed into institutional authority and tangible policy action.

Security reference provides the cognitive preconditions and objects of constructing identity. Identity framing lays the relational foundation and policy orientation for setting agendas. Agenda setting then translates the discursive constructions into policy outcomes, while the feedback from policy reshapes the intensity of perception towards the threat and solidity of identity. This model shows a dynamic logical loop regarding the mechanisms of securitization, and offers a more integrated and explanatory tool for examining securitization.

2. Securitization Expansion Practices in U.S. and European Policies Toward China: Interaction, Divergence, and Evolution

(1) Latent Securitization (1990s-2008): Promoting “Transformation” through Engagement

From the 1900s until the outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis, the U.S. and European policies toward China were characterized by “engagement”, embedded in a core assumption: by incorporating China into a Western-led international system, China could be induced to undergo a “liberalizing” transformation.

During this phase, the security perspective of the U.S. and Europe framed China’s political system and ideology as a long-term, systemic risk to the Western-dominated order. For instance, the Clinton administration linked China’s MFN status to its so-called “human rights conditions”. Additionally, Europe framed EU-China relations with the objective to “support China’s transition to an open society”, listing the promotion of human rights and rule of law as key goals. Based on a shared security reference, the U.S. and Europe displayed a highly coordinated relationship in identity framing. Both sides reinforced their identity as a “transatlantic community” grounded in common values of democracy, freedom and human rights. As a result, the agenda setting of their policies focused strongly on embedding China into international institutions and assimilating China in a normative way. Supporting China’s WTO accession constituted a carefully designed geoeconomic strategy, which aims to shape China’s behavioral norms.

(2) Explicit Securitization (2008-2016): Crisis Catalysis and the Hedging Strategy

The 2008 financial crisis exposed structural flaws in Western governance models and witnessed China’s rapid growth in economic strength and international influence. U.S. and European policies shifted from an emphasis on “engagement” to a strategy of “hedging”, characterized by the coexistence of engagement and containment. Securitization began to expand explicitly into economic and geopolitical domains.

During this phase, the security reference of U.S. and European policies shifted from “value-based threats,” to China’s “existential challenge,” to Western dominance. U.S. official reports began to characterize China’s economic behavior as “unfair competition” and, through the policy of “rebalancing” toward Asia-Pacific, signaled a more critical stance toward China. The EU did not pivot toward geopolitical confrontation as rapidly as the U.S., but its perception of economic threats from China also intensified. In terms of identity framing, the U.S. labeled China as a “competitor” and a potential “rival” capable of challenging U.S. authority. The EU continued to uphold China’s status as a “cooperation partner”, albeit with greater emphasis on China as a “strong economic competitor” and an actor with whom the EU must “defend its interests in negotiations.” U.S. and European agenda setting converged on the objective of “guarding against China,” yet diverged in concrete pathways and policy instruments. U.S. combined geopolitical and economic instruments, reallocating diplomatic, economic and military resources to Asia-Pacific. The EU, by contrast, exhibited a defensive orientation centered on rules and regulatory mechanisms.

(3) Comprehensive Securitization Expansion (2017-present): Competition and Coordination under the Agenda of De-Risking

Since the first Trump administration, security logic has come to dominate trade, technology, supply chains, people-to-people exchanges and other agendas. In terms of security reference, the U.S. positioned China as the “most consequential geopolitical challenge”, while the EU sees China as a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor and a systemic rival, maintaining limited focus on traditional military security.

To mobilize internal consensus and legitimize policy action, both sides reshape a collective identity centered on a “democratic values alliance”. The US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) has emerged as the central mechanism for both sides to coordinate agendas. However, the EU emphasizes “de-risking” instead of the comprehensive “decoupling” favored by the U.S. The EU prefers rule-based and defensive policy tools, while the U.S. rely on unilateral measures such as tariff threats and the Entity List. They jointly engaged in the “Indo-Pacific”, but the EU has stressed that its presence in the region is primarily trade- and rule-based, whereas the U.S. places greater emphasis on military initiatives such as AUKUS and the QUAD. The EU has also shown a strong sense of strategic autonomy and reluctance of becoming merely an instrument of U.S. values-based diplomacy. As a result, both sides display high levels of coordination in low-politics areas, but greater divergences in high-politics issues involving comprehensive trade wars and mandatory sanctions.

3. The Inherent Limitations of U.S. and European Policies Toward China Determined the Limited Cooperation Between the U.S. and Europe

(1) Persistent Divisions and Gradients in Interest Structures within the EU

Western industrial powers like Germany and France prioritize technological sovereignty and market access, while Central and Southern European countries, such as Hungary and Greece, value Chinese investment and infrastructure cooperation and remain geographically dependent on U.S. security guarantees. Diverging interests also appear in the differing willingness to invest in the Indo-Pacific strategy and to share the associated costs. Such heterogeneity significantly weakens the coherence and intensity of transatlantic interactions in China.

(2) Misalignment Between Different Strategic Priorities of U.S. and EU

The U.S. aims to preserve its absolute advantage within the global hegemonic system, pursuing policies with a zero-sum logic. The EU, by contrast, emphasizes maintaining a rules-based multilateral order and safeguarding its prosperity and influence within it. This divergence creates mismatched policy rhythms and instruments: the U.S. favors aggressive pressure and unilateral sanctions, while the EU prefers regulatory tools and multilateral frameworks.

(3) Transactional Shift in Transatlantic Alliances Led by Tensions in Cost-Sharing and Sovereignty

The U.S. expects European allies to unconditionally shoulder greater risks, providing full support in defense spending, technology restrictions on China, and sanctions enforcement, while implicitly accepting U.S. leadership. Europe, however, seeks to cooperate while maximizing economic interests, technological sovereignty, and strategic autonomy. When security imperatives directly conflict with core economic interests, the fragility of the alliance becomes evident.

(4) Three Paradoxes of Security-Centric Narratives Appear in the U.S.-EU Relationship

First, efforts to “decouple” supply chains from China and relocate production offshore raise short-term inflation and fiscal burdens, undermining domestic competitiveness and consumer welfare. Second, pressuring China under the banner of democracy and human rights is weakened by perceived double standards on issues like the Israel-Palestine conflict. Third, weaponizing international rules and standards to exclude China erodes the neutrality, fairness, and stability of the very rules-based order the U.S. claims to defend.

4. The Impacts of U.S. and European Policies Toward China and China’s Strategic Responses

(1) U.S. and European policies Toward China Influenced China, the Trilateral Relationship and the International Order

First, the U.S.-Europe policy interactions toward China seek to impose a systematic framework and regulatory constraints across multiple domains, which shape a more complex and challenging external environment for China. Second, these interactions create a new normal of trilateral relationship dominated by strategic competition, with significantly narrowed space for pragmatic cooperation and highly politicized rules. In such a paradigm defined by the U.S., it’s increasingly difficult to pursue dialogues and cooperation, which presents a difficulty for Europe to seek balance between cooperation and caution. It also carries instability caused by the structural conflicts over economic interests between two sides. Third, such interactions lead to a hierarchized multipolarity and more fragmented governance. Global South countries face the risk of further marginalization or being forced to choose sides. A broader security-driven logic weakens international multilateral institutions, leading to their replacement by exclusive, value-based clubs or technology alliances.

(2) China Should Focus on Proactively Shaping the Environment Based on Precise Strategic Assessment

At a theoretical level, it should establish a strategic philosophy centered on Resilient Centralism: placing its own development at the core, building an internal resilience system capable of withstanding external shocks and possessing strong self-repair capacity, and leveraging the inherent limitations of U.S.-Europe interactions to carry out precise, asymmetric “counter-shaping”.

Based on this strategy, China’s policy toolkit should be more targeted and flexible. In the economic and technological sphere, it should actively explore a path of “relinking” between decoupling and dependence, which means achieving self-reliance and controllability regarding the “high fence”, while deepening connections with the broader global market beyond its “small yard”.

In terms of diplomacy and security, China should distinguish between the U.S.-Europe “value alliances” and its own “development partner network,” building a united front with Global South countries based on shared development interests. China should also leverage U.S.-Europe divergences and support the EU in deepening its practice of strategic autonomy. In the realm of narrative and normative influence, China should actively participate in international discourse competition and enhance its soft power.

On one hand, China should systematically expose how the securitization expansion of the U.S. and Europe raises global costs, undermines international rules, and obstructs human progress. On the other hand, China should go beyond defensive rebuttals to set the agenda proactively, presenting alternative frameworks such as “a community with a shared future for mankind” and “universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization.”

Conclusion

U.S. and European policies toward China reflect an ongoing and progressively deepening expansion of securitization. A three-dimensional analytical framework-security reference, identity framing, and agenda-setting- provides a systematic examination of the evolution of U.S. and European policies toward China since the 1990s. Yet, this process of securitization expansion is inherently full of tensions and limitations, leaving critical space for China to implement strategic countermeasures.

Looking ahead, the trajectory of China-U.S.-Europe trilateral relations will largely depend on whether China can accurately identify and skillfully exploit the logical fractures within U.S. and European interactions, effectively break containment, and ultimately guide great-power relations back toward rational competition and necessary cooperation.

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About the Author

YUE Shengsong 岳圣淞: Associate Professor at the Country and Area Studies Academy, Beijing Foreign Studies University. His main research interests include international political discourse theory and foreign policy analysis, discourse power in international institutions and external communication, asia-pacific international relations and China’s neighborhood strategy.

About the Publication

The Chinese version of the article was published by Northeast Asia Forum (《东北亚论坛》). The journal, managed by the Jilin University, is a comprehensive bimonthly periodical in politics, military, and law. Founded in 1992, the magazine focuses on analyzing the current situation, development strategies, economic cooperation, friendly exchanges and theoretical research in various countries and regions of Northeast Asia. It also evaluates new trends and developments in industry, agriculture, science and technology, finance, commerce, and foreign trade in the Asia Pacific region.

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ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by Sun Chenghao and Huang Jiali, which focuses on the rise, impact, and prospects of the U.S. Tech-Industrial Complex.

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Summary

The essence of the U.S. Tech-Industrial Complex is a techno-political power structure driven by national security imperatives and technological innovation. Its rise stems from the deep integration of state power, technological capital, and security logic, embodying the fusion of capital and political power: government agencies incorporate key technologies like artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and quantum computing into the national security framework; venture capital and industrial giants accelerate technological change; policymakers facilitate high-frequency interaction between government and corporate elites through the “revolving door”; both sides also seek a balance between regulation and innovation, creating a resonance effect between capital and policy.

As a strategic choice in response to global technological competition, the Tech-Industrial Complex has spurred the rise of techno-nationalism, reflecting profound adjustments within the U.S. domestic political-economic structure. At the institutional level, this new governance architecture may evolve into a long-term mechanism for science and technology governance, yet it also faces difficulties in avoiding strategic shifts due to policy changes, industrial risks triggered by market fluctuations, and public oversight pressures concerning ethics and equity. The rise of the U.S. Tech-Industrial Complex may become a significant variable driving the “tech cold war” landscape, and its development will, to some extent, shape the future global governance order.

Why It Matters

In recent years, interactions between U.S. tech companies and the government have grown increasingly intimate, leading to the gradual emergence of a new power structure termed the “Tech-Industrial Complex.” Composed of diverse entities including government departments, leading high-tech enterprises, venture capital firms, research institutions, and think tanks, this complex is relevant not only to the restructuring of the U.S. domestic political economy but also profoundly influences the evolving trends of global technological competition. Against the backdrop of intensifying U.S.-China tech competition and rising techno-nationalism, understanding the formation logic, operational mechanisms, and institutional prospects of the Tech-Industrial Complex has become a crucial entry point for analyzing the direction of U.S. technology strategy and grasping trends in global governance transformation.

Existing academic research primarily focuses on how the Tech-Industrial Complex evolved from the traditional Military-Industrial Complex, paying particular attention to the gradual formation of collaborative mechanisms between the government and tech companies amidst the Trump administration’s promotion of techno-nationalist policies. However, current studies offer limited discussion on the potential long-term institutionalization prospects of the “Tech-Industrial Complex” and its geopolitical implications for transforming global technology governance. To address this gap, this paper attempts to construct a systematic analytical framework centered on the logic of capital-power, defining the “Tech-Industrial Complex” as a “techno-political complex” deeply coupling state power, technological capital, and policy mechanisms, with the government and leading high-tech enterprises as the dominant actors, to explain the dynamic synergy and feedback effects between policy drive and technological dominance.

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Key Points

1. The Formation of the U.S. Tech-Industrial Complex

(1) Embedding Technological Issues into the National Security Framework

In line with the warning given by former U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his 1961 farewell address, the deep integration of wartime technology and defense needs gradually shaped a “military-industrial-congressional” complex. In contrast, although the Tech-Industrial Complex reconstructs the structure of technology governance under the guidance of national security logic, it is not confined to traditional weapons systems. Instead, it encompasses broader frontier fields like artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and quantum computing, and permeates economic competition, social governance, and even diplomatic interactions. Within this embedded structure, tech companies are no longer mere innovators but become part of a “national capability.” Technological innovation is not purely market-driven but a process highly aligned with national strategic objectives.

(2) Deep Intertwining of Power and Capital

A second distinctive feature of the Tech-Industrial Complex is the high-frequency interaction between the government and tech elites, manifested concretely in the trend towards institutionalization of the “revolving door” mechanism. Under this mechanism, the flow between tech entrepreneurs and government officials has become increasingly frequent, forming a closed-loop power field encompassing policy, capital, and technology, thereby enhancing tech companies’ influence over government policy. As technological competition between the U.S. and China has escalated, national security has become a core concern. Consequently, companies have adjusted their strategies, relying on state power for policy protection and resource support to obtain dual guarantees for capital security and competitive advantage.

(3) Synergistic Resonance Between Capital and Policy

The third core feature of the Tech-Industrial Complex is the interaction between capital and policy through which the government and corporations promote technological commercialization and reinforce their respective strategic objectives. The government supports the landing and marketing of technological innovations through massive investments, tax incentives, and regulatory relaxation. Corporations, through lobbying, policy penetration, and close cooperation with the government, ensure national strategic goals are highly aligned with their interests, thereby pushing policy formulation in a direction favorable to their own development. This ultimately fosters a resonance effect between technology-based capital and policy, constructing a collaborative ecosystem covering the entire chain of research, legislation, and industrialization.

(4) Coexistence of Deregulation and Innovation Monopoly

Within the framework of the Tech-Industrial Complex, innovation and monopoly are deliberately shaped into a “symbiotic” relationship to serve the strategic goal of national technological hegemony. By relaxing regulations, the government both boosts the development of tech companies and consolidates the market control of tech giants in global competition. Technological monopoly is gradually evolving into governance monopoly; innovation is no longer merely a driver of economic development but has become a tool for reshaping the global power structure.

2. Drivers Behind the Rise of the U.S. Tech-Industrial Complex

(1) The Demand for Dominance by Technological Capital

The absolute U.S. advantage in key areas such as computing power, algorithms, and data means that tech companies are no longer just market participants but are gradually transforming into core actors in implementing national strategy. This trend of technological capital dominance is reflected, firstly, in the revolving door mechanism. The technological advantages and capital power of tech companies, combined with the needs of national strategy, form a powerful policy impetus, accelerating the achievement of national goals through technological commercialization.

(2) The Significance of Technology for Political Power

Policy shifts during the Trump administration marked a new stage in U.S. reliance on technology for its political power. Firstly, driven by policies such as the militarization of AI and the reshoring of semiconductor industries, the “scientific powerhouse” strategy launched during Trump’s first term elevated federal focus on key technology areas, aimed at safeguarding national security and the U.S. competitive advantage in global technology, particularly dominance in AI. Secondly, cooperation between the Pentagon and Silicon Valley deepened significantly, marking a new phase in the integration of U.S. military and civilian technology. From a broader perspective, the reliance of powerful political actors on technology is a result of the role of technology in national security, reflecting the impact of technology on modern political operations and strategic priorities.

(3) National Security Considerations and Strategic Interests

Against the backdrop of increasingly fierce global technological competition, the U.S. has gradually incorporated key technology fields into its national security system and promoted a “technology as security” governance paradigm through institutionalized measures. The formation of the Tech-Industrial Complex is the institutionalized embodiment of this shift in governance paradigm, exhibiting a strategic function of “hedging” against China. Through strengthened export controls, increased industrial investment, and the construction of technological alliances, the U.S. attempts to build a tech “iron curtain” to consolidate its leadership in global innovation.

3. The Impact of the U.S. Tech-Industrial Complex

(1) Shaping U.S. Politics

Through deep integration with government policy, legislation, and regulatory processes, the Tech-Industrial Complex has formed a pattern of “public-private co-governance.” Companies rely on policy support to enhance their technological advantages, while the government utilizes corporate technology and resources to achieve national security and economic objectives. However, the political influence of the Tech-Industrial Complex is not unconditional and may also bring profound negative effects. For instance, tech giants assisting the government in data monitoring and guiding public opinion could foster a model of “techno-authoritarianism.” This may subtly weaken oversight of the tech industry, exacerbate potential risks of social control by the U.S. government, and even gradually erode the democratic values and civil rights championed by the U.S.

(2) Reshaping Global Governance

As the Tech-Industrial Complex globalizes, its influence has long transcended corporate boundaries, permeating the institutional level of global governance. In the process of the U.S. promoting tech blockades and building technological alliances, these companies are both executors of policy tools and shapers of strategic objectives. On one hand, tech giants, by setting industry standards and dominating international forums and standards organizations, gradually translate their own interests into global rules. On the other hand, in areas like digital infrastructure and platform governance, the ecosystem of the Tech-Industrial Complex has become a core node of global cyberspace. The “technological hub” built by these companies significantly enhances their influence over information flows and digital sovereignty. Simultaneously, the transnational capital structure and patent control of the Tech-Industrial Complex also drive the development of the new logic of a tech cold war, serving as a tool for the U.S. government’s competition with China. Compared to traditional diplomatic tools, the actions of the Tech-Industrial Complex are faster and more covert; by promoting the rapid implementation of technology export restrictions, they have effectively caused a substantive redistribution within the existing multilateral technology governance system.

(3) Challenges and Impact on China

As the U.S.-China “tech war” intensifies, the Tech-Industrial Complex has played a key role in the U.S.-led technological blockade against China. This has had a profound impact on China’s technology strategy and industrial layout. In the short term, the technological blockade by the Tech-Industrial Complex has placed immense external pressure on China in multiple key technology fields, particularly in core technologies like semiconductors and high-end communication equipment. Concurrently, these U.S. measures have also prompted the Chinese government to focus more intently on indigenous technology R&D and supply chain construction, while actively expanding international cooperation.

4. Challenges and Development Prospects of the U.S. Tech-Industrial Complex

(1) Multiple Challenges Facing the Tech-Industrial Complex

• Declining Autonomy of U.S. Enterprises

Corporate market behavior is increasingly influenced and constrained by national policy. Excessive government intervention may subject their decision-making processes to factors like political cycles and policy adjustments, preventing companies from quickly adapting their strategies or responding to consumer demands in the face of changing global market needs. Government intervention might also lead to a “path dependency” effect, where corporate innovation directions become locked in by government objectives.
Furthermore, enterprises within the Tech-Industrial Complex model face a dilemma between globalization and local policies: on one hand, global markets offer opportunities for transnational cooperation and expansion; on the other hand, increasingly stringent localization policies from various governments require companies to adhere to national political, economic, and technological strategies. Therefore, intensified U.S.-China technological competition in this context presents more complex transnational compliance challenges for large U.S. tech companies.

• Constraints from Intensifying Political Polarization

Different political parties exhibit significant differences in their understanding and support of technology policy. Democrats tend to favor regulation-dominated tech governance, emphasizing data privacy protection, antitrust measures, and algorithmic fairness, striving to maximize public interest through strengthened government oversight. Republicans place greater emphasis on market autonomy, championing corporate freedom, and warning against the potential negative impact of excessive government intervention on innovation capacity. Moreover, political polarization exacerbates conflicts among interest groups both inside and outside the Complex, particularly regarding priority setting on key issues like data sovereignty, national security, and global market strategy. With deepening polarization, the Tech-Industrial Complex might form a tactical policy coalition in the short term rather than a stable institutional arrangement.

• Significant Public Scrutiny and Regulatory Pressure

In recent years, ethical issues in the technological innovation process of tech companies, especially large platform companies, have drawn widespread attention. Examples include runaway AI-generated content, algorithmic bias, and platform manipulation of public opinion. These issues have not only led the public to demand higher standards of transparency and fairness but have also increased scrutiny of the social responsibilities of tech companies. In this environment of public opinion, the policy legitimacy of the Tech-Industrial Complex faces severe tests. If the public perceives the deep binding between enterprises and the government as exacerbating technology misuse or regulatory failure, a trust crisis for the Complex could erupt swiftly. This could lead not only to public dissatisfaction and backlash but also trigger stricter government regulation and antitrust actions.

(2) The Tech-Industrial Complex as a Potential Representative of Structural Reform

As a key lever for the U.S. to promote the upgrading of its technology strategy, the Tech-Industrial Complex could, in institutional conception, evolve into a long-term S&T governance structure, integrating government, industry, and technological forces through institutionalized means to reshape the layout of the global value chain. However, as an expedient measure based on political consensus, this model likewise faces difficulties in avoiding uncertainties arising from policy changes, market fluctuations, and ethical risks, and its high dependence on government support also constitutes a structural limitation.

From the perspective of institutional design, the construction of the U.S. Tech-Industrial Complex follows the organizational logic of the “Military-Industrial Complex,” but its goals have gradually shifted from being military-led to focusing on technological security and industrial restructuring. The U.S. government seeks to deeply intervene in the technology industry chain to promote the advantages of U.S. enterprises in technological innovation and market leadership, thereby reshaping the global technology map. If the institutionalization process of the Tech-Industrial Complex continues to advance in the future, this government-led model of technology governance may not only become a new normal for U.S. S&T governance but will also profoundly influence the rules and frameworks of global technological competition.

Conclusion

This study demonstrates that the rise of the Tech-Industrial Complex is not only a manifestation of underlying changes in the U.S. model of technology governance but also a force that reshapes the global structure of technological power. Under the dominance of the Tech-Industrial Complex, global technological competition is entering a new “Cold War” stage. However, although the Tech-Industrial Complex consolidates its technological dominance through its profound influence on the U.S. government, this model reliant on government support also faces significant tests regarding its stability and sustainability.

Confronted with this situation, China is accelerating efforts to achieve technological self-reliance and innovation, strengthening its R&D architecture, optimizing its industrial chain layout, and actively building a more resilient technological ecosystem. On this basis, the global governance concept advocated by China is gradually taking shape, promoting the establishment of global technical norms and ethical standards, and gradually breaking down the “technological iron curtain” advanced by the U.S. Tech-Industrial Complex.

Overall, the U.S. Tech-Industrial Complex will occupy an important position in the 21st-century contest for technological power. However, its ability to balance innovation with ethics, and monopoly with collaboration, will determine its future sustainability. In this technological contest, dual innovation in both institutions and technology will become the core driving force. Continuous research on the U.S. Tech-Industrial Complex is essential for understanding U.S. technology strategy, analyzing the evolution of the global technological landscape, and providing references for promoting a more open and sustainable form of global technology governance.

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About the Author

SUN Chenghao孙成昊： Fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies and a visiting scholar at the Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School (fall 2024). Professor Sun’s research interests mainly include: American politics and diplomacy, China-U.S. relations, U.S.-Europe relations, U.S.-Russia relations, AI and international security governance.

HUANG Jiali黄佳丽：Master’s candidate at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies.

About the Publication

The Chinese version of this article was published in American Studies《美国研究》.This is a comprehensive academic publication that delves into various aspects of the U.S., including its politics, economy, culture, and foreign relations. The journal aims to provide valuable insights and foster a deeper understanding of American society and its impact on the world. It is an essential resource for anyone interested in the multifaceted nature of the United States and its role in international affairs.

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As we enter 2026, China–US relations stand at a moment of renewed possibility. Over the first half of 2025, the two sides experienced both sharp frictions and cautious re-engagements — moments of tension, but also gestures of restraint and renewed dialogue.

Yet history reminds us that the true foundation of relations between nations lies not only in official exchanges, but in the friendship and mutual understanding of their peoples. Across mountains and oceans, and despite profound cultural differences, it is the exchange of hearts, the resonance of emotions, and the shared hopes of ordinary people that ultimately sustain and advance relations between countries.

As the Chinese New Year approaches, may friends from all corners of the world feel the warmth of this ancient land — a warmth shaped by openness, mutual respect, and a sincere desire for understanding. May the year ahead bring peace to our homes, success in our endeavors, and steady progress toward our shared aspirations. May the bonds between our peoples grow deeper, and may dialogue and cooperation continue to light the way forward.

At the same time, China and the United States are facing a rare opportunity to rebuild and strengthen the guardrails of their relationship. Although the overall tone at the senior level has recently become more restrained and constructive, this shift has yet to be fully institutionalized. The fragile balance that now exists could still be easily unsettled. If Beijing and Washington can seize this window to move toward a new round of normalization, it will become increasingly possible for both sides to safeguard their respective strategic interests.

As once written in 1963 and later quoted during a historic moment of engagement between our two countries:

“Ten thousand years are too long; seize the day, seize the hour.”

In the spirit of the New Year, may wisdom guide policy, may trust gradually replace suspicion, and may cooperation once again become the defining feature of China–US relations.

Thank you, as always, for your trust and continued support.

The ChinAffairsplus Team

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ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by NI Feng on Changes and Continuities in the U.S. National Security Strategy.

Why It Matters

U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) reports are closely watched worldwide because they provide the most authoritative and systematic articulation of Washington’s long-term strategic priorities. When the latest NSS was released, much public attention focused on the notion of a U.S. “strategic retrenchment.” However, a closer reading suggests that the United States is not abandoning its pursuit of global primacy. Rather, it seeks to recalibrate the means and costs of sustaining its dominant position by prioritizing resources, reshaping partnerships, and selectively engaging in international institutions.

In this sense, the NSS reflects a strategy of cost-conscious leadership adjustment rather than a withdrawal from global power competition. Recent U.S. actions in areas such as coercive diplomacy, extraterritorial enforcement, and selective disengagement from international mechanisms further illustrate how the strategic principles outlined in the NSS are being translated into practice.

This article, published in a leading Chinese party and government journal Qiushi(《求是》), represents a comprehensive assessment by the Chinese academic and policy communities of the strategic logic and long-term orientation of the U.S. NSS. By examining both the apparent adjustments and the enduring continuities in U.S. strategy, it seeks to provide a clearer basis for anticipating future U.S. behavior and for informing China’s policy planning in an increasingly fragmented and competitive international system.

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Key Points

Since the end of the Second World War, U.S. national security strategy has largely been shaped by the tradition commonly described as liberal internationalism. Its central objective has been to construct an international order based on liberal principles through which the United States could exercise global leadership, while simultaneously safeguarding its national security, sustaining economic prosperity, and expanding the global influence of its values.

In recent years, as structural changes in the international system have accelerated, this long-standing strategic framework has encountered growing constraints. The relative weakening of U.S. hegemony has become increasingly visible, and the gap between strategic ambition and available resources has continued to widen. Against this background, the current U.S. administration has begun to reassess its global posture, shifting strategic resources away from broad global engagement and concentrating them instead on regions regarded as vital to the preservation of its hegemonic foundations. At the same time, it has sought to apply more selective, pragmatic, and long-term forms of containment toward those it identifies as its principal strategic competitors.

On December 4, 2025, the administration released a new National Security Strategy report, hereinafter referred to as the Report, which presents a systematic restructuring of U.S. global strategy. The positions articulated in the document largely correspond with recent U.S. diplomatic and security behavior. Examining both the changes introduced in the Report and the elements that remain constant allows for a clearer understanding of the evolving appearance of U.S. strategy as well as its underlying logic.

1. Where the Changes Lie

Strategic Thinking Emphasizes “America First”

The current administration argues that earlier U.S. global strategies devoted excessive attention and resources to external affairs, while neglecting domestic development, a pattern that it identifies as an important contributor to America’s relative decline. According to the Report, the United States pursued goals that were neither sustainable nor achievable, which gradually weakened its middle class and industrial base and ultimately limited its capacity to maintain global dominance.

In this context, the new national security strategy no longer seeks comprehensive global engagement. Instead, it focuses on protecting a limited number of core national interests that have been reordered according to perceived priority.

At the level of strategic ideology, the concept of “America First” occupies a central position. This approach is rooted in a combination of strong nationalism and utilitarian realism, both of which emphasize the primacy of U.S. interests. The Report adjusts previous assessments of American power and redefines strategic objectives by placing domestic challenges, including industrial decline, immigration pressures, drug proliferation, and border security, at the forefront of national security concerns. Such priorities reflect a security outlook that carries clear nationalist and populist characteristics and aligns closely with the political preferences of the “Make America Great Again” constituency, which holds that national renewal must begin with internal reconstruction.

Statements asserting that border security constitutes the primary element of national security, together with claims that the era of mass migration must come to an end, indicate an effort to redefine national strength in terms of social control, economic autonomy, industrial resilience, and cultural cohesion. Within this framework, reindustrialization, energy dominance, and financial leadership are no longer treated as economic objectives. Rather, they are increasingly presented as structural foundations necessary for sustaining military superiority and political independence, thereby contributing to a national security architecture that is strongly inward-oriented.

Strategic Retrenchment and the Construction of a “Western Hemisphere Fortress”

If “America First” provides the ideological foundation of the current strategy, the consolidation of U.S. dominance within the Western Hemisphere constitutes its most important geographic focus.

The historical narrative of America’s rise has long been intertwined with the Monroe Doctrine, while the expansion of U.S. global power was closely linked to sustained political and economic involvement in Latin America. However, as Washington progressively shifted its strategic attention toward Europe, the Asia-Pacific, and the Middle East, Latin America, despite its significance, gradually receded from the center of U.S. strategic planning.

The Report now elevates the region to the level of national security priority, arguing that after years of neglect, the United States must reassert its leadership in the Western Hemisphere. By explicitly reaffirming the Monroe Doctrine, the administration signals an intention to reconstruct a sphere of influence that it regards as exclusive. The so-called Trump Corollary articulated in the Report asserts that the United States is prepared to employ all available means, including military force, to prevent foreign powers from gaining control over critical assets in the hemisphere. Recent U.S. rhetoric and actions concerning Greenland further reinforce this strategic direction.

Outside the Western Hemisphere, U.S. engagement appears more selective and issue-specific. In Asia, the strategy places simultaneous emphasis on economic competition and security deterrence. In Europe, while acknowledging the region’s continued relevance, the Report increasingly highlights internal structural crises and confines U.S. interests to conflict management and regional stability. In the Middle East and Africa, ideological agendas such as democracy promotion are deliberately de-emphasized, while economic cooperation and transactional partnerships receive greater attention.

Through these adjustments, the administration seeks to concentrate limited strategic resources on defending a hemispheric stronghold while preparing for a prolonged phase of great-power rivalry characterized by sustained competition and gradual attrition. Nevertheless, practice does not always fully correspond with declared intentions, as continued U.S. threats of intervention in resource-rich states such as Iran suggest that strategic retrenchment does not imply a complete withdrawal from external coercion.

Strategic Measures Emphasize Cost Control and Burden Sharing

The Report outlines a revised hegemonic model that aims to reduce operational costs while preserving strategic advantages. This model rests on domestic revitalization and hemispheric consolidation, supported by economic, technological, and military superiority, while relying on the redistribution of responsibilities to external actors.

One dimension of this approach involves the restoration of domestic economic capacity through policies associated with economic nationalism. Under the justification of rebalancing global trade, the administration employs tariffs, industrial subsidies, and protective measures intended to encourage manufacturing reshoring and to reverse trends of industrial hollowing and trade imbalance.

A second dimension focuses on limiting external obligations. The administration views many existing multilateral institutions as burdens that constrain sovereignty and generate disproportionate costs. Consequently, the United States has withdrawn from or reduced participation in a wide range of international organizations and agreements, arguing that such arrangements no longer align with American interests.

A third component involves transferring the costs of hegemony to allies. Through pressure on NATO members to increase defense spending, as well as demands for financial and industrial contributions from allies such as Japan and South Korea, the United States seeks to maintain strategic dominance while minimizing its own expenditures.

Finally, the strategy explicitly downplays democracy promotion as a guiding principle of foreign policy. Institutions previously responsible for exporting U.S. political values have been significantly weakened, reflecting the view that economic engagement and commercial cooperation are more effective and less costly than efforts aimed at political or social transformation abroad.

2. What Remains Unchanged

Although the new National Security Strategy reflects substantial adjustments in rhetoric and priority, its fundamental orientation toward maintaining U.S. dominance has not been altered. The changes outlined above primarily concern methods and sequencing rather than ultimate objectives.

The Core Objective of Preserving U.S. Global Hegemony Remains Intact

While the language of global leadership has been moderated, the emphasis on protecting core national interests represents a recalibration of means rather than a retreat from hegemonic ambition. The underlying aim remains the preservation of a power structure in which no external actor can pose a serious challenge to U.S. supremacy.

In military terms, the strategy continues to stress overwhelming superiority, sustained deterrence, and expanded defense investment. In economic terms, the construction of a highly resilient and innovative industrial base is presented as the highest priority of national economic policy, ensuring productive capacity in both peacetime and wartime. In technological terms, continued leadership in advanced innovation is regarded as indispensable to maintaining both economic influence and military advantage.

From this perspective, the adjustments contained in the Report reflect tactical recalculation, while the pursuit of singular dominance remains unchanged.

The Strategic Orientation of Great-Power Competition Remains Unchanged

The contraction of U.S. strategic focus toward the Western Hemisphere does not signify abandonment of great-power competition. Instead, it reflects an effort to concentrate competition more precisely within selected domains.

The Report continues to define the Indo-Pacific as the central arena of geopolitical and economic rivalry, with China remaining the primary reference point. China is described as a near-peer competitor and the foremost economic challenger, and competition with China is framed as a long-term struggle over future global leadership.

A substantial portion of the Report’s China-related content addresses trade imbalances, supply chain security, critical minerals, manufacturing capacity, and technological leadership. This focus suggests that the United States seeks to rely on its existing economic and technological advantages while pursuing selective containment in key sectors, thereby avoiding the risks associated with comprehensive confrontation.

The Hegemonic Nature of External Intervention Remains Unchanged

Although the Report expresses a preference for restraint, U.S. behavior indicates a shift not toward non-intervention but toward more selective and power-oriented forms of interference.

This pattern is evident in continued military operations, as U.S. forces have carried out repeated strikes in multiple countries within a short period. Such actions demonstrate that the willingness to employ force remains an integral component of U.S. strategy.

Intervention is also manifested through political involvement in the domestic affairs of other states. Electoral interference, diplomatic pressure, and efforts to influence political outcomes continue to be employed where Washington considers its interests to be at stake.

Under the banner of “America First,” these practices have become increasingly explicit, reflecting a transformation in style rather than substance.

Conclusion

Following the release of the new National Security Strategy, a major adjustment in U.S. grand strategy has formally begun. Whether this adjustment can be sustained over time remains uncertain, as deep political divisions within the United States limit the formation of broad strategic consensus. While the Republican Party has generally expressed support, the Democratic Party continues to defend liberal internationalism as the normative foundation of U.S. foreign policy.

For the international community, the United States appears increasingly inclined to distance itself from an international order that it once helped design and uphold, without offering clear alternatives to multilateral cooperation or collective security. Such developments risk weakening the normative foundations of global governance and increasing the likelihood of bloc confrontation and strategic mistrust.

For China, the current U.S. adjustment should not be interpreted as a reduction in strategic pressure. Rather, it represents a recalibration following setbacks in comprehensive containment, one that seeks to preserve American advantages while raising the costs of others’ development. It signals the emergence of a long-term strategy centered on endurance and competition. In this context, maintaining strategic clarity and restraint remains essential.

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About the Author

NI Feng(倪峰): Senior Research Fellow, PhD supervisor, Former Director of the Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and President of the Chinese Association for American Studies (CAAS). His main research interests include U.S. domestic politics and China–U.S. relations.

About the Publication

The Chinese Version of this article was published on Qiushi. Qiushi (《求是》) Journal is an official publication of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. It serves as an important theoretical medium for guiding the work of the entire Party and the country as a whole. As the English website of Qiushi Journal, Qiushi Online uses materials from the Chinese and English versions of the journal to introduce the CPC’s theories, policies, and practical experience in national governance to domestic and foreign audiences.

ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by Cui Shoujun, which focuses on U.S. Nuclear Renaissance Strategy.

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Summary

Following his second inauguration, President Trump has identified the revival of nuclear energy as the core of America’s energy transition. The newly introduced Nuclear Renaissance strategy seeks to reshape US nuclear policy across five dimensions: strategic positioning, regulatory framework, technological pathway, capital structure, and supply chain restructuring. Its overarching goal is to rebuild the foundation of the nuclear industry, strengthen energy resilience, and restore the United States’ global competitiveness in the nuclear sector.

Beneath this policy shift lie deeper strategic considerations: meeting the soaring electricity demand driven by artificial intelligence, forging bipartisan political consensus, stimulating economic growth, and competing for global leadership in nuclear energy. Although there are high expectations surrounding Trump’s Nuclear Renaissance strategy, its implementation is facing challenges relating to economic cost, technological innovation, safety regulation, and geopolitical competition. These challenges constitute the obstacles to revitalizing America’s nuclear industry.

Why It Matters

In recent years, the rapid development of artificial intelligence has sharply increased global demand for computing power, and in turn highlighted energy as the foundational constraint of the digital era. With high efficiency, stability, low carbon emissions, and strong resistance to climatic fluctuations, nuclear energy provides a continuous low-carbon option with high energy density. Amid the global energy transition and the reshaping of geopolitical dynamics, the strategic value of nuclear energy is increasingly prominent.

In April 2025, China released the Nuclear Energy Development Report (2025), emphasizing that a global nuclear energy revival is underway and that the development of AI and nuclear energy has become increasingly interdependent. The report highlights a two-way integration trend: AI technologies are accelerating innovations in nuclear engineering, while nuclear energy,due to its low-carbon, clean, safe, and reliable nature, is becoming an energy source favored by the rapidly expanding AI and computing-power industries. The rise of energy-intensive AI applications has further strengthened the strategic significance of nuclear energy as a reliable, scalable, and sustainable power source.

As AI becomes the commanding height of national competitiveness, states are not only competing over high-end chips, advanced lithography, critical minerals, and semiconductor supply chains. They are also racing to secure the energy sources required to support long-term, large-scale, low-carbon computing power. Against this rapidly shifting landscape, the Trump administration has positioned nuclear energy as a central pillar of future U.S. technological strength and energy security. This agenda has marked the most aggressive shift in American nuclear policy since the 1980s, with far-reaching implications for the country’s energy mix, decarbonization strategy, industrial competitiveness, and geopolitical posture.

Understanding the drivers, logic, and constraints of this policy shift is essential for grasping how the United States seeks to compete in an era where energy, AI, and geopolitics are increasingly fused. This article therefore provides a comprehensive review of the transformation of nuclear policy under the Trump administration and offers an in-depth analysis of its strategic motivations and domestic limitations.

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Key Points

1. Five Aspects of Trump’s Nuclear Renaissance Strategy

The Trump Administration’s Nuclear Renaissance Strategy seeks to reshape U.S. nuclear development across five dimensions: strategic positioning, regulatory framework, technological pathway, capital structure and supply chain restructuring.

(1) Comprehensive Upgrading of Strategic Positioning

Nuclear energy is redefined as a key pillar for restoring the US’s leadership in energy and achieving energy independence. First, the role of nuclear power is upgraded from merely “one component of the energy mix” to a strategic lever for the U.S.’s energy leadership. Second, the Trump administration links nuclear power not only to energy security but also to national security and global leadership. Nuclear energy is viewed as an ultimate guarantee, enabling the U.S. to dominate the global nuclear market ahead of China and Russia. Third, the Trump administration removes administrative barriers and leverages the Defense Production Act (DPA) and other policy tools to stimulate the nuclear industry. It also expands federal support for reactor development, nuclear-technology exports, and U.S. nuclear enterprises.

(2) Structural Reform of the Regulatory Framework

Trump views excessive regulation as the primary barrier to the development of the U.S. nuclear industry. Therefore, he has initiated sweeping reforms of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). These include establishing expedited approval pathways, relaxing radiation-protection standards and strengthening White House intervention by incorporating the approval of innovative technologies into a national strategic evaluation framework.

(3) Multi-Track Nuclear Technology Development

First, Trump’s nuclear strategy focuses on optimizing existing mature technologies including by extending the operational lifespans of large reactor systems. Second, it accelerates the deployment of small modular reactors. Third, it advances next-generation technologies such as microreactors and fast-neutron reactors. This ecosystem aims to rapidly revitalize the nuclear sector in the near term, form an industrial ladder over time, and support long-term breakthroughs.

(4) Dual-Track Capital Structure Combining Government Leadership and Market Mechanisms

On the government side, federal and state authorities increasingly provide nuclear infrastructure investment and risk-mitigation tools, while reprioritizing budget allocations to support nuclear projects. On the market side, the Trump administration actively attracts private-sector investment, accelerating the commercialization of U.S. nuclear power.

(5) Strengthening the Resilience of the Nuclear Fuel Supply Chain

The Trump administration aims to achieve this by enhancing domestic fuel cycling. First, it will expand uranium mining and processing. Second, it will increase domestic enrichment capacity, particularly High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU). Third, it will advance fuel recycling, such as repurposing excess plutonium into advanced nuclear fuel.

2. Underlying Drivers of Trump’s Nuclear Renaissance Strategy

(1) Artificial Intelligence and National Defense as the Immediate Drivers

Trump places great emphasis on the development and deployment of AI, which is increasingly integrated into the U.S. military system and plays a critical role at both strategic and tactical levels. The surge in AI computing demand requires a reliable, high-density power supply, and nuclear energy is the preferred solution to meet this future electricity gap.

(2) Nuclear Development’s Role in Stimulating Manufacturing Revitalization and Job Creation

Expanding nuclear energy can drive demand for power-plant construction and nuclear equipment manufacturing. The Trump administration seeks to revive the full nuclear industrial chain and promote “reindustrialization,” supporting upstream sectors such as mining, chemicals, and precision processing, facilitating midstream technology commercialization, and developing downstream professional services. Nuclear energy also generates diverse employment opportunities, improves the trade balance, and drives economic growth.

(3) How the Low-Carbon Narrative Helps Mitigate Partisan Divisions on Energy Issues.

Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and cancellation of renewable energy subsidies under the Biden administration have fueled political and legal conflicts. Nuclear energy, positioned between traditional fossil fuels and renewables, allows the administration to advance a low-carbon agenda while satisfying Republican support for traditional energy industries, thereby securing broader domestic political backing and reducing Democratic attacks on energy policy.

(4) The Geopolitical Logic of Pursuing the Global Nuclear Leadership

In recent years, Russia and China have rapidly developed their nuclear sectors and gained market share, weakening U.S. influence in global energy geopolitics. Under these circumstances, Trump’s second term emphasizes nuclear energy as a lever for energy security and geopolitical competition, strengthening U.S. competitiveness in strategic interactions with China and Russia.

3. Challenges Facing the U.S. Nuclear Renaissance Strategy

(1) High Construction Costs and Intense Market Competition

Nuclear projects require substantial investment and are prone to delays, which hinder U.S. nuclear development. The lack of standardized designs and construction experience means that each project is essentially custom-built, limiting the cost reductions that come from learning curves. Historical data show that the construction costs of 75 U.S. reactors exceeded initial budgets by an average of 207%. In addition, nuclear power faces competition from other energy sources due to its high costs, technical complexity, and long construction timelines.

(2) The Degradation of the Industrial Ecosystem and Supply Chain Constraints

Developing next-generation small reactors requires not only new materials and manufacturing processes but also a completely new industrial ecosystem. Bottlenecks in U.S. heavy nuclear manufacturing and gaps in high-precision component production impede commercialization. Moreover, the U.S. nuclear fuel supply chain remains highly dependent on imports, particularly from China and Russia.

(3) Regulatory Safety Concerns and a Deficit of Public Trust

The Trump administration’s shift from a “safety-first” to an “efficiency-first” regulatory approach, aiming to place the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under closer presidential oversight, may undermine public confidence. Accelerating or bypassing environmental reviews for nuclear reactors is likely to trigger opposition from environmental groups and the broader public.

(4) International Competition and Compatibility with Nuclear Standards

China and Russia have established strong competitive positions in the global nuclear market, making it difficult for the U.S. to compete in the short term. Expanding U.S. nuclear exports also faces legal and diplomatic hurdles, as imposing domestic safety standards on foreign partners during the negotiation of Agreements for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation may provoke opposition from allies and create barriers for non-allies, weakening U.S. international competitiveness in nuclear energy.

Conclusion

Unlike his first term, which focused on promoting fossil fuels, Trump’s second term demonstrates a strong emphasis on nuclear energy. The administration is restructuring U.S. nuclear policy, aiming to secure reliable power for artificial intelligence and national defense, build bipartisan consensus, stimulate economic growth and job creation, and reestablish the U.S. as a global leader in nuclear energy. However, this effort faces significant challenges, including high nuclear costs, a weakened U.S. industrial base, and a deficit of public trust.

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About the Author

CUI Shoujun 崔守军: Professor and Deputy Director of the Institute of International Development Studies at the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China (RUC). In addition to his academic role, he also serves as the Associate Dean of the School of Global Governance. He holds the position of research fellow in the National Academy of Development and Strategy, as well as the directorship of the Centre for Latin American Studies, the executive directorship of the Centre for Middle East and African Studies, and the executive directorship of the Contemporary China Studies Program at RUC. He has participated in the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) as a visiting fellow to the U.S. Department of State. Additionally, he has worked as a visiting fellow for the EU Marie Curie International Research Staff Exchange project.

About the Publication

Contemporary International Relations （《现代国际关系》）is a comprehensive academic monthly journal on international studies sponsored by the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. It has long been listed as the source journal of the Chinese Social Science Citation Index (CSSCI), the Chinese Core journal (International Politics) and the core journal of the Evaluation of Chinese Humanities and Social Science Journals (AMI). The CICIR mainly publishes the latest research produced by experts and scholars on international strategic issues, international relations theory, world politics, diplomacy, economy, military and other major topical issues. Its main columns include international politics and security, world economy, relations between major powers, regional and country studies, foreign publications, academic debates, conference information, and so on.

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ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by Zhou Fangyin, which traces the course of U.S. strategic retrenchment and examines its impact on the international order.

Summary

Strategic retrenchment refers to acts in which a major power reduces its grand strategic commitments on the international stage. When a major power faces relative power decline, strategic retrenchment at an appropriate level helps better align strategic goals with available resources. For more than a decade starting with the Obama administration, the U.S. has implemented strategic retrenchment, with complex implications. To accurately understand the nature and characteristics of U.S. strategic retrenchment, a comprehensive assessment must be conducted from four dimensions: military investment and overseas military intervention, alliance management, diplomatic strategy adjustment, and domestic economic policy reform.

U.S. strategic retrenchment has had significant implications for the international order: the U.S.-led liberal international order has shown signs of instability; international strategic relations have undergone reconfiguration, with the U.S.-led alliance system facing a major transformation; imbalances in regional power structures have intensified turbulence in the international system; pan-securitization has taken hold in the international community; and increasingly domestic-oriented U.S. foreign policy has heightened the instability of the international order.

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Why it matters

On December 4, 2025, the White House officially released its new National Security Strategy—a landmark document that signals a profound strategic shift from global hegemonic ambition to “core interest-first” pragmatism, with the Western Hemisphere as a key pillar. This shift has sent ripples across the globe, reshaping strategic calculations for allies, competitors, and regional powers alike. As international audiences struggle to navigate the complexities of U.S. policy adjustments, this article offers indispensable insights from a prominent Chinese scholar.

The article helps readers move beyond surface-level observations, such as rhetorical tweaks in China-U.S. relations or tensions within transatlantic partnerships, to grasp the underlying drivers of U.S. strategic retrenchment: constrained national strength amid great-power competition, pressing domestic economic imperatives, and a deliberate recalibration of competitive priorities. By unpacking how this retrenchment redefines the rules of great-power engagement, reshapes risk assessments for states worldwide, and exacerbates fragmentation in regional power structures, the article equips readers to better understand an increasingly fragmented international order. For policymakers, scholars, and anyone tracking global dynamics, it provides a timely, non-Western lens to decode the continuity beneath U.S. policy fluctuations and anticipate the future trajectory of global governance.

Key Points

1. Strategic Retrenchment: Definition, Obstacles and Measurement

(1) Definition of Strategic Retrenchment: Cost Cutting & Resource Reallocation

Strategic retrenchment refers to a behavior in which major powers reduce their strategic commitments in international affairs. It usually occurs against the backdrop of a major power’s relative power decline, where its economic and military strength gradually becomes insufficient for supporting its original foreign policy goals. It usually involves the readjustment of strategic goals and priorities, the reclassification of core and secondary regions, and the reallocation of strategic resources internationally. As a policy choice that adapts to changes in the power structure, strategic retrenchment can often bring significant benefits to the states that implement it.

The fundamental characteristic of strategic retrenchment lies in the “deliberate reduction of overall foreign policy costs.” It often exhibits a mixed nature of advancing in some areas while retreating in others, making it prone to confusion with a general “shift of strategic focus.” Unlike a pure retrenchment strategy, strategic retrenchment uses retrenchment as a means to realign national capabilities with national objectives. Such retrenchment is inherently irreversible—if a state can re-engage in a withdrawn area immediately or without incurring substantial costs, the withdrawal cannot be regarded as meaningful.

(2) Obstacles of Strategic Retrenchment: Inevitable Chaos

From a practical perspective, strategic retrenchment is difficult to manage and is prone to causing a certain degree of policy disarray. First, such retrenchment sends signals to other states, which may give rise to unexpected risks. Second, when a major power conducts strategic retrenchment in certain regions, this may create a power vacuum in said region and spur potential rivals or other forces to fill that void, leading to regional instability. Third, strategic retrenchment leaves national leaders of major powers vulnerable to attacks from their domestic political opponents.

(3) Standards for Determining Major Powers’ Strategic Retrenchment

U.S. strategic retrenchment has now been ongoing for more than a decade. This article will analyze the manifestations of U.S. strategic retrenchment during different presidential terms from four dimensions: military investment and overseas military intervention; alliance relationship management; diplomatic strategy; domestic economy.

2. Strategic Retrenchment During Trump 1.0

(1) Military Input & Overseas Intervention

The governance of the Trump administration was marked by a prominent “America First” ideology. The Trump administration undertook multiple initiatives to curtail overseas military commitments and exhibited a clear inclination toward strategic retrenchment, yet U.S. military expenditure during this period increased. Notably, the Trump administration was highly cautious about overseas military interventions and made efforts to withdraw military forces from overseas. These facts indicate that while conducting strategic retrenchment, the U.S. government continued to emphasize maintaining a strong military capability to preserve U.S. superiority over major competitors.

(2) Alliance Management

Trump applied a diplomatic style featuring transactionalism to U.S. allies. He leveraged allies’ asymmetric dependence on the U.S. to exert pressure on them, which eroded the credibility of U.S. commitments to safeguarding its allies’ security. He demanded that allies assume greater defense responsibilities in security, raised the proportion of defense cost-sharing, and sought to secure greater economic benefits from allies.

(3) Diplomatic Strategy Adjustment

Trump’s foreign policy reduced participation in international affairs, notably withdrawing from a series of international organizations and arrangements. Meanwhile, the Trump administration identified China as its primary strategic competitor and squeezed China’s strategic space from multiple dimensions, leading to a significant deterioration of relations between the two states.

(4) Domestic Economic Policy Transformation

Trump emphasized the importance of manufacturing, attached great importance to traditional industries such as steel and energy, and actively attracted high-tech enterprises including within the semiconductor industry and liquid crystal panel industry to invest and establish factories in the U.S. His policies drove U.S. economic growth in the short term, but their effectiveness weakened later.

3. Strategic Retrenchment During the Biden Administration

(1) Military Input & Overseas Intervention

During the Biden era, military expenditure as a proportion of GDP dropped to the lowest level since the War on Terror. The Biden administration was also highly cautious about overseas military interventions, completed the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, and significantly reduced military intervention in Middle Eastern affairs.

(2) Alliance Management

The Biden administration’s approach of requiring its allies to assume greater defense responsibilities and increase their share of costs is generally consistent with expectations of strategic retrenchment. However, this administration did not reduce its security commitments to allies; instead, to a certain extent repaired the relations with allies that were damaged during Trump 1.0.

(3) Diplomatic Strategy Adjustment

The Biden administration sought to ease relations with secondary adversaries such as Iran and North Korea, and attempted to stabilize relations with Russia. It aimed to concentrate strategic resources on containing China by reducing resource investment in other regions. However, the subsequent outbreaks of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Middle East crisis made it difficult for the administration to achieve the goal of cutting resource inputs into Europe and the Middle East. Overall, Biden’s policies here were consistent with the requirements of strategic retrenchment.

(4) Domestic Economic Policy Transformation

The Biden administration attached great importance to infrastructure development, emphasizing that against the backdrop of great-power competition, it had to reshape and strengthen America’s own economic fundamentals. This is because in a phase of strategic retrenchment, a major power’s domestic economic base is insufficient to underpin its international ambitions. However, large-scale investment in infrastructure development has also widened the imbalance in fiscal revenue and expenditure, leading to a further rise in U.S. federal debt.

4. Strategic Retrenchment During Trump 2.0

(1) Military Input & Overseas Intervention

Trump’s increase in military spending during his second term has, to a certain extent, deviated from the behavioral expectations of a state pursuing strategic retrenchment. It reveals his obsession with maintaining the preeminent military status of the U.S., which is closely linked to his international approach of bullying the weak. After all, a robust military capability serves as a critical material foundation for the U.S. to impose its hegemonic policies on other states.

In terms of overseas military interventions, Trump’s efforts to facilitate peace talks between Russia and Ukraine align with the demands of strategic retrenchment. While his military strikes against Iran and the Houthi armed forces have diverged from typical strategic retrenchment—reflecting the opportunistic nature and a degree of adventurism in his foreign policy—his resolute measures to cut losses are consistent with the requirements of strategic retrenchment.

(2) Alliance Management

With Trump’s return to power, U.S. relations with its allies—which had been strengthened during the Biden administration—have once again been impacted. The Trump administration has undermined the credibility of its security commitments to allies, demanded that they assume greater responsibilities in security, and imposed inequitable economic policies on them.

(3) Diplomatic Strategy Adjustment

During his second term, Trump has exhibited a tendency to reduce participation in certain aspects of international affairs and curtail investment in some regions. Currently, U.S. policy toward China has displayed complexity, with a greater focus on economic protectionism and reducing U.S. dependence on China. Up to July 2025, the foreign policy of Trump 2.0 has shown a willingness to ease relations with secondary adversaries; Trump has no intention of intervening deeply in international affairs in other regions unless they bring direct benefits to the U.S. Regarding Trump’s policies toward China, perhaps due to the fact that his second term only commenced at the beginning of the year, the U.S. has not yet significantly withdrawn resources from other regions to concentrate on targeting China. Instead, it has displayed policy flexibility toward China.

(4) Domestic Economic Policy Transformation

During its first year, the second Trump administration has implemented a series of reform measures on domestic economy. On the one hand, it has pushed for cuts to government spending with considerable intensity and reformed government agencies; on the other hand, the government has promoted the reshoring of manufacturing through various means, seeking to strengthen the foundation of the U.S. domestic economy.

5. The Evolution of International Order Under U.S. Strategic Retrenchment

(1) The Irreversible Erosion of the Liberal International Order

For a period after WWII, the U.S. served as the founder and leader of the liberal international order. With its relative decline, the U.S. is no longer willing to bear the costs of sustaining this order. China is not yet capable of exerting global leadership, while the material capabilities of other states also make it difficult for them to assume such a leadership position. Consequently, the international system will witness a leadership vacuum for a long period to come. As to whether the liberal international order can be revitalized, it is hard to provide a definitive answer at present.

(2) The U.S. Alliance System Faces Transformation

U.S. strategic retrenchment is not a simple withdrawal of power, nor does it mean abandoning global hegemony. Instead, it involves reprioritizing strategic tasks and conducting more effective resource allocation accordingly. First, the U.S. has identified China as its primary competitor. Second, the U.S. relations with its allies have undergone in-depth adjustments. Some allies’ desire for strategic autonomy has grown, with the EU being particularly prominent. However, due to the long-standing asymmetric dependency on the U.S., most allies lack the capacity for security self-help amid a turbulent international situation, and are still far from achieving true strategic autonomy.

(3) The Adjustment of the International System and Turbulence in the International Situation

Against the backdrop of U.S. strategic retrenchment, various forces are competing for dominance over regional affairs, pursuing their own interests amid evolving regional dynamics. As a result, disputes have been on the rise in the European periphery and the Middle East. On the one hand, none of these forces holds an absolute dominant position in these conflicts; on the other hand, while pursuing limited retrenchment, the U.S. still seeks to influence these regional affairs. Additionally, coupled with complex historical and realistic factors as well as the weakened binding force of international institutions, the number of large-scale armed conflicts has increased, their duration has lengthened, and some conflicts have even spilled over on a large scale.

(4) Challenging International Concepts, Giving Rise to the “Pan-Securitization” Phenomenon

Changes in U.S. behavior were particularly evident during the first Trump administration. Trump advocated the “America First” doctrine, adopting a transactional style in his foreign policy. He abandoned the values of freedom, democracy, and human rights that the U.S. had long upheld, and blatantly pursued power politics. As the world’s most powerful state, U.S. behavior exerts a strong demonstration effect internationally. Consequently, changes in U.S. behavior have accelerated the evolution of the international community toward an anarchic systemic culture.

(5) The ‘Domestication’ of U.S. Diplomacy and Rising Instability in the International Order

On the one hand, the U.S. increasingly emphasizes enhancing its own capabilities to uphold its leadership position globally; on the other hand, the polarization of U.S. domestic politics is more clearly reflected in its foreign policy, with U.S. diplomatic behaviors exhibiting more distinct partisan features. The consequence of this is that the U.S. is unwilling to exercise necessary restraint to safeguard its international image and the seriousness of its international commitments, and may even adopt diplomatic practices that incur only costs without yielding any benefits. Some foreign policies have lost stability and continuity, undermining international cooperation between other countries and the U.S. Given the global influence of the U.S., this has also become a key source of instability in the international order.

Conclusion

Since 2009, the U.S has undergone a long period of strategic retrenchment, with distinct characteristics manifesting across different administrations. The Obama administration carried out resolute retrenchment, redirecting U.S. strategic resources to be concentrated in the Asia-Pacific region. The first Trump administration’s retrenchment was marked by isolationist tendencies, it pursued material interests at the expense of the U.S.’ international image and its relations with allies. The Biden administration, while maintaining a stance of strategic retrenchment, preserved its alliances to an extent.

America’s strategic retrenchment has undermined the liberal international order it once led, driven the transformation of alliance relations, exacerbated imbalances in regional power structures, and exerted an impact on international norms. This has also led to the persistent spread of the “pan-securitization”. In addition, the growing trend of the ‘domestication’ of U.S. foreign policy has further heightened the instability of the international order.

About the Author

Zhou Fangyin周方银：Dr. Zhou is a Professor at the School of International Relations, Sun Yat-sen University. Having published over 100 academic papers in both Chinese and English, he serves as a member of the editorial board for numerous SSCI and CSSCI-indexed journals, such as The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies, Foreign Affairs Review, Journal of International Political Science, Pacific Journal, Asia-Pacific Security and Maritime Affairs, and Contemporary American Review.

About the Publication

The Chinese version of this article was published in Foreign Affairs Review（《外交评论》）. Launched by China Foreign Affairs University，affiliated with Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1984, it covers topics such as international relations, Chinese diplomacy, diplomatic studies, international economics and law, and academic trends. The journal is a bimonthly publication and serves as a platform for scholarly articles related to international affairs, aimed at academic institutions, foreign affairs departments, libraries, and research institutions.

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In this episode, Da Wei, Director of the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, and Shao Yuqun, Director of the Institute for Taiwan, Hong Kong & Macao Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), co-host a discussion with special guest Zhou Bo, China Forum expert and Senior Fellow of CISS. Together they review U.S. foreign policy during Trump’s first year in office and explore whether the United States is undergoing a phase of strategic retrenchment, how China should respond to an increasingly fragmented international order, and the possible trajectories of future great-power relations—offering a multidimensional Chinese perspective and analysis.

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Experts in today’s dialogue:

Key Points:

Da Wei has historically held a relatively pessimistic view of U.S.-China relations, particularly in light of the tariff disputes since April. However, current dynamics suggest that bilateral relations may enter a more stable period. Most Chinese scholars currently hold an optimistic outlook, expecting China-U.S. relations in 2026 to be relatively stable. Da Wei identifies three critical moments in past China-U.S. relations: the first being the “deepseek moment”, the second the “Trump TACO’s moment”, during which China successfully compelled the U.S. to negotiate at the table, and the third the “rare earth moment”, when both countries attempted to constrain each other through supply chains.

Currently, in the supply chain domain, China and the U.S. have established a form of Mutual Assured Disruption (MAD), which may encourage managed competition and negotiation-driven problem-solving. Da Wei notes that while Biden-era policies imposed more predictable pressures on China, current U.S. actions in the Indo-Pacific generate unpredictable chaos, requiring China to remain confident yet vigilant against “flying black swans.” He further emphasizes that multipolarity does not imply a simple distribution of power; rather, each pole has different objectives and conflicting interests, with China cooperating but also experiencing friction with these powers.

Zhou Bo observes that Trump’s second-term style is more pronounced, bringing a revolutionary element to policy. With two years remaining, it is necessary to watch how his actions evolve. Zhou notes that Trump’s strikes on Venezuela and claims over Greenland have damaged U.S. credibility and image. Although the U.S. is undergoing “strategic retrenchment,” it is unlikely to fully withdraw from the Indo-Pacific. Zhou argues that Trump’s chaotic policies may, to some extent, benefit the U.S., as China can fill vacuums left by U.S. pullbacks. Moreover, current U.S. actions may improve China’s international image. He highlights the importance of comparing the U.S.-China competition in the Asia-Pacific under Trump versus the Biden administration.

Shao Yuqun identifies four unexpected elements in Trump’s policies: first, his assertive Western Hemisphere policy, particularly the arrest of Maduro; second, challenges in U.S.-India relations, which complicate U.S. competition with China; third, the lack of domestic constraints on Trump’s policies, highlighting an imbalance in U.S. checks and balances; and fourth, adjustments in U.S.-China policy, notably the abandonment of the term “strategic competition.” Shao emphasizes that while the U.S. is retrenching, it will not leave the Asia-Pacific, and the current U.S. approach is chaotic, presenting opportunities for China. She also stresses the implications of U.S. withdrawal from global governance mechanisms, creating openings for China, though China must carefully consider whether to fully fill these gaps or selectively engage.

Regarding summit diplomacy, Zhou observes that Trump’s personal rapport with Xi Jinping will increase the likelihood of positive outcomes. He notes, however, that the U.S. is unlikely to make significant shifts on Taiwan. Da Wei adds that the frequency of potential meetings in 2026 is uncertain, but such engagement would be beneficial for both bilateral and global stability, signaling more controllable U.S.-China relations. Frequent summits could facilitate clearer communication, build confidence among officials, and potentially advance issues such as tariffs, investment, and trade rebalancing.

On China-Europe relations, Zhou notes that Europe has been adjusting its China policy even prior to JD Vance’s Munich speech. While the Russia-Ukraine conflict remains a significant obstacle, China-Europe ties are becoming more pragmatic. Shao adds that although transatlantic relations face challenges, the U.S. and European countries still have coping mechanisms. She observes a shift in European perspectives: whereas Europe once saw China as pursuing modernization, it now perceives China as attempting to define modernization. Despite lingering biases, more scholars are adopting new lenses to understand China, suggesting potential improvements in China-Europe relations.

Concerning the U.S. midterm elections, Shao notes divergent views within China. Da Wei emphasizes that the election outcomes will have significant implications for China-U.S. relations, primarily by shaping the domestic agenda on issues such as inflation and immigration. While these issues are not directly related to China, a stable bilateral relationship would be important for Trump. Current mainstream expectations suggest the Republican Party may lose the House, requiring reflection on a post-Trump era. Shao observes that Trump seeks stable China-U.S. relations, but many in Washington, particularly hawkish voices, disagree. Da Wei believes Trump has the capacity to shape Washington’s China policy, and both sides should pursue opportunities for constructive, healthy engagement.

On evaluating Trump’s first year from a Chinese perspective, Zhou gives a score of 8, noting that other countries might rate it lower, around 5. Shao gives a 9, expressing cautious support for continued performance, while Da Wei also rates 8, with 7 for other regions. Despite disagreements with many of Trump’s policies, Da Wei notes that the past decade has already revealed the limitations of the post-Cold War world order and the dark sides of globalization. Trump’s approach represents a “destructive construction” that, paradoxically, may generate new opportunities for other regions, warranting a score of 7 globally.

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China Scholar Insights is a feature which aimed at providing you with the latest analysis on issues that Chinese scholars and strategic communities are focusing on. We will carefully select commentary articles and highlight key points. Questions or criticisms can be directed to sch0625@gmail.com

I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University. ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu.

Background

The Ukraine war has persisted for years, profoundly impacting the global geopolitical and security landscape. With Trump’s return to the White House and adjustments to U.S. foreign strategy, his push for ceasefire and negotiations has drawn international attention. All parties have intensified diplomatic efforts: the U.S.-proposed “28-point peace plan”—having undergone revisions—has driven interactions. Trump met Zelenskyy at Mar-a-Lago on December 28, noting nearly 95% consensus on key issues, with remaining differences over Donbas. He also held in-depth calls with Putin, with both sides agreeing to shun temporary ceasefires that prolong the conflict, as the international community monitors developments closely.

Summary

Regarding the direction of the Ukarine war, U.S. policy has shifted toward pragmatic retrenchment, prioritizing interests to promote a ceasefire. However, the vague and suspicious origins of peace plans have led to mutual blame-shifting among Ukraine, Europe and Russia. Europe’s marginalization in negotiations, bearing heavy costs without proportional influence, exposing the limitations of its strategic autonomy.

Meanwhile, Russia and Ukraine remain far apart on territorial issues and ceasefire terms, with differences in war costs and patience influencing the negotiation process. Additionally, potential U.S.-Russia normalization could pose challenges to China’s peripheral security. Finally, attention is also needed on the complex impacts of a peaceful resolution on China’s overall interests, including China-Russian relations and interactions among China, the U.S., and Europe.

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Insights

HUANG Jing & JIA Qingguo：A Peaceful End to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict Would Serve China’s Overall Interests Better

The White House recently released the 2025 National Security Strategy report, elaborating on Trump’s policy since his January return. Centered on core national interests, it readjusts U.S. global security priorities.

The U.S. Abandons Global Hegemony

The 2025 strategy differs sharply from prior versions. It reflects Trump’s personal views on international affairs, highlights strategic contraction and primacy of U.S. interests, and shifts focus from the globe to homeland . It downplays ideology, weakens alliance bonds, and demands allies take greater regional security responsibilities. Overall, it reverts to the Monroe Doctrine and Jacksonianism, prioritizing military contraction and economic competition.

Shifts in Latin America & Europe Policies

The U.S. seeks to reassert influence in Latin America, stabilize the region, and combat smuggling/illegal immigration—marking a drastic policy shift. Its military deterrence against oil-rich but militarily weak Venezuela can be seen as means to assert U.S. influence in Latin America, warn potential challengers, and reinforce Latin American countries’ attention to U.S. views.

On Europe, Trump repudiates the previous administration’s stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, calling for an immediate ceasefire based on pragmatic interests instead of ideology. He argues prolonged war drains U.S./European resources and risks nuclear conflict with Russia, deeming early ceasefire beneficial even if Ukraine makes territorial concessions.

U.S.-Russia Reconciliation’s Pose Potential Risks to China’s Peripheral Security

Normalized U.S.-Russia ties may prompt Japan to improve relations with Russia, letting its right-wing forces focus on countering China. Russia-India relations follow the same logic. Vietnam and North Korea—major users of Russian weapons—have strengthened cooperation, reflecting Russian influence. Thus, U.S.-Russia normalization could pose potential risks to China’s peripheral security.

A Ceasefire Between Russia and Ukraine is Overall Beneficial to China

The prolonged Russia-Ukraine conflict pushes Russia to deepen political, military and economic cooperation with China amid Western sanctions, yet strains bilateral relations—Russia expects more support, but China avoids supplying weapons to evade Western sanctions.

The war has pros and cons for China: it diverts U.S. attention, easing China-related pressure, but hinders China-Europe relations as Europe aligns with U.S. pressure. An early ceasefire would reduce U.S. pressure, facilitate smoother China-Russia cooperation, and boost China-Europe ties as Europe’s focus shifts. Overall, a ceasefire benefits China.

CHEN Yu: “The 28-Point Plan” Changed to “The 19-point plan”: This Suspicious “Ball” Was Kicked Back by Ukraine and Europe.

During the U.S.-Russia and U.S.-EU summits in August this year, all countries refused to compromise on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, while also not wanting to outright reject Trump’s ceasefire appeal. This led Russia, Ukraine and Europe to shift the blame for “refusing peace” onto each other. From the 28-point peace plan to the 19-point plan, the interactions among these countries might still be a “game of kicking the ball for Trump to watch”.

Suspicious plan: Unprofessional content and unknown sources

The official version of the 28-point plan has not been released till now, and the plan was only leaked by a Ukrainian parliamentarian and the U.S. media Axios. However, the revealed content contains obvious errors, lacks the design of key elements, and includes some provisions that seem difficult to implement.

The source of the plan is also highly suspicious. Some Western media outlets believe that the 28-point plan was jointly drafted by Trump’s trusted follower Steve Witkoff and the special representative of the Russian president Kirill Dmitriev, with some sentences resembling “direct translations from Russian”. The plan also raised suspicions among both the Democratic and Republican parties. Some critics of Trump believe that the leak of the plan might be a “fishhook” designed by Russia, aiming to urge Trump pressure Ukraine.

The response of Europe and Ukraine: Using negotiations as an excuse to “kick the ball back”

The original 28-point plan almost repeated Russia’s previous demands, making it hard for Ukraine and Europe to accept. Zelensky delivered a “darkest hour” speech, stating that “we will never give the enemy the pretext that ‘Ukraine does not want peace’”. Meanwhile, Europe released a “24-point peace plan”, which was formally similar to the original but had significant differences in content. Now as western media said, the plan has been reduced to 19 points.

Russia’s stance: Having the upper hand and little room for compromise

The 28-point plan sparked controversy within Russia. Putin’s attitude was very cautious, and some parliamentarians and commentators believed that Russia’s demands weren’t met. Therefore the revised 19-point plan, which takes into account Ukraine’s and Europe’s concerns, is obviously more difficult for Russia to accept. In particular, the new plan has deleted the content related to U.S.-Russia relations and Europe affairs, going against Russia’s “package solution” demands.

Moreover, the Russian army has the upper hand on the battlefield, and domestic public opinion supports continuing military actions. Russia lacks the urgency for tactical compromise and the space for political compromise, and may refuse the revised plan or may attempt to kick the ball back by having a dialogue with the U.S..

Gao Jian: U.S. Pushes New Russia-Ukraine Peace Deal, Is Europe the Biggest Loser?

The U.S. is advancing a new peace plan for the Russia-Ukraine conflict, triggering strong shock and dissatisfaction in Europe. European leaders worry their interests may be sacrificed in great-power rivalry and crave an “acceptable better solution.” This mocks Europe’s long-touted “strategic autonomy”—having paid heavy economic and social costs, it is excluded from the negotiating table.

Europe Is Marginalized in Peace Talks, Facing Over-the-Top Diplomacy

The conflict’s resolution is likely to follow the new deal, with Europe marginalized on core interests—exposing extreme power imbalance in the transatlantic alliance. Europe bet its security entirely on the U.S., mistaking a “values alliance” for an interest community. Washington’s direct negotiations with Moscow (for its global strategy) left Europe facing “over-the-top diplomacy,” showing Europe’s security interests are subordinate to U.S. goals—used as a frontline fortress or bargaining chip, lacking independent status in the U.S.-Russia-Europe triangle.

Europe as the Biggest Loser: Heavy Costs Without Voice

Aligning with the U.S. strategy, Europe cut cheap energy supplies, endured high inflation, faced manufacturing outflow and deindustrialization, and bore refugee and livelihood crises. Yet it gained no corresponding say—the conflict’s rhythm is controlled by the U.S. and Russia, depriving Europe of both interests and dignity as it realizes it may be a “geopolitical expendable.”

Unfulfilled Strategic Autonomy: Rooted in Lack of Strength

Europe’s “strategic autonomy” remains empty talk due to hesitant defense integration and blind foreign policy obedience. Unable to build an independent security architecture outside NATO, its anger is powerless without hard power backing—merely emotional venting

Europe Needs Self-Reflection, China-Europe Cooperation Holds Promise

The U.S.-Russia rumoured secret deal taught Europe a realist lesson. To avoid future sacrifice, it must rethink its dependent strategic culture and build independent defense and diplomatic systems. China sees Europe as a key multipolar world participant. Abandoning Cold War mentality, China and Europe—two major forces, civilizations and markets—can move forward together amid global changes.

XIAO Bin: War Cost Calculations in Ukraine Conflict

After a five-hour meeting in Moscow on December 2, 2025, the United States and Russia remained at odds over the Ukraine peace proposal. Although Russian President Vladimir Putin’s active involvement in the talks signaled a willingness to engage, this alone did not bridge the gap between the two sides.

Territorial issues are at the heart of the dispute

Resolving the territory issue is the primary prerequisite for resolving the crisis and the current dispute is focused on two key dimensions.

First is the choice between “de facto recognition” and “de jure recognition”. Russia needs sustainable security architecture, while the U.S. seeks for strategic wiggle room, leading them to choose different ways to dispose of their gains. Russia insists on solidifying its gains through “de jure recognition”, while the U.S. Prefers “de facto recognition” to preserve policy flexibility.

Second is the conditions for freezing the front lines. The lack of consensus on the European security landscape results in this divergence. Russia seeks a long-term solidified border and pushes Ukrainian forces to unconditionally withdraw from the eastern regions. In contrast, the U.S. prefers short term management and hope Ukraine can make some tactical adjustments without sacrificing bargains in negotiations on a precondition of an ambiguous approach.

Patience and battle on cost

By the end of 2025, the cumulative cost of the war in Ukraine will have soared to nearly $3 trillion and counting.

In Putin’s view, Russia possesses sufficient leverage and a relatively flat cost curve, which is primarily grounded in Russia’s confidence in its institutional framework and resource allocation capabilities. Therefore，Russia will maintain a persistently high proportion of defense spending in its 2026 budget, so as to send a signal that it can bear war costs over the long term.

Conversely, Ukraine and its Western allies face steeper cost curves.Moreover, amid the competition with China, the U.S. is reallocating its strategic resources, so the European theater cannot monopolize more attention and resources. This imperative is driving the U.S. to necessitate a swifter de-escalation strategy.

Peace race

This Moscow Talks has been described as “productive” instead of substantial breakthrough.

The future peace process may be influenced by several dynamic factors: marginal changes of patience, the gap between freezing and peace and the recording of U.S. strategic priorities. These factors reveal that it is the dynamic changes in the cost curves of all sides that will ultimately determine the peace process.

Through the lens of strategic cost curves, the vast difference of the ability to bear between Russia, Ukraine and the West, which demonstrates that any peace plan on the table is just another form of conflict extending over time essentially.

LÜ Yunmou: Is the Russia–Ukraine Conflict Heading for an Endgame? Europe Has Three “Fears”

After the United States proposed a “28-point” plan on the Russia–Ukraine conflict, Europe’s major powers have grown anxious—fearing an outcome beyond their control, an unaffordable Ukrainian burden, and the undermining of Europe’s security.

Fear One: “No Seat at the Table”

Since Trump’s return to the White House, Europe has worried it will be shut out of Russia–Ukraine negotiations. After experiencing U.S.–Russia “over-the-head” talks, European leaders mounted sustained charm offensives, in hopes of securing a place in the talks. Yet Europe’s bid to sway Trump has largely fallen flat. Washington has rolled out a “28-point” plan with Moscow while keeping European capitals out of the loop—and Trump has publicly echoed Russia-favoring assessments while brushing off Europe-led consultation as “a waste of time.” To many European leaders, this amounts to a deliberate bypass that risks turning them into mere spectators on a security outcome that directly affects their core interests.

Fear Two: “Unable to Foot the Bill”

Even if Europe gets a seat at the table, it may still be forced to shoulder the postwar bill. With the United States likely to scale back, Europe doubts its ability to shoulder the responsibility of “helping Ukraine” alone. After four years of costly support—massive aid to Kyiv and an expensive energy and sanctions break with Russia—Europe worries much of its investment could be stranded under a U.S.-brokered ceasefire. It would then face open-ended obligations for Ukraine’s reconstruction and, potentially, EU accession, both of which could deepen existing EU fractures over budgets, subsidies, and migration. Meanwhile, disputes over using frozen Russian assets could trigger legal and political blowback once the war ends—adding financial strain and increasing the risk that European states splinter under pressure.

Fear Three: “Becoming a Bigger Ukraine”

Geopolitically, Ukraine is Europe’s gateway. If the conflict ends in an outcome unfavorable to Ukraine, Europe fears it could face a stronger threat and still be unable to close its near-term “security deficit”—sliding into the predicament of being wealthy and democratic yet unable to protect itself. A U.S. pullback would further expose Europe’s vulnerabilities: dependence on U.S.-made military equipment and NATO institutions could even deepen, while Europe’s own defense coordination remains fragmented. This also sharpens intra-European rifts over leadership and burden-sharing. Domestically, a perceived failure of pro-Ukraine, anti-Russia policies could rebound against Europe’s political elites, empowering anti-establishment forces and adding volatility to an already shifting political landscape. In short, Europe fears not only the war itself, but an endgame that sidelines European interests, constrains Europe’s development, and undermines its security.

Conclusion

The outcome of the Ukarine war remains uncertain, shaped by U.S. policy adjustments, cost calculations, and geopolitical maneuvering. While a peaceful resolution would benefit China overall, shifts in the regional security environment warrant caution. Future negotiations will test the strategic patience and pragmatism of all parties, requiring China to advance its interests and multilateral cooperation prudently within a dynamic landscape.

Editor for Today’s Newsletter: SUN Chenghao, CHEN Didi, FAN Jiaji, WEI Zongqin, LIU Xinman, LI Yining, BAI Xuhan, ZHANG Xueyu

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Over the past year, ChinAffairsplus has shared leading Chinese academic perspectives on China’s foreign policy, China–U.S. relations, and China–Europe relations. This time, I hope to add a more direct analytical voice, offering our own assessments of major global developments and the strategic logic behind them.

The article examines how the Trump administration’s operation in Venezuela signals a return to a Monroe Doctrine–style regional strategy. It explores why Washington is prioritizing dominance in the Western Hemisphere, how migration and resource politics shape U.S. decision-making, and what this means for the future of China–Latin America relations. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com.

“Donroe Doctrine” in Practice: Trump’s Strike in Venezuela

Nicolás Maduro took office as the president of Venezuela in 2013. He continued Chavismo named after his predecessor, Hugo Chávez. Drawing on the political ideas of Venezuelan military leader Simón Bolívar, who championed the independence of Latin American nations from Spanish rule in the nineteenth century, Chávez launched a series of social initiatives aimed at reducing poverty and promoting equality within Venezuela. These initiatives involved expanding state-funded welfare programmes, bringing key industries under state ownership, and challenging what Chávez portrayed as imperialist policies led by countries such as the US.

A March 2013 study by the Washington-based Center for Economic and Policy Research reported that poverty levels in Venezuela fell dramatically following Chávez’s rise to power—declining by almost half, while extreme poverty dropped by over 70 percent. During this period, the nationalisation of the oil sector also contributed to economic growth. However, Venezuela under the rule of Maduro is widely associated with severe economic collapse, hyperinflation, human rights abuses and corruption, leading to mass emigration.

As mentioned above, Venezuelan political ideology, economic policy and the surge of emigration inhibit US pursuit of preeminence in the Western Hemisphere and its implementation of “Donroe Doctrine”. In 1823, the US president James Monroe asserted that efforts by European powers to control or influence sovereign states in the Americas would be viewed as a threat to US security during his seventh annual State of the Union Address to Congress. In 1845, president James K. Polk created the word “Monroe Doctrine” and announced that the principle of the doctrine should be strictly enforced. The Monroe Doctrine established the US objective of constructing a monopolistic regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.

On this basis, the 2025 National Security Strategy states that the US wants to prevent and discourage mass migration from other countries in the Western Hemisphere to the US; to cooperate with the Hemisphere’s governments to fight against narco-terrorists, cartels, and other transnational criminal organizations; to control key assets and supports critical supply chains; and to ensure its continued access to key strategic locations. This is described as “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, or the “Donroe Doctrine”. To implement the doctrine, in January 2026, the US Army’s Delta Force, an elite special forces unit, carried out the operation and captured Venezuelan former President Maduro and his wife.

The US Pursuit of Regional Hegemony: A Cost-Benefit Consideration

Trump’s strike in Venezuela is not just for the sake of removing Maduro and controlling assets in Venezuela, but to show US resolve to consolidate hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Pursuing regional instead of global hegemony is motivated by US cost-benefit consideration.

According to John Mearsheimer, “the best outcome a great power can hope for is to be a regional hegemon.” It is difficult and costly to dominate the entire world. So the US seeks to adopt a focused definition of its national interests and shifts its attention to the Western Hemisphere. It will deny its competitors to position force or to control strategic resources in the Hemisphere.

The request for regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere will benefit US in several aspects. Trump believes that immigration took a heavy toll on working Americans. Therefore, asserting a dominant role in the hemisphere would allow the US to influence political and economic conditions in its neighboring states, reduce instability, and thereby mitigate inward migration pressure.

More importantly, according to Michael Klare, in the post-Cold War era, international politics is increasingly focused on gaining or maintaining access to and control of valuable natural resources. To invigorate US national power and serve its geopolitical goals, it will seize control of strategic resources in the Western Hemisphere. Although the US is the top oil producer and a net exporter, it still relies on importing heavy crude to meet domestic refining needs and obtain more profits. Canada was the largest source, accounting for 62% of total imports in 2024. But Venezuela’s heavy crude is a potential alternative source, and the US can threat not to purchase Canandian oil, which gives Washington leverage over Ottawa when Trump talks about making Canada the “51st state”. Trump said that US oil companies would be able to invest in Venezuela to fix the badly broken oil infrastructure and start making money for the US. In addition to oil, the US also means to use Latin America’s critical minerals and rare earths to create a new supply chain that cuts out China. This will enable Washington to decouple with and outcompete Beijing.

Pushing out China? The Future of China-Latin America Relationships

China has close ties with Latin American countries. China is the second largest trading partner of Latin America and the Caribbean. According to data from the General Administration of Customs of PRC, in 2024, the total value of goods imports and exports between China and Latin America reached $518.467 billion, a year-on-year increase of 6%. Within this total, imports amounted to $241.466 billion, representing an increase of approximately 46% compared to five years ago. China is also top trading partner for countries such as Brazil, Chile, and Peru.

With the expansion of US influence in Lain America, Chinese presence will be partly influenced, especially in terms of critical infrastructure. In the 2025 National Security Strategy, the White House said it seeks to push out foreign companies that build infrastructure in the region. Actually, the US has already successfully weaken China’s presence. Under US pressure, a Hong Kong company, CK Hutchinson, sold its $22.8 billion ports business in Panama to an investment group led by US giant BlackRock. The US may also target Peru’s Port of Chancay. Trump’s Latin America advisor, Mauricio Claver-Carone, once said, “Any product passing through Chancay or any port owned or controlled by China in the region should be subject to a 60% tariff”.

However, the availability of Chinese consumer goods in everyday life will remain largely unchanged. For instance, according to the Singapore-based market research firm Canalys, Chinese brands now command over 60 percent of the Latin American smartphone market. In Peru, that figure climbs to a staggering 70 percent. Besides, China’s largest carmaker, BYD already leads electric car sales in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Uruguay. Given that Latin American countries struggle to find substitutes for cheap and high-quality Chinese manufactured goods in the short term, the United States is unable to fully exclude China from the Latin American consumer market.

In conclusion, the rise of the “Donroe Doctrine” under Trump reflects the United States’ renewed focus on asserting regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere to secure economic and political interests. Operations like the strike in Venezuela demonstrate a willingness to manage migration pressures, control critical resources and limit rival influence, particularly from China. However, despite efforts to curb Chinese presence in strategic sectors, everyday life in Latin America continues to be shaped by Chinese consumer goods, like smartphones and electric vehicles. This suggests that US dominance may reshape geopolitics without fully displacing China’s entrenched economic and technological footprint in the region.

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ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me. Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com.

In this newsletter, we address concerns about China’s positions through a Q&A format, while also presenting key points of leading Chinese scholars’ commentaries. Through this series, we aim to provide policymakers, think tanks, and strategic communities overseas with access to Chinese scholars’ views, accompanied by curated academic perspectives that help readers better understand the considerations underlying China’s foreign policy choices.

Background

It is widely recognized that U.S.–Venezuela relations have long been tense. Yet although several previous U.S. presidents continuously sought to contain Venezuela, none ultimately chose a direct military invasion. Against this backdrop, the Trump administration’s decision to conduct a military strike and capture President Nicolás Maduro in January 2026 represents a significant departure from previous patterns of U.S. behavior.

In this context, today’s Ask China is based primarily on analyses by Chinese scholars to analyse this issue from three dimensions. First, how should the underlying objectives of the U.S. action be understood—was it driven by immediate tactical considerations, domestic political incentives, or broader strategic signaling? Second, does this shift indicate a deterioration of the international security environment more broadly, suggesting that the constraints imposed by international law and norms on the use of force are further eroding? Finally, does the sudden and decisive U.S. action against Venezuela signal a template that could be replicated elsewhere, raising concerns about whether future U.S.–China competition in other regions might increasingly unfold through similar high-risk, unilateral interventions?

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Trump intends to use the counternarcotics narrative to lower political costs. Counternarcotics has been a major policy priority since Trump took office. Through portraying Maduro as a narco-trafficker, Trump turned a counternarcotics crackdown into a signature achievement to build domestic support and strengthen his position ahead of the midterm elections.

The U.S. strike on Venezuela pursued several objectives. From a domestic political standpoint, Trump currently needs a win that is both measurable and highly visible. For him, 2026 brings two immediate tests: the January 20 milestone marking one year in office, and the U.S. midterm election. With unemployment rising at home and his pledge to end the Russia–Ukraine war still unfulfilled, he has strong incentives to pursue an external operation that can deliver clear, demonstrable results and showcase governing competence. Venezuela—repeatedly linked in his rhetoric to illegal immigration and drug trafficking—thus became a plausible target.

From an interest-group perspective, the Venezuela operation reflects substantial incentives for the military–industrial complex. Trump has reasons to appease the defense industry and hawkish domestic constituencies that benefit from sustained military engagement, and these actors can shape electoral outcomes through Super PACs. The U.S. military–industrial complex is deeply embedded in the political system via lobbying, revolving-door networks, and intelligence sharing; over the past eight years, it has donated more than $87 million to members of Congress. The Venezuela campaign, in turn, creates new contracts and market opportunities for defense firms.

From an economic standpoint, Trump’s attack at this time was aimed at obtaining Venezuela’s oil resources. By toppling Venezuela’s government, Washington could seize the opportunity to control oil resources and key ports, securing tangible economic gains. Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves—about 303 billion barrels, roughly 17% of global reserves. On the one hand, Trump has sought to bring U.S. oil majors back into Venezuela and commit billions of dollars to rebuilding its oil infrastructure. On the other hand, energy security is a core pillar of the United States’ manufacturing revitalization—especially the electricity demand and supply-security pressures created by AI supercomputing centers. Beyond oil, Venezuela is also a major holder of key minerals, including gold and aluminium. Because emerging critical technologies depend on stable access to such inputs, Venezuela’s energy and mineral endowments have become a prime object of Trump’s strategic-economic interest.

From a strategic perspective, the United States chose to strike Venezuela to preserve its regional hegemony. In the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy, Trump signaled an intent to return to the Western Hemisphere and advance an America First agenda. The Maduro government in Venezuela embraces an anti-interventionist posture that challenges U.S. primacy in Latin America—something Washington is unwilling to tolerate. At the same time, Venezuela maintains close ties with U.S. strategic competitors such as China and Russia and has leveraged its oil resources to support other actors in the region that have tense relations with the United States. Against this backdrop, military action against Venezuela would reinforce U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, deter anti-American forces, and provide political backing and security guarantees for pro-U.S. actors in the region.

Venezuela incident should not be seen as an isolated case of crisis management. Instead, it points to a broader change in how the United States conducts external intervention during a period of strategic retrenchment, with clear implications for regional instability.

This incident matters not mainly because of its immediate outcome, but because it helps explain a wider shift in U.S. strategy. The United States has not withdrawn from international affairs. Rather, it is reducing long-term institutional commitments while strengthening direct control over what it sees as core strategic areas and critical assets. Trump’s second term does not mean the end of U.S. hegemony. It reflects a change in how hegemony is exercised, with less reliance on multilateral institutions and long-term order-building, and greater use of lower-cost, more direct, and more coercive tools. In practice, the United States is scaling back its role as a provider of global public goods, while reinforcing exclusive control over the Western Hemisphere, key transport routes, strategic resources, and security depth.

Viewed in this context, the Venezuela case shows how this strategy is applied on the ground. The incident sets a practical precedent by lowering the political and institutional barriers for the United States to use direct force. It was not an accidental action, but part of a broader effort to refocus U.S. attention on the Western Hemisphere and reshape regional order. Unlike earlier approaches based mainly on sanctions or proxy competition, the United States is now combining military action, cross-border law enforcement, and narratives of “political transition”. By applying domestic legal logic to international issues, Washington blurs the line between war and law enforcement, and between sovereignty and jurisdiction. If this approach continues, regional states are likely to feel greater uncertainty about their sovereignty and security, and Venezuela is unlikely to be the last country affected.

The case also highlights the growing importance of resources and geography in triggering direct intervention. U.S. involvement in Venezuela is not only about politics, but also about control over energy resources and regional influence. By moving directly into the oil sector and promoting “transitional management”, the United States is testing a model that combines regime change, economic takeover, and strategic pressure in Latin America. When Venezuela is considered alongside Greenland, a clear pattern emerges. Areas rich in resources, located at strategic nodes, or controlling key routes, are increasingly treated as security issues. This trend pushes affected countries to rethink the stability of their sovereignty and to take more hedging measures in diplomacy, security, and economic policy.

Finally, at the level of global order and major-power relations, this approach leaves little room for ideas such as “great-power co-governance”. By bypassing multilateral institutions, deciding legitimacy on its own, and directly shaping political outcomes, the United States is promoting a more instrumental and exclusive view of international order. This weakens the predictability of international rules and deepens differences between China and the United States over how order should be managed, where intervention should stop, and how responsibility should be shared. As a result, the idea of a “Trump-style G2” lacks a solid foundation.

Accordingly, the Venezuela case should be understood as a signal rather than an exception. As multilateral constraints weaken and power politics return, the United States is more likely to use direct and coercive tools in regions it defines as central to its security. This trend creates long-term pressure for Latin America and may also appear in other strategically sensitive regions.

The U.S. raid on Venezuela and the forcible seizure of President Maduro—widely viewed as a grave violation of sovereignty and international law—cannot be treated as an isolated crisis. For China, relations with Venezuela, Latin America, and the United States must be understood as part of a single strategic environment shaped by Washington’s ongoing reconfiguration of its hegemonic model.

Politically, China must firmly uphold sovereign equality and non-interference, and oppose the U.S. practice of using domestic law and military force to override international law and remove foreign leaders. The Venezuela incident directly damages China’s all-weather strategic partnership with Caracas and reflects a form of new colonialism that exploits Latin America’s long-standing dependency. China should therefore work with regional states to resist the revival of a “new Monroe Doctrine” and to strengthen collective political autonomy through greater regional coordination.

Economically, China must urgently address the systemic risks to its investments and energy security. Venezuela’s core vulnerability lies in assets and jurisdiction, since U.S. courts and the dollar system can be used to strip foreign assets and weaponize finance. Given Venezuela’s vast oil reserves and China’s large-scale loans and investments, Beijing must hedge against legal and political expropriation by diversifying settlement systems, supply chains, and financial exposure, while prioritizing the safety of Chinese personnel and assets.

Regionally, the Venezuela case is accelerating strategic hedging across Latin America. U.S. coercive intervention is pushing regional states to seek greater legal, diplomatic, and economic autonomy. China should respond by embedding itself more deeply in regional development and trade networks, reducing reliance on politically fragile partners and limiting the effectiveness of U.S. point-pressure tactics.

At the global level, the crisis confirms that a “Trump’s G2” lacks foundation. The United States is bypassing multilateral rules and directly reshaping other countries’ politics, reflecting a more exclusive and coercive order fundamentally at odds with China’s emphasis on sovereignty and stability. China should therefore combine firm opposition to hegemonic intervention with pragmatic risk management, avoiding both accommodation and reckless confrontation.

In sum, China’s optimal strategy is to defend international law while restructuring its Latin American engagement in a more diversified, resilient, and institutionalized way, preserving strategic space under conditions of increasingly direct and unpredictable U.S. power.

The U.S. intervention in Venezuela and the forced removal of President Maduro represent more than a regional political upheaval; they constitute a paradigmatic case of contemporary great-power competition conducted through military coercion, financial instruments, and legal mechanisms rather than conventional warfare. As such, this conflict is highly likely to serve as a reference case for future U.S.–China strategic competition in other regions, including the Indo-Pacific, where similar patterns of indirect confrontation, institutional leverage, and economic pressure are already evident.

From the U.S. perspective, the Venezuela operation demonstrates a replicable model of enforcing strategic dominance without prolonged occupation, combining “surgical” military action with the weaponization of financial sanctions, extraterritorial legal jurisdiction, and control over global energy systems. This approach reflects the revival of a sphere-of-influence logic, explicitly articulated in the Trump administration’s embrace of a “new Monroe Doctrine” that defines entire regions as core strategic spaces requiring direct U.S. control or supervision. By reasserting primacy in what it considers its “home region,” the United States signals to both rivals and partners that challenges to its dominance—even when framed as economic or developmental cooperation—may provoke coercive responses beyond diplomatic or economic competition.

The Venezuelan case also illustrates how U.S. domestic law and judicial institutions have become integral tools of foreign policy, enabling the systematic transfer of foreign sovereign assets through American courts without formal annexation or long-term military presence. This fusion of legal authority and geopolitical strategy significantly lowers the threshold for intervention, as it allows the United States to undermine state sovereignty while maintaining a veneer of procedural legality. Such practices erode established norms of international law, particularly the prohibitions on the use of force, non-interference in internal affairs, and the immunity of sitting heads of state.

For China, the Venezuela crisis underscores the structural vulnerabilities inherent in overseas economic engagement when host-country assets, financial flows, and settlement mechanisms remain embedded within U.S.-dominated legal and monetary systems. Despite extensive Chinese investment and long-term energy cooperation with Venezuela, Beijing has been unable to shield its interests from unilateral U.S. actions, revealing the limits of purely economic statecraft in the absence of parallel legal, financial, and security safeguards. This experience is likely to inform China’s strategic calculations in the Indo-Pacific, where similar risks exist for infrastructure projects, energy routes, and financial arrangements involving third countries.

At a broader level, the Venezuela conflict highlights a shift in great-power rivalry away from direct military confrontation toward a form of legal and financial warfare, in which control over rules, institutions, and systems becomes more decisive than battlefield superiority. In the Indo-Pacific context, this suggests that U.S.–China competition will increasingly focus on shaping regional order through alliance structures, monetary systems, technology standards, and legal norms rather than through overt armed conflict. Consequently, third-party states may find their strategic autonomy constrained not by invasion, but by their degree of dependence on external legal jurisdictions, financial infrastructures, and security guarantees.

In conclusion, for both the United States and China, future strategic competition will hinge less on territorial control than on the ability to dominate systems of energy, finance, and international rule-making.

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ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by Liu Guozhu, which focuses on U. S. Industrial Policy and Supply Chains.

Summary

As the neoliberal paradigm in economic policy reaches its end, different camps in the United States have, in recent years, been exploring a new paradigm to address the threats posed by deindustrialization to America’s economic prosperity and security.

Represented by a new generation of Republican politicians, as well as scholars from think tanks, the new conservatives have put forward concepts such as “Pro-American industrial policy” and “national developmentalism.” They attempt to use federal public policies to promote industrial policy more proactively and on a larger scale, thereby rebuilding America’s manufacturing system. With the new conservatives occupying key decision-making positions within the second Trump Administration and more and more traditional conservatives fading out of mainstream politics, the new conservative industrial policy has not only exerted a significant impact on the industrial policy of the Trump Administration’s second term but has also driven the shift in the industrial policy consensus across the entire conservative camp. Together with liberals, the new conservatives have jointly promoted the formation of America’s new economic policy paradigm.

Why It Matters

The 2011 Occupy Wall Street movement placed the flaws of Neo-liberal economic policies in full view. The transformation of the economic policy paradigm has become a dominant policy consensus gradually formed by the major factions of the two major national political parties. Both parties have successively embarked on the path of exploring a new economic policy paradigm.

While Chinese academic circles have conducted some research into the transformation of the U.S.’ economic strategy and economic policy paradigms, they have overlooked the formation of a neoconservative faction within the conservative camp and its impact on the industrial policy of the Trump administration during its second term. This paper fills this research gap by analyzing the neoconservatives’ industrial policy concepts and the development trend of the Trump administration’s industrial policy in its second term under their influence.

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Key Points

1. Neoconservative Conceptualizations of Industrial Policy

The neoconservative camp consists of two main components: a new generation of Republican politicians such as Marco Rubio and J. D. Vance, and scholars from think tanks like American Compass. Their conceptualizations of industrial policy include the following components.

• Rejecting the free-market orthodoxy of the conservative establishment

In a process starting with the presidency of Ronald Reagan, the U.S. conservative camp had almost completely lost the core elements of conservatism, leading to blind faith in the free market. This in turn has resulted in the deindustrialization of American manufacturing and a sharp contraction in the job market, leaving the country’s social fabric eroded, lacking structural stability, and moving toward collapse. Based on this, neoconservatives argue that blind allegiance to the market cannot bring national prosperity, and they have revived the emphasis on the role of government planning.

• Constructing a new economic paradigm based on the “American System” and embodying traditional conservative values

To address the current challenges facing the United States, policymakers are adopting the theory of national developmentalism. Since its founding, the United States has relied on national developmentalism to achieve its rise, largely through tariff protectionism, the construction of a financial system, infrastructure investment, and government support for industrial development—historical experience has demonstrated its effectiveness. Specifically, national developmentalism advocates for government policies meticulously formulated and implemented by the state. With growth as the core, it involves designing effective policies targeting productivity, innovation, and competitiveness, cultivating enterprises so that they become strong and dynamic, and achieving synchronous development among freedom, prosperity, and national power.

• Building an industrial policy ecosystem

Neoconservatives focus not merely on industrial policy itself, but regard it as part of an integrated whole, seeking to create a healthy ecological environment for U.S. industrial development through federal public policies. From their perspective, the federal government should prioritize the following policy areas: first, expanding protectionist policies to promote the reshoring of manufacturing. Second, promoting large-scale industrial innovation. Third, prioritizing critical industries beyond the national defense industrial system and advanced manufacturing. Fourth, deregulating, particularly in the environmental realm where regulations impose significant constraints on manufacturing development. Fifth, implementing defense-driven industrial policies.

2. The Neoconservative-Influenced Industrial Policy of the Second Trump Administration

Compared with those in his first administration, the officials in Trump second administration are more aligned with neoconservative ideology. Consequently, the campaign platform of the Trump camp has essentially adopted the neoconservative conceptualization of industrial policy. Since assuming office for the second time, Trump has rolled out a series of manufacturing-related economic policies proposed in his campaign platform. These policies largely reflect the trends in the Trump administration’s conceptualizations industrial policy.

• Expanding the implementation of national protectionist measures

Under neoconservative influence, the Trump administration’s second term has significantly strengthened national protectionism, reshaping the U.S. manufacturing base through trade and procurement policies. Specifically, on one hand, it has reinforced the “Buy American” principle, reexamined and potentially adjusted or withdrawn from international procurement and defense agreements that weaken domestic manufacturing preferences, and leveraged the scale of federal procurement to provide stable demand for onshore production and supply chain security. On the other hand, it has raised import barriers through broader and higher-intensity tariff measures, forcing the reshoring of manufacturing. It has also used tariffs as a negotiating tool to urge major trading partners to invest directly in U.S. core industries. This form of protectionism does not merely pursue trade balance; rather, it regards persistent merchandise trade deficits as a record of national capacity failure, and aims to achieve the reshoring of manufacturing and the reconstruction of the U.S. manufacturing system.

• Prioritizing technological innovation in emerging industrial sectors

The government has explicitly prioritized support for the two key fields of AI and nuclear technology. It aims to address challenges in the technological domain by accelerating research and development, removing regulatory barriers, strengthening domestic supply chains and manufacturing, stimulating private-sector investment, promoting U.S. companies’ entry into global markets, and establishing new paradigms for research enterprises. In the field of AI, the government emphasizes eliminating administrative regulations that restrict innovation, advancing the coordinated development of research and development, data, applications, and manufacturing, and deeply integrating AI with national defense, manufacturing, and critical infrastructure through national-level action plans and financial investment. In the field of nuclear technology, the government focuses on energy security and strategic competitive needs, promoting the research, development and commercial deployment of next-generation nuclear reactor technologies to provide stable electricity for energy-intensive emerging industries and national security facilities.

• Supporting U.S. reindustrialization through defense-driven procurement

Stephen Moore, current Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), states that defense-oriented industrial policies can generate particularly significant positive economic spillover effects in technological progress, research and development, and investment. Furthermore, these policies possess a dual-use nature, capable of advancing both the development of national security and the reindustrialization process simultaneously. Consequently, the government has actively promoted defense-oriented industrial policies, including revitalizing the U.S. maritime industrial base, investing more funds in rebuilding the national defense industrial base, and fostering public-private partnerships between the Department of Defense and selected critical enterprises.

• Promoting the development of key industries

Since Trump’s return to the White House, three new industries have been added as federal priority areas. First, the AI industry: the government has launched the Win the Race: U.S. Artificial Intelligence Action Plan to secure U.S. global leadership and reshape related sectors via exporting U.S. AI products, accelerating data center development, promoting tech innovation, and removing restrictive regulations. Second, the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) industry: the administration issued an executive order to speed up the safe commercialization and domestic mass production of UAV technology, integrating it fully into the National Airspace System (NAS) to boost productivity in logistics, agriculture, emergency response, and other sectors, as well as create high-skill jobs. Third, the critical minerals industry: to eliminate external reliance and secure supply chains, the government has taken emergency steps, including simplifying mining permits, launching trade investigations, tapping offshore resource potential, easing project financing, and fast-tracking mineral projects, to boost domestic critical minerals production and processing capacity.

• Easing the regulations and restrictions that hinder industrial development

The Trump administration views overregulation as a major barrier to stifling innovation, investment, and economic growth. To this end, since its return to the White House, the administration has vigorously pursued regulatory reform: repealing burdensome regulations from the previous administration; removing barriers to development in sectors such as energy, natural resource extraction, AI, and digital assets; scrapping rules that drive up the prices of essential consumer goods; and establishing the “U.S. Investment Accelerator” to rapidly eliminate regulatory barriers for foreign investment. These measures aim to drastically simplify government regulations, reduce corporate compliance costs, and unlock market vitality.

3. Controversies over Neoconservative Industrial Policies and the Shift in Economic Policies of the Conservative Camp

• Controversies over neoconservative industrial policy pre-Trump 2.0

The traditional conservative camp roundly rejected neoconservative industrial policies, arguing that the federal government’s manufacturing policies are ineffective and unnecessary. It questioned Marco Rubio’s so-called “correct industrial policy,” maintaining that it could not solve America’s problems and that replacing China’s central planning with that of the U.S. is unacceptable. The camp accused Rubio’s America-first industrial policy of letting Washington bureaucrats decide what U.S. workers need, then picking winners and losers in the U.S. economy. It urged conservatives to wake up to the fact that the industrial policy pursued by Rubio had failed and would continue to fail. Additionally, the camp attacks neoconservative industrial policies as bearing the mark of progressivism, even embodying the key characteristics of socialist economic policies, and dismisses them as a foolish endeavor.

• Controversies surrounding the industrial policies of the Trump Administration’s Second Term

The conservative camp shares roughly the same perspective and degree of concern regarding the Trump administration’s industrial policies, both expressing worry that Trump will expand the implementation of protectionist measures—particularly that indiscriminate tariff wars will harm the development of U.S. advanced manufacturing. It criticizes Trump’s series of industrial policies as a break with traditional American capitalism, which would foster “crony capitalism” and ultimately undermine the global competitiveness of U.S. enterprises. The camp denounces Trump’s industrial policies as “moving toward state capitalism with American characteristics” or “a hybrid of state capitalism and socialism.”

• Neoconservatives: drivers of the paradigm shift in the economic policies of the conservative camp

The concepts and practices of neoconservative industrial policies are driving a fundamental paradigm shift in the economic policies of the conservative camp. While drawing criticism from traditional conservatives, the trend has become irreversible. Strengthening intervention in the economy, particularly industrial development, through federal public policies has emerged as a key feature of the Trump’s second administration. Today, Trump enjoys growing support from the increasingly powerful economic forces of the new right, and various policies aimed at rebuilding the U.S. manufacturing system have gained more advocates. Although neoconservatives do not believe they can reshape the Republican Party’s image and policies in the short term, they are convinced that, in time, they can alter the party’s agenda to better align with voters’ interests. Currently, neoconservative economic ideas have made significant headway in Washington. Clearly, under the interaction of internal and external environments, the economic policies of the conservative camp, especially its conceptualization of industrial policy, have been undergoing quiet changes.

Conclusion

The emergence of neoconservatives in U.S. intellectual and political circles coincided almost simultaneously with Trump’s rise in the U.S. political scene. It reflects the social reality that the neoliberal economic policies pursued since President Reagan have reached a dead end, prompting some political forces within the conservative camp to seek a new national governance model. As Trump returns to the political arena, the division within the U.S. conservative camp has further accelerated. Reaganite Republicans are gradually exiting the political stage. Neoconservative industrial policy will become the dominant economic philosophy of the Republican administration at a faster pace than Vance anticipated.

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About the Author

Liu Guozhu: Dr. Liu is a professor and researcher at Zhejiang University, and the Director of the Center for American Studies. His main research areas include US foreign relations, international relations, and non-traditional security issues. Liu’s research reports have been collected and reported by the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and CCTV.

About the Publication

The Chinese version of this article was published in The Chinese Journal of American Studies (《美国研究》) . Founded in 1987, The Chinese Journal of American Studies is an academic journal supervised by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and co-sponsored by the Institute of American Studies of CASS and the Chinese Association for American Studies (CAAS). It publishes articles by Chinese scholars on various aspects of American society, including U.S. politics, economy, diplomacy, military affairs, science and technology, culture, history, art, ideological trends, and other fields.

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Dear friends，

I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with Center for International Security and Security(CISS) of Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies, a visiting scholar at Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School in 2024 and Munich Young Leader 2025.

As we bid farewell to 2025 and welcome the promise of the year ahead, we would like to extend our sincere thanks for your continued support.

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China Scholar Insights is a feature which aimed at providing you with the latest analysis on issues that Chinese scholars and strategic communities are focusing on. We will carefully select commentary articles and highlight key points. Questions or criticisms can be directed to sch0625@gmail.com

I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University. ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu.

Background

On December 4, 2025, the White House unveiled its updated National Security Strategy Report, a document widely seen as the guiding framework for the Trump administration’s foreign policy in its second term. The report establishes a new and more complex framework for China-US relations, defining that competition will primarily revolve around economic security, supply chain restructuring, and dominance in high technology, while also defining the boundaries between competition and cooperation. The impact of the report extends far beyond bilateral China-US relations and is actively reshaping the global landscape.

Summary

Scholars assessing the new U.S. National Security Strategy generally view its “America First” strategic retrenchment not as abandoning global hegemony, but as selective resource prioritization and cost optimization to sustain long-term great power competition. They note economic security and technology competition are now central to U.S. strategy toward China. Experts warn that Washington’s push for allied burden-sharing in the Indo-Pacific, alongside increasingly ambiguous security commitments, could intensify regional security dilemmas and elevate risks in flashpoints like the Taiwan Strait. Finally, effectively countering Western narrative dominance by systematically articulating policy positions is crucial to navigating the intensified perception competition accompanying these strategic shifts.

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Insights

Yuan Zheng & Wei Zongyou: U.S. New National Security Strategy Report Released: Strategic Retrenchment or ‘Retreat to Advance’? Expert Interpretations

The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy signals a selective, interest-driven recalibratiing: Washington is narrowing its priorities and responsibilities under “America First,” yet it is not abandoning hegemony. Instead, it is concentrating resources on what it defines as core interests while reducing commitments elsewhere—an approach likely to strain alliances and complicate global governance.

A Strategic Reprioritization Shaped by Nationalism and Transactional Realism

The new strategy reflects an inward-looking security outlook with strong nationalist—and even populist—overtones. It reprioritizes from broad global engagement to homeland and near-abroad concerns, advancing a “Western Hemisphere first” agenda that treats border control, counternarcotics, and preventing extra-regional influence as central interests. The report also elevates economic security—reindustrialization, supply-chain “de-risking,” and maintaining U.S. advantages in advanced technology, manufacturing, critical minerals, and energy. According to a realist worldview, it emphasizes sovereignty and competition among states, downplays ideological “democracy promotion,” and portrays global politics as a bargining arena in which power functions as currency.

Not Letting Go of Hegemony: Limited Responsibility and “Selective Dominance”

The U.S. is not truly giving up global primacy; rather, it is moving from an expansionary model toward a more protective and selective form of hegemony. Under resource constraints and domestic pressure, the strategy adopts “limited responsibility”: concentrating investments in priority regions and domains, while asking allies to shoulder more costs and reducing attention to areas deemed non-core. Strategic contraction is therefore conditional—paired with efforts to preserve decisive control in the Western Hemisphere and to sustain leadership in high-end technology, finance, energy, and other core sectors. This recalibration is both a response to perceived limits of capacity and a way to accumulate strength for long-term great-power competition.

Negative Spillovers: Alliance Frictions and Global Governance Headwinds

The shift is expected to deepen strains within U.S. alliance networks. Demands for allies’ higher defense spending and stronger policy alignment—combined with pressure on trade, investment, and other issues—may widen transatlantic cracks and generate dissatisfaction among Asia-Pacific allies. Globally, skepticism toward multilateralism and reduced willingness to provide public goods could inject instability into international institutions and increase uncertainty, while supply-chain security policies may accelerate fragmentation. At the same time, the report’s weaker emphasis on ideological export may marginally expand room for managing competition, but the overall trajectory points to greater volatility in alliances and global governance.

FU Xiaoqiang: New Trends in Hegemonic Logic: An Interpretation of the United States’ New National Security Strategy

The new National Security Strategy (NSS), centered on “strength advantage” and operationalized through “policy preference”, seeks to construct a new framework for sustaining U.S. hegemonyamid accelerating global power shifts. While carrying forward the political promise of “Make America Great Again,” the new NSS aims to systematically reshape U.S. hegemonic status. It is bound to generate complex and profound implications.

Three New Characteristics: America First Value Orientation, Hard-Power–Centered Advantage Building, and Pragmatic Policy Prioritization

The first notable characteristic of the new strategy is its explicit “America First” value orientation. The NSS defines the survival and security of the United States as an independent sovereign republic as the paramount national objective. In practice, this translates into prioritizing homeland security through stricter border controls, restrictive immigration policies, and the reconstruction of the defense industrial base. Economically, the strategy advances a form of economic nationalism, justified by “rebalancing global trade relations” and implemented through tariffs and industrial subsidies to encourage reshoring.. It also elevates the primacy of nation-state sovereignty as a fundamental principle of foreign policy and adopts a skeptical stance toward multilateralism and supranational institutions.

Second, the strategy frames domestic strength advantage as the material foundation of hegemony, emphasizing military deterrence, technological leadership, and energy independence as core pillars. This hard-power–centered approach seeks comprehensive leadership in key domains and consolidates hegemonic foundations through exclusive advantages.

Third, it embraces a pragmatic orientation, transcending the “liberal democratic” framework to prioritize strategic choices rooted in core national interests with flexible adjustments to foreign policies and cooperation boundaries enhancing the targeting and effectiveness of U.S. actions.

The Triple “Rebalancing” Logic: Economics, Geopolitics, and Alliances

The deep logic of NSS reflects a triple “rebalancing” intended to sustain U.S. dominance through cost control, risk contraction and responsibility sharing. In economic and trade relations, it rejects free-trade orthodoxy in favor of protectionist measures— aimed at addressing deindustrialization and widening trade deficits, structural ills stemming from neoliberal-driven globalization—even at the cost of global economic coordination efficiency. In geopolitical posture，the NSS reallocates strategic resources by elevating the Western Hemisphere, reaffirming the Monroe Doctrine, whilenarrowing U.S. interests in Europe toward ceasefire and stability and de-emphasizing ideological agendas in the Middle East and Africa in favor of interest-based cooperation. . For the alliance system, the United States seeks to shift greater security responsibilities and costs onto allies while retaining decisive control, thereby reducing the financial and military burdens of hegemony.

Strategic Shifts Toward China: From Comprehensive Competition to Sector-Focused Rivalry, From Value-Driven to Interest-Oriented Policy

The NSS signals important adjustments in the U.S.—China policy. At the strategic cognitive level, it acknowledges that China and the U.S. are “nearly evenly matched.” In terms of competition focus, the NSS shifts from comprehensive confrontation toward concentrated competition in economic and technological domains, reflecting recognition of the high costs of full decoupling. For tactics application, the United States increasingly relies on flexible, lower-cost tools, including the instrumentalization of the Taiwan issue, a practice that risks undermining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

Essentially, the new National Security Strategy reflects U.S. systematically adjusting traditional hegemonic tactics for core national interests, with unilateral and exclusive traits. It fails to resolve domestic structural issues, undermines multilateralism, and fuels instability. The stability and development of China-US relationship must be based on mutual respect, coexistence and win-win cooperation.

Shao Yuqun: The New U.S. Strategy and the Western Cognitive Cocoon on Taiwan

How to Understand the Attitudes of Japan and the Taiwan Authorities Toward the U.S. National Security Strategy?

The new U.S. National Security Strategy underscores an explicit “America First” orientation. Its policy signals that the U.S. Prioritizes U.S.-China relations over U.S.-Japan relations, and that the expansion of unofficial ties with Taiwan must not not come at the expense of U.S.–China relations. For President Trump, the immediate priority is to ensure a smooth China visit next spring, so he prefers that neither the Taiwan factor nor U.S.–Japan frictions disrupt this objective.

Japan and Taiwan therefore read the NSS as a negative signal—“a minus point” for both. Both also have domestic incentives to amplify U.S. statements to reassure their publics and sustain internal narratives of external support.

The U.S. demands that Japan assume greater defense responsibilities and directly confront frontline risks, which has sparked internal tension in Japan. President Trump has not explicitly committed to defending Taiwan, which leaves the DPP authorities uneasy. Their recent attempts to convey messages through U.S. media have yielded limited results.

Japan and Taiwan’s recent sensationalization of the PLA aircraft carrier Liaoning and related drills serves to reassure domestic audiences and offset the negative impact of the new NSS.

Can Trump Reach Any New Understanding with China on Taiwan?

This report does not mention opposition to “ Taiwan independence “ movements . A potential Trump 2.0 administration shows no intention of fully articulating the U . S .” one - China policy .” Its interpretation of “ maintaining the status quo “ in the Taiwan Strait is limited to “ avoiding military conflict ,” displaying little concern over whether Taiwan authorities pursue “ independence .” However, the U.S. government has consistently “ militarized “ the Taiwan question , which risks exacerbating regional security tensions .

Trump is reluctant to proactively address the Taiwan question and must balance the interests of such a visit with the Republican Party ‘ s midterm elections . Key indicators to watch regarding his stance on Taiwan include : first, whether to allow Lai Ching-te to transit U.S. territory; second, the intensity of arms sales to Taiwan.

Pro-Taiwan forces in the U.S. Congress have been pushing relevant agendas. If the Republican Party loses the 2026 midterm elections, the legislature’s negative meddling in cross-Strait issues will likely intensify.

How Can China Break Through the Western “Information Cocoon”?

Misunderstandings toward a rising China are, to some extent, natural, and China and the world must adapt to each other. The current key challenge lies in the information gap: many Western audiences are unaware of the substance of mainland China’s current policy toward Taiwan, such as promoting cross-Strait integrated development and encouraging Taiwan compatriots to live, work, study, and travel on the mainland, while Western media coverage over-focuses on military movements and reinforces one-sided perceptions.

The proposed remedy is to communicate China’s stance and policy on the Taiwan question clearly, in accessible terms and through relevant channels, in order to foster a more objective understanding within the international community.

Li Haidong: The United States’ New National Security Strategy and Strategic Realignment
A Structural Shift in American Foreign and Security Policy

A Structural Shift in U.S. National Security Thinking

The new U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) marks a fundamental departure from the globalist framework that has guided American foreign and security policy for more than three decades. It sends a clear signal that the United States no longer intends to take sole responsibility for maintaining global orders. Instead, the strategy emphasizes national interests and strategic selectivity, reflecting a major change in how the U.S. positions itself within a changing international environment.

From Globalism to Nationalism

At the core of the new strategy is a decisive shift away from elite-driven globalism toward a nationalist orientation centered on sovereignty, national identity, and core interests. International cooperation based on global norms is increasingly de-emphasized, while “America First” principles guide policy priorities such as border security, economic resilience, and supply-chain protection. According to the author, this transformation represents a relative strategic contraction rather than a comprehensive withdrawal from global affairs. It also reflects a rejection of the globalization and free-trade framework long associated with that globalist approach.

Regional Refocusing and the Western Hemisphere

Another defining feature of the NSS is the repositioning of the Western Hemisphere as the central focus of U.S. global strategy. By reinterpreting the Monroe Doctrine, the United States reinforces its leadership role and perceived right to intervene in the Americas. This adjustment illustrates a shift from global dominance toward region-centered influence management, reflecting changing power dynamics and strategic constraints.

A Recalibrated but Competitive China Policy

Compared with the 2017 and 2021 NSS documents, the new strategy adopts a more sober and realistic assessment of China. It recognizes that U.S.–China relations have evolved into a near-peer relationship rather than an asymmetric one. On this basis, it signals an intention to adjust economic relations with China on the principles of reciprocity and equality. Nevertheless, the stated objective of restoring U.S. economic autonomy indicates that strategic competition with China remains central, taking the form of long-term coexistence accompanied by intensified rivalry.

Economic Security and Technological Rivalry

The report places strong emphasis on building independent supply chains in sectors related to national defense and security. It also underscores the determination to maintain absolute advantages in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology, and space. These priorities are likely to intensify technological competition between the two countries and increase the risk of partial decoupling within global industrial and innovation networks.

Adjustment without Transformation

Overall, the new NSS outlines an approach aimed at preserving U.S. influence through resource reallocation, selective engagement, and a focus on core interests. While the strategy appears more pragmatic in tone, its underlying logic, centered on great-power competition, regional dominance, and technological privilege remains largely unchanged. As such, this shift is more about how things are done than what is actually done, and it may be hard to put into practice.

Chen Wenxin and others: An Interpretation of the United States’ New National Security Strategy

The new U.S. National Security Strategy report is the guiding framework of the Trump administration’s “America First” doctrine. It prioritizes core national interests, the economy, and the Western Hemisphere, advocating the “Monroe Doctrine” and “non-interventionism,” marking a major shift in U.S. national security strategy since the end of the Cold War.

China Strategy: Competitive Posture and Key Issues

The strategy identifies the “Indo-Pacific region” as a “critical economic and geopolitical battleground,” signaling intensified U.S. competition around China. However, its tone toward China is relatively restrained, avoiding labels such as “primary strategic competitor” or “revisionist state,” and refraining from ideological framing. The characterization of U.S.-China relations as “near-peers” reflects the Trump administration’s recognition of China’s growing strength. From this basis, new strategic adjustments are emerging, with competition in the economy, technology, supply chains, and strategic channels becoming central to bilateral relations.

Southeast Asia: Anxiety and Marginalization

Southeast Asia responds with “no surprise but greater anxiety,” feeling marginalized in the document. It reinforces U.S. security dominance in Asia-Pacific while emphasizing burden-sharing or shifting, disregarding regional stability to maintain deterrence along the first island chain. It also “securitizes” economic tools—tariffs, export controls, and supply-chain reshoring—and pressures ASEAN states to pick sides in key technologies (e.g., semiconductors and subsea cables).

India: Mixed Reactions and Transactional Friction

India shows mixed reactions with relatively polarized evaluations. While its foreign ministry highlights U.S. recognition of India’s importance, many Indian media note cooled rhetoric and a more transactional approach. India’s repeated denial of Trump’s mediation in India-Pakistan conflicts reflects domestic political factors and ongoing bilateral friction.

Japan and South Korea: Alliance Concerns and Autonomy Dilemma

Japan and South Korea, with different focuses, worry that Trump’s “new isolationism” may compromise their interests by raising their security costs. Japan focuses on the softened tone toward China and Russia, while South Korea fears its military could be leveraged against China and is concerned over the omission of North Korea. Generally, it is considered that their uncertainty and unease would persist as long as they keep their reliance solely on the U.S. alliance while giving up autonomous efforts to shape their security environment.

Russia: Cautious Optimism and Implementation Doubts

Russia adopts a “wait-and-see” stance, viewing the report positively for acknowledging the decline of the U.S.-led global order, showing pragmatism, and signaling openness to dialogue. However, it remains cautious regarding implementation, noting the U.S. is unprepared for serious strategic stability talks and may target Russia’s energy influence.

Latin America: Heightened Control and Securitization

For Latin America, the strategy implies strengthened U.S. control over the Western Hemisphere amid global retrenchment. It frames regional dominance as solving U.S. domestic problems, asserts hegemony over key passages and resources, and justifies enhanced military deployments through “securitization,” including the claimed right to use lethal force.

Meng Weizhan：When America Embraces “Recuperation”: The Long-Term Strategy Behind Trump’s New National Security Approach

Strategic Core: Reducing Commitments to Rebuild Strength

Trump’s second-term national security strategy is fundamentally a “recuperation” doctrine. It aims to deliberately scale back America’s global security commitments and military engagements. The objective is to curb excessive strategic overextension, conserve national strength, and concentrate resources on rebuilding comprehensive power for future great power competition.

Primary Target: Re-centering Long-Term Competition on China

A pivotal adjustment involves redefining the primary strategic competitor. The strategy softens its rhetoric toward Russia and signals interest in dialogue and strategic stability, potentially seeking stabilization or even a modus vivendi in Europe. This allows the U.S. to reallocate its strategic focus and resources decisively toward the Indo-Pacific region, targeting China as the principal long-term challenger.

Implementation Methods: Leveraging Allies and Selective Pressure

Washington plans to achieve strategic retrenchment by compelling its allies to assume greater defense burdens and responsibilities. Concurrently, the U.S. will employ targeted, high-intensity pressure on specific adversarial points. This combination creates strategic breathing space, enabling internal consolidation and the accumulation of momentum for a protracted contest.

Ultimate Objective: Reshaping the Future International Order

This is not isolationism but a calculated long-term play. The final goal is to overcome the current phase of strategic “exhaustion.” By recuperating and accumulating strength, America seeks to reclaim overwhelming strategic initiative and dominance. The aim is to decisively shape a new international political and security order that aligns with its core interests in the coming decades.

Conclusion

The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy signals a pivotal shift toward a hardened, interest-based realism. This refocusing on economic and technological competition with China, coupled with demands for allied burden-sharing, redefines America’s global posture. It aims to forge a more sustainable hegemony but risks fueling regional instability and fragmenting international order. Navigating this era requires China to bolster its resilience, manage complex alliance dynamics, and articulate a compelling strategic narrative amidst intensified systemic rivalry.

Editors for Today’s Newsletter:

SUN Chenghao, LI Xinyi, SHAO Yujie, Stefanie Perner, Zhang Xinyue, LIU Zhuofan, CHEN Weng U, Yamada Yumi, ZHANG Xueyu

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China Scholar Insights is a feature which aimed at providing you with the latest analysis on issues that Chinese scholars and strategic communities are focusing on. We will carefully select commentary articles and highlight key points. Questions or criticisms can be directed to sch0625@gmail.com

I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University. ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu.

Summary

Chinese Scholars broadly agree that the collective rise of the Global South marks a fundamental shift toward multipolarity, weakening long-standing Western dominance. This surge is amplified by expanded South-South cooperation and institutions like BRICS, enabling the bloc to better advocate for a more equitable global power structure.

China, as a member of the Global South, has effectively facilitated the development of countries in the region by adhering to multilateralism and advancing pragmatic cooperation initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative. Despite significant opportunities, persistent challenges remain, driven by internal inequalities, economic fragility, and intensifying geopolitical headwinds.

Sustained progress depends on enhanced solidarity and pragmatic collaboration within the Global South. China’s role is seen as constructive—promoting mutual benefit, dialogue, and incremental reform of the international order.

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Insights

LUO Jianbo: Interpreting the Collective Rise of the Global South as a Defining Hallmark of our Era’s Profound Transfomation

As Chinese President Xi Jinping has pointed out, the collective rise of the Global South stands as a defining hallmark of our era’s profound transformation. It is reshaping the landscape of the global economy and international politics. A global governance system encompassing multiple actors, dimensions, and fields is gradually taking shape.

As a natural member of the Global South, China remains committed to advancing shared development with fellow nations. It is believed that China will play an even greater role in fostering the unity and revitalization of the Global South.

The Collective Rise of the Global South

Despite current global economic headwinds, China remains to be a major driver and significant engine, injecting crucial stability into the uncertain world economy. From “the hopeless continent” to “the hopeful continent”, several African countries have demonstrated sound development trends, emerging as new growth points of the global economy. As a crucial force for the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America in the past, today’s Global South focuses on the economic development and national rejuvenation, contributing new strength to the true revitalization today.

The Collective Rise of the Global South and Its Profound Global Impact

The collective rise of the Global South is not just a matter for developing nations, but a transformative force reshaping the global order and the future of international relations.

The centuries-old “center-periphery” system is shifting, moving toward genuine multipolarity. Many nations have found their own successful paths, altering the modern world’s wealth distribution for the first time. On issues like Ukraine and Gaza, many Global South countries pursue independent policies, resisting Western pressure.

A new pattern of mutual learning among human civilizations is taking shape. Developing nations increasingly see modernization as an autonomous quest, not synonymous with Westernization. Seeking systems suited to their own conditions, countries like China demonstrate success through alternative models.

Reforms for a fairer global governance system are underway. As developing countries now having greater influence in international affairs, the norms and principles of global governance are also evolving rapidly. Unlike unilateralism or zero-sum thinking, principles championed by China, such as mutual respect and win-win cooperation are gaining growing support and significant global influence.

Contributing Greater Chinese Strength to the Solidarity and Revitalization of the Global South

China places the Global South at the heart of its diplomacy, striving to pool its mighty strength to jointly build a community with a shared future for mankind. As the world’s largest developing country, China can play a unique role in the promotion of the Global South.

The vision of a community with a shared future for mankind builds a new path for solidarity and cooperation, where China calls for mutual respect and collaboration among all nations. To address common global challenges, China has proposed the Global Development, Security, Civilization, and Governance Initiatives, upholding true multilateralism, opposing economic decoupling, and ensuring globalization benefits developing countries. Guided by a correct approach to justice and interests, exemplified by zero-tariff policies for least-developed nations, China advocates the principle of extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits.

Jointly building the Belt and Road achieves common development. The combined imports and exports between China and the countries involved in the initiative account for more than 50% of China’s total imports and exports. The cooperation not only provides China for new economic expansion, but also gives the Global South a significant cooperation platform and crucial development motivation, even contributing to the global economic recovery.

SONG Wei：The Global South Advances the Evolution of the World Configuration

The Global South, as a coalition of states united byshared interests in the international order, advocates politically for anti-colonialism, sovereign equality, and non-interference politically; opposes neo-colonialism while pursues mutually beneficial economic development; and calls for differentiated responsibilities as well as a stronger voice in global governance. These common interests bind the countries of the Global South into a cohesive whole, enabling them to speak with a common voice in the international order. Since the end of World War II, the evolution of the Global South’s collective strength can be broadly divided into four phases.

Phase I: Formation of the Global South as a Political Force

The formation of the Global South began in the aftermath of World War II and accelerated throughout the mid-1960s, when national liberation movements gave rise to numerous new independent states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. They substantively altered the post-World War II situation where Western countries monopolized international affairs. The Bandung Conference held in 1955 is the first large-scale international conference held by Asian and African countries and regions without the participation of colonial powers. Meanwhile, the founding of the People’s Republic of China greatly strengthened the power of the Global South.

Phase II:Emergence on the Global Stage Through Unity and Self-Strengthening.

From the 1960s to the late 1980s, the Global South began to play a more active role in international institutions. By leveraging its numerical strength, it pushed for reforms such as amendments to the UN Charter and expanded the membership of the Security Council. Their collective stance prevented major powers from dominating those international organizations that adopt the “one country, one vote” decision-making method. The Eight Principles for Foreign Economic and Technical Assistance proposed by China emphasize equality, non-interference in internal affairs, and not attaching any political conditions. During this period, the Global South substantively transformed the world pattern and the world order of that era.

Phase III: Accelerated Rise Driven by the Economic Ascent of China and the “BRICS” Nations

From the end of the Cold War to 2012, rapid economic growth—especially China’s rise to the world’s second-largest economy—reshaped global power balances. The emergence and institutionalization of the concept of “BRICS” provided a relatively coherent framework for coordination for the Global South. The evolution from the G7 to the G20 demonstrated that representative major countries within the Global South had gained the capacity to to jointly discuss and decide global affairs alongside Western developed nations,reflecting the broader trend of “the East rising and the West declining.”

Phase IV: A New Phase of Multipolar Evolution

Since 2013, the rise of the Global South has entered a new phase. From a long-term perspective, multipolarity has become a fundamental trend in the development of internatinal stystem, with the United States, China, Russia, Japan, India, and the European Union emerging as potential key poles, particularly China and India. Through initiatives such as the Belt and Road, China is increasingly providing international public goods and moving closer to the center of the world stage. As long as countries of the Global South can unite, strengthen themselves, and continuously enhance their capabilities, the long-standing dominance of Western nations over the world order and global landscape will continue to be weakened and transformed.

Challenges to the Rise of the Global South

Economically, the Global South faces challenges in maintaining sustainable economic growth and social stability amid rising trade protectionism and unfavorable international trade conditions. Strategically, the test lies in whether its member countries can unite as one, seek common ground while preserving differences, forge a unified force in global governance, and speak with a collective voice. In this process, China’s stability and development serve as a ballast stone and stabilizer.

WANG Min：China and Global South——a major role change in the era of globalization

Over the past 45 years, China has transformed from a closed low-income economy into a major open economy and trading power. Its rapid rise has significantly boosted the weight of middle-income economies in the world economy and weakened the previously centre–periphery structure.

Deepening Trade and Evolving Comparative Advantage

Trade expansion is a key channel of China–Global South cooperation. By 2023, exports had reached USD 3.56 trillion and imports USD 2.71 trillion, about 15% and 11% of global totals. Low- and middle-income economies now account for a rising share of this trade and already exceed high-income partners in China’s imports. The composition of trade has shifted from importing capital and intermediate goods and exporting labour-intensive consumer goods to high-income markets, to a pattern in which China imports raw materials and exports capital goods. Between 2000 and 2023, the share of Global South economies in China’s capital-goods exports rose from 16.5% to 41.5%, while their share in China’s raw-materials imports jumped from 14.4% to 69%. This two-way flow links China’s industrial transformation with the Global South’s industrialization needs, turning trade into a channel for capacity-building.

Outward Investment, Industrial Relocation and South-South linkages

By the end of 2023, China’s cumulative outward FDI had reached almost USD 3 trillion, with annual flows of over USD 170 billion，already exceeding inward FDI and marking a shift from being mainly a capital-importing country to a major outward investor. At the same time, the structure has changed: the share of cross-border M&A has fallen, while greenfield investment has become the main form of outward investment. Manufacturing investment—surpassing mining—has become a key channel for China’s industrial relocation. China’s industrial relocation now follows a “four-direction” pattern, with Chinese firms investing simultaneously in Southeast and South Asia, Africa, Central Asia, and South America, including in regions next to US and EU markets. Together, China’s industrial relocation and infrastructure financing are helping reshape development pathways across the Global South.

Structural Constraints and Operational Challenges

Despite this dense web of trade and investment, China–Global South economic linkages face serious constraints. External debt in developing economies rose from USD 3.87 trillion in 2010 to USD 8.84 trillion in 2023, but Chinese official lending accounts for only about 5% of the total, calling the so-called “Chinese debt-trap” narratives into question. The deeper bottlenecks are largely domestic: low savings and capital shortages, weak human capital and productivity, macroeconomic fragility (especially exchange-rate volatility), and governance deficits. These structural constraints—not China’s involvement per se—remain the primary obstacles to turning China–Global South trade, investment, and infrastructure initiatives into sustained, development-enhancing cooperation.

XU Feibiao: The G20 Summit and Global Governance Reform Driven by the Global South

Bilateral Reset and Economic Consensus

The 100-minute dialogue focused on the long-term direction of China-U.S. relations and confirmed progress in trade negotiations previously held in Kuala Lumpur. The United States agreed to withdraw the so-called “fentanyl tariff” and to suspend the 50% penetration export-control rule for one year., while China implemented reciprocal measures. The cordial tone and balanced outcomes underscored renewed momentum after months of diplomatic tension, signaling that both sides recognize the value of stability over confrontation.

From Strategic Friction to Pragmatic Engagement

The Busan summit reflected a cautious yet meaningful strategic recalibration in China-U.S. relations. President Xi urged both sides to approach differences with rationality and to focus on the “big picture” — to “keep the long-term and overall interests in mind” — turning friction into cooperation.He emphasized that economic relations should act as a ballast and driver for bilateral stability. President Trump echoed that “dialogue is better than confrontation,” indicating readiness for renewed engagement. Analysts noted Beijing’s calm confidence in pursuing mutual benefit while advancing its modernization goals. Trump’s “G2 is coming!” remark—though symbolic—suggested interest in great-power coordination. Scholars foresee expanding cooperation beyond trade, in areas such as AI governance, public health, and regional stability in Ukraine and the Middle East, reviving long-dormant channels of dialogue.

Toward a Mutually Reinforcing Partnership

The Xi–Trump meeting sent a constructive signal of resilience in China-U.S. relations. Both sides recognized that stabilizing and advancing the relationship will require continued effort. They also identified three clear directions for future engagement. First, they will expand dialogue from trade issues to broader areas such as law enforcement, public health and emerging technologies. Second, they will strengthen coordination on regional and global challenges including Ukraine, the Middle East and humanitarian crises. Third, they emphasized the importance of maintaining regular and institutionalized communication between the two leaders. President Xi’s statement that “China has never sought to challenge or replace anyone, but to do its own job well and share development opportunities”underscores that China and the United States are not destined for a zero-sum rivalry and that both countries can achieve success through mutual benefit.

JIA Qingguo: Implications of Chinese Modernization for Global South Countries

Understanding Chinese Modernization

Chinese modernization is a socialist path led by the Communist Party of China, defined by its vast population scale, pursuit of common prosperity for all, coordination between material and spiritual advancement, harmony between humanity and nature, and a commitment to peaceful development. It integrates China’s unique historical, cultural, and institutional strengths into its development process, adhering to a people-centered approach and promoting comprehensive progress through reform, opening-up, and independent innovation. Departing from the Western model centered on capital, polarization, and expansion, it pursues high-quality development alongside fairness and justice. While maintaining its independence, it offers a new alternative for global modernization. It is both the essential path to achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and a practical contribution to building a community with a shared future for mankind.

Implications for Global South Countries

As the largest developing country, China has risen from poverty to become the world’s second-largest economy. China’s trajectory demonstrates that modernization can be achieved through independent, endogenous effortswithin the global system. This offers inspiration and confidence to Global South countries.

Key Strategies from China’s Experience

First, pursuean independent development path grounded in national realities rather than imported prescriptions. Second, leverage opening-up and comparative advantages to connect with global capital, technology, and markets. Third, adopt gradual reform, starting with pilot projects. Fourth, balance reform, development, and stability to ensure sustainable growth.

Opportunities for Cooperation

China can leverage its captial, technology, and industrial capacity to support infrastructure and emerging sectors across the Global South. In return, these countries offer markets and resources. Politically, China supports their sovereignty and amplifies their voice internationally, with most adhering to the One-China principle. Together, they can reform global institutions, amplify the voice of developing countries, and promote joint responses to climate change and energy transitions.

Addressing Challenges

Key challenges include Western attempts to sow division, persistent political instability in partner countries, and investment and coordination risks. To build a win-win partnership, both sides should enhance dialogue, expand economic and technological cooperation, and coordinate on global governance. Trade imbalances and responsibilities must be managed fairly. China will focus on its own development while proposing constructive initiatives. Through sustained dialogue and institutionalized cooperation, a stable and mutually beneficial partnership can take shape.

XIAO Wei: The “Global South” as the Key Player in a Changing World

A Structural Force in Global Change

The world is undergoing major geopolitical shifts. The rise of the Global South is reshaping the post–Cold War order long dominated by the West. The Global South is not just a geographic term but a political and economic actor seeking fairness in global governance. At the same time, the world still faces serious “four deficits” in peace, development, security and governance, and the Global South has become an important force in constraining Cold War thinking, unilateralism and hegemony. China shares common priorities of peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit, and works with the Global South to advance genuine multilateralism and international reform.

From the Periphery to a Driver of Reform

Evolving from the concept of the “Third World,” the Global South has increased its influence through UNCTAD, the G77, and the G20. Its rise is supported by a growing population and economic weight, and it now provides a strong voice questioning Western-centric neoliberal rules and institutions.

A Strategic Actor Shaping World Order

Since the 2008 financial crisis, emerging economies have become major engines of global development. The expansion of BRICS and the African Union’s entry into the G20 symbolize a broader institutional presence. Yet internal diversity in development levels, governance systems, and geopolitical interests makes unified action difficult. A core feature highlighted by the author is that many Global South countries maintain strategic autonomy by upholding non-alignment and rejecting a “new Cold War,” resisting pressure to take sides. Western countries have responded with competition and attempts to divide the Global South, especially through Indo-Pacific strategies designed to counter emerging power centers.

Putting Development Back at the Center

Many Global South countries still face severe development imbalances which the author identifies as the greatest imbalance in today’s world. Poverty, weak infrastructure and limited industrial upgrading persist, while debt burdens and significant financing gaps constrain the ability to invest in long-term development.Climate change impacts are heavier in the South, yet finance and technological support remains insufficient. A widening digital divide furtherrestricts participation in global data governance, and governance capacity gaps continue to limit these countries’ influence in shaping international rules.

China’s Role in a Fairer Global Order

The collective rise of the Global South is becoming a key force shaping global transformation. The next challenge is to translate this strength into institutional influence and restore development as a core global agenda. China supports the UN-centered international system, international law–based order, UN Security Council reform, stronger multilateral cooperation, and the protection of Global South interests. Through these efforts, China aims to work with the Global South to build a more just and equitable international order.

Conclusion

The collective rise of the Global South reshapes world order as a core trend of global transformations, moving the world toward genuine multipolarity. While this shift reduces traditional Western dominance, it also presents complex challenges of internal cohesion and external pressure for the emerging bloc. China plays a constructive role via multilateralism and pragmatic cooperation. Ultimately, addressing internal divergences and external interference while advancing equitable global governance remains imperative to foster an equitable and inclusive international system.

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Editors for Today’s Newsletter:

SUN Chenghao, SHAO Yujie, Stefanie Perner, LI Xinyi, Zhang Xinyue, LIU Zhuofan, CHEN Weng U, Yamada Yumi, ZHANG Xueyu