Welcome to the 82ed edition of our weekly newsletter! I’m , a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies, a visiting scholar at Yale Law School in 2024 and Munich Young Leader 2025.

ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, , and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by SUN Haiyong on the Return of Geopolitics, International Competition for Critical Minerals and Supply Chain Restructuring.

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Summary

The shifting power balance among major powers is intensifying global geopolitical competition, leading to restructuring pressures for the global supply chains of critical minerals. During this period, the priority of major powers on critical mineral supply chains has shifted from efficiency to security. The energy transition process, which relies on critical minerals, is increasingly linked to the geopolitical competition among major powers. Additionally, the critical mineral supply chain policies pursued by the United States and its key allies, as well as some mineral-rich countries, are motivated by “resource nationalism”, and misaligned with their respective industrial endowments. All these factors are shaping the critical mineral development and cooperation policies of raw material-importing and end-product-consuming countries, as well as major mineral-rich countries.

In the process of geopolitical return, Western countries led by the United States are attempting to build critical mineral supply chains that significantly reduce China’s influence and limit China’s rise. Meanwhile, some mineral-rich countries, particularly those in the Global South, are striving to maximize their resource benefits. On one hand, as this strategic competition unfolds, Western countries face difficulties in restructuring critical mineral supply chains due to domestic industrial conditions and the global industrial development landscape. On the other hand, the industrial autonomy of mineral-rich countries in the Global South continues to grow, as they benefit from China’s significant rise in national power and its support for their country. The influence of mineral-rich and mineral processing countries in the Global South within the international division of labor for critical minerals is also steadily increasing. In the future, industrial cooperation among mineral-rich and processing countries in the Global South, along with partnerships between these countries and select Western enterprises, could enable the Global South to build new critical mineral supply chains in certain mineral sectors, significantly reducing U.S. influence.

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Why it Matters

In the third decade of the 21st century, the global political and economic landscape is undergoing its most profound systemic transformation since the end of the Cold War, asgeopolitical forces reassert their dominance over the international order in new ways. This process is vividly mirrored in the domain of supply chains. The global production chain system, once constructed by the neoliberal globalization narrative as a “depoliticized” arena, is experiencing a historic turning point where nations reshape value chains through the lens of national security and restructure production networks based on strategic competition.

Existing scholarship delineates the landscape of international competition on critical minerals through three primary lenses. First, the securitization theory perspective posits that the United States, experiencing hegemonic anxiety due to its inability to establish a “core-periphery” structure, frames China as a threat through securitizing discourse and policies while building institutionalized policy networks with its allies. Second, the geopolitical and power competition perspective argues that geopolitical shifts and the pandemic have exacerbated mutual distrust, intensifying competition centered on supply chain resilience. The U.S.and other West countries are restructuring supply chains under the banner of “de-risking,” driving shifts in geo-trade blocs and steering globalization toward compartmentalization and bloc-formation through club-based partnerships. Third, the geo-economic perspective highlights China’s heavy reliance on Pan-South China Sea nickel resources, which faces challenges from containment, political risks, and resource nationalism, even as China promotes regional cooperation and production network coupling. Concurrently, Latin American countries utilize asymmetric dependencies to enhance their agency, striving to translate resources into developmental autonomy, although the limits of this translation are determined by a trilateral game and vary across different mineral types. Meanwhile, the United States attempts to counter China’s dominance through geo-economic strategies.

While highly insightful, the corporate literature doesn’t fully grapple with the contradictions between competitive drivers and the holistic roles played by countries across various nodes of the supply chain, thereby limiting a systemic understanding of restructuring prospects. In reality, the driving factors are complex and contradictory. Although great power competition is the primary narrative, the policies of countries positioned at different nodes are just as important. This article breaks new ground by systematically assessing the structural limits on Western ambitions to restructure supply chains. It also explains why the Global South is steadily gaining influence across all nodes of the critical mineral supply chain.

Key Points

1. The Return of Geopolitics and the Dynamics of International Competition over Critical Minerals

Under the globalized division of labor, the critical mineral supply chain once took the form of a geo-economic competitive landscape, characterized by deep cooperation among resource-rich nations, processing nations, and downstream manufacturing/consuming countries. In contrast, geopolitical competition over critical minerals is now reshaping the industrial landscape through policy declarations, alliance-building, and coercive pressure—aimed at decoupling from “over-dependence” on rivals. Since the second decade of the 21st century, critical minerals have increasingly become a pivotal factor in geopolitical rivalries, with both geopolitical and geo-economic logics jointly shaping national policy orientations.

• From Efficiency Supremacy to Security Primacy

Current supply chain adjustments are driven by a dual logic: first, the “power-security” logic under which the U.S. and the West promote domestic substitution and intra-alliance or friend-shoring circulation; second, the principle of efficiency optimization, which still exhibits path dependency on non-sensitive sectors. The spatial distribution of critical minerals across various stages is highly uneven, categorizing nations into three archetypes: mineral-exporting countries, import-dependent processing countries, and downstream manufacturing/consuming countries—with China positioning itself as a major import-dependent processing powerhouse. The current processing landscape is a market-driven outcome of developed nations downsizing their metallurgical capacities during globalization, while China scaled up capacity by leveraging factor endowment advantages. However, perceiving China’s industrial upgrading as a threat to the Western-dominated international division of labor, the U.S. and the West have begun to redefine what supply chain security really means.

First, the deepening external reliance of the U.S. and the West on critical raw materials has intensified their security anxieties. The U.S. depends heavily on imports for most of its critical minerals, and EU imports are similarly concentrated in a few sources such as China. Furthermore, the blurring boundaries of dual-use technologies have turned niche metals into strategic materials; China’s deep integration even into the U.S. military supply chain underscores the depth of this dependence.

Second, China’s advantages in smelting, processing, and downstream manufacturing, contrasted with the relative decline of Western capabilities following “deindustrialization,” have led the West to expose its lack of supply chain control as a security vulnerability.

Third, great power rivalry and crisis shocks have accelerated the “securitization” of the issue. The U.S. has pursued containment against China while amplifying the “China supply chain threat” narrative; meanwhile, the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict have exposed supply chain fragilities.

Consequently, competition over critical minerals has escalated from a market-driven pursuit of efficiency to a geopolitical confrontation encompassing economic, technological, and national security dimensions, with supply chain evolution increasingly shaped by the alliance systems’ foreign policies rather than market forces, disrupting established industrial cooperation patterns.

• The Coupling and Alignment of the Green Transition and Great Power Geopolitical Competition

The return of geopolitics has allowed power competition to once again dominate international relations. Whilecooperation on the energy transition is essential to advancing the global climate agenda, the U.S. and otherWestern countries—driven by growing concerns over their lack of competitiveness in the new energy sector—have increasingly weaponized and restructured the critical mineral supply chain.

The clean energy industry has exponentially driven up demand for critical minerals, with market sizes for lithium, cobalt, and nickel multiplying, pushing energy transition minerals to the center of the mining industry and placing them at the core of major economies’ strategic mineral lists. Potential supply-demand gaps have fueled concerns over “greenflation,” which could exacerbate interstate tensions or even trigger conflicts—despite the fact that global reserves are not structurally scarce, scarcity expectations are inflated by commercial speculation, and emerging alternativetechnologies are poised to reshape demand.

Nonetheless, the U.S. and the West remain highly vigilant against China’s dominance in clean energy equipment manufacturing and mineral supply chains. They seek to constrain China’s competitiveness through supply chain restructuring. At its core, its essence does not lie in their unwillingness to import at scale based on market principles, which would only augment China’s power. Rather, it concerns the industrial standing and relative gains of major powers in the global energy transition. Even if some Western economies slow down their transition, global green investments will continue to grow, ensuring that the critical mineral gambit remains a focal battleground.

• The Misalignment Between Economic/Resource Nationalism and Industrial Endowments

Against the backdrop of intensifying great power competition, both Western manufacturing/consuming nations and energy/mineral-producing nations seek to enhance resource control and industrial yields. “Resource nationalism” manifests not only as the Global South strengthening resource control but also as the West’s strategic intervention in supply chains. The policies of certain countries have detached from their factor endowments, exacerbating competitive disarray.

Under the traditional “core-periphery” configuration, mineral-producing countries in the Global South occupied the low end of the value chain, processing nations like China sat at the “semi-periphery,” while developed nationsmaintained core positions in certain downstream sectors. The rise of emerging powers and middle powers is driving the evolution of this landscape. The new wave of resource nationalism in the Global South focuses heavily on critical minerals but is more moderate than in the past, tightening regulation while still welcoming foreign capital, thereby shifting the relationship between resource states and foreign capital toward “cooperative competition.” Concurrently, Western economic nationalism has experienced a resurgence, particularly post-2020. Its resource nationalism policies deploy subsidies, investment barriers, market protectionism, and overseas control to suppress rivals and solidify its position in the division of labor—a phenomenon that is both a product of power transition and an extension of value chain restructuring.

In policy execution, certain Western consuming nations disregard their endowment constraints, attempting to forcibly alter the international division of labor through industrial policies and geopolitical maneuvers. Meanwhile, some mineral-rich nations, constrained by market access and geopolitical coercion, implement measures detached from their own economic structures and technological capacities. This exhibits a stark misalignment between policy and endowment, ultimately distorting the evolution of the critical mineral supply chain.

2. Geopolitical Competition and the Restructuring Paths of the Global Critical Mineral Supply Chain

Geopolitical competition deeply influences the policy evolution of countries across all segments of the supply chain. Guided by perceptions of “threats,” Western consuming nations prioritize security logic over efficiency, tightening their grip on supply chains through industrial policies, diplomatic coordination, and geopolitical competition. Conversely, mineral-producing countries in the Global South leverage the policy space carved out by great power rivalry to actively pursue “resource nationalism” and advance their industrialization processes.

• Western Consuming Nations: Advancing Upstream Supply Chain Diversification and Restricting China’s Role

The U.S. and the West support domestic mining and smelting internally while strengthening resource control externally, aiming to build a “de-Sinicized” supply chain, squeeze China’s overseas mining cooperation space, and weaken its industrial capabilities.

(1) Supporting Domestic Production

Successive U.S. administrations have utilized executive orders and industrial policies, such as the Inflation Reduction Act, to incentivize domestic critical mineral extraction and processing through subsidies and tax credits, explicitly positioning the country as a major producer of non-fuel minerals. The European Union, via the Critical Raw Materials Act, has set benchmarks for domestic extraction, processing, and recycling to curb import reliance on single sources, reflecting a decline in the weight of free trade and a rise in industrial security demands.

(2) Fostering Allied Collaboration

Constrained by factor costs, the West views “friend-shoring” collaboration as the cornerstone of supply chain diversification. Mechanisms led by the U.S., such as the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) Supply Chain Agreement, and the “C5+1” Critical Minerals Dialogue, aim to construct exclusive international clubs. These mechanisms propagate Western environmental and social governance standards to execute a strategy of “soft balancing.” Under U.S. pressure, countries like Australia have reorganized their mining supply chains, causing setbacks to Sino-Australian cooperation. The EU, by contrast, emphasizes a balance between strategic autonomy and openness.

(3) Strengthening Control over Critical Mineral Resources

The U.S. and the West reinforce control over resource-rich nations through sanctions, proxy interventions, and economic inducements. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), for instance, the G7-backed “Lobito Corridor” project forces the country to strike a balance between China and the West. The Trump administration even used coercive tactics with allies. Its repeated expressions of interest in annexing Greenland or purchasing resource access from Canada underscored a clear intent to seize rare earths and other resources. Likewise, it sought to trade aid for the rights to develop Ukraine’s minerals—highlighting a geopolitical logic that prioritizes resource control over alliance commitments.

• Mineral-Exporting Countries: Enhancing the Value-Add of Mineral Resources

Mineral-exporting countries are taking advantage of the strategic space opened up by the return of geopolitics to increase their share of resource revenue by raising royaltiesand taxes, advancing nationalization, and developing downstream industries.

(1) Developing Downstream Industries

Indonesia serves as a textbook case: by banning raw ore exports and mandating domestic processing, it attracted multi-nation investments and replaced China as the largest producer of refined nickel. African nations like the DRC and Zambia have jointly developed a cross-border Battery Economic Zone, striving to capture more value from copper and cobalt. Similarly, Brazil and Australia are actively expanding processing capacities, proving that regardless of developmental levels, states are committed to extending their domestic value chains.

(2) Advancing Nationalization

Mineral-producing states increase returns by restricting foreign equity and nationalizing strategic minerals. Indonesia mandated that foreign equity must not exceed 49%, while Chile designated lithium as a strategic mineral and promoted public-private partnerships, diluting the equity and returns of certain foreign enterprises. Such policies shift the dynamic between resource states and foreign capital from a zero-sum game to a competition over interest distribution.

(3) Constructing Monopolistic Alliances

Certain countries with highly concentrated resources have attempted to replicate the OPEC model. South American “Lithium Triangle” nations and Brazil once deliberated on forming a lithium alliance, while South Africa has called for a unified African stance on specific minerals. Although facing hurdles due to supply shocks from producers like Australia, such visions inject substantial uncertainty into the market.

(4) Diversifying Investment Sources and Export Markets

To balance external partnerships and hedge against geopolitical risks, Brazil actively courts Western investment for its rare earth and graphite projects. Under U.S. influence, the DRC obstructed acquisitions by Chinese firms under the pretext of preventing investment source monopolization, seeking partnerships with Western corporations instead. This indicates that U.S. geopolitical maneuvering has altered the cooperative configurations of certain mineral-rich nations.

3. Geopolitical Competition and the Restructuring Prospects of the Global Critical Mineral Supply Chain

While the U.S. and the West attempt to decouple supply chains from China through industrial policies and geopolitical maneuvers, they face insurmountable barriers due to structural deficiencies in their factor endowments and a lack of downstream competitiveness. Conversely, China’s rise has bolstered the industrial autonomy and supply chain standing of the Global South, forging a new paradigm for the critical mineral supply chain.

• Strategic Implementation Limits of Western Supply Chain Restructuring

First, factor endowments severely constrain localization.The U.S. suffers from stagnant power generation capacity, protracted permitting processes, and a shortage of technical talent, leaving domestic mining and metallurgical projects sluggish. The EU faces an energy crisis and risks of deindustrialization, making the domestic replication of supply chains prohibitively expensive. Allies similarly face a deficit in mining talent; the case of the Lynas rare earth plant relocating processing back to Australia from Malaysia due to technical and cost dilemmas underscores the economic infeasibility of “decoupling and breaking chains.”

Second, geopolitical hurdles obstruct allied collaboration. The West attempts to redirect Central Asian mineral logistics; however, countries like Tajikistan still rely on China for processing. Alternative routes heading south through Afghanistan or west across the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus lack economic and security viability. Conversely, the advancement of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway and the operationalization of the Chancay Port reinforce China’s mineral cooperation with regional states.

Third, capability deficiencies fail to deliver on strategic commitments. The West’s inadequate infrastructure and financing capabilities have rendered initiatives like “Build Back Better World” (B3W) largely ineffective. Even if completed, projects like the “Lobito Corridor” cannot substitute for China’s industrial presence and market absorption capacity in the region.

Fourth, restructuring inflicts negative externalities on mineral-producing nations. Unilateral U.S. actions, such as imposing tariffs on Canada, undermine allied synergy. Some mineral-rich countries that brought in the U.S. and other Western actors for the sake of “diversification” may experience slower industrial development and wastedresources due to the West’s lack of industrial capabilities or purely geopolitical motives. This stands in sharp contrast tothe developmental efficacy of China’s mutually beneficial cooperation model.

• Supply Chain Restructuring and the Rising Power Status of the Global South

The ascent of China’s comprehensive national power has broken the Western monopoly over high-tech industries and markets, offering the Global South superior options for cooperation. In the critical minerals sector, China has supported nations like Indonesia in developing localized processing capabilities—transforming Indonesia from a raw ore exporter into the world’s largest refined nickel producer, which has now begun venturing into the battery industry. This has significantly enhanced resource nations’ industrial autonomy and revenue sharing.

Concurrently, the influence of the Global South is rising comprehensively across all supply chain nodes:

(1) Processing: Countries like Indonesia and Zambia have established industrial parks and processing bases with Chinese assistance.

2) Downstream Manufacturing: Thailand has emerged as an electric vehicle (EV) manufacturing hub driven by Chinese investments, upgrading the ASEAN value chain.

3) Consumption: EV markets in Indonesia and South Africa are expanding rapidly, boosting the Global South’s market absorption capacity.

4) Pricing Power: The rising status of the Shanghai Futures Exchange, alongside BRICS initiatives to establish precious metals exchanges, is steering the global mineral pricing architecture toward a multipolar configuration.

• Geopolitical Return, Great Power Competition, and the Emergence of a New International Supply Chain

Western supply chain restructuring acts are reshaping trade flows, giving rise to a new critical mineral supply chain relatively independent of the West.

First, supply chain integration among emerging economies like China, Russia, and Brazil is deepening.United Company RUSAL and Norilsk Nickel have secured raw material supplies and integrated into the battery supply chain through equity cooperation and capacity transfers to China. Brazil and China collaborate deeply on permanent magnet motors, new energy vehicles, and niobium resource development, forging a mutually beneficial industrial relationship.

Second, investment and financing collaboration between China and the Global South is reshaping the capital landscape. Joint-venture plants between GEM and Vale in Indonesia, as well as a consortium of Chinese and Russian enterprises winning bids for Bolivian lithium projects, demonstrate the continuous deepening of mutual dependence within the Global South.

Third, China actively engages in tripartite cooperation with Western mining countries and corporations.Chinese corporate investments in Australian mining and metallurgical projects, alongside collaborations with firms like Glencore in Global South nations, blunt the allied synergy of US “de-Sinicization” efforts and construct new industrial dependencies. Concurrently, the contradiction between unilateral, protectionist U.S. policies and its reliance on allied strategies will prompt more nations to strengthen economic ties with China. This is poised to trigger a “domino effect,” ultimately further circumscribing U.S. leverage over the global critical mineral supply chain.

Conclusion

Geopolitical factors have deeply permeated international competition over critical minerals. As China counters Western technological sanctions with export controls and Global South nations steadily elevate their position in supply chains, a paradox emerges: by deliberately inflating the “China supply chain threat” narrative and constructing exclusive supply chains, the West has self-fulfilled its own supply security dilemmas.

During the “Trump 2.0” era, the United States is expected to intensify its containment of high-tech industries, continuing to apply securitized thinking and geopolitical competition logics to the realm of critical minerals. With the exception ofa few minerals like rare earths, China’s raw ore reserves and extraction output remain relatively limited compared to its smelting and processing capacities. The U.S. strategy of supporting domestic downstream industries through industrial policies while exerting geopolitical pressure on mineral-producing nations will inevitably threaten China’s downstream industrial advantages and security. Therefore, expanding and deepening industrial cooperation with mineral-producing countries is crucial to sustaining China’s downstream capacity and preserving room for industrial upgrading.

The Western-led Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) is actively providing financing to Global South mineral producers while promoting its environmental and social governance standards. Although this framework advancesgreen mining, it also seeks to leverage rule-based systems to obstruct cooperation with Chinese enterprises. In response, China should take proactive initiatives through sectoral and regional platforms to strengthen international collaboration with the Global South on institutional rules for critical minerals. Backed by its steadily growing industrial capabilities, China’s external mineral cooperation will play a greater role in shaping a more equitable global critical mineral industrial landscape—one that better serves the interests of the Global South.

About the Author

SUN Haiyong孙海泳：Dr. Sun is Senior Research Fellow of Institute for Public Policy and Innovation Studies/Center for American Studies of SIIS. Dr. Sun got his Ph.D from School of International Studies, Renmin University of China. He specializes in the study of high-tech competition in international relations and Chinese outward investment on infrastructure.

About the Publication

The Chinese version of the article was published by Foreign Affairs Review (《外交评论》). It is a Chinese academic journal on international politics, sponsored by the China Foreign Affairs University and overseen by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. It was founded in 1984, delving into various significant theoretical and practical issues within the disciplines of “macro-international relations” and “macro-diplomacy”, with a focus on exploring Chinese diplomacy and related matters.

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Artificial intelligence is advancing at an extraordinary pace globally, and the core debate has shifted from who owns more powerful models and advanced chips to how to carry out effective global AI governance. This year’s World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) provides a key window to observe this issue, as the conference has gradually transformed from a technical and industrial event to a high-level international platform focusing on global AI governance, and made new progress in promoting the establishment of the World AI Cooperation Organization (WAICO).

What are the new changes of WAIC 2026? What is the positioning of WAICO, how should we understand the different international reactions to this initiative? How to evaluate the current advantages and bottlenecks of China’s AI development? How will AI competition between China and the United States evolve, and what is the space for practical cooperation between the two sides? In this episode of ChinaVoice, we are honored to invite Yao Xu, Associate Professor, Secretary-General of Center for Global AI from Fudan University, who has been deeply involved in related work, to analyze the transformation of WAIC, the development of WAICO, the current situation of China’s AI development, the prospect of China-US AI relations, and China’s contribution to global AI governance.

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World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) is gradually evolving from a technology- and industry-focused event into a more international platform connecting technological innovation with global AI governance.

From SUN Chenghao’s perspective, WAIC 2026 made this shift particularly visible through broader international participation, a stronger emphasis on governance, and the agreement-signing process related to the World AI Cooperation Organization, or WAICO. Yao Xu agreed that this reflects a longer-term evolution rather than a sudden change. He explained that WAIC initially focused largely on showcasing the development of Shanghai and China’s AI industry, but since around 2024 it has increasingly become a high-level platform bringing together governments, industry leaders, academics, and international organizations. He also stressed that WAICO should be understood more precisely as an initiative still in the process of institutional development, with the 2026 conference marking the signing of an intergovernmental agreement rather than the formal launch of the organization.

Sun Chenghao observed that international reactions to WAICO have been mixed. While many countries in the Global South appear interested in an additional platform for AI capacity building and governance, some observers have questioned whether China is attempting to build an alternative AI governance architecture. He suggested that this reflects a broader tendency in international politics for even global governance initiatives to be interpreted through the lens of geopolitical competition.

Yao Xu argued that such skepticism is understandable, but that the more important question is whether international institutions can actually provide the global public goods that developing countries need. Drawing on his engagement with Global South scholars and practitioners, he emphasized their demand for high-quality datasets, computing resources, technical expertise, training programs, and other forms of capacity building. He argued that WAICO’s significance will ultimately depend on whether it remains open and inclusive and whether it can provide practical assistance rather than become a closed geopolitical bloc.

About China’s AI capabilities, Sun argued that it should not be measured simply by comparing frontier models. While the rapid development of models such as Kimi K3 reflects China’s technological progress, he suggested that a country’s overall AI competitiveness also depends on semiconductors, computing infrastructure, energy, talent, applications, safety, and the ability of society to absorb technological change.

Yao agreed and cautioned against placing too much emphasis on individual “moments” such as a “DeepSeek moment” or “Kimi moment.” In his view, these breakthroughs are usually the visible outcome of much longer processes of technological accumulation. He identified China’s emerging AI ecosystem as one of its major strengths, particularly the increasingly close interaction among universities, research institutes, frontier laboratories, start-ups, and large technology companies. At the same time, he regarded advanced semiconductors and computing resources as China’s clearest structural weakness, noting that the United States still maintains a substantial advantage in chips, data-center capacity, and aggregate compute.

Sun placed infrastructure and social adaptation within the broader definition of national AI capacity, emphasizing that energy, data centers, supply chains, and the ability of society to absorb technological disruption are becoming increasingly important.

Yao added that China and the U.S. face somewhat different political and social environments in expanding AI infrastructure. He noted that public opposition to data centers has become more visible in the U.S. because of concerns over electricity consumption, water use, environmental pressure, and local infrastructure, whereas China may have greater capacity to coordinate large-scale infrastructure through national and local planning. At the same time, he stressed that China also faces serious social challenges from AI, particularly concerns about automation, employment displacement, autonomous driving, creative industries, and the rapid transformation of existing occupations. In his view, these are not uniquely Chinese problems but common challenges that all major economies will increasingly have to address.

On China–U.S. AI competition, Sun argued that the rivalry is increasingly shifting beyond individual models toward competition between entire technological ecosystems. Given that technological competition is likely to remain a persistent feature of China–U.S. relations, cooperation will need to coexist with competition rather than replace it.

Yao cautioned against describing this as a direct or symmetrical “battle.” He suggested that the two countries currently occupy different positions, with the United States still maintaining clear advantages in frontier models, advanced semiconductors, computing resources, cloud infrastructure, and global talent concentration, while China is catching up rapidly. He therefore described the relationship more as two runners at different stages of the race than as two equal competitors confronting one another across every dimension of AI.

Technological competition does not remove the need for cooperation on shared risks. Sun identified military applications of AI, AI–nuclear risks, misuse by non-state actors, critical infrastructure, and frontier AI safety as areas in which neither China nor the United States can fully manage the consequences alone.

Yao agreed and argued that emerging risks associated with advanced AI, especially in combination with nuclear technology, biotechnology, and other high-consequence scientific capabilities, could provide a practical foundation for bilateral cooperation. About the upcoming China–U.S. dialogue, Yao believed that it should treat AI safety itself as a global public good. Under this approach, China and the U.S. could cooperate in providing regulatory sandboxes, safety toolkits, evaluation mechanisms, technical assistance, and capacity-building programs to Global South countries. This would make safety governance more closely connected to development and reduce the risk that developing countries see AI safety rules simply as new barriers to technological participation.

At the same time, Sun argued that an official China–U.S. AI dialogue should pursue relatively modest and realistic objectives. It should not attempt to resolve the broader technological competition between the two countries, which would be unrealistic, but instead identify areas where both sides have a shared interest in preventing unintended outcomes. In his view, a realistic success would involve creating channels for risk reduction, practical cooperation, basic common understandings, and continued communication.

Yao broadly agreed but placed stronger emphasis on openness. He argued that the experience of both China and the U.S. shows that scientific progress benefits from cross-border exchange, talent mobility and interaction among researchers. He therefore urged both sides to keep genuinely sensitive competition within a limited range and prevent security concerns from overwhelming the broader relationship between their scientific and technological communities.

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Welcome to the 81st edition of our weekly newsletter! I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies and a visiting scholar at the Paul Tsai China Center of Yale Law School (fall 2024).

ChinAffairsplus shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions or criticisms may be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by Zhu Min, Gong Bing and Yang Siyao, who analyze Changes in U.S. Economic Policy Toward China Over the Past Three Decades and China’s Strategic Countermeasures.

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Summary

Over the past three decades, U.S. economic policy toward China has undergone a structural evolution from engagement and cooperation to competition and containment, and then to systemic suppression, forming a systematic policy framework against China with trade, finance, science and technology, and security as the core pillars. This system has further deepened since the beginning of Trump’s second term.

After returning to the White House, the Trump administration has introduced and frequently adjusted its policies toward China in the three core areas of trade, finance, and science and technology in a short period of time, with more explicit policy objectives, systematic suppression measures, and a significant increase in the cross-pillar policy integration, demonstrating a more evident intention to comprehensively promote the decoupling of the China-U.S. economies. During this period, high inflation, financial market risks, games among interest groups in the U.S., as well as China’s strong countermeasures have become important restrictive factors curbing the extremization of U.S. policies toward China. These constraints have continued to play a role in the second term of the Trump administration, rendering its China policy characterized by a firm strategic objective and wavering implementation path. In general, the direction of U.S. economic policy toward China in the Trump administration’s second term may be irreversible, yet its implementation pace and intensity are still subject to internal and external constraints, showing volatile and transactional features.

China should build a systematic, hierarchical and tradable response strategy in the three key areas of trade, finance, and science and technology. It should maintain strategic resolve while flexibly taking advantage of the fluctuating window of U.S. policies and optimize the mechanism of countermeasures and games while stabilizing growth, strengthening science and technology and promoting security as the main thread.

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Why It Matters

The transformation of U.S. economic policy toward China has not only reshaped bilateral relations between the two countries, but also profoundly influenced the global economic order, industrial and supply chain structures, and functioning of international governance systems. Compared with studies that focus on a single domain or short-term policy developments, this article adopts a long-term perspective, examining trade, finance, technology, and security within an integrated analytical framework, thereby capturing the overarching logic and internal coherence of U.S. economic policy toward China. For these reasons, the study not only contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the complexity of U.S. economic policy toward China but also provides meaningful practical insights for China in assessing future trends and refining its policy responses.

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Key Points

1. Evolution of the Concepts and Objectives of U.S. Economic Policy Toward China

• Over the past three decades, U.S. economic policy toward China has undergone a clear, phased evolution. During the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, the United States largely pursued a cooperation-oriented approach. The core strategy of “constructive engagement” aimed to integrate China more deeply into the U.S.-led global free trade system, cooperation remained the dominant theme of this period.

• During the Obama administration, as China’s economic scale expanded rapidly, the global financial crisis shook the U.S.-led international order, the United States began to systematically adjust its economic policy toward China. It increasingly viewed China as a potential challenger. As a result, U.S. policy gradually sought a new balance between cooperation and containment, while reinforcing a competitive orientation through strategic initiatives such as the “Pivot to Asia.”

• In the period of the Trump administration’s first term and the Biden administration, U.S. economic policy toward China further shifted from competition to containment and suppression, with the space for bilateral economic cooperation significantly reduced. Both identified China as the primary challenge to the United States in the economic, technological, and global governance domains, and steadily intensified pressure on China. Overall, the evolution of U.S. economic policy toward China reflects not short-term fluctuations, but a structural shift driven by changes in the balance of power between the two countries, transformations in the global political economy, and the reconfiguration of domestic political forces within the United States. Its underlying logic has moved from “shaping China through engagement” to “maintaining U.S. dominance through competition and containment,” exhibiting strong long-term continuity.

2. Evolution and Implementation of U.S. Policy Instruments Toward China

• Evolution of the Policy Framework and Toolkit: Over the past three decades, the United States has built a systematic framework around four core pillars—trade, finance, technology, and security. As U.S. policy shifted from cooperation to competition and containment, these instruments expanded in scope, variety, and intensity. At the same time, the boundaries between policy domains have become increasingly blurred, producing stronger cross-domain linkages.

  • In trade, U.S. policy has evolved from a dual approach of cooperation and threat to one dominated by unilateral measures. During the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, the United States promoted cooperation by supporting China’s accession to the World Trade Organization and establishing dialogue mechanisms, while employing tariffs and trade disputes as instruments of pressure. During the Trump administration’s first term and the Biden administration, trade policy became more instrumentalized and routinized, with tariffs and institutional tools widely deployed as part of a broader strategic competition framework.

  • In investment and finance, U.S. policy has shifted markedly from openness and cooperation to restriction and partial decoupling. Since Trump’s first term, however, the United States strengthened controls over cross-border capital flows, restricted Chinese firms’ access to financing, and sought to redirect capital flows. The Biden administration has largely continued this trajectory, further integrating financial policy with technology policy, making it an important tool of strategic competition.

  • In technology, U.S. policy has undergone a “leapfrog” transformation from fragmented controls to systematic, full-chain restrictions. The Trump administration institutionalized these controls, while the Biden administration has advanced “full-chain” restrictions and allied coordination, forming a systemic regime centered on key sectors such as semiconductors, while also reinforcing domestic technological capabilities through industrial policy.

  • In security, U.S. policy expanded from military security into broader economic domains, producing a pronounced trend of securitization. Since Trump’s first term, the United States has increasingly invoked “national security” to justify measures in trade, technology, and industrial chains, while the Biden administration further deepened the integration of security and economic policy.

• The Wavering Nature of U.S. Economic Policy Toward China: In the implementation of its economic policy toward China, the United States has consistently faced significant cost constraints and structural limitations. Over time, China and the United States have developed a high degree of interdependence in key areas such as trade, finance, science and technology, and knowledge exchange. It has imposed considerable economic and institutional costs on efforts to promote decoupling or pursue extreme suppression policies toward China. In practice, such policies may not only fuel domestic inflation and weaken employment and output, but also undermine corporate performance, capital market stability, and innovation capacity, thereby constituting a de facto “bottom-line constraint” on policy implementation.

• Moreover, the implementation of U.S. policy is shaped by a range of internal and external factors. Domestically, there is a clear divergence among interest groups. This internal contestation directly influences both the direction and intensity of policy. Externally, China’s countermeasures and changes in the global macroeconomic and financial environment also impose constraints by altering cost structures and expectations of policy outcomes.As a result, U.S. economic policy toward China exhibits a pronounced wavering implementation path. While its strategic objective—competition and containment as the dominant approach—has become increasingly clear, its implementation is frequently adjusted in response to domestic economic conditions and international developments.

3. Continuity and Development of U.S. Economic Policy Toward China in the Second Term of the Trump Administration

• Entering the second term of the Trump administration, U.S. economic policy toward China has further advanced the existing framework of containment and suppression, marking a new stage of systemic and comprehensive intensification. The United States has explicitly defined China as its core competitor, and embedded its China policy more closely within the “America First” strategy. Its core objectives focus on reducing dependence on China, narrowing the trade deficit, restricting bilateral investment, and containing China’s development in key frontier technologies.

• The second Trump administration has also upgraded the existing toolkit and emphasized cross-pillar instruments. In trade, policy has expanded beyond tariffs to include non-tariff barriers and rule-based constraints. In technology, the United States has expanded export controls, investment restrictions, corporate sanctions, and allied coordination. In finance, it has tightened restrictions on capital flows and Chinese firms’ access to financing.

• At the same time, U.S. economic policy toward China exhibits a pronounced trend of securitization, with trade, finance, and technology policies increasingly integrated under the logic of national security. Policy implementation remains subject to multiple constraints, including the need to control inflation, maintain employment and financial stability, and balance competing domestic interest groups. These constraints mean that, even as containment intensifies, U.S. economic policy toward China continues to display a degree of flexibility and room for adjustment.

4. Wavering and Volatility in the Implementation of U.S. Economic Policy Toward China in the Second Term of the Trump Administration

• In the early stage of Trump’s second term, U.S. economic policy toward China has shown clear wavering and volatility. Its trajectory can be characterized as “intense suppression—sharp fluctuation—gradual moderation.” In trade, the United States rapidly raised tariffs and expanded non-tariff barriers, but later lowered tariffs and delayed some measures under negotiation and macroeconomic pressures. In finance, policy tightened but remained more cautious than in trade and technology. In technology, export controls and corporate sanctions continued to escalate in semiconductors and artificial intelligence, while some measures were adjusted or suspended in response to negotiation dynamics or market pressures.

• The volatility of these policies is the result of multiple interacting factors. On the one hand, the second Trump administration has adopted a more aggressive policy stance toward China in terms of concepts and objectives. On the other hand, domestic inflationary pressures, financial market volatility, and losses to corporate interests have imposed significant constraints on policy implementation. Simultaneously, large multinational corporations and technology firms have exerted “corrective” pressure on the government through lobbying and policy intervention. In addition, China’s countermeasures, together with changes in the global macroeconomic and geopolitical environment, have further increased the costs of sustaining extreme policies, reinforcing the wavering implementation path of U.S. economic policy toward China.

Conclusion

Overall, Trump’s second term has further strengthened U.S. economic suppression of China, made decoupling more explicit, and deepened policy integration across trade, finance, and science and technology. Yet implementation remains constrained by inflation, financial stability concerns, domestic interest-group games, and China’s countermeasures. For China, the key is to maintain strategic resolve, use the fluctuating window in U.S. policy implementation, strengthen economic and industrial resilience, and refine its countermeasures, negotiation tools, and policy responses to secure greater strategic initiative.

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About the Authors

ZHU Min朱民: Senior Expert Committee Member, China Center for International Economic Exchanges; Former Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund

GONG Bing巩冰: Associate Professor, School of International Political Economy, University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

YANG Siyao杨斯尧: Postdoctoral Fellow and Assistant Researcher, PBC School of Finance, Tsinghua University

About the Publication

The Chinese version of this article was published in The Chinese Journal of American Studies（《美国研究》）, which was founded in 1987 and is jointly sponsored by the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Chinese Association for American Studies. Originally launched as a quarterly and published as a bimonthly since 2014, the journal features Chinese scholarship on the United States, including its politics, economy, foreign policy, military affairs, science and technology, and culture.

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Welcome to the 80th edition of our weekly newsletter! I am , a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, Council Member of The Chinese Association of American Studies and a visiting scholar at Yale Law School (fall 2024).

ChinAffairsplus shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, .

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions or criticisms may be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by Wang Fan and Wen Yinghui, which focuses on The Adjustments of US Foreign Policy in the Context of Strategic Retrenchment.

Summary

The United States’ adjustments in its foreign policy exhibit new logic and characteristics against the backdrop of overall strategic retrenchment and mark a turning-point significance amid the current international landscape. This round of US strategic retrenchment does not represent a simple return to isolationism; rather, under the dual pressures of domestic political and economic structural woes and a relative decline in international influence, it constitutes a strategic recalibration aimed at cutting hegemony maintenance costs, prioritizing core interests, and more effectively constraining strategic competitors.

The US strategic adjustment reflects a paradoxical unity of “retrenchment” and “control”: on one hand, the US seeks to curb overseas spending through selective intervention, promoting burden-sharing among allies, and reducing direct engagement in secondary regions. On the other hand, it intensifies targeted containment of emerging powers such as China by restructuring alliance networks, abusing non-military instruments of competition, and competing for dominance in emerging strategic frontiers.

Changes in the balance of power, domestic economic challenges, a slowdown in technological innovation, and reduced internal political constraints jointly constitute the four core driving forces of this round of US strategic retrenchment. This adjustment will not only undermine the liberal international order long dominated by the United States, but also exert multidimensional impacts on major-power strategic relations and regional power structures, thereby exacerbating the instability of the international order.

Why It Matters

As the United States places greater emphasis on coercive allied burden-sharing, cross-regional strategic resource reallocation, and sustained long-term competition with China, grasping the substantive connotation of “strategic retrenchment” has become essential to accurately assessing the direction of U.S. foreign policy.

We selected this article because it cautions against assuming that reduced commitments abroad necessarily signal a weaker international role or diminished competitive intent; they may instead reflect a change in how the United States seeks to preserve its advantages.

By situating retrenchment within the broader context of domestic political and economic constraints, shifting alliance relationships, and changes in the international order, the article helps explain why Washington may appear more restrained in some regions while becoming more concentrated and assertive in areas tied to its core strategic interests. This perspective also helps readers understand why Chinese scholars often view U.S. retrenchment not simply as a sign of moderation, but as a development with potentially far-reaching consequences for major-power relations, regional stability and international rules.

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Key Points

1. Manifestations of the Adjustment in U.S. Foreign Policy

(1) Reordering Geographic Priorities

The United States is not withdrawing comprehensively from international affairs, but selectively redistributing its constrained strategic resources across distinct geopolitical blocs. Homeland defence and the U.S. traditional sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere have gained prominence, while the Indo-Pacific remains the central arena of great-power competition. In Europe, Washington seeks to make allies assume greater responsibility for their own security, but the Russia–Ukraine conflict and Europe’s limited defence capacity constrain any large-scale withdrawal. In the Middle East, the United States adopts a primary retrenchment strategy supplemented by tactical partial redeployment; it increasingly relies on precision limited military strikes, backed by regional proxy allies, and phased temporary troop surges to safeguard vital interests including energy supplies and maritime chokepoints, to prevent re-entering the costly quagmire of full-scale ground warfare.

(2) A Shift toward “Low-cost Competition”

The United States is scaling back costly large-scale direct ground military intervention and relying more heavily on alliance networks and non-military instruments of competition. On the one hand, it is promoting burden-sharing among allies by transferring more defence and regional security costs to European and Indo-Pacific partners. On the other hand, it is using minilateral arrangements such as AUKUS and the Quad to build flexible and exclusive networks around military affairs, technology, supply chains, and maritime security. Export controls, financial sanctions, technological standards, long-arm jurisdiction, and narrative shaping are also being used to intensify targeted containment of China.

(3) Expanding Competition in “New Strategic Frontiers”

The United States is extending great-power competition beyond traditional land and maritime spaces into critical sea lanes, the Arctic, and the deep sea. These domains matter not only for military deployment and strategic mobility, but also for access to critical resources, supply-chain security, and the formulation of future international rules. Washington adopts three sets of competitive measures to advance its layout: continuously intensifying regular military control over global sea lanes, comprehensively expanding military and resource-exploration presence across the Arctic, and advancing unilateral deep-sea mining unrestricted by the International Seabed Authority, in an attempt to pre-emptively draw new strategic advantage boundaries favorable to its own hegemony and restrictive to rival powers.

2. Main Drivers of US Strategic Retrenchment

(1) Shifts in the Balance of Power and an Imbalance in Strategic Commitments

The rise of China and other emerging powers has weakened America’s relative advantages in economic, technological, and military terms, while the long-term costs of maintaining a global base network and fighting overseas wars have placed severe pressure on US resources. Strategic contraction is therefore intended to reduce commitments in secondary areas and redirect limited resources toward core interests and principal strategic competitors.

(2) Domestic Economic and Industrial Difficulties

Federal debt, rising interest payments, manufacturing decline, and supply-chain vulnerabilities have constrained Washington’s capacity to invest in defence, research, and infrastructure. Reshoring, friend-shoring, and the restructuring of critical industrial chains have consequently become important components of US strategic adjustment.

(3) A Slowdown in Technological Innovation

Although the United States retains considerable technological strength, the growth of its research investment has slowed, while China has rapidly narrowed the gap in artificial intelligence, quantum technology, robotics, clean energy, and semiconductors. The article argues that technological restrictions alone cannot preserve US advantages over the long term and may instead damage American firms while accelerating Chinese indigenous innovation, making a broader strategic recalibration necessary.

(4) Reduced Domestic Political Constraints

The foreign-policy establishment that traditionally supported deep global engagement has lost influence, while officials favouring “America First,” sharper strategic prioritization, and competition with China have entered key positions. At the same time, a stronger bipartisan recognition that US grand strategy requires reprioritization has created a more favourable domestic political environment for strategic contraction.

3. International Impacts of US Strategic Adjustment

(1) The Liberal International Order is being Undermined

As the United States places greater emphasis on cost-benefit calculations and domestic interests, its willingness to provide international public goods, uphold multilateral rules, and assume global responsibilities is declining. This transformation generates two-tier shocks to the global system: on one hand, it continuously depletes U.S. global leadership credibility accumulated since World War II; on the other hand, it fuels the wide global proliferation of trade protectionism, unilateral power politics and zero-sum game mindsets, while impairing the operational effectiveness of multilateral cooperation institutions.

(2) Major-Power Strategic Relations and Regional Power Structures are being Reshaped

US contraction in some regions does not imply weaker competition with China. On the contrary, resource concentration may make China an even more clearly defined and enduring strategic competitor. Meanwhile, US demands that allies bear greater costs and serve American strategic objectives may weaken trust and cohesion within alliance networks, while encouraging allies to pursue greater strategic autonomy.

(3) Power Vacuums may intensify Regional Instability

As the United States reduces direct engagement in secondary regions, regional powers may compete to fill the resulting power vacuums, increasing security rivalry, conflict, and fragmentation. The article stresses that strategic contraction does not necessarily create stability and may instead amplify existing regional tensions.

(4) The Domesticization of Foreign Policy ncreases Uncertainty

US foreign policy is increasingly subordinated to domestic industry, electoral politics, and partisan competition, making it more transactional and reversible. Sharp policy changes across administrations not only damage US credibility but also add uncertainty to global governance and the international order.

Conclusion

The ongoing U.S. strategic retrenchment represents neither a return to isolationism nor a comprehensive decline in American global influence, but a reallocation of strategic objectives, regional priorities, and policy instruments under growing resource constraints. Its central logic is to reduce costly overseas commitments while preserving influence and containment over key regions and strategic competitors through selective intervention, burden-sharing among allies, non-military instruments of competition, and competition for dominance in new strategic frontiers.

Yet this strategic retrenchment remains constrained by domestic politics, congressional restrictions, continuing regional conflicts, and existing alliance commitments; even where the United States reduces its traditional military footprint, it can continue to exercise influence through alliance networks, technological dependence, infrastructure, and institutional advantages.

U.S. foreign policy adjustment is therefore unlikely to take the form of a sustained and comprehensive withdrawal, but will instead remain a limited, uneven, and long-term process of strategic recalibration that further accelerates great-power competition, alliance restructuring, and changes in the international order while adding uncertainty to the global strategic environment.

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About the Author

WANG Fan王帆：Wang Fan is Professor and Doctoral Supervisor at China Foreign Affairs University. He concurrently serves as Vice President of the China National Association for International Studies and Vice President of the Chinese Association of American Studies. He is a recipient of the State Council Special Government Allowance. His primary research interests include China–U.S. relations, Chinese foreign policy, international security, and the security strategies of major powers.

WEN Yinghui温盈晖：Wen Yinghui is a Ph.D candidate in the Institute of International Relations at China Foreign Affairs University.

About the publication

The Chinese version of this article was published in International Studies. （《国际问题研究》）International Studies is a comprehensive academic journal of international affairs under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China and published by the China Institute of International Studies. Committed to serving China’s diplomacy, the journal integrates strategic, forward-looking, and policy-oriented perspectives and seeks to provide theoretical support for China’s diplomatic practice.

Editor: , , ,

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Welcome to the special edition of China Scholar Insights!

Not long ago, I spent some time in the UK, visiting government agencies, think tanks, universities and media organizations to exchange views on AI safety and governance. One question came up repeatedly in my conversations with British colleagues: Will Chinese AI models eventually move away from open source and become closed?

The reasoning behind the question was intriguing. Some of my British interlocutors suggested that Chinese AI companies currently embrace open-source models partly because China still trails the United States at the technological frontier. If China eventually catches up with—or even surpasses—the U.S., they wondered, would Chinese companies have fewer incentives to remain open and instead follow a more closed path?

I found this question worth thinking about. Is China’s current embrace of open-source AI merely a temporary strategy for technological catch-up, or does it reflect deeper structural forces within China’s AI ecosystem? These conversations prompted Songruowen Ma, Songting Ding, and me to take a closer look at the issue and write this article.

The article was first published by the UK-based independent think tank Center for Dialogue and Global Affairs.

Questions, comments, or criticisms are welcome at sch0625@gmail.com.

In July, the 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) opened on the banks of the Huangpu River in Shanghai. In his keynote speech, Chinese President Xi Jinping said that AI development should not be “a solo performance by a single country, but a symphony of international cooperation”, and urged countries to embrace “open source, openness, collaboration and sharing” in AI. His remarks once again brought the debate over AI openness and the future of open-weight models into the international spotlight.[1]

Chinese AI companies have increasingly embraced openness as a key part of their strategies, and in some areas have emerged as global leaders in open-weight AI. On 16 July 2026, Beijing-based startup Moonshot AI released Kimi K3, a 2.8 trillion-parameter model that it claimed to be the world’s largest open-weight AI system. At the time of writing, ranking data on the platform OpenRouter showed that the five most-used open AI models worldwide were all Chinese models.

During our recent research visits in the UK, policy analysts repeatedly asked us the same question: Will Chinese language models remain open-weight in the long run? To answer this question, we look at how the Chinese government views open-weight models, discuss what China (and its AI firms) gains and risks by keeping model weights open or closed, and argue that Beijing is likely to pursue a hybrid and tiered strategy rather than commit fully to either path.

The Chinese Government’s Stance on Open-weight AI Models

China has consistently supported open-weight AI as a way to encourage innovation, strengthen the AI ecosystem, and expand international cooperation.

Domestically, openness is treated as a way to broaden access to AI and accelerate its adoption and diffusion. In 2024, the Ministry of Science and Technology encouraged firms to open up industry-specific data, models and algorithms, and called on leading AI companies to help build more open AI ecosystems. Later that year, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Finance, People’s Bank of China and National Financial Regulatory Administration jointly issued an action plan that called on small and medium-sized enterprises to participate actively in open-weight projects and aimed to lower barriers to AI development and deployment. This emphasis continued in the 2026 “AI+Manufacturing” initiative, which set the goal of building a world-leading open-source ecosystem by 2027.

Internationally, the government increasingly presents openness as part of China’s broader agenda of global AI cooperation. At the 2025 WAIC, Premier Li Qiang said that “China would be more open in sharing open-source technologies and products”. The subsequent State Council guideline on the “AI+” initiative linked accessible AI technologies to international cooperation on computing power, data and talent, with particular emphasis on capacity-building in the Global South. The Chair’s Statement of the 2026 WAIC went further, describing openness as an important pathway towards inclusive AI development and calling for more open and internationally connected AI communities.

However, official language does not imply that every Chinese model should be open-weight, as it also emphasizes intellectual-property protection, security, responsible governance and companies’ freedom to choose their own development strategies. Taken together, Beijing appears to treat model openness as a strategic choice rather than an across-the-board principle, leaving room for both open-weight and closed models.

The Commercial Pressure and Risks of the Open-weight Strategy

That flexibility on openness may become important as keeping models open-weight grows more costly, with US-China competition pushing frontier models toward the trillion-parameter scale and the spread of AI agents sharply increasing model use.

The commercial strain has already become visible. Opening a model’s weight can expand its user base, attract developers and strengthen an ecosystem. Yet it is generally harder to capture recurring revenue from an open-weight model than from a proprietary service built around subscriptions and API fees. Moonshot illustrates the tension. Just three days after Kimi K3’s launch, the company temporarily paused new subscriptions as demand strained its available computing capacity, while prioritizing existing subscribers. DeepSeek has faced similar capacity constraints during periods of surging demand, at one point suspending API top-ups because of server-resource pressure.

When an official platform cannot absorb all of that demand, users can move to third-party deployments and service providers. The original model developer then bears much of the cost of R&D and ecosystem-building while some users and some of the commercial value they generate shift elsewhere. Wider availability also intensifies price competition, putting further pressure on margins.

Chinese companies are therefore beginning to experiment with ways of keeping models open-weight while trying to retain more of their commercial value. The Kimi K3 licence is one example. Commercial products or services built on the model must display the “Kimi K3” prominently once they exceed either 100 million monthly active users or US$20 million in monthly revenue. A separate provision applies to licensees or affiliates operating a Model-as-a-Service business: if aggregate revenue from that business exceeds US$20 million over any consecutive twelve-month period, a separate agreement with Moonshot is required before commercial use. Reuters reported on 7 August that Alibaba was planning a comparable revenue-sharing arrangement for major commercial users of its next open model, Qwen3.8-Max.10.

These moves suggest that “open-weight” no longer has to mean giving away most of the commercial upside. Chinese model developers are beginning to search for a new balance between broad ecosystem adoption and sustainable returns.

The second pressure concerns the allocation of rights and responsibilities. Once model weights have been released, however, access cannot simply be withdrawn in the same way that an online service can be switched off. Third parties can download the model, fine-tune it, alter its safeguards and deploy it in environments over which the original developer has little or no control.

Open-weight models are also more exposed to technical scrutiny: the availability of model weights makes it easier to investigate training data or identify signs that a model may have been distilled from another system. These practices can more readily spark disputes over model provenance, permissible reuse, ownership, and responsibility, with such issues becoming increasingly salient amid intensifying great-power AI competition.

Open-Weight as a Source of Competitive and Strategic Advantage

However, China is unlikely to follow the US model of moving broadly towards closed-weight AI.

One reason is that efficiency has become one of the clearest competitive advantages of China’s AI industry. Much of the strength of Chinese technology companies lies in compute efficiency, training engineering, inference cost, model compression, and software-hardware adaptation. This produces a different industrial logic from that of leading US frontier labs. While American companies such as OpenAI and Anthropic compete at the cutting edge of compute, advanced chips and proprietary API services, many Chinese developers have stronger incentives to differentiate themselves through lower cost, local deployability and the ability to adapt or further develop a model downstream.

This has made Chinese models particularly appealing in markets where concerns over data sovereignty and dependence on foreign technology are especially pronounced, including much of the Global South. Open or locally deployable models can reduce dependence on a single foreign provider, give users more control over where data is processed, and make it easier to adapt systems to local languages and use cases. These advantages have become an important route through which Chinese models attract international developers and users. For that reason alone, Chinese firms are unlikely to give up openness lightly.

There is also a broader political and diplomatic logic. China’s effort to build an open AI ecosystem fits closely with its blueprint on global governance, from the idea of a community with a shared future for humanity and the BRI to the principles of consultation, joint contribution and shared benefit, as well as the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, Global Civilization Initiative and Global Governance Initiative.

China describes itself as a provider of international public goods relating to AI. The future trajectory of China’s AI models therefore cannot be read through technology and commercial incentives alone. Openness is also part of a wider national strategy: it helps expand developer ecosystems and international adoption while reinforcing China’s preferred narrative of more inclusive access to AI.

From Open Weights to Real Access

Returning to the question we began with, the answer is unlikely to be a simple “yes” or “no” when it comes to model openness. Rather, China is likely to move towards a hybrid ecosystem in which open and closed models coexist. Small and mid-sized foundation models, many industry-specific models, and models designed to attract developers and expand application ecosystems will probably remain relatively open. By contrast, the most advanced models – those requiring the greatest R&D investment, posing the highest safety risks, or offering the strongest prospects for monetization – are more likely to be closed, released with a delay, distributed under restrictive licenses, or made available only via APIs. ByteDance already offers an early example of this tiered approach. It has released the weights of selected models such as Seed-OSS, while keeping its flagship models proprietary and providing access through consumer products such as Doubao and API services via Volcano Engine.

Such a tiered approach would not conflict with China’s broader commitment to making AI more widely accessible. For many countries, especially in the Global South, opening the weights of models with hundreds of billions or even trillions of parameters will offer limited practical benefit if they lack the computing power, data-center capacity and engineering resources needed to run them at scale. What matters more is access to capable models that can operate under tighter constraints on compute, electricity and network capacity, while still being adapted to local languages and applications.

This helps explain why Chinese AI companies are placing growing emphasis on model efficiency and what is called “intelligence density” (智能密度): the capability delivered for a given model size or level of compute. Based on the Intelligence Index vs. Cost per Intelligence Index Task test given by artificialanalysis.ai, DeepSeek-V4-Flash significantly outperforms all other models in terms of intelligence density. High intelligence density made DeepSeek-V4-Flash the most popular model on OpenRouter, highlighting the global demand for high intelligence density models.

From this perspective, China may have stronger incentives to keep highly capable, efficient mid-sized models open-weight while keeping the most expensive frontier models closed or more tightly controlled. This would allow Chinese firms to broaden international adoption without giving up the commercial returns and strategic value of their most advanced models.

[1] In this article, we primarily use the term “open-weight”refers to models whose trained parameters (or “weights”) are publicly released and available for users to download and run. This does not mean that the model’s training data, training code, or full technical documentation is also publicly available. The term is therefore narrower than “open-source AI.”

Songruowen Ma is a Research Associate at Center for Dialogue and Global Affairs and a DPhil Candidate at the University of Oxford.

is Fellow, Associate Professor, and Head of the US-Europe Program at the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University; Fellow at Center for Dialogue and Global Affairs.

Songting Ding is a Master Student at University of Tokyo.

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Welcome to the special edition of China Scholar Insights!

China Scholar Insights is a feature which aimed at providing you with the latest analysis on issues that Chinese scholars and strategic communities are focusing on. We will carefully select commentary articles and highlight key points. Questions or criticisms can be directed to sch0625@gmail.com

I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University. ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu.

The New China-EU Trade Consultation Mechanism

Background

On June 29, Chinese Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao and European Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security Maroš Šefčovič held the inaugural meeting of the China-EU Trade and Investment Consultations (TIC) in Brussels and issued a rare joint statement. The two sides agreed to formally establish a new consultation mechanism covering four working areas: trade and investment balancing, export controls, intellectual property rights, and WTO reform. According to the joint statement, China and the EU also agreed to “establish a joint monitoring mechanism to exchange relevant data, monitor trade flows and support technical work with a view to improving transparency, enhancing mutual trust and managing trade frictions.”

The mechanism arrives at a moment when China-EU trade is economically indispensable but increasingly vulnerable to political pressure. Eurostat data shows that the EU’s goods trade deficit with China reached €98 billion in the first quarter of 2026, the highest quarterly level since Q3 2022. In 2025, EU exports to China stood at €199.5 billion, while imports from China reached €559.5 billion, leaving a deficit of €360 billion. These figures have made the trade imbalance one of the most politically salient issues in the relationship. More importantly, the imbalance is increasingly interpreted in Brussels not simply as a trade problem, but as evidence of deeper concerns over industrial competitiveness, overcapacity and economic security.

The new mechanism sends an important signal that neither side wants economic disputes to spiral into a trade war. Šefčovič said the two sides had an ambitious timetable and hoped to achieve tangible results before October. For China, the mechanism offers a channel to address EU restrictive measures through negotiation. For Europe, it provides a way to manage domestic pressure over trade deficits while keeping dialogue with China open. Its significance, therefore, lies less in resolving individual disputes than in creating an institutional framework within which an increasingly contentious economic relationship can be managed.

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From Fragmented Disputes to Institutionalized Management

China-EU trade frictions have moved from occasional product disputes to a broader pattern of sectoralized confrontation. Over the past five years, disputes have spread across investment, electric vehicles, medical devices, solar procurement, critical minerals, food products, public procurement, cybersecurity, and industrial policy. Each case has followed its own legal procedure and political rhythm, but together they reveal a relationship increasingly governed by defensive instruments.

The danger of fragmented dispute management lies in its tendency to turn technical questions into tests of political resolve. As seen in the past years, electric vehicles are framed as the future of European manufacturing, rare earths as a matter of supply-chain security, solar and battery products as a risk of green industrial dependence. Once these cases enter public debate as symbols of strategic competition, technical compromise becomes harder, since governments must answer not only to firms and regulators, but also to public narratives about weakness and resilience. In other words, fragmentation does not merely multiply disputes; it raises the political cost of resolving each one.

The joint monitoring mechanism is therefore the most technically modest and politically valuable part of the new arrangement. Contemporary trade tensions are intensively data-sensitive. For example, a rise in Chinese exports may be read in Brussels as evidence of overcapacity, dumping, or state distortion, while Chinese analysis often points to weak European demand, high energy costs, supply-chain reorganisation, or European firms producing within Chinese manufacturing ecosystems. Shared data will help discipline disagreements by identifying the factual terrain. This common basis for discussing trade flows can help pull certain disputes back from political claims into technical diagnosis, which is easier to manage than generalized accusations.

The mechanism also reflects a recognition in Chinese policy discussions that Europe’s anxiety is partly structural. Some recent Chinese commentaries have described China-EU relations as characterized by “ice and fire”: restrictions and mistrust coexist with strong commercial interdependence and continued demand for cooperation. This framing captures the central contradiction of the relationship. Europe is worried about a new wave of Chinese industrial strength in sectors such as EVs, batteries, solar equipment, machinery, and digital manufacturing, yet these same sectors are also crucial to Europe’s decarbonization and industrial modernization. The mechanism is an attempt to manage that contradiction through procedure rather than escalation.

Rebalancing Through Expansion, With Broader Implications

One of the most consequential ideas emerging from the mechanism is that rebalancing should come through expansion. On July 2, MOFCOM spokesperson He Yadong noted that the two sides “had focused on promoting more balanced growth in bilateral trade rather than reducing trade to achieve balance,” with emphasis on cooperation in artificial intelligence, the green transition, services trade, and market access consultations. China has invited Šefčovič to visit China this autumn for the second ministerial meeting under the mechanism, and the two sides have agreed to hold one or two ministerial-level meetings each year.

This formulation matters because it reframes the trade imbalance as a problem of composition as much as volume. The EU’s goods deficit dominates the political debate, but the broader relationship contains areas where Europe retains considerable advantages. The EU continues to run a services surplus with China, amounting to €21.3 billion in 2025 according to the European Commission. A more balanced relationship could therefore emerge from expanding services trade, improving market access, and encouraging two-way investment instead of compressing goods flows alone.

The mechanism also fits a wider pattern in EU external economic governance. Brussels has long relied on institutionalised platforms to manage relations with major economic partners, such as the EU-US Trade and Technology Council, the EU-India Trade and Technology Council, and trade committees under its agreements with Japan and South Korea. Although these mechanisms differ substantially in purpose and political context, they reflect Brussels’ broader preference for embedding complex economic relationships in standing institutional channels. The China-EU mechanism is distinctive because it is designed less to coordinate policies than to prevent competitive economic policies from becoming unmanageable.

In addition, the focus on WTO reform gives the mechanism a broader multilateral relevance. The joint statement stresses the need to strengthen China-EU cooperation in the WTO and advance substantive progress on reform. This aligns with the EU’s own July 2026 submission of three WTO reform papers, as well as China’s interest in defending a rules-based trading system as stated in its 2026 Position Paper. At a time when unilateral tariffs, economic coercion, industrial subsidies, and weakened dispute settlement are eroding confidence in the global trading system, even limited China-EU cooperation on WTO reform gives the relationship a broader public value.

Challenges: Dialogue Without Suspension of Pressure

The mechanism enters a European political environment already moving on two tracks. Brussels has reopened a channel for negotiation with Beijing, while several member states are pressing the Commission to act more quickly against perceived trade distortions. The tension was visible at the June European Council discussion on “global macroeconomic imbalances.” According to the European Parliamentary Research Service, France proposed a tool similar to the US Section 301 mechanism, which would allow the EU to impose targeted tariffs or import quotas on countries judged to employ unfair trade practices. France also joined Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and Lithuania in calling for tougher trade measures, while Germany, traditionally more cautious about restrictive action toward China, stated that the EU must protect itself from trade distortions. EU leaders ultimately tasked the Commission with taking a twofold approach: on the one hand pursuing dialogue with Beijing, on the other hand sharpening the EU’s trade-defence toolbox and considering further instruments. The result is a more complicated consensus: dialogue with China remains necessary, while the political threshold for using defensive trade instruments has clearly fallen.

This dual-track logic explains why the launch of the mechanism has not stopped the EU from expanding its economic-security and trade-defence toolkit. In July 2026 alone, the European Commission opened an anti-dumping proceeding concerning Chinese Pekin Duck imports, imposed definitive anti-dumping duties on Chinese passenger-car and light-lorry tyres, upgraded its import monitoring mechanism, opened a consultation on the overall evaluation of the Dual-Use Regulation, and imposed anti-dumping duties of 60 to 67.6 percent on Chinese polyamide yarns. These steps show that dialogue will proceed alongside pressure, and that the mechanism will operate in a policy environment where Brussels remains willing to use unilateral instruments.

European policy debates continue to favour a more assertive response to China’s industrial rise. Recent European analyses emphasize the widening trade deficit, the limits of existing trade-defense tools, and the need for faster responses to import surges and industrial overcapacity. This defensive mood reflects real pressure on European firms, workers, and governments.

From a Chinese perspective, one concern is that some of Europe’s competitiveness challenges may increasingly be attributed to Chinese competition, even though they also reflect domestic constraints such as high energy costs, fragmented capital markets, regulatory burdens and uneven innovation performance. China’s Ministry of Commerce has argued that China is “not the root cause” of Europe’s economic and trade problems, while Chinese policy commentary has pointed to high energy costs, policy volatility, and insufficient innovation momentum as deeper constraints on European competitiveness.

The autumn meeting will therefore provide an early test of whether the TIC can move from political signalling to practical problem-solving. Four indicators will be particularly important: whether the two sides can establish a credible data-sharing process; whether they can create early-warning procedures for sudden trade-flow changes; whether export-control communication becomes more predictable; and whether the exchanged market-access lists produce concrete outcomes.

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Conclusion

Chinese official accounts have highlighted a new characterization of China and the EU as “each other’s stable and balanced key trading partners”. Together with the joint statement’s emphasis on stabilizing the relationship and making it more balanced, this language signals an effort to establish a more constructive baseline for economic ties.

The mechanism will not remove the structural pressures behind China-EU trade tensions. Its value lies in making frictions more governable, more transparent, and less vulnerable to political escalation, while preserving the possibility that balance can be achieved through deeper cooperation. Against the backdrop of rising protectionism and unilateralism, the choice of institutionalized dialogue between China and Europe is itself a limited but important signal of stability.

is currently a Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at the School of Social Sciences, Tsinghua University, where her research focuses on science diplomacy, technology and international relations, and China’s foreign policy.

is a Senior Fellow and head of U.S.-EU program at Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS), Tsinghua University. He is a member of Munich Young Leaders with Munich Security Conference, visiting scholar at Yale Law School (2024) and fellow at Arms Control Negotiation Academy (2025-2026). His research interests include U.S. domestic and foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, transatlantic relations, AI and International security, etc.

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ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by Cai Cuihong and Yin Jiahui, which focuses on the Trump administration’s second-term reshaping of U.S. critical minerals policy.

Summary

The reconfiguration of critical mineral supply chains has become an important lever for both U.S. parties to revive manufacturing, safeguard national security, and intensify strategic competition with China. At present, the critical minerals issue is deeply intertwined with policy domains such as the environment, security, and diplomacy.

There are major differences between the policies of the Biden and Trump administrations on critical minerals. In its second term, the Trump administration has made the construction of “energy dominance” a core objective, loosening regulation, expanding domestic development, strengthening bilateral cooperation and reshaping multilateral mechanisms to reconfigure the U.S. critical mineral supply system.

This will intensify turbulence in global critical mineral supply chains, encourage the formation of resource blocs, and sharpen competition over technology and standards. However, due to the United States’ weak industrial foundation, high development costs and substantial obstacles to international cooperation, the results of Trump’s critical minerals policy will remain limited.

Why It Matters

Critical minerals are the “strategic grain” of modern technology, clean energy, and the defense industry. As demand grows across countries, critical minerals have become an important front in great-power strategic competition. At present, U.S. critical minerals policy is gradually shifting from a market-first approach to a security-first one and ensuring supply chain resilience while prevailing in competition with China has become a major policy objective.

China is both a major producer and consumer of critical minerals, and U.S. exclusionary supply-chain policies may reshape the global mineral resource landscape and threaten the development of China’s high-end manufacturing and new quality productive forces. Therefore, analyzing the Trump administration’s second-term critical minerals policy not only helps to grasp the logic of America’s new round of industrial policies and strategies, but also helps China better coordinate resource security, industrial security and external cooperation so that it can retain the initiative in an increasingly competitive global critical minerals landscape.

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Key Points

1. Drivers of Trump’s Second-Term Reconfiguration of U.S. Critical Minerals Policy

A change in the policy agenda. During the Biden administration, U.S. critical minerals policy was deeply tied to the green transition. Critical minerals were treated as a subtopic of clean energy and climate governance, mainly involving lithium batteries and new energy supply chains. Related legislation included the Inflation Reduction Act, the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act.

Trump argued that Biden’s critical minerals policy raised energy prices and expanded fiscal spending. In addition, environmental review weakened the United States’ capacity for mineral development . As a result, early in his second term, Trump quickly overturned many of the Biden-era energy-transition measures and treated critical minerals as important resources for safeguarding America’s “energy dominance” and supply-chain security. In doing so, the Trump administration has bound fossil energy, geopolitical competition, and critical minerals together.

The two administrations differ clearly in their policy goals. The Biden administration treated critical minerals mainly as a supply-chain security issue and pursued “de-risking” in order to reduce dependence on China. The Trump administration has gone further by treating critical minerals as a tool of great-power geopolitical competition and emphasizing that the United States should achieve “dominance” in this field. This means that Trump seeks not only to reduce dependence on China but also to compress China’s room for influence in global resource politics.

In terms of cooperation pathways, Biden placed greater emphasis on bilateral and multilateral cooperation with allies and partner countries, hoping to build cooperative networks through mechanisms such as the Minerals Security Partnership and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. By contrast, the Trump administration prefers bilateral arrangements with a stronger transactional character. It tends to use tools such as market access, financing support, investment screening, tariffs, and even aid to push partner countries to make clearer policy commitments.

2. Progress in Trump’s Second-Term Reconfiguration of U.S. Critical Minerals Policy

Guided by “America First,” the Trump administration has sought to enhance domestic mining and processing capacity for critical minerals. At the very start of Trump’s second term, he declared a national energy emergency and elevated critical minerals to a new strategic level, placing them alongside fossil energy. The administration then created the National Energy Dominance Council and issued executive orders such as “Immediate Measures to Increase American Mineral Production,” simplifying approval procedures, expanding financing, removing environmental constraints, and promoting offshore mineral development. At the same time, the United States has shifted its policy focus toward a wider range of minerals such as copper and uranium, rather than remaining confined to the lithium-battery sector as it did under the Biden administration.

Bilateral cooperation has become more transactional, while multilateral cooperation has become more securitized. At the bilateral level, the Trump administration has consolidated cooperation with traditional partners such as Australia, Japan and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, it has brought Pakistan, Malaysia, Thailand and Central Asian countries into its critical minerals cooperation network, offering investment support and coordinating regulatory policies, supply guarantees, and pricing mechanisms.

The Trump administration has worked with these countries mainly through tools such as aid, sanctions, and reconstruction funds. At the multilateral level, it has deliberately weakened the Biden-era narrative of a “green supply chain” and instead used platforms such as the G7 and the Quad to advance its critical minerals agenda. As a result, the U.S. critical minerals agenda has become closely bound up with economic security, national defense security, and geopolitical confrontation.

3. Impacts of Trump’s Second-Term Reconfiguration of U.S. Critical Minerals Policy

Volatility in global critical mineral supply chains will intensify. Choosing “energy dominance” as its governing objective, the Trump administration is trying to expand capacity, restrict imports and restructure external cooperation within a short period of time. These measures have significantly increased market uncertainty and pushed up prices for copper, zinc, rare earths and other critical minerals. Once upstream prices fluctuate, the effects are quickly transmitted downstream, raising costs in industries such as electric vehicles, wind power equipment, and magnet manufacturing, while also increasing firms’ investment risks.

More importantly, the Trump administration is attempting to rewrite the original market-based global division of labor through executive orders and bilateral agreements, which could shift critical mineral trade from gradual adjustment to rupture-style restructuring. For many critical minerals, both China and the United States rely heavily on external supply, and their sources overlap to a high degree. If the United States pushes critical mineral supply chains in an exclusionary direction, it will further raise the geopolitical premium and push more countries into new economic security dilemmas.

Global resource governance and competition over technical standards will become more politicized. As the United States has shifted critical minerals from an economic issue to a strategic competition issue, the political coloring of global resource governance has deepened further, and the tendency toward smaller, more exclusive supply-chain circles has become more obvious. Through bilateral agreements and mechanisms such as the G7 and the Quad, the Trump administration has directly tied critical mineral supply-chain security to economic security and defense security. As a result, global resource governance is shifting from the logic of open markets to a bloc-based logic rooted in alliance cooperation.

At the same time, the Trump administration is seeking to keep technology-intensive segments such as processing, refining, testing, and certification within the United States and its partner system. It has actively supported R&D subsidies, fund investment, and the export of technical standards to reshape the global standards system and intensify competition in fields such as high-end smelting, materials applications, and rulemaking. These measures will also place greater pressure on China in industrial chains, technology chains, and international discursive influence.

4. Challenges to Trump’s Second-Term Reconfiguration of U.S. Critical Minerals Policy

The United States still has a weak industrial base. Long-term deindustrialization, the decline of mining, and inadequate supporting infrastructure remain persistent problems. Even if the United States emphasizes “rapid output expansion,” it will be difficult in the short term to make up for weaknesses in mine development, power transmission networks, rare earth separation, and high-end smelting. Moreover, many critical mineral projects take a long time to move from discovery to production, and the United States does not hold a clear advantage in reserves, extraction capacity, or processing capacity for some key minerals.

Developing critical minerals in the United States is costly and faces strong political resistance. Federal and state environmental regulations, environmental impact assessment procedures, and opposition from local communities and indigenous groups all slow project progress and increase financing uncertainty. Even if Trump relaxes regulations, it will be difficult to eliminate these obstacles in a short period of time.

The United States also faces considerable resistance in advancing critical minerals cooperation abroad. In some key processing technologies, the United States struggles to replicate capacity at scale, and partner countries may not be willing to accept exclusionary policy arrangements, let alone abandon their existing diversified cooperation networks or bear the risks created by frequent shifts in U.S. policy. Therefore, the actual effects of the Trump administration’s critical minerals policy are likely to fall short of its initial expectations.

Conclusion

In Trump’s second term, critical minerals have become a key hinge connecting industrial policy, energy strategy, national security, and great-power competition. By recasting the sector around “energy dominance,” Washington is seeking not merely to secure supply chains, but to reshape the global division of labor in mining, processing, and downstream manufacturing in ways that strengthen U.S. strategic leverage.

Yet, the harder the United States pushes to securitize and weaponize critical minerals, the more it risks destabilizing the market mechanisms that have long underpinned global resource allocation. Volatility, bloc formation, and standards rivalry may all intensify, but that does not guarantee U.S. success. Domestic bottlenecks, cost disadvantages, and partner resistance will continue to constrain implementation.

For China, the challenge is therefore long-term and structural rather than momentary. The key task is to strengthen whole-chain resilience at home while defending an open, stable, and non-exclusionary international resource order abroad. Strategic patience, technological upgrading, diversified cooperation, and proactive rule-shaping will be essential in navigating the next phase of global critical minerals competition.

About the Author

Cai Cuihong is Professor at the Center for American Studies, Fudan University, and a researcher at the Global AI Innovation Governance Center. Her research focuses on China-U.S. relations, information security strategy, cyberspace governance, and cyber politics in international relations.

Co-author Yin Jiahui is a PhD candidate at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University. Together, they work on U.S. strategy, industrial policy and China-U.S. strategic competition.

About the Publication

The Chinese version of this article was published in The Chinese Journal of American Studies (Meiguo Yanjiu, 《美国研究》), which was founded in 1987 and is jointly sponsored by the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Chinese Association for American Studies. Originally launched as a quarterly and published as a bimonthly since 2014, the journal features Chinese scholarship on the United States, including its politics, economy, foreign policy, military affairs, science and technology, and culture.

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ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me. Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com.

In this newsletter, we address concerns about China’s positions through a Q&A format, while also presenting key points of leading Chinese scholars’ commentaries. Through this series, we aim to provide policymakers, think tanks, and strategic communities overseas with access to Chinese scholars’ views, accompanied by curated academic perspectives that help readers better understand the considerations underlying China’s foreign policy choices.

Background

On July 17, the 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference and High-Level Meeting on Global AI Governance opened in Shanghai. Chinese President Xi attended the opening ceremony and delivered a keynote address titled “Joining Hands to Build a Just and Equitable System For Global AI Governance.” The World AI Cooperation Organization was also established in Shanghai. What solutions does China propose for global AI governance, and how will these proposals be translated into practice? Against this broader backdrop, how does China view its competition with the United States in shaping the future of global AI governance? In this episode of Ask China, we bring together the perspectives of Chinese scholars to offer readers a closer look at these questions.

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The outcomes of the 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) indicate that China has gradually developed a coherent approach that connects normative principles, institutional arrangements and practical cooperation. President Xi Jinping’s keynote address presented China’s proposal through four dimensions—development, security, civilization and governance. The establishment of the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) at the Conference further translated these principles into concrete actions.

From the development dimension, it regards governance as an enabler of technological progress rather than merely as a means of mitigating risks. The Chair’s Statement advocates an innovation ecosystem that is enterprise-led, market-driven, application-oriented, research-grounded and talent-based. It also calls for the promotion of the AI Plus model, the responsible development of open-source ecosystems, and the application of AI in science, education, agriculture, health and so forth. These commitments show that China does not place governance in opposition to innovation. Instead, it seeks to use appropriate rules, infrastructure, open-source cooperation and scenario-based applications to unleash the potential of AI, facilitate industrial upgrading and improve the accessibility of AI technologies and services.

From the security dimension, China is committed to a controllable path of AI. The Conference called for the establishment of laws and regulations, technological monitoring, risk-warning and emergency-response systems, while also advocating tiered and category-based management according to the characteristics and risk levels of different AI systems. Large language models should be equipped with necessary guardrails, while AI agents should operate within clearly defined decision-making authority and behavioral boundaries, supported by mechanisms for behavior tracing and risk alerts. The scope of governance extends from data security, personal information protection and algorithmic ethics to critical infrastructure and the malicious use of AI by terrorist, extremist and transnational criminal groups. At the same time, China opposes overstretching the concept of national security and using security concerns to justify technological blockades or decoupling. The objective is to ensure that AI remains a trusted tool for humanity and is always under human control without suppressing technological innovation.

From the civilization dimension, China promotes a culturally inclusive approach that places human dignity, social well-being and mutual learning between civilizations above technological efficiency alone. The Conference emphasized that AI development should respect differences in national histories, cultures, social systems and forms of civilization, rather than imposing a single cultural or ideological model on the world. It also called for systematic responses to the impact of AI on employment, including AI education, skills training, job creation and the protection of workers’ rights and dignity. China’s commitment to enable 30 countries to use MAZU, an AI-powered meteorological warning system, further transformed the principle of AI for good into a practical international public good serving disaster prevention, public safety and the protection of livelihoods.

From the governance dimension, a major institutional outcome of the Conference was the establishment of WAICO in Shanghai. The organization is intended to promote policy dialogue, technical cooperation, governance coordination and capacity building, with particular attention to the needs of Global South countries. China also announced that, over the next five years, it would provide developing countries with 5,000 opportunities in AI training and seminar programs and establish international AI application cooperation centers with major regional organizations. These measures show that China also seeks to strengthen the capacity of developing countries to innovate, apply and govern AI, thereby bridging the AI and digital divides.

For many countries across the Global South, the question is no longer whether to adopt artificial intelligence, but how to do so without becoming dependent on a single technology ecosystem. As AI capabilities become increasingly concentrated in a handful of countries and companies, governments in Asia, Africa and Latin America are looking for partnerships that strengthen domestic capabilities rather than lock them into proprietary platforms. The 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) presented China’s answer to this demand: a collaboration model that prioritises capacity building, open ecosystems and multilateral governance over technology dependence.

While advanced economies tend to focus on frontier innovation, AI safety and regulation, many developing countries remain constrained by an emerging “intelligence divide”. Computing power, foundation models and high-end AI talent remain heavily concentrated in a small number of countries and leading technology firms, leaving many Global South countries at a structural disadvantage. Representatives from developing countries consistently raised the same concern: they wanted greater opportunities to participate in the AI revolution, but feared that unequal access to infrastructure, talent and data would create a new form of global inequality. From this perspective, AI governance is not only about managing risks, it must also ensure that more countries can develop and use AI on their own terms.

WAIC therefore framed international cooperation less as technology transfer than as capability building. For instance, China pledged to provide 5,000 AI training places for developing countries and to establish International AI Application Cooperation Centres serving regional organisations including ASEAN, the African Union, the Arab League, CELAC, BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Beyond training, cooperation extends to joint research, governance exchanges and long-term technical support. In this model, universities and research institutions become long-term partners in knowledge production and talent cultivation rather than simply channels for technology transfer.

Another feature of WAIC’s collaboration model is its emphasis on open and adaptable AI ecosystems instead of exclusive platforms. Throughout the conference, Chinese companies showcased open-source foundation models alongside lightweight AI applications designed for deployment in resource-constrained environments. Visitors from Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America showed particular interest in the low-cost weather early-warning systems, rural digital education platforms and compact industrial AI solutions that require relatively limited computing infrastructure. These demonstrations reflected that future cooperation aims to help countries build their own AI ecosystems.

WAIC also sought to redefine AI governance as an enabler of development. During the conference, 29 countries signed the agreement establishing the World AI Cooperation Organisation (WAICO) in Shanghai. Rather than allowing governance rules to be determined primarily by technologically advanced countries, these new institutions aim to expand developing countries’ participation in setting standards, building regulatory capacity and shaping the future architecture of global AI governance.

Taken together, these initiatives suggest that instead of promoting closed technology platforms, WAIC seeks to promote the conditions for technological development itself: skilled talent, institutional capacity, open-source ecosystems, local adaptation and multilateral governance. Whether this model can be implemented at scale remains to be seen. But for many Global South countries seeking greater technological autonomy without technological isolation, WAIC offered a vision of AI cooperation that is alternative to both technological dependence and geopolitical alignment.

Yes—but only if WAICO continues to uphold the United Nations as the main channel for global AI governance and positions itself as a complement to, and a connector within, the existing global governance architecture, rather than as a parallel system created outside it. Whether a new international mechanism contributes to governance fragmentation depends less on who initiated it than on whether it can effectively align itself with existing international institutions. WAICO’s founding agreement affirms the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; its purpose is to strengthen international AI cooperation within the broader UN-centered framework.

At the same time, WAICO addresses a long-standing weakness in global AI governance: insufficient representation. Existing international rules are often shaped primarily by a small number of technologically advanced countries, while developing countries have limited opportunities to participate. This creates an imbalance between the production of rules and the representation of interests. WAICO’s founding members span Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe. By following the principle of extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits, it expands opportunities for Global South countries to participate in rulemaking and capacity building, helping move AI governance from an “exclusive club” toward an open platform for all countries to participate, strengthening the representation and voice of Global South countries in AI governance.

More importantly, WAICO seeks to address another major weakness in the current system: the gap between principles and action. The international community does not lack broad principles concerning AI ethics, safety and development. What it lacks are durable mechanisms that can translate those principles into sustained cooperation and tangible international public goods. Through the AI Capacity-Building Action Plan for Good and for All, WAICO can promote capacity building through professional training, joint application centers and technological cooperation, thereby integrating governance rules with development cooperation. Hu Yi describes this function through three important transitions: “turning consensus on principles into coordination mechanisms, technological capabilities into public goods, and development needs into governance issues.”

To turn principles such as “AI for Good,” “inclusive development,” and “multilateralism” into international governance mechanisms that countries can monitor, assess, and implement, the international community needs to build a coherent institutional chain from shared values to practical action.

First, states should translate broad principles into common standards and concrete requirements. Within multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations, states should build consensus around the core principles of AI governance. They should define “AI for Good” through clear requirements concerning safety, effective human oversight, transparency and explainability, fairness and non-discrimination, and accountability. International institutions and technical bodies should also develop common standards for model training, data governance, safety assessment, and the allocation of responsibility.

Second, regulators should adopt a risk-based and adaptive approach to monitoring and assessment. Because AI systems vary significantly in their purposes and potential risks, regulators should tailor governance requirements to different risk levels and application contexts. They can apply relatively flexible rules to lower-risk applications while requiring high-risk applications to meet stricter testing, certification, accountability, and withdrawal requirements. Regulators should also move beyond one-time, pre-deployment reviews. Through a recurring process of monitoring, assessment, adjustment, and regulatory revision, they can update standards and regulatory measures in response to technological developments and real-world impacts.

Third, international institutions, governments, companies, and social actors should share responsibility for implementation. At the international level, the United Nations and other multilateral institutions should coordinate different governance arrangements and promote cooperation on AI safety standards, assessment methods, and certification procedures. At the national level, governments should incorporate these standards into laws and regulations, clarify the responsibilities of developers, platforms, and users, and establish testing, certification, market-access, and withdrawal requirements. Companies should take responsibility for managing the risks associated with the technologies they develop and deploy, while civil society, academic institutions, and other stakeholders should provide oversight and feedback.

Fourth, the international community should strengthen capacity building to advance inclusive development. Many countries in the Global South still lack sufficient capacity to develop and govern AI. International cooperation should therefore do more than establish common rules; it should also help developing countries implement them. International AI capacity-building centers, global capacity-development networks, training and exchange programs, and the provision of global public goods can strengthen these countries’ technological capabilities, risk-identification capacity, and governance institutions while narrowing the global AI divide.

Over the past year, global AI governance has been characterized by two parallel trends: the rapid acceleration of technological innovation alongside rising governance risks, and intensifying strategic competition alongside expanding international cooperation. AI infrastructure, computing power, frontier foundation models, and high-end talent remain concentrated in a small number of countries and leading technology firms, leaving many developing countries facing a widening “AI divide.” At the same time, significant differences remain over AI regulation, data governance, and technical standards, while a broadly accepted global governance framework has yet to emerge.

Against this backdrop, the United States has continued to frame AI primarily through the lens of strategic competition. On the one hand, it has strengthened export controls, investment restrictions, semiconductor regulations, and other technology-related legislation to constrain China’s technological advancement. On the other hand, it has sought to build an AI ecosystem centered on the U.S. technology stack and allied partners in order to preserve its leadership in both technological innovation and global rule-making. In contrast, this year’s World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) placed greater emphasis on AI governance, global technological risks, and inclusive development. Rather than viewing AI through a zero-sum geopolitical lens, the conference approached AI as a global public good and highlighted the need for international cooperation. This reflects China’s broader understanding of long-term China-U.S. AI competition.

First, China believes that long-term AI competition should not evolve into uncontrolled technological confrontation. Escalating rivalry could increase the risks of AI safety failures, fuel an AI-driven arms race, fragment the global technology ecosystem, and ultimately force third countries to choose between competing technological systems, thereby undermining global innovation.

Second, China views AI competition as extending beyond technological breakthroughs alone. Competition is not simply about achieving marginal advantages in frontier models or computing power, but also about building resilient innovation ecosystems, strengthening governance capacity, and promoting responsible development. In this sense, governance capability itself constitutes an important dimension of national AI competitiveness. China argues that countries able to promote more open, inclusive, and responsible AI governance—and uphold the principle of AI for Good—will possess greater long-term strategic influence.

Third, China recognizes that strategic competition with the United States is likely to remain a long-term reality. While China does not regard confrontation as its preferred choice, it acknowledges the need to respond to sustained U.S. competitive pressure by strengthening its own technological capabilities and maintaining long-term strategic resilience.

The priorities highlighted at this year’s WAIC illustrate how China intends to prepare for this long-term competition. The first priority is to further strengthen indigenous innovation. China remains confident about its progress in large language models, industrial applications, and AI ecosystem development, while recognizing that gaps remain with the world’s leading frontier models, particularly in fundamental research and original innovation. Strengthening basic research and core technologies therefore remains a strategic priority.

The second priority is to expand international partnerships. China continues to advocate openness and inclusiveness by deepening cooperation with developing countries and other international partners in areas such as infrastructure, talent development, and capacity building. This reflects both China’s aspiration to contribute to global AI governance and its effort to prevent further fragmentation of the global AI ecosystem.

The third priority is to strengthen talent development and long-term innovation capacity. Beyond cultivating more AI specialists, China emphasizes developing a workforce capable of effectively using AI tools while retaining uniquely human capabilities, including independent thinking, creativity, and lifelong learning. Ultimately, China sees long-term AI competitiveness as depending not only on technological advances themselves, but also on the quality of human capital and the capacity to harness technology responsibly.

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Welcome to ChinaVoice, a new podcast series from the ChinaAffairsplus team.

Hosted by , we will invite scholars and experts to discuss major international issues from great power relations and global governance to emerging security and diplomatic challenges. Through these conversations, we hope to share diverse perspectives on China’s foreign policy and the evolving international landscape.

The recently concluded Ankara Summit may not have been the most dramatic NATO summit in recent years, but it could well prove to be the one that most clearly reflects the Alliance’s evolving nature. Previous summits largely revolved around questions such as whether the war in Ukraine would reinvigorate NATO, when Ukraine might join the Alliance, and whether President Trump would weaken the United States’ security commitments to Europe. By contrast, the Ankara Summit confronted a more fundamental and practical question: how NATO will continue to function as the United States expects Europe to shoulder greater responsibility while the European security environment continues to deteriorate.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte described this transformation as “NATO 3.0.” At its core, the concept envisions a rebalancing of security responsibilities within the Alliance, with European allies and Canada increasing defense spending, expanding defense industrial production, and assuming a greater share of collective defense.

To explore the implications of NATO 3.0 and what this latest summit reveals about the Alliance’s future trajectory, we are delighted to welcome Professor Yanan Song of SOAS University of London. In this dialogue, we discuss the meaning and defining features of NATO 3.0, assess its prospects and potential challenges, and examine the strategic choices that are likely to confront Europe as it navigates a rapidly evolving transatlantic security landscape.

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Experts in Today’s Dialogue:

Key Points:

Ankala Summit and the NATO’s Current Operational State

Prof. SONG positions the 2025 Ankara Summit not as a dramatic turning point for NATO, but as an important step in NATO’s long-running evolution. She defines its core character as strategic rebalancing: the 32-member bloc is adjusting internal responsibility allocation to adapt to a shifting global strategic landscape, while preserving cross-alliance unity amid evident internal political differences.

The summit delivers dual-layer outcomes: in the short term, it locks in immediate political reassurances including reaffirmation of Article 5 collective defense commitments and sustained collective support for Ukraine to solidify alliance cohesion. In the long term, it formally kickstarts the long-debated gradual transformation of NATO’s internal division of labor, rather than marking the end of that decades-long policy discussion. Notably, a clear implementation gap persists between the summit’s political pledges and tangible execution: adjustments to defense capacity building, cross-national industrial alignment and domestic political consensus take years of continuous investment to deliver, and cannot be measured only by public headline announcements.

NATO 3.0 and Redefinition of Tranatlantic Responsibility Division

Two experts agree that NATO 3.0 does not signal a weakoned alliance or U.S. withdrawal from European security, but instead refers to an attempt to build a far more sustainable transatlantic security architecture via balanced responsibility sharing. Europe will take primary charge of core conventional deterrence against Russia, military readiness improvement, cross-national defense industrial capacity building and sustained follow-up support for Ukraine, to free up U.S. resources for its long-term strategic priority of Indo-Pacific competition. And the U.S. will remain the irreplaceable core provider of nuclear deterrence, global intelligence sharing, strategic airlift, theater missile defense and unified alliance command and control systems for the foreseeable future, capabilities that cannot be easily transferred to European allies. For the Europe, although there is a growing recognition that it needs to take a greater responsibility for its own security, its defense capacity building still face many chanllenges. Increased defense budgets do not automatically translate to actual military capability, due to fragmented European defense industry and long production lead times for key equipment.

The two discussants also point out that people often overemphasize Trump’s personal role in pushing Europe to take more security responsibilities, and tend to ignore the broader underlying strategic trends. Prof. SONG notes the root of this adjustment lies in consensus in the U.S. over the past decade to devote more attention and resource to the strategic competition with China, which is an inevitable structural shift of US grand strategy rather than a reflection of a single president’s personal personality.

Future Trajectory of NATO and Transatlantic Relations

The two speakers confirmed that the transatlantic defense relationship has entered a more complex new phase, where cooperation and competition coexist as the new normal, rather than a binary choice between the two. While the two sides will remain close security allies, they are also becoming competitors in certain areas of defnese, technology and industry policy.

Looking ahead, NATO will gradually evolve into a more balanced, more Europe-centered but still fundamentally transatlantic alliance. Issue linkage, ad-hoc coalitions of willing allies and expanded loyalty tests covering broader strategic domains beyond traditional defense will become increasingly common features, as reaching full consensus across 32 members on every single agenda item grows progressively difficult.

At the end of this episode, Prof. SUN raises a question about China, asking how the new division of labor between the US and Europe may shape Europe’s future China policies. Prof. SONG argues that Europe will maintain close coordination with the U.S. on security and critical technology issues, but retain independent operational flexibility in its bilateral economic relations with China, rather than carrying out full alignment with Washington’s policy stances.

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ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by ZHANG Shuyan and CHEN Zhimin The Rise of “Sovereign AI” in the Global South and China’s Cooperative Responses on how China’s pursuit of sovereign artificial intelligence has become closely tied to its broader vision for the Global South, technological autonomy, and a more inclusive global governance order.

Summary

“Sovereign AI” refers to the governance of Artificial Intelligence (AI) led by sovereign states: domestically, it relies on the “supremacy” of sovereignty to strike a balance between industrial development and security risks; externally, it leverages the “independence” of sovereignty to pursue strategic autonomy and international influence. The theoretical implication of this concept derives from the technological characteristics of AI. The rapid iteration and inherent uncontrollable nature of AI compels states to assert their agency in technology governance. The broad, general-purpose nature of AI requires state powers to coordinate efforts across multiple security domains. The cross-border mobility of technological factors of AI necessitates that “sovereign AI” pursue strategic autonomy while remaining open.

To counter the monopolization of technical standards and governance rules, “sovereign AI” must assert its voice in international rulemaking, thereby upholding the value of diversity in the global order. As a natural member of the Global South, China adopts a cooperative response towards “sovereign AI,” featuring a spirit of cooperation based on equality and mutual benefit, a capacity-building model integrating open-source strategies with localized deployment, and a solidarity approach to enhance global AI governance engagement.

Why It Matters

The article conceptualizes “Sovereign AI” as a strategic choice through which states seek to shape the development and governance of artificial intelligence according to their own national priorities. Rather than viewing AI governance solely through the lenses of regulation or technological competition, it argues that sovereign AI has increasingly become a strategy adopted by countries in the Global South to strengthen technological autonomy, safeguard national security, and expand their voice in global AI governance.

Against this backdrop, the 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) provides an important practical context through which the article’s arguments can be understood. At the opening ceremony, President Xi stated that artificial intelligence “should not be the solo performance of one country, but a symphony of global cooperation.” This vision reflects China’s long-standing emphasis on AI for good, openness and inclusiveness, and the belief that AI development should contribute to more equitable global development.

More importantly, China announced a series of concrete initiatives aimed at strengthening AI capacity in developing countries, including providing 5,000 AI training opportunities over the next five years, establishing AI application cooperation centers with organizations such as ASEAN, the African Union, the Arab League, CELAC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and BRICS, and expanding AI-enabled meteorological early-warning systems to thirty countries. These initiatives suggest that China’s understanding of sovereign AI extends beyond technological self-reliance to include capacity building and the diffusion of technological capabilities across the Global South.

The establishment of the World AI Cooperation Organization (WAICO) on 16 July 2026 further illustrates how this vision is being translated into institutional practice. Created through an intergovernmental agreement signed by twenty-nine founding member states, WAICO represents one of the first international organizations dedicated specifically to AI cooperation and governance. By emphasizing consultation, shared development, human-centered governance, and compliance with the purposes of the UN Charter, the organization seeks to provide a new multilateral platform through which developing countries can participate more actively in shaping international AI governance. In this sense, WAICO is significant not simply because it creates another international institution, but because it offers the Global South an additional institutional channel through which the goals of sovereign AI—greater technological autonomy, stronger governance capacity, and enhanced international representation—may be pursued collectively rather than individually.

Viewed from this perspective, the article’s analysis of China’s cooperative approach to sovereign AI is particularly timely. Recent developments at WAIC and the creation of WAICO do not simply demonstrate China’s growing role in AI governance; they illustrate a broader attempt to combine technology empowerment with institution building as complementary pathways for strengthening the agency of the Global South in global AI governance.

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Key Points

1. The Conceptual Logic of Sovereign AI

Existing scholarship often focuses on AI sovereignty, a normative concept emphasizing a state’s supreme authority over AI systems and data flows within its jurisdiction. By contrast, Sovereign AI is a policy-oriented concept centered on how states build the technological, industrial, and institutional capacities needed to achieve strategic autonomy in AI. Whereas AI sovereignty concerns a state’s right to govern, Sovereign AI concerns its ability to act. The article adopts the latter framework because it is more practical, better captures the interaction between AI and national security, and provides a broader lens for analyzing both domestic capacity-building and international cooperation in pursuit of technological autonomy.

• The Return of the State in AI Security Governance

Sovereign AI reflects a renewed emphasis on the state as the ultimate guarantor of security. Drawing on theories of sovereignty from Jean Bodin to Carl Schmitt, the concept argues that AI’s rapid evolution, opaque decision-making, and security risks are creating governance gaps akin to modern “states of exception.” As powerful AI systems and technology firms challenge traditional regulatory authority, governments are reasserting control over innovation, risk management, and public order. Sovereign AI thus extends earlier debates over cyber and digital sovereignty into the age of artificial intelligence.

• Sovereign AI as a Comprehensive Security Framework

Because AI is a general-purpose technology, its implications extend across every dimension of national security. In military affairs, autonomous weapons and AI-enabled intelligence reshape deterrence and warfare. Economically, AI may reconfigure global value chains and deepen technological inequalities. Socially and politically, generative AI amplifies misinformation, cyber threats, and governance challenges. Culturally, algorithmic bias and foreign data influence can affect national identity and societal values. Sovereign AI therefore seeks to coordinate responses across military, economic, social, political, and cultural domains rather than treat AI as a narrow technical issue.

• Sovereign AI and Open Strategic Autonomy

Despite its emphasis on autonomy, Sovereign AI does not imply technological self-sufficiency. AI development depends on globally distributed data, computing power, talent, capital, and infrastructure. As a result, states must balance domestic capacity-building with international cooperation. The goal is not ownership of every technological resource, but control over the ability to develop, deploy, and govern AI within a country’s jurisdiction. In this sense, Sovereign AI redefines technological sovereignty as open strategic autonomy within an interconnected global ecosystem.

• Sovereign AI and the Quest for International Voice

Sovereign AI also requires influence over global rulemaking. As AI standards and governance frameworks are increasingly shaped by a handful of states and technology giants, countries seek greater representation in setting international norms. The concept emphasizes translating national development priorities and governance experiences into global standards while respecting diverse political and institutional models. Ultimately, Sovereign AI combines domestic capability with international participation, advocating a more pluralistic and inclusive global AI order (as presented in the Table below) rather than a single universal model of governance.

2. Building Sovereign AI in the Global South

The United States and Europe are advancing their own Sovereign AI strategies to strengthen technological autonomy and reduce external dependence. Washington emphasizes state-backed innovation and industrial investment, while Brussels integrates AI into its broader digital sovereignty agenda. Together, these efforts reflect a broader global shift towards treating AI as a strategic national capability rather than merely a commercial technology.

• Constraints on Sovereign AI in the Global South

Global South countries face significant structural disadvantages in AI development. Data shortages, weak research ecosystems, limited computing capacity, and underfunded digital infrastructure constrain indigenous innovation. At the same time, these states remain vulnerable to cyberattacks, deepfakes, data breaches, and emerging AI-related security risks. Their dependence on foreign cloud services, advanced chips, and frontier models deepens technological reliance, while Western dominance in AI standards and governance institutions limits their influence over rulemaking.

• The Governance Gap

Beyond technological dependence, the Global South remains underrepresented in global AI governance. Many developing countries are excluded from key forums, while existing frameworks largely reflect Northern priorities. Issues central to the Global South—technology transfer, digital inclusion, data sovereignty, and equitable development—receive limited attention, reinforcing asymmetries in both rulemaking and implementation.

• Domestic Sovereignty: State Leadership and Regulation

The article argues that Sovereign AI begins with strengthening the state’s domestic role. Governments should formulate national AI strategies, coordinate investment in data, computing power, talent, and infrastructure, and establish regulatory frameworks capable of balancing innovation with security. Regardless of whether countries adopt “hard-law” or “soft-law” approaches, states must retain ultimate authority over AI governance.

• External Sovereignty: Strategic Autonomy and Voice

Externally, Sovereign AI requires reducing technological dependence without embracing isolationism. Global South countries should pursue open strategic autonomy through international cooperation, South–South partnerships, and local capacity-building. At the global level, they must coordinate efforts to increase representation, shape international norms, and secure a stronger voice in the future governance of AI.

3. The Practice of Sovereign AI in the Global South

Referencing Brazil and Indonesia as case studies, the article examines how Global South countries pursue Sovereign AI through state-led strategies, institutional design, and capacity-building. Their experiences highlight common challenges and emerging pathways for technological autonomy, while offering insights into broader patterns of AI governance and South–South cooperation.

• Brazil: State-Led Planning and Global South Rulemaking

Brazil has emerged as a leading AI hub in Latin America, ranking fifteenth globally in AI research in 2022. Its Sovereign AI strategy rests on state-led planning, legal regulation, and selective openness. The 2021 Brazilian AI Strategy set priorities in education, labor, innovation, industry, public security, and social applications, while the 2024–2028 AI Investment Plan pledged $4 billion for infrastructure, business innovation, public services, and regulation. Brazil has also strengthened data protection through the LGPD and advanced an AI bill based on risk classification. Internationally, it uses cooperation with China, BRICS, the G20, and the OECD framework to expand technical capacity while defending Global South representation in AI governance.

• Indonesia: Digital Sovereignty through Infrastructure and Regulation

Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest economy, is rapidly building AI capacity while confronting deepfakes, cyberattacks, data leaks, digital inequality, and a projected shortage of nine million digital workers by 2030. Its 2020–2045 National AI Strategy identifies health, education, food security, government reform, and smart cities as priorities, while the 2025 AI white paper proposes a Sovereign AI Fund. Indonesia has passed a personal data protection law, issued AI ethics guidelines, and begun drafting binding AI regulation. Cooperation with Chinese firms such as Huawei, Alibaba Cloud, and Tencent Cloud supports infrastructure and cloud capacity, while data-localization rules seek to preserve sovereignty.

• Shared Pattern: Open Autonomy for the Global South

Brazil and Indonesia show that Sovereign AI in the Global South is neither isolationist nor purely market driven. Both rely on strong state planning, regulatory reform, foreign technology, and local capacity-building. Their common goal is to open domestic markets without surrendering control, and to turn national AI development into a platform for greater Global South representation on the global stage.

4. China’s International Cooperation Strategy for Sovereign AI

Unlike many Global South countries focused on technological catch-up, China combines concerns over supply-chain security and AI governance with significant technological strengths in patents, research, models, and computing infrastructure. The article argues that China’s Sovereign AI strategy increasingly centers on helping other Global South countries build AI capacity, while promoting greater collective influence and representation in global AI governance. China is thus positioned not only as a practitioner of Sovereign AI, but also as a key partner in advancing it across the Global South.

• A Reciprocate Vision for the Global South

China’s AI cooperation model emphasizes respect for national sovereignty and non-zero-sum security. Unlike approaches that export regulatory standards, Beijing advocates allowing countries to choose their own development and governance paths. Through the 2023 Global AI Governance Initiative and the Global Security Initiative, China presents AI cooperation as a vehicle for shared development rather than technological containment or geopolitical rivalry.

• Empowering Sovereign AI through Capacity Building

China increasingly frames itself as a capacity builder for the Global South. The 2024 UN resolution on AI capacity-building and China’s AI Capacity-Building Action Plan promote infrastructure, talent development, data security, and digital connectivity. Open-source models such as DeepSeek, Qwen, ERNIE, and Pangu lower barriers to entry, while initiatives like the China–ASEAN AI Innovation Cooperation Center provide tailored solutions that combine technology transfer with local strategic autonomy.

• Expanding Global South Representation in AI Governance

China seeks to strengthen developing countries’ voice in global AI governance through platforms such as the Digital Silk Road, BRICS, and the United Nations. It advocates greater representation, equal participation in rulemaking, and opposition to governance fragmentation. Through BRICS declarations and UN-led initiatives, Beijing positions itself as a champion of a more inclusive, multipolar, and development-oriented AI governance order.

Conclusion

This article examines the theoretical logic and practical meaning of “sovereign artificial intelligence,” arguing that it reflects a broader return of the state in global AI governance. As a general-purpose technology marked by cross-border flows of data, capital, talent, and infrastructure, AI has reshaped the tasks of national security and expanded its spatial boundaries. Sovereign AI therefore entails both strategic coordination across policy domains and a delicate balance between openness and autonomy. Its ultimate value lies not in technological closure, but in respecting diverse national interests and development models, thereby advancing a more equal and inclusive international order.

For countries of the Global South, sovereign AI is a strategic response to asymmetric power structures and widening technological divides. The cases of Brazil and Indonesia show that this approach can enhance domestic technological capacity. Internally, both states have used strategic planning and regulation to manage the tension between innovation and oversight. Externally, they have pursued international cooperation to strengthen local industries and amplify developing countries’ voices in global rulemaking.

China’s practice further advances this agenda. By combining open-source strategies, capacity-building, customized technical assistance, and cooperation through the United Nations, the Digital Silk Road, and BRICS, China offers a model of AI cooperation that moves beyond geopolitical rivalry and strengthens the Global South’s role in shaping the future of AI governance.

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About the Author

ZHANG Shuyan(张书言): ZHANG Shuyan is a Ph.D candidate in Diplomacy at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University. He is research assistant at the Center for Global AI Innovative Governance Global Artificial Intelligence Innovation Governance Center and Rongchang Scholar. His research interests include AI technological power, global AI governance and sovereign AI, etc.

CHEN Zhimin(陈志敏): CHEN Zhimin is the Vice President of Fudan University and professor at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University. He is a Chang Jiang Scholars Program Distinguished Professor by the Ministry of Education, a Jean Monnet Chair Professor by the European Union, and a Leading Talent of the National “Ten Thousand Talents Program” in Philosophy and Social Sciences. He serves as the Chairman of the International Politics Sub-committee of the China Higher Education Association, the Deputy Director of the Teaching Guidance Committee for Political Science Majors under the Ministry of Education, and the Vice Chairman of the Shanghai Federation of Social Science Associations. His research interests include international relations theory, diplomatic studies, and EU studies.

About the Publication

The Chinese version of the article was published by International Security Studies (《国际安全研究》), a leading Chinese academic journal in the field of international security and strategic studies. Published as a bi-monthly journal, International Security Studies is dedicated to strengthening strategic thinking, examining international security issues, and safeguarding national interests. The journal promotes academic research and scholarly exchange while serving as a platform for theoretical innovation and policy-relevant analysis. Covering a wide range of topics in security, diplomacy, and international affairs, it has earned broad recognition among both scholars and practitioners for its academic rigor and practical relevance.

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ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we present a collection curated by LI Yining and LI Yijie, Chinese Perspectives on the 250th Anniversary of the US, on how leading Chinese scholars evaluate America’s structural transition, its severe domestic polarization, and the enduring resilience of its institutions and technology.

Summary

This collection brings together four distinct Chinese assessments of America’s 250th anniversary. Zhang Tengjun describes the moment as a “historical halftime,” while the other contributors emphasize prolonged adjustment, institutional resilience, or the uncertain relationship between declining hegemony and national power.

Despite maintaining global leadership in technology and economics, the U.S. is plagued by structural dilemmas. The authors highlight a fractured national consensus fueled by severe political polarization, widening inequality, and intense culture wars over identity and historical narratives. The traditional “progressive narrative” is facing unprecedented internal challenges.

However, the essays caution against simplistic predictions of American collapse. Zhu Zhaoyi emphasizes the resilience and adaptive capacity of U.S. institutions. Da Wei, by contrast, questions whether the conventional idea of American “self-correction” adequately explains the country’s historical development. Meanwhile, the U.S.-led order commonly associated with “Pax Americana” is visibly eroding—often dismantled by the U.S. itself due to domestic constraints—while America’s technological frontier remains a possible engine for national renewal.

Taken together, the four essays portray a contested American transition. Their authors share concerns about polarization and structural strain, while differing over the resilience of U.S. institutions, the prospects for national renewal, and the future of American global leadership.

Why It Matters

As the United States approaches its 250th anniversary, understanding how several Chinese scholars assess America’s trajectory is useful. This collection moves beyond simplistic narratives of “American decline.” Instead, the selected authors offer a nuanced assessment, acknowledging both America’s severe internal fractures and its continuing institutional and technological strengths.

For global policymakers, businesses, and analysts, these insights are useful. They reveal how these authors interpret U.S. domestic polarization, shifting foreign policies, and the erosion of “Pax Americana.” This selection represents a cross-section of Chinese scholarly debate and carries no claim to official status.

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Key Points

1. CICIR Institute of American Studies Research Group: The United States at 250: How Did It Get Here, and Where Is It Headed?

Beneath the clamor of the celebrations marking the 250th anniversary of American independence on July 4, 2026, the two parties’ dispute over “what exactly should be celebrated” deepens public division. National pride has fallen to a 25-year low. Mainstream media and think tanks clash over core questions such as “What is America?” This prompts deep reflection on how the United States arrived at this point and where it is headed.

• The Development Course of the United States and the Evolution and Predicament of American-style Capitalism

From independence to the late 19th century, American laissez-faire capitalism developed gradually. From the late 19th century to the 1930s, it developed into monopoly capitalism. From the 1930s to the late Cold War, it moved from general monopoly capitalism toward state monopoly capitalism, with international hegemony fully taking shape. From the late Cold War to the first decade of the 21st century, state monopoly capitalism became rigid, and waves of privatization, marketization, and liberalization pushed the United States toward international financial monopoly capitalism.

• U.S. Structural Problems Keep Emerging, but Its Global Lead Is Hard to Overturn in the Short Term

The United States still leads globally in the economic, technological, security, and global governance spheres, but widening wealth gaps, erosion of the manufacturing base, a long-term decline in manufacturing employment, slowing marginal growth, and waning national identity are undermining its hegemony. The report argues that checks and balances have become increasingly dysfunctional, contributing to political gridlock. Ideological polarization deepens the dispute over “What is America?” With global leadership in decline, American hegemony is hard to sustain.

• Looking Ahead, the United States Will Enter a Prolonged Period of Adjustment Marked by Both Restructuring and Division

The relative decline of hegemony does not mean national power will collapse overnight, and some strength may be restored, but a return to the “golden age” is extremely difficult. Financial monopoly capital squeezes the real economy, entrenching industrial hollowing out. The tech-right and financial oligarchs are deeply embedded in politics, exacerbating polarization and K-shaped growth while the public grows disillusioned. The right wing is internally divided, and the two parties battle over major issues, with the public interest reduced to a casualty. These fundamental problems mean the United States can hardly replicate its past “greatness.”

2. ZHANG Tengjun: America at 250: Halftime of History

The U.S. marks its 250th anniversary amid mixed feelings. Zhang argues that a question long posed by Black Americans and other minority groups—“What does it mean to love a country that does not love you?”—is now confronting the broader American public.

• Two Bodies Vie for Control of the Celebrations, and Two Narratives Tear Apart National Consensus

In 2016, Congress created the “U.S. Semiquincentennial Commission” for the celebrations. In January 2025, Trump established Task Force 250 by executive order. Later that year, following a cooperative agreement with the National Park Service, the National Park Foundation created Freedom 250 LLC to help organize anniversary events. Zhang argues that the creation of the parallel structure shifted control over the celebrations and directed a larger share of federal funding toward Freedom 250. The competing arrangements push rival narratives: one of diversity and historical reflection, the other of national glory and “greatness again.” Polls show record-low national pride and deep pessimism about the “American Dream” and the country’s future. In 1976, similar difficulties helped forge national healing; today, grander celebrations expose a shattered basic consensus.

• An Inherent Contradiction Ignites a Culture War on Two Fronts: Identity Politics and Historical Narrative

The Declaration of Independence proclaimed that "all men are created equal" while slavery persisted, an inherent contradiction from America's very birth that comes into sharp focus on the 250th anniversary. For a long time, the "progressive narrative" could still be maintained — yet today it has become untenable. The culture wars unfold along two fronts: one is the battle over identity politics, with the two sides mirroring each other through "anti-wokeness" versus diversity and inclusion, squeezing the middle ground; the other is the clash over historical narratives, from the "1619 Project" to book bans and the removal of statues, where even the path of looking back at history has split in two.

• Ideological Divisions Spill into the Economic and Diplomatic Spheres, Driving a Transformation of American Power

Ideological divisions are now spilling over into the economic and diplomatic spheres: macro data is strong, yet public sentiment has hit rock bottom, and “affordability” has become the top concern. On the economic front, bipartisan consensus is driving manufacturing reshoring and supply chain security, a course correction from neoliberalism, but in the short term tariffs raise consumer prices, while fiscal subsidies add to federal debt pressures, with long-term competitiveness still in doubt. On the diplomatic front, the Monroe Doctrine is reviving, the Western Hemisphere is once again a priority, and allies face transactional pressure. The Economist argues that domestic polarization is being transmitted into foreign policy volatility, adding to global uncertainty.

• Pessimism and Optimism Coexist, and the "Republican Experiment" Stumbles Forward Through Detours and Corrections

Looking back from the 250th anniversary, pessimism and optimism coexist. The pessimistic case lies in political dysfunction, collapsed social trust, and generational value divides. The optimistic case rests on foundational innovation, demographic and immigrant vitality, and local civic energy that still fuel national self-renewal. The “republican experiment” launched 250 years ago has no destined endpoint and is bound to cycle through detours and corrections. This anniversary is merely a historical halftime. America will neither easily disintegrate nor swiftly become “great again,” but will keep stumbling forward in the tension between its ideals and reality. For the world, more meaningful than pronouncing its rise or fall is to soberly prepare for a more uncertain future.

3. ZHU Zhaoyi: America at 250: Roots, Institutions, and Fractures

Philadelphia is revisiting the founding history of 1776, while the San Francisco Bay Area is chasing technology and the future—the same country split by two different themes. But the reason the United States has not followed the historical trajectory of great powers from rise to decline after 250 years lies in an institutional root system that can self-correct, self-restructure, and continuously absorb new elements amid its fractures.

• The Span of Growth: Paradigm Shifts Every Half-Century to a Century and an Unfinished Project in the Public Mind

With roughly 4% of the world’s population, the United States accounts for 26% of global GDP. Over the past 25 years, it has received more than 60% of global venture-capital investment, and more than half of the world’s most important AI models have been developed there. Among countries with populations above 10 million, none has a higher GDP per capita. What truly sets it apart is that, despite repeated crises throughout its history, it has never been locked into decline. The key lies in the fact that its growth has never been dependent on a single industry; roughly every half-century to a century, it restructures its growth paradigm, replacing old engines with new ones. Majorities of Republicans, Democrats, and independents say the American Dream remains a work in progress. Zhu interprets this finding as evidence that many Americans still view the national project as unfinished, and this collective mindset is precisely the evidence that it continues to grow.

• Institutions Are the Primary Productive Force: Self-Correction, Restructuring, and Absorption That Keep Recombining Factors of Production

The foundation of America's long-cycle resilience lies in its institutions. Its political institutions disperse power through checks and balances, reduce the risk of systemic collapse, and provide room for error correction in times of crisis. Its economic institutions, built on property rights protection, contract enforcement, and deep capital markets, form the incentive foundation for long-term investment and innovation. Its social institutions, particularly an immigration system that attracts global talent and top-tier universities backed by substantial research funding, convert human capital into continuous innovative output. Together, these three layers endow American institutions with three rare qualities: the capacity to self-correct, to restructure, and to absorb. Land, capital, and technology are all factors of production, but the institution that enables the continuous recombination of these factors is the primary productive force.

• The Price of Hegemony: How Global Dominance Breeds Inequality, Partisan Rupture, and a Nation Divided Between Optimism and Despair

Zhu argues that America’s geographic security buffer has facilitated extensive overseas intervention while limiting the direct military risks to its homeland. Such interventions can still impose heavy fiscal, military, and political costs. He identifies the dollar system as a durable instrument of U.S. power. At home, the unequal distribution of globalization’s gains has intensified political and social divisions. In his assessment, these forces make the United States both a highly dynamic testing ground and a potentially dangerous source of instability.

• Zhu Argues That China Has Benefited from the Existing Order and Seeks a Greater Voice Within It

Zhu argues that China has been a major beneficiary of the U.S.-led international order and seeks greater institutional influence within that order. The core insight from America’s 250-year experience is that institutional resilience lies in maintaining the capacity for self-correction and continuous absorption. Zhu concludes that most states will continue to operate largely within the existing system, while the United States itself lacks the capacity to construct an entirely new international order.

4. DA Wei: The End of Hegemony and the Rebirth of Power: America on Its 250th Anniversary

The United States is in an interregnum marked by the end of the old "Pax Americana" order, uncertainty over the trajectory of its power, and a still-blurry new world of the "Post-American Era."

• The Rise and Fall of American Hegemony: How Two Traditions Pulled America from Dominance to Self-Dismantlement

Two traditions have always pulled at American foreign policy—the self-preserving republican tradition and the expansionist imperial tradition—driving its trajectory from a great power to a hegemon in a pattern of “two steps forward, one step back.” After World War II, the United States built an institutional order centered on the United Nations and a network of international institutions. During the Cold War, this order operated primarily within the Western bloc; after the Cold War, it expanded globally under U.S. unipolarity. Yet hegemony itself sows the seeds of decline; internal contradictions such as industrial hollowing out and strategic overreach erupted after 2008, giving rise to Trump’s “table-flipping” foreign policy. Today, the United States is ending its hegemony in a rare way—not by external defeat, but by actively dismantling the system it built, trapped in the core dilemma of being unwilling to bear the costs and constraints of liberal internationalist hegemony while still wanting to enjoy its benefits.

• The Rise and Fall of American Power: The Technological Frontier as the Most Realistic Remaining Path to Renewed Power, but Institutional Hegemony Hard to Rebuild

America’s leaps in national power have relied on geographical, institutional, and technological frontiers. The first two avenues are increasingly constrained, making the technological frontier the most realistic path to reviving its strength. Yet even if technological change grows the “pie,” it may fail to improve distribution and could intensify the concentration of wealth and power. America’s much-vaunted “capacity for self-correction” is in essence a reinterpretation of its founding ideals in different historical contexts; past success offers no guarantee of future victory. American power may rise again, but a “Pax Americana”-style institutional hegemony is now difficult to rebuild, owing to the absence of the overwhelming material advantage, international prestige, and domestic consensus that the United States possessed in 1945 or at the end of the Cold War.

Conclusion

Taken together, the four articles portray America at 250 as a formidable power navigating a painful, long-term transition rather than a failing state. They share concerns about domestic contradictions, partisan gridlock, and cultural fractures, but they differ over the resilience of U.S. institutions, the prospects for national renewal, and the future of American global leadership. The era of unquestioned “Pax Americana” is fading, yet America’s future trajectory remains contested rather than predetermined. As the U.S. stumbles forward as an “unfinished project,” it will continue to wrestle with the gap between its founding ideals and reality. For the rest of the world, the focus must shift from predicting America’s collapse to adapting to a more complex, uncertain international landscape defined by this ongoing transformation.

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ChinAffairsplus shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions or criticisms may be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by NI Feng on China’s American Studies.

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Summary

In recent years, China’s research on area studies and the construction of an independent knowledge system have developed rapidly and yielded substantial results. China’s American Studies is a specialized field devoted to the systematic observation and understanding of the U.S. in all its dimensions, including China-U.S. relations. Its developmental trajectory reflects the evolution of modern Chinese scholarship and the continuous deepening of China’s understanding of the outside world.

However, China’s American Studies still faces several developmental bottlenecks, which call for coordinated efforts in research paradigms, disciplinary integration, talent development, and knowledge system construction.

Why It Matters

In 2022, area studies was officially established as a first-level discipline in China, laying a stronger institutional basis for the field within the national academic system. The core significance of this move lies in constructing China’s independent knowledge system to inform national strategy.

China-U.S. relations are widely regarded as one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world. Given this context, China’s American Studies has gained renewed significance as a field that seeks to systematically understand the U.S. and China-U.S. relations through interdisciplinary and comprehensive approaches.

It aims to develop a deeper understanding of the complex social and political dynamics of the U.S., grasp the underlying logic of its behavior, and respond to the practical challenges of China-U.S. relations, as well as the strategic need to rejuvenate the Chinese nation. Against this backdrop, this article critically reviews the achievements and limitations of China’s American Studies and offers reflections on the construction of this evolving field.

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Key Points

1. From Learning to Strategic Response and Disciplinary Subjectivity

   1. Origins and Foundation Building (1949-late 1970s)

      During this period, China’s American Studies was highly integrated into international situation assessments and foreign policy decision-making support. It was characterized by strong practical orientation and a degree of confidentiality. First, it focused on intelligence analysis and strategic assessment. The central task of research was to accurately assess U.S. intentions toward China and the trajectory of its policies. Second, early academic work began to take shape, especially in American history and the history of China-U.S. relations. Universities and research institutions began to conduct foundational studies on American history and the history of China-U.S. relations, laying the groundwork for later development of the discipline.

   2. Institutionalization and the Rise of a Research System (late 1970s-early 1990s)

      China’s reform and opening up, combined with the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the U.S., provided both motivation and conditions for developing American Studies. This period was marked by three major developments. First, the establishment of core research institutions. For example, the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences was founded in 1981. Specialized journals such as American Studies were launched. Second, the expansion of university-based research networks. Several leading universities established American Studies centers, drawing on strengths in history, political science, and international relations to form distinctive research orientations. Third, the broadening and deepening of research perspectives. Research agendas gradually expanded from China-U.S. relations and U.S. foreign policy to include domestic political institutions, economic models, history, and culture. Many American academic works and theoretical writings began to be introduced into China.

   3. Expansion and Deepening Phase (early 1990s-2017)

      Following the end of the Cold War and China’s accelerated integration into the world, American Studies entered a period of diversified expansion. In terms of research agendas, studies rapidly expanded from traditional “high politics” fields such as history, politics, and economics to “low politics” areas including society, culture, ethnicity, and religion, with the aim of constructing a comprehensive, panoramic understanding of the U.S. In terms of research networks, a structure centered on state institutions, affiliated research institutes, universities, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences system gradually took shape. In terms of methodology, scholars consciously introduced theories and methods from established disciplines such as international relations, political science, economics, sociology, history, and cultural studies, undertaking mid-range theoretical construction and case-based analysis.

   4. Transformation and Innovation Phase (2017-present)

      With the U.S. clearly shifting its China policy toward “strategic competition”, China’s American Studies has entered a new stage focused on responding to major-power competition and developing innovative research approaches. First, this phase is marked by an unprecedented strengthening of problem consciousness, with a sharper focus on real-world concerns and policy orientation. Issues such as “America First”“decoupling” “de-risking” and “U.S. technology containment of China” have rapidly become central topics of scholarly analysis. Second, understanding of internal changes in the U.S. has enhanced, including “political polarization”“culture wars” and “identity politics”. Third, self-awareness within the discipline has increased. China’s American Studies actively explores new interdisciplinary approaches, aiming to construct an independent knowledge system of American Studies with China’s characteristics.

2. Strategic Alignment, Real-Time Agenda Tracking, and Dual Research Perspectives

   1. Main Characteristics: Alignment with Strategic Needs, Emphasis on Dynamic and Strategic Agendas, and Duality of Research Perspectives

      First, China’s American Studies is closely aligned with national strategic needs and has consistently focused on major strategic priorities of national development. For example, scholars’ attention to the Taiwan question stems from the fact that it is the most important and sensitive issue in China-U.S. relations. Similarly, Chinese research on the U.S. Congress began in the context of the 1995 Taiwan Strait crisis.. Research on intellectual property rights was also closely linked to negotiations between China and the U.S. over China’s accession to the WTO.

      Second, there is a strong focus on dynamic developments and strategic issues. Chinese scholars have long paid attention to major debates within U.S. political, academic, and strategic circles, such as “economic globalization”, the thesis of “end of history” “clash of civilizations”“soft power”“smart power” and the “Thucydides Trap”. Through these discussions, scholars seek to understand shifts in U.S. strategic thinking while engaging in dialogue with American and international counterparts. In addition, China has continuously tracked the evolution of U.S. global strategy. For instance, the Clinton administration’s “enlargement and engagement”, the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia”, the Trump administration’s “trade war” and its strategy of great-power competition during the first term. China has also maintained close attention to changes in U.S. domestic politics, such as the 2008 financial crisis, the Occupy Wall Street movement, and the Tea Party movement. Related research has often developed in near real time alongside these events, responding promptly to emerging concerns.

      Third, there is a duality of research perspectives and an increasing methodological pluralism driven by interdisciplinary exploration. Research perspectives operate on two levels: first, an effort to understand the U.S. in itself - that is, what the U.S. is; and second, an inquiry into the relationship between the U.S., China, and the wider world - that is, what the U.S. means for China and for the world. The latter perspective has increasingly become more prominent. Ultimately, American Studies in China converges on the question of the challenges the U.S. poses to China and China’s responses to them. As understanding deepens, scholars have come to recognize that no single discipline is sufficient to grasp the complexity of a superpower. As a result, interdisciplinary integration has become a consensus within the field.

   2. Developmental Bottlenecks: Insufficient High-Quality Works, Limited Theoretical and Methodological Innovation, Disconnect between Research and Public Understanding...

      Compared with the goal of building a mature and independent knowledge system, China’s American Studies still faces several developmental bottlenecks.

      First, many studies remain descriptive and policy-responsive, and high-quality scholarly works are insufficient. Many studies are limited to immediate descriptions of changes in U.S. policies and corresponding policy-response analyses, with insufficient exploration of underlying historical and cultural roots. As a result, there is a lack of deep, long-term structural explanations with strong analytical penetration.

      Second, theoretical and methodological innovation remains limited. In terms of research methods, although quantitative research and data analysis have been strengthened, the field is still in the process of exploring how to organically integrate the holistic perspective and dialectical thinking rooted in China’s traditional scholarly approaches into modern scientific methods, to form a distinctive methodological framework.

      Third, there is a disconnect between academic research, policymaking, and public understanding. Effective channels for disseminating high-quality academic findings to the public remain limited, and the discipline has not fully played its role in guiding rational public understanding of the United States or shaping public opinion on U.S.-related issues.

      Fourth, interdisciplinary integration remains relatively shallow. In practice, political science, economics, history, and sociology largely continue to operate in parallel rather than in deep integration.

      Fifth, there is a shortage of talent and room for improvement in training mechanisms. The overall scale of China’s American Studies community remains insufficient, and talent cultivation mechanisms remain narrow and insufficiently systematic.

3. Reflections on Constructing an Independent Knowledge System in Social Science

   1. Emphasizing a China-Centered Perspective

      A China-centered research agenda is the foundation of an independent knowledge system. Agenda-setting should proceed from China’s national interests, development needs, and security concerns, rather than simply following topics set by American academia. Researchers should draw on China’s historical experience, philosophical thinking, and practical standpoint to produce original knowledge about the U.S. that can engage in dialogue with the international academic community.

   2. Promoting a Profound Transformation of Research Paradigms
      First, strengthening problem consciousness. Research should focus on changes within the U.S., with particular attention to internal divisions, crises, and conflicts. Existing knowledge should be updated in response to these developments. Second, strengthening comparative politics and transnational perspectives. The U.S. should be examined within a broader global context. Third, deepening historical, cultural, and ideational research, to understand the logic of U.S. behavior through its historical trajectory. Fourth, encouraging the application of interdisciplinary approaches and emerging methods. Big data, artificial intelligence, and other tools can be used to analyze U.S. public opinion, politics, and elections, while integrating economic models to form a comprehensive analytical toolkit. Fifth, placing greater emphasis on fieldwork and primary sources. Through on-site visits, archival research, and elite interviews, scholars can obtain deeper insights that go beyond publicly available reports.

   3. Strengthening the Three Pillars of Discipline, Data, and Talent
      First, promoting interdisciplinary integration. Relying on area studies as a foundation, research institutions and universities should genuinely establish research centers and training programs that break down disciplinary boundaries. Second, building independent and authoritative databases and case libraries. Systematically collecting, organizing, and translating primary materials on U.S. politics, economy, and society is essential. Third, innovating talent training models for interdisciplinary professionals. Emphasis should be placed on the integration of foreign language proficiency, disciplinary theory, area knowledge, research methods, and cross-cultural practice.

      At the same time, more flexible “revolving door” mechanisms should be explored, allowing scholars to gain experience in policy and practice-oriented institutions. Likewise, experienced practitioners from diplomacy, trade, and public communication fields should be encouraged to bring their practical experience into classrooms and research settings. Support should also be given to a more diverse range of research actors.

   4. Actively Participating In and Guiding the Formation of International Academic Discourse
      Chinese scholars should engage more confidently on the international academic stage, contribute Chinese conceptual frameworks to global discussions, and conduct equal, rational dialogue and cooperation with international peers, while actively helping to shape the agenda of global American Studies.

Conclusion

The goal of building an independent knowledge system for American Studies is to forge a new knowledge paradigm rooted in China, grounded in a deep understanding of the U.S., and capable of integrating Chinese and international perspectives. This requires a more confident and composed mindset, systematically analyzing the complex internal structure of the U.S. while continuously reflecting on and defining China’s own position and methodological approach as the research subject, thereby providing important intellectual support for interpreting changes in the U.S. and shaping China-U.S. relations.

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About the Author

NI Feng (倪峰): Senior Research Fellow, PhD supervisor, Former Director of the Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and President of the Chinese Association for American Studies (CAAS). His main research interests include U.S. domestic politics and China–U.S. relations.

About the Publication

The Chinese version of the article was published by the Journal of University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (《中国社会科学院大学学报》). The journal, administered by the University of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), was founded in 1981, at the early stage of China’s reform and opening up. The journal publishes academic articles by leading scholars and experts from China and abroad, with a focus on studies addressing major contemporary theoretical and practical issues.

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Hosted by SUN Chenghao, we will invite scholars and experts to discuss major international issues from great power relations and global governance to emerging security and diplomatic challenges. Through these conversations, we hope to share diverse perspectives on China’s foreign policy and the evolving international landscape.

Over the past year, European discourse on China has increasingly prioritized concepts such as economic security, de-risking, and industrial resilience, reflecting a significant shift in bilateral dynamics. Since the European Union officially defined China as a partner, competitor and systemic rival in 2019, the relationship has navigated a complex and often turbulent path. What are the structural sources driving current tensions, and how do issues like trade imbalances, investment hesitations, and the Ukraine crisis complicate the landscape? To what extent is Europe’s cautious approach rooted in an over-securitization of economic issues, driven by internal anxieties over sluggish growth and declining industrial competitiveness? As the EU’s 27 member states navigate internal divisions to formulate a cohesive policy, maintaining pragmatic engagement remains crucial.

In this episode of ChinaVoice, we invited LIANG Linlin from the China Chamber of Commerce to the EU (CCCEU), deeply engaged in China-Europe relations, to dissect the realities of European policymaking, the operational environment for Chinese enterprises in Europe, the mechanisms needed to prevent frictions from escalating into strategic confrontation, and the enduring necessity for bilateral cooperation in global governance, green transition, and artificial intelligence.

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This episode focuses on the evolving trajectory of China-Europe relations, with SUN Chenghao and LIANG Linlin discussing how both sides should understand rising tensions, manage economic and technological frictions, and identify realistic areas for future cooperation.

SUN opens the discussion by placing current European debates on China in a broader comparative context. He observes that many conversations now taking place in Europe sound similar to debates in Washington about a decade ago, when U.S. policymakers increasingly concluded that engagement with China had failed and that competition should become the organizing principle of the relationship. In Europe today, he notes, China-related discussions increasingly revolve around economic security, de-risking, industrial resilience, technological sovereignty and the idea of a “China Shock 2.0.” Against this background, he asks whether China-Europe relations have reached a new turning point.

LIANG responds that China-Europe relations have been described as being “at a crossroads” many times in recent years. In her view, however, the more substantial turning point came in 2019, when the European Union redefined China simultaneously as a partner, a competitor, and a systemic rival. Since then, this three-part framework has shaped many policy debates in Brussels and across Europe. She argues that Europe is now once again at a moment of reflection: some policymakers and scholars are debating whether Europe should take a tougher approach toward China, while others are asking whether the EU has overemphasized rivalry and competition at the expense of partnership.

SUN then raises the question of whether Europe has become overly concerned about China. He points out that issues such as economic dependence, industrial competition, critical infrastructure, and national security have become much more prominent in European debates. From the Chinese perspective, some observers worry that Europe is increasingly viewing China through a security lens and may be exaggerating the risks associated with China.

LIANG notes that the EU’s threefold definition of China is difficult to implement in practice because the categories of partner, competitor, and systemic rival can contradict one another. In recent years, Brussels has often stressed the competitor and rival dimensions more than the partner dimension. However, she also observes that not all Europeans see China primarily as a rival. Many are more concerned with China as a powerful economic competitor, especially in manufacturing. She adds that China is not necessarily the central issue in all European political debates; Europe is also preoccupied with energy, defense, migration, and broader economic challenges. There is also a gap between discussions in Brussels and attitudes at the member-state or regional levels.

Turnning to the sources of tension between China and Europe, SUN suggests that current disagreements go beyond individual issues such as electric vehicles, trade disputes, market access, and the Ukraine crisis. They are increasingly connected to broader European concerns about economic security, technological dependence, industrial competitiveness, and Europe’s position in a more competitive international system. LIANG identifies trade and industrial policy, investment, and the Ukraine crisis as three major sources of tension. From Europe’s perspective, trade imbalances, Chinese industrial competitiveness, and market access have become central concerns. From China’s perspective, there is concern that Europe’s de-risking agenda could slide into protectionism or selective decoupling.

On the question of “anxiety” in Europe, LIANG argues that European concerns about China are deeply connected to Europe’s own economic difficulties. Europe is facing sluggish growth, pressure on employment, weakness in parts of its manufacturing sector, high energy prices, rising labor costs, and a complex regulatory environment. In this context, China’s manufacturing capacity can appear overwhelming. Some Europeans worry that China can produce almost everything at competitive prices and increasingly high quality, which raises deeper questions about Europe’s own competitiveness. LIANG believes that some of this anxiety is understandable, but it can become problematic when the concept of security is overstretched. She gives the example of fears that Chinese companies could control infrastructure or access data in unrealistic ways. In her view, such concerns are often not based on facts and reflect a lack of trust.

At the same time, LIANG emphasizes that Europe should not be overly pessimistic about itself. Europe still has a large consumer market, strong innovation capacity, a deep talent pool, and significant power in global standard-setting. For Chinese companies, Europe remains a highly attractive destination, and survey data from the China Chamber of Commerce to the EU suggest that Europe’s importance for Chinese companies’ overseas expansion has continued to rise.

Then, SUN and LIANG also discuss internal divisions within Europe. LIANG explains that the EU is not a single state but a bloc of 27 member states, each with different economic exposure to China, policy traditions, and political preferences. Some countries are more supportive of free trade, while others are more protectionist. Positions also vary between Brussels, national capitals, and regional governments. However, she stresses that EU decision-making mechanisms still matter: even if member states disagree, EU-level rules can still produce collective decisions, especially on trade defense measures.

On managing differences, SUN argues that China and Europe should not allow trade and technology disputes to define the entire relationship. Complete decoupling is neither realistic nor desirable. LIANG agrees and points out that China and the EU already have many dialogue mechanisms, including summits, high-level economic and trade dialogues, digital economy exchanges, climate and environment dialogues, and strategic dialogues. However, she believes that the frequency and effectiveness of communication are still insufficient. She welcomes discussions on a China-EU trade and investment consultation mechanism, which could help address concrete issues such as export controls, the implementation of the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation, trade defense instruments, and supply-chain-related measures. SUN adds that compared with the frequency of China-U.S. exchanges on trade and investment, China-EU communication still needs to become more regular and institutionalized.

Finally, the discussion turns to global governance. LIANG argues that China and Europe still have meaningful room for cooperation in areas such as energy security, green transition, food security, counterterrorism, climate change, multilateral governance, and third-party market cooperation. She notes that Chinese companies have contributed positively to Europe’s green transition and that there may be potential synergies between the Belt and Road Initiative and the EU’s Global Gateway, particularly in connectivity and third-party markets. However, she stresses that trust must be rebuilt first.

SUN concludes by highlighting artificial intelligence governance as a promising area for future China-Europe cooperation. He suggests that the two sides could explore official or Track 1 dialogues on issues such as the AI-nuclear nexus, the social impact of AI, and preventing the malicious use of AI by non-state actors. Overall, the episode suggests that China-Europe relations are becoming more complicated but also more important. The key question is not whether disagreements exist, but whether both sides can manage them while building more concrete, issue-based, and sustainable cooperation.

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Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by Zhou Guiyin on From Crisis Management to Strategic Stability in China-U.S. Relations.

Summary

Since 2017, the United States has engaged in comprehensive strategic competition with China, leading to recurring crises in their bilateral relationship. Yet through the interaction of domestic and international factors on both sides, especially thanks to the efforts of the two countries’ leaders, relationship has repeatedly returned to a phase of relative stabilization after each period of tension, demonstrating a notable degree of resilience.

A comparative analysis of China-U.S. relations and historical cases of great-power competition in the modern era suggests that there is a positive relationship between stable great-power relations and a stable international order. The stability of international order, in turn, depends on two fundamental conditions: consensus among major powers, and commonly accepted rules and institutions for managing major bilateral and multilateral affairs.

Based on this argument, the article proposes a multi-level and multi-sector policy agenda aimed at shifting China-U.S. relations from crisis management toward strategic stability. At the bilateral level, China and the United States must respect each other’s core interests and seek mutual understanding on key disputes, including economic and trade relations, the Taiwan issue, the South China Sea, and technological competition. At the regional and global levels, both sides should take each other’s major concerns into account and work toward agreements on secondary issues such as reform of international organizations, regional security, nonproliferation, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity.

Why it Matters

As China-U.S. tensions continue to expand from trade and technology into security, artificial intelligence, and regional geopolitics, discussions about “strategic stability” have become increasingly important.

This article is valuable because it moves beyond the common “new Cold War” framing and instead examines whether major power competition can remain manageable under current international conditions. Rather than focusing only on political disputes, the article places current China-U.S. relations in a broader historical context.

By comparing today’s rivalry with cases such as the Concert of Europe, Anglo-German competition before World War I, and the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, it argues that the stability of international order often depends on whether major powers can maintain communication, crisis management mechanisms, and limited strategic consensus even during periods of intense competition.

The article is also closely connected to ongoing developments. Issues such as semiconductor restrictions, supply chain restructuring, Taiwan, the South China Sea, and AI governance are no longer isolated policy disputes; rather, they increasingly shape global economic and security structures. Against this backdrop, the article provides a useful framework for understanding why both competition and coexistence are likely to remain defining features of China-U.S. relations in the coming years.

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Key Points

As China-U.S. tensions continue to expand into trade, technology, AI, and regional security, discussions about “strategic stability” have become increasingly important. Rather than simply framing the relationship as a “new Cold War,” this article focuses on whether major power competition can remain manageable. By comparing current China-U.S. relations with historical cases such as the Concert of Europe and the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, the article argues that competition does not necessarily lead to direct conflict. Diplomacy, communication, and crisis management still matter.

I. The Expansion and Management of U.S. Strategic Competition with China

As China-U.S. tensions increasingly expand into trade, technology, AI, and regional security, discussions about “strategic stability” have become more important. This article is useful because it moves beyond the simple “new Cold War” narrative and instead focuses on whether competition between major powers can still be managed.

The article places current China-U.S. relations in a broader historical context by comparing them with cases such as the Concert of Europe, Anglo-German rivalry before World War I, and the U.S.-Soviet Cold War. It argues that competition does not automatically lead to direct conflict. Communication mechanisms, diplomacy, and limited strategic consensus can still help stabilize great power relations.

The discussion is also closely connected to current events. Issues such as semiconductor restrictions, supply chain restructuring, Taiwan, the South China Sea, and AI governance are increasingly affecting not only bilateral relations but also the wider international order. Against this background, the article provides a relatively clear framework for understanding why competition and coexistence are likely to continue at the same time in China-U.S. relations.

II. The Resilience of China-U.S. Relations

Since the United States began comprehensive strategic competition with China, China-U.S. relations have repeatedly moved through cycles of tension, negotiation, and partial stabilization. Major crises, including the 2018 trade war, the 2020 COVID-19 origins dispute, the 2022 Pelosi Taiwan visit, and the 2025 tariff war, all pushed bilateral ties into periods of instability. Yet after each crisis, both sides eventually resumed dialogue and crisis management, showing that the relationship still retains significant resilience.

This resilience comes from four main sources.

First, China and the United States remain deeply economically interdependent. For decades, economic ties have acted as a “ballast” in bilateral relations. Although recent trade wars and technology restrictions revealed the risks of mutual disruption, they also showed that neither side can fully absorb the costs of economic decoupling. This explains why both countries repeatedly returned to negotiations and eventually reached partial agreements.

Second, cooperation in regional and global governance, together with pressure from third parties, has helped prevent relations from collapsing completely. Even during periods of intense competition, China and the United States continued to cooperate on issues such as climate change, pandemic response, nonproliferation, AI governance, fentanyl control, and regional conflicts. At the same time, actors such as the European Union, ASEAN, and many Global South countries generally refused to fully choose sides, preferring strategic autonomy and hedging strategies instead. These external actors have indirectly moderated China-U.S. tensions.

Third, sustained diplomatic dialogue has remained essential. Although many bilateral dialogue mechanisms established during the Bush and Obama years were suspended, high-level communication channels survived. New consultation mechanisms were also created to handle trade disputes, security tensions, and strategic communication. Most importantly, leader- to- leader diplomacy between Chinese and American presidents has played a key role in stabilizing relations during moments of crisis.

Fourth, and most importantly, the resilience of China-U.S. relations ultimately rests on the balance of power between the two countries. The United States still possesses unmatched global military alliances, technological innovation capacity, and international influence. China, however, has rapidly expanded its military capabilities, built the world’s most comprehensive manufacturing system, and increased its international influence. This combination of competition, mutual constraints, and asymmetric strengths has prevented either side from fully dominating the other, creating the conditions for what the author describes as an “uncomfortable coexistence.”

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III. Comparing U.S.-China Competition with Historical Great Power Rivalries

The resilience of China-U.S. relations suggests that effective crisis management is possible, but long-term strategic stability remains uncertain. To better understand this issue, the article compares current U.S.-China competition with several historical cases, including Anglo-German rivalry before World War I, the Concert of Europe after the Congress of Vienna, and the U.S.-Soviet Cold War.

Stable great power relations are closely tied to a stable international order. Historically, international systems have always been hierarchical, meaning that relations among major powers largely determine the structure and stability of the world order. The comparison shows that a stable international order usually depends on two core conditions.

First, major powers must share at least a minimal consensus on preserving the overall international system. During both the Concert of Europe and later Cold War, rival powers still accepted certain rules, spheres of influence, and mechanisms for crisis management. Strategic stability was maintained not because conflict disappeared, but because competition remained bounded by shared understandings.

Second, diplomacy matters. Even during severe confrontations, major powers continued negotiations, maintained communication channels, and sought limited compromises. According to the article, diplomacy becomes more important, not less, during periods of high tension.

The article also highlights several historical lessons from failed great power competition. International order tends to collapse when rival states refuse to compromise over territory, economic competition, security interests, or prestige. Excessive pressure, ideological confrontation, arms races, and strategic overextension often push crises toward war. Historical examples such as Imperial Germany, Nazi Germany, and later stage Soviet expansion are presented as warnings about the dangers of aggressive rivalry and overreach.

Overall, the article argues that the future stability of China-U.S. relations will depend on whether both countries can maintain strategic restraint, preserve dialogue mechanisms, respect each other’s core interests and avoid turning competition into direct confrontation.

IV. The Possibility of Strategic Stability in China-U.S. Relations

Can China-U.S. relations move from crisis management toward long- term strategic stability? The article argues that despite growing competition, this possibility still exists because the relationship remains deeply interconnected and both sides still share an interest in maintaining overall international stability.

The author believes that U.S.-China competition is comprehensive but also asymmetric. The two countries compete in politics, economics, technology, military affairs and international influence, yet their strengths and goals are not identical. China repeatedly emphasizes that it does not seek to replace the United States, while the United States continues to view China as its main strategic competitor. At the same time, the two countries remain deeply connected through supply chains, global markets and international institutions.

According to the article, strategic stability requires both sides to clarify and respect each other’s core interests. For China, the most important issues include continued economic development, the Taiwan issue and political security. For the United States, major concerns include technological leadership, domestic political stability and maintaining its dominant position in the Asia Pacific.

The article suggests that future China-U.S. relations should focus on “managed competition” rather than confrontation. In the bilateral sphere, both sides should maintain dialogue, seek compromises on secondary issues, and avoid escalation on sensitive issues such as Taiwan and the South China Sea. Economically, trade agreements and supply chain cooperation could continue to serve as stabilizing forces. In the technology realm, competition will likely continue, but limited cooperation in areas such as AI governance and scientific research may still be possible.

At the regional and global level, the article argues that China and the United States should continue cooperating on issues including climate change, nuclear nonproliferation, global governance reform, cybersecurity and artificial intelligence. Ultimately, strategic stability will depend on whether both countries can maintain communication, exercise restraint and reach at least a minimal consensus on preserving international order.

Conclusion

Competition will likely remain a long-term feature of China-U.S. relations, but competition does not automatically mean confrontation or conflict. Whether the relationship can shift from repeated crisis management toward greater strategic stability will depend on continued dialogue, mutual restraint, and the ability of both sides to manage disagreements within a stable international framework.

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About the Author

ZHOU Guiyin(周桂银) is Professor at the School of International Relations/Research School for Southeast Asian Studies and the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Xiamen University. His research focuses on the intellectual history of international relations, the history of strategic thought, China’s neighborhood diplomacy, and China-U.S. relations.

About the Publication

Forum of World Economics & Politics is a bimonthly academic journal supervised by the Jiangsu Academy of Social Sciences and published by its Institute of World Economics. Since its founding in 1981, the journal has developed into an important academic platform in China for research on world economics and international politics. Since 2004, the journal has continuously been included in the Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index (CSSCI) and the Guide to Chinese Core Journals. It mainly publishes recent research on international relations, international politics, international security, international strategy, world economy, international trade and investment, and international finance.

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ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by Da Wei and Zhou Wuhua about China-U.S. Relations in the Era of “Dual-Core Multipolity”.

Summary

The international order defines the nature of state-to-state relations, while the nature of state-to-state relations shapes their contents. The post-Cold War global order has come to an end, and the international landscape is evolving toward a “Dual-Core Multipolar” order anchored in the pursuit of nation-state interests. Transformations in the international order have altered the nature of China-U.S. relations and necessitated a corresponding rebalancing of their contents. Since 2017, China and the United States have explored the new nature of bilateral relations amid strategic games. Over the past two years, this nature has become increasingly clear.

Accordingly, it is imperative to adjust the content of China-U.S. relations based on this evolving nature to forge a new state of stability. The decision by the Chinese and U.S. leaders to establish a “Constructive China-U.S. Relationship of Strategic Stability” as the new orientation of bilateral relations represents the latest effort to recalibrate the substance of China-U.S. relations. To this end, China and the United States need to establish an acceptable, predictable, and sustainable relationship of competitive coexistence across strategic perception, military security, economy, science, technology, and education, the Taiwan question, geopolitics, major country interactions, and global governance.

Why It Matters

Since Donald Trump first took office in 2017, the international order and the nature of China-U.S. relations have undergone a fundamental and profound shift. The international community, deeply troubled by geopolitical conflicts and a Cold War mentality, urgently requires the stabilization of major country interactions to inject certainty into the world. On May 14, 2026, the heads of state of China and the United States met in Beijing and reached a consensus on building a “Constructive China-U.S. Relationship of Strategic Stability” proposed by President Xi Jinping, providing the latest guidance for the future direction of bilateral relations.

From a structuralist perspective and borrowing the concept of equilibrium from thermodynamic systems, this article breaks away from the traditional equilibrium theory’s pursuit of absolute symmetry. It profoundly demonstrates how, amidst profound transformations in the international order, China and the United States can achieve a dynamic equilibrium, which may not be entirely symmetrical yet remains acceptable, predictable, and sustainable, through the adjustment of internal variables.

This offers a rational framework for crisis management to prevent major country competition from sliding into the Thucydides Trap. Furthermore, it provides an actionable logic for how both nations, in their future interactions, can translate macro strategic stability into cooperation across fields such as the economy, climate change, science, and technology, and how they can gradually accumulate mutual trust and recalibrate their relations to forge a relatively stable, healthy, and sustainable bilateral relationship.

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Key Points

• China-U.S. Relations and International Order Shifts since 1972

1. Strategic Collaboration in the Cold War Era: Under the US-Soviet bipolar structure, the nature of China-U.S. relations was a strategic collaborative relationship between a relatively defensive United States and China as a crucial third party, driven by a shared external threat from the Soviet Union. Despite vastly different institutional systems and limited social exchanges, the two nations engaged in deep strategic coordination. This was achieved through the issuance of the three joint communiqués, a blurred handling of the sensitive Taiwan question, and cooperation on military intelligence and regional affairs. In the 1980s, as China initiated reform and opening up, the original strategic collaboration was superimposed by economic and social engagement, propelling bilateral relations into a stable and positive honeymoon period.

2. Interdependence in the Post-Cold War Era: Amid neoliberal globalization defined by a unipolar landscape with multiple great powers, the nature of China-U.S. relations transformed into a relationship of high interdependence and mutual development between the largest developing country and the largest developed country. As the United States pursued an engagement strategy and China integrated into the international system, economic and trade relations became the ballast stone of bilateral stability. Both nations became the primary beneficiaries of globalization, significantly raising their shares of global economic output. Despite major divides over ideology, Taiwan, and the South China Sea mid-air collision, both sides derived maximum benefits because the content of their relations closely matched their nature.

3. Order Reshaping and Landscape Transformation in the New Era: Western skepticism toward globalization and a political shift to the right have driven a fundamental reversal of the international order, forcing a passive restructuring of China-U.S. relations. Following the 2008 financial crisis, the surge of populism and economic nationalism in the United States triggered a strategic debate that completely repudiated the engagement strategy, turning China-U.S. relations into the primary scapegoat for Western internal contradictions. Concurrently, US global strategy evolved in three stages, moving from America versus China under Trump’s first term, to the West versus China under Biden, and ultimately to America versus the whole world in Trump’s second term. Driven by the failure of domestic interest redistribution in the West, the rise of China under an alternative system, and the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the old globalization order has ended after nine years of systemic disruption. The current deterioration of China-U.S. relations is the inevitable impact of this systemic collapse rather than a mere policy mistake.

• Reconfirming the Nature of China-U.S. Relations

  The international order has irreversibly shifted from a US-led liberal unipolar order to a nationalist new order under a dual-core multipolar framework, and the nature of China-U.S. relations has consequently transformed into a competitive coexistence between two independent major powers within a multipolar landscape.

  1. Structural Characteristics of the New International Order

     1. Ideological Shift Toward Sovereignty and Nationalism: The new order rejects the liberal logic of the old order that pursued the maximization of economic efficiency on a global scale and instead increases the analytical weight of other elements such as national security, national capacity, and civilizational identity narratives. At present, the United States pursues making America great again, China advocates for running parallel without conflict and achieving common prosperity, India strives for a developed and self-reliant vision through “Viksit Bharat@2047” and “Atmanirbhar Bharat”, Russia emphasizes its identity as a state-civilization and a sovereign center of global development, and the European Union proposes concepts such as European sovereignty and strategic autonomy. This reflects that all major power centers in the international community view their own sovereignty, security, autonomy, and identity as the fundamental starting point and ultimate destination of strategic planning.

     2. Gradual Formation of a Dual-Core Multipolar Landscape: Although the distribution of global power centers is becoming more balanced, the relationships among these centers are being restructured, and multipolar features are highly prominent. The power of the two poles, China and the United States, occupies a relatively more vital position within this framework. This is because the economic aggregates, advanced technology research and development, such as artificial intelligence, and military expenditures of China and the United States are far greater than those of other power centers. Furthermore, the bilateral relationship exerts a driving effect on other poles, and the contradictions between the two nations constitute the primary contradiction among all poles, creating a dual-core multipolar mixed power structure beneath the basic dimension of a multipolar landscape.

     3. Three-Stage Catalysis of U.S. Global Strategy: The formation of this landscape has undergone a nine-year evolution. The first Trump administration adopted a unilateral coercive competition strategy, attempting to maintain a hegemonic unipolarity through tariffs, technology restrictions, and hard power pressure. The Biden administration attempted to use the Ukraine crisis to promote a bipolarized and bloc-oriented organizational competition to construct a downsized version of the liberal order. It was not until 2025, when the second Trump administration launched a multi-front offensive and restructured its relationships with allies and international institutions, that the dual-core multipolar trend re-emerged. Concurrently, several factors have rendered it difficult for the United States to restore the old system, despite having the desire to do so. These include the persistence of domestic nationalism and unequal wealth distribution, the serious damage Trump’s two terms did to liberal international institutions and alliance systems, and the loss of the unprecedented economic and military advantages the U.S. enjoyed at the end of the Cold War. As a result, the shift toward a dual-core multipolar order is irreversible in the foreseeable future.

  2. Fundamental Restructuring of the Nature of China-U.S. Relations and the Path Toward Equilibrium

     1. Comprehensive Transformation of the Nature and Positioning of Relations: With the collapse of the old order, China-U.S. relations are no longer a profound interdependence between the largest developing country and the largest developed country in the context of globalization. Instead, the relationship has transformed into one between two major powers that are strategically independent of each other and may even lean towards opposition within a multipolar landscape.

     2. Compatibility Conflicts of Strategic Goals: Under the previous two orders, the nature or goals of China-U.S. relations were either identical or compatible. However, after entering the new landscape in 2017, both the Trump and Biden administrations placed outcompeting China at the core of their global strategies. Although China rejects defining bilateral relations in terms of competition, it acknowledges the presence of competitive elements within the relationship. China pursues the full realization of Chinese modernization and seeks to become one of the world’s primary powers, while the United States strives to maintain its unchallenged position as the world’s most powerful pole. The collision of these grand goals has driven bilateral relations toward a highly competitive and confrontational state.

     3. Path Choice Between Active Transformation and Passive Equilibrium: Faced with this monumental shift in bilateral relations, the content of China-U.S. relations must be restructured. On the one hand, China and the United States can actively coordinate and adjust their strategic directions to proactively establish a new equilibrium of interests through interaction, thereby transforming bilateral relations as quickly as possible - a path that is ideal but fraught with difficulties. Alternatively, they will be forced to gradually grope their way toward a new equilibrium through continuous, uninterrupted gray-zone games, frictions, and painful confrontations. Given the massive aggregates of both China and the United States, such a blind race to the bottom would not only be extremely painful but would also bring immense systemic risks and catastrophic challenges to both nations and the entire world.

  3. Five Marginal Conditions Constraining a “Race to the Bottom” in China-U.S. Relations

     Through repeated exploration, China and the United States are forming a new normal. Faced with comprehensive confrontation, both nations are rigidly constrained by five deep marginal conditions, preventing a complete race to the bottom. While neither side is fully satisfied, these constraints steer them toward a mutually acceptable state of competitive coexistence, namely, a new type of major power relations 2.0.

     1. Mutual Assured Destruction in the Military Sphere: Traditional nuclear deterrence remains effective despite emerging technological challenges. Because a hot war would bring unbearable costs for both sides and the world, neither country will risk pushing the other toward nuclear escalation. This reality forced the United States to pragmatically seek a decent peace in its 2026 National Defense Strategy, signaling that absolute military victory is unviable and a mutually acceptable equilibrium must be pursued.

     2. Respective Strong Resilience at the Political and Economic Levels: A decade of extreme strategic competition proves that unilaterally crushing the opponent is a strategic illusion. The United States remains powerful and technologically vibrant, while China has withstood containment, maintaining domestic unity and achieving major high-tech breakthroughs that force U.S. industry to reconsider the costs of decoupling. This mutually unbeatable reality has prompted successive U.S. administrations to declare they do not seek conflict, a new Cold War, or regime change.

     3. Mutual Assured Disruption along Supply Chains: Decades of globalization cemented China as the global manufacturing core and the United States as the demand core, making full decoupling impossible despite ongoing sanctions. By 2025, China’s export controls over critical raw materials such as rare earths demonstrated its reverse disruption capability against U.S. industrial chains. When both actors possess the means to severely disrupt each other’s economic lifelines, their confrontation is strongly constrained by objective economic laws.

     4. Strategic Independence of External Multipolar Actors: As the dual cores of a multipolar world, neither China nor the United States can dictate global alignment, thus hindering bloc-oriented polarization. While Europe pursues strategic autonomy and middle powers strengthen cooperation for self-preservation, the Global South adopts a posture of active non-alignment and multi-hedging, refusing to choose sides. This independent multi-alignment prevents either superpower from pulling the rest of the world into a joint race to the bottom.

     5. Rigid Demand for Collaboration in Cutting-Edge High-Tech Governance: While traditional global governance has severely shriveled, the rise of artificial intelligence is fundamentally reshaping state-to-state relations. As the absolute leaders in AI, complete non-cooperation between China and the United States carries devastating global risks that far exceed traditional fields. This shared technological crisis serves as the ultimate driving force pushing both nations to abandon a race to the bottom and embrace parallel progress under competitive coexistence.

• Rebalancing the Content of China-U.S. Relations

  A fundamental shift in the international order and the nature of relations necessitates a profound adjustment of the content of China-U.S. relations. With 2026 serving as a crucial milestone for bilateral relations, both nations are committed to advancing a “Constructive China-U.S. Relationship of Strategic Stability” at the macro level. This implies the pursuit of an acceptable, predictable, and sustainable state of stability where both sides move toward each other and engage in deep integration, even if it is not the absolute optimal solution. To achieve this, the content of the relationship must be recalibrated across the following eight fields.

  1. Rebalancing Strategic Perception: The logic of mutual expectation from the globalization era - where the United States expected China to Westernize and China expected the United States to accommodate its rise - has collapsed, leading to the American narrative of engagement failure and acute Chinese strategic apprehensions. The new equilibrium must shift from mutual expectation to mutual recognition. Through psychological and emotional recalibration, both sides must transition from attempting to change the other to managing coexistence. This requires acknowledging the long-term nature of each other’s institutions, values, and strategic choices, while accepting the objective reality that neither side can easily reshape or overwhelm the other.

  2. Rebalancing Military Relations: As China’s military capacity extends toward the Western Pacific, the two militaries have transitioned from isolation to direct opposition and face-to-face standoffs, facing systemic risks of accidental friction. To operationalize the principle of non-conflict and non-confrontation amid chronic strategic mistrust, both sides should draw on U.S.-Soviet historical experience to establish rigid institutional arrangements. These mechanisms must cover military communication channels, the prevention of nuclear miscalculation, the reduction of nuclear risks, ballistic missile launch pre-notifications, and air and maritime encounter rules. Concurrently, emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, unmanned warfare, and missile defense must be fully integrated into the security dialogue.

  3. Rebalancing Economic Relations: Although the role of economic and trade ties as the ballast stone of bilateral relations has significantly declined, the new equilibrium does not mean comprehensive decoupling. Instead, both nations must preserve economic ties to the greatest extent possible under conditions acceptable to national security. In the near future, the focus lies in achieving a series of stable deliverables sequenced by difficulty through bilateral consultations in procurement, tariffs, investment, and export controls. The core of this effort lies not in the size of the yard or the height of the wall within the small yard and high wall approach, but rather in establishing the stability and predictability of the position of the wall.

  4. Rebalancing Science, Technology, and Education Exchanges: Societal exchanges have been comprehensively securitized and disrupted, making a full return to the absolute openness of the globalization era unrealistic. Rebalancing these exchanges requires an internal consensus within each country regarding the trade-offs between benefits and risks, formulating clear, enforceable rules to secure their respective safety. Provided that government departments maintain a unified policy framework, both sides should expand connections through consultation in non-sensitive areas like study abroad, tourism, think tank dialogues, and subnational exchanges to ensure their societies maintain mutual familiarity and connectivity.

  5. Rebalancing the Taiwan Question: As the most sensitive core issue, the Taiwan question is complicated by an American one-China policy that essentially treats the status of Taiwan as undetermined, in addition to a hollowing out of its policy that sends strategically ambiguous signals to the Taiwan authorities. Rebalancing demands from both countries makes stabilizing the situation their shared pursuit. The U.S. side needs to provide clarity regarding the Taiwan question and stop sending wrong signals, thereby creating favorable external conditions for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as well as the peaceful development of cross-strait relations.

  6. Rebalancing Geopolitics: The Western Pacific serves as the primary theater where China’s rising power collides with the strategic priorities of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, triggering regional polarization amid U.S. strategic contraction and domestic political unpredictability. The core of geopolitical rebalancing lies in mutually allowing adequate space and comfort for all actors. The U.S. side must view China’s military growth normally and reduce the anti-China coloration of its alliances, while the Chinese side must respect the legitimate interests of the United States in the Asia-Pacific. Concurrently, both sides should understand and accommodate the hedging strategies adopted by third-party states.

  7. Rebalancing Major Country Interactions: Within the dual-core multipolar framework, a zero-sum approach to other power centers will accelerate bloc-oriented division and drastically increase strategic pressure on both nations. The basic principle of rebalancing is to recognize that other power centers, such as the European Union and the Global South, are independent actors possessing strategic autonomy rather than passive objects or bargaining chips. Both sides should handle relations with other poles with an open posture, refrain from viewing third parties through the prism of dual-core contradictions, avoid constructing a closed strategic triangle, and allow flexible combinations across different issues to prevent relationships among poles from being negatively locked in.

• Rebalancing Global Governance: Against the background of weakened multilateral mechanisms and heightened major power tensions, the global governance deficit cannot be redressed in the short term, threatening the international community with the Kindleberger Trap due to the absence of public goods provision. In this environment, the rebalancing of global governance adopts a basic policy of selective cooperation rather than an all-encompassing framework. China and the United States should select specific areas of rigid mutual demand, such as artificial intelligence governance, international financial stability, public health, climate change, and food security, driving global governance through bilateral collaboration to send a signal of stability to the world.

Conclusion

Over the past nine years, although bilateral relations have suffered through extreme games of fierce winds and raging waves, this strategic friction has also allowed deep-seated structural factors of stability to gradually manifest. These elements, including nuclear deterrence, respective national resilience, interwoven supply chains, multipolar strategic autonomy, and the rigid demand for artificial intelligence governance, have effectively constrained a mutual race to the bottom.

At present, China-U.S. relations stand at a critical crossroads of destiny, and the future direction depends entirely on current choices. With 2026 serving as a crucial window of opportunity, the two nations must bid farewell to their nostalgia for the old order, shifting their fundamental approach from attempting to change the other to focusing on managing coexistence.

By moving toward each other across the eight pivotal fields, including strategic perception, military security, economy and trade, and the Taiwan question, and by proactively adjusting the content of bilateral relations to adapt to the new international order, it will be possible for China and the United States to weather the storm. Only through these concerted efforts can they usher in a longer cycle of a “Constructive Relationship of Strategic Stability” and ultimately forge a path toward running parallel without conflict and achieving peaceful coexistence under a “New Type of Major Country Relations 2.0”.

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About the Author

DA Wei 达巍: Da Wei is the director of the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua, and Professor at the Department of International Relations, School of Social Science, Tsinghua University. Professor Da’s research expertise covers China-U.S. relations and US security & foreign policy. He has worked in China’s academic and policy community for more than two decades. He has written hundreds of policy papers for the Chinese government, and published dozens of academic papers on journals in China, the US and other countries. He was a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States from 2006 to 2007, and a Visiting Senior Associate at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University from 2008 to 2009.

ZHOU Wuhua 周武华: Ph.D. candidate in the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University, primary research focus on China-U.S. relations.

About the Publication

The Chinese Version of this article was published on Contemporary International Relations（《现代国际关系》）. First established in 1981, the Contemporary International Relations (a monthly journal) is a central-level, comprehensive academic monthly publication in the field of international studies, sponsored by the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. Adhering to its mission of providing high-quality services to readers across the party, government, military, academic, and business sectors to deeply understand and perceive the world, the journal strives to fully exhibit the latest and finest research achievements of experts and scholars on major international strategic issues, the global landscape, international relations theory, international economy, major hot spots, as well as vital developmental shifts in the politics, diplomacy, economy, technology, society, and military affairs of various regions and nations.

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China Scholar Insights is a feature which aimed at providing you with the latest analysis on issues that Chinese scholars and strategic communities are focusing on. We will carefully select commentary articles and highlight key points. Questions or criticisms can be directed to sch0625@gmail.com

I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University. ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu.

Background

On May 14, Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump met in Beijing and agreed to work toward a constructive trategic stability of the bilateral relationship. The meeting came amid years of mistrust, trade and technology frictions, and renewed tensions over Taiwan, the most sensitive issue in the relationship. For Beijing and Washington, the summit offered a framework for keeping competition within bounds. For the wider Asia-Pacific, it sent a key signal about whether the two powers could manage rivalry without destabilizing the region.

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SUN Chenghao: Great Power Rivalry, Shared Responsibilities

The Practical Foundation for China-U.S. Cooperation is Stronger than Current Discussions Suggest

Present discussions between China and the United States largely focus on trade disputes, technology controls and regional crises, while global governance is temporarily overlooked yet crucial. Cooperation in this domain is not only possible but also essential. Against the backdrop of intensifying strategic competition between the two countries, the structural forces that necessitate close collaboration have not disappeared.

Today’s global challenges are increasingly complex and deeply interconnected—no single nation, no matter how powerful, can address them alone. China and the U.S. remain pivotal actors in effectively tackling various global issues, and many international initiatives would struggle to achieve real impact without their participation. Other countries, including the “Global South”, also look to China and the U.S. to provide a certain degree of international public goods and stability.

The Core of the China-U.S. divide lies in how Cooperation should be Defined

China-U.S. differences are not as irreconcilable as they are commonly perceived. In fact, both sides harbor certain expectations of each other, leading to a form of cooperation that is functional rather than ideological. This type of collaboration rests on a more limited but stable foundation: certain global risks would be difficult to manage effectively without at least some degree of coordination between China and the U.S.

The intersection of artificial intelligence and nuclear issues presents a promising yet underdeveloped starting point for cooperation. The integration of AI into nuclear deterrence systems could introduce new risks of miscalculation and unintended escalation. Against this backdrop, even limited consensus between the two countries carries significant importance. Both have already affirmed the fundamental principle that decisions regarding nuclear weapons must always remain under human control. Moving forward, the two sides could explore ways to extend this initial agreement beyond bilateral relations, incorporating more nuclear-armed states into the framework.

Competition and Interdependence often Coexist within the same Relationship

The above cooperative path aligns with the fundamental interests of both China and the U.S.. This logic of cooperation also applies to areas such as climate governance and public health. Even in more competitive fields like digital governance, there remains room for dialogue between the two countries.

Cooperation does not mean that China-U.S. relations will return to the previous phase of comprehensive engagement. Meaningful collaboration need not be all-encompassing; in an increasingly fragmented international system, even narrow and limited coordination can have a positive effect on stabilizing the situation.

China and the U.S. remain key actors in the functioning of the global system. Global governance is not a secondary concern but a structural necessity for both countries. While dialogue between the two leaders may not fundamentally resolve deep-seated differences, it could create space for more constructive interactions. Such limited yet pragmatic cooperation might well be the most realistic option—and an indispensable foundation for maintaining global stability.

ZHAO Minghao: The New Positioning of China–U.S. Relations: From Strategic Stability to Constructive Strategic Stability

From Strategic Stability to Constructive Strategic Stability

Since 2017, the U.S. has viewed China as a “strategic competitor,” anchoring its China policy in great power rivalry—a stance reinforced by Biden and later reframed by Trump’s second term. Trump prioritized domestic security and industrial revival, recognizing internal challenges as key to national strategy, while initially escalating trade tensions with China. China maintained a firm position on core interests, leading the U.S. to realize that pressure tactics were ineffective and that constructive engagement was needed. High-level talks in 2025, including two telephone conversations between the Presidents, signaled a shift toward negotiation and cooperation. From “strategic stability” to “constructive strategic stability”, this transformation reflects the arduous and tortuous process in which both China and the United States have continuously corrected their mutual perceptions through competition and gradually moved towards a new equilibrium point in their relations. This evolution marks a cautious but significant recalibration and stabilization in China–U.S. relations.

The New Positioning in China-U.S. Relations are of Great Significance

Breaking away from its past obsession with “great power competition,” the Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy adopts “flexible realism.” Its willingness to embrace “constructive strategic stability” as the new positioning for bilateral ties marks a hard-won and major adjustment. Driven by the economic backlash of tariffs and the recognition of China as a near-peer, Washington increasingly acknowledges the necessity of mutually beneficial cooperation. Specifically, in the economic sphere, the U.S. rejects complete “decoupling” in favor of “de-risking,” proposing a new formulation to maintain a “genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship.” In the security domain, the U.S. aims for a “decent peace.” Defense Secretary Hegseth’s unprecedented inclusion in the presidential visit to China signals a pragmatic willingness to expand military-to-military dialogue, avoid direct conflict, and jointly promote strategic stability.

Mutual Action Is Needed

In 2026, as China launches its 15th Five-Year Plan and the U.S. celebrates its 250th anniversary, both countries will host major summits, creating opportunities for more direct engagement between their leaders. Xi Jinping and Donald Trump’s recent meetings underscored “constructive strategic stability” as a guiding principle and the importance of candid, high-level dialogue, especially on core issues like Taiwan. The greatrejuvenation ofthe Chinese nation and making America great again need not be in conflict, and that healthy competition and cooperation are preferable to zero-sum rivalry. As President Xi Jinping has stated, a China-US relationship of constructive strategic stability is not just a slogan, but requires concrete actions from both sides moving toward each other.

WU Qicong: What is the perception of neighboring countries toward the China-US presidential summit?

A Clear Dividing Line Between “At Ease” and “Anxious” Over the Summit

The 2026 China-US summit has drawn a clear line across the region: nations that see US-China stability as an opportunity are relieved, while those that rely on US-China confrontation for their strategic relevance are troubled.

The “At Ease” Bridge

Seoul is notably positive. President Lee Jae-myung stated that stable US-China relations benefit the entire world. As an export-driven nation, South Korea relies heavily on stable industrial chains between the two powers. Lee pragmatically chose a bridge-building role, believing that picking a side is less rewarding than becoming a neutral platform between China and the US.

ASEAN nations feel reassured by the reduced risk of economic spillovers and less pressure to take sides. However, caution remains, as structural disputes—such as those over the South China Sea—are unresolved. The prevailing sentiment is best captured by an ASEAN diplomat’s remark: “A handshake between China and the US is better than a fight, but who can guarantee they won’t fall out again tomorrow?”

The Anxious Outsider：

Tokyo is deeply uneasy. Japan had hoped Trump would visit Japan first to showcase its “core ally” status, but the plan fell through. The underlying anxiety is that Japan’s long-standing strategic role as America’s “forward bastion” is depreciating now that China-U.S. relations are moving toward constructive strategic stability. China-U.S. relations are moving toward constructive strategic stability.

The Taiwan region is even more anxious than Japan. As long as the direct communication channel between China and the US is open, the influence of “Taiwan independence” maneuvering will only grow weaker. Moreover, the US side appears unsatisfied with the recent defense budget passed by the Taiwan legislative body — raising the question of whether Washington is willing to risk itself for an unreliable pawn.

India finds itself in a predicament: it seeks to ride on the coattails of the U.S.-proposed Indo-Pacific Strategy while remaining economically reliant on trade ties with China; it attempts to take an aggressive stance on border issues yet cannot afford the costs of confrontation with China. India finds itself in a predicament: it seeks to ride on the coattails of the U.S.-proposed Indo-Pacific Strategy while remaining economically reliant on trade ties with China; it attempts to take an aggressive stance on border issues yet cannot afford the costs of confrontation with China. The deeper fear is that when China and the US engage directly, India’s perceived strategic autonomy becomes constrained in the face of genuine power politics.

Cautious Balancing Continues：

Australia is continuing its dual-track strategy: relying on the US for security while maintaining strong economic ties with China. The summit did not alter Canberra’s calculus — if anything, it reinforced the belief that for medium powers, maintaining strategic balance between giants is the only viable way forward.

Russia adopted a cautious and restrained stance. Russian experts assessed that the main outcome of the visit was to consolidate the previously reached trade “truce.” Russia is closely watching whether China and the US discussed the Ukraine conflict and what understandings they reached, as these will directly affect Russia’s strategic choices on the Ukrainian battlefield.

A Changing Order Sidelining Smaller Powers

The divergent responses from neighboring countries reveal the dawning shape of a multipolar Asia-Pacific. Within this new landscape, there exist no everlasting allies or rigid blocs, only continuous realignments grounded in national interests and tangible power dynamics. The region’s future hinges on whether all stakeholders can forge a more stable balance between security competition, economic and trade cooperation, and crisis management.

WANG Yingjin: The Taiwan Strait in the New China-U.S. Framework

Taiwan Question at the Center of the Relationship

On May 15, Foreign Minister Wang Yi briefed the press on the meeting between Chinese and U.S. Presidents and the consensus reached. He stated:”During the meeting, we felt that the U.S. side understands China’s position, attaches importance to China’s concerns, and, just like the international community, does not stand for or accept Taiwan moving toward independence.There are three messages from Wang Yi’s briefing after the summit. First, the Taiwan question is China’s internal affair. Second, it is the most important and most sensitive issue in China-U.S. relations, with consequences for the relationship as a whole. Third, maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is the largest area of common ground between the two sides.

A New Framework for Stability

The agreement to build a constructive relationship of strategic stability as the most important political consensus reached at the summit. For years,some political forces in the United States have treated China mainly as a strategic competitor and have tried to contain it through pressure in trade, technology, diplomacy and geopolitics. Yet China’s continued development has shown that such pressure cannot reverse the broader historical trend. The new positioning therefore reflects a move from extreme pressure to pragmatic engagement, and from confrontation to communication and management.Any assessment of the Taiwan Strait must now be placed within this new China-U.S. framework. Trump’s remarks on Taiwan during his return flight from Beijing. When asked whether the United States would militarily defend Taiwan, Trump did not offer an affirmative commitment. Wang reads this as a clear signal. Taken together with other U.S. statements after the summit, Washington’s position shows a stronger tendency to restrain Taiwan independence forces.

Two Conditions for Peace

Peace across the Taiwan Strait depends on two basic conditions. The first is that the United States must handle the Taiwan question prudently, abide by the one-China principle, and honor the three China-U.S. joint communiqués. Continued arms sales to Taiwan, upgrades official exchanges, or supports Taiwan independence forces would enrode the foundation for peace in the Strait and the new framework of constructive strategic stability between China and the United States will also be undermined.

The second condition is firm opposition to Taiwan independence. Taiwan independence forces are the most immediate source of danger to peace across the Strait.Taiwan independence and peace cannot coexist. Therefore, resolutely containing “Taiwan independence” and safeguarding peace across the Taiwan Strait serves the common interests of China and the United States and represents the broadest common ground between the two sides. Therefore, resolutely containing “Taiwan independence” and safeguarding peace across the Taiwan Strait serves the common interests of China and the United States and represents the greatest common divisor for both sides.

The Larger Trend

China-U.S. strategic relations are undergoing a historic adjustment, while the balance of overall strength across the Taiwan Strait continues to shift toward the mainland.The only viable path is to follow this trend, embrace peace, and return cross-Strait relations to the proper track.

Conclusion

The new positioning gives China-U.S. relations a clearer operating logic: competition should stay bounded, communication should remain open, and sensitive issues should be managed before they turn into crises. Its durability will depend on follow-up on trade, technology, military communication, and Taiwan question. For China, the summit helps shape a steadier external environment while keeping core interests at the center of the relationship. For the Asia-Pacific, greater predictability between Beijing and Washington could ease regional pressure and leave more room for development and practical cooperation. The real test is whether the consensus reached in Beijing can become a sustained pattern of restraint, coordination, and risk control.

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ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares articles by Chinese academics on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-Europe relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu, and me. Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions and feedback can be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com.

In this newsletter, we address concerns about China’s positions through a Q&A format, while also presenting key points of leading Chinese scholars’ commentaries. Through this series, we aim to provide policymakers, think tanks, and strategic communities overseas with access to Chinese scholars’ views, accompanied by curated academic perspectives that help readers better understand the considerations underlying China’s foreign policy choices.

Background

At President Xi Jinping’s invitation, U.S. President Donald Trump paid a state visit to China from May 13 to 15. It was the first face-to-face meeting between the two heads of state since Busan last October, and the first China visit by a U.S. president in nine years. The year 2026 holds special significance for both countries: China begins its 15th Five-Year Plan, while the United States marks the 250th anniversary of its independence. This renewed “handshake across the Pacific” has drawn global attention.

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The constructive and strategically stable China-U.S. relationship is the highest-level political consensus reached at the China-U.S. presidential meeting in Beijing on May 14, 2026. Centered on the “four dimensions of stability,” this new positioning sets a new framework for China-U.S. relations in the coming three years and beyond.

President Xi Jinping defined “constructive strategic stability” from four perspectives. First, it should be positive stability with cooperation as the mainstay. China and the United States should make cooperation, not confrontation, the mainstream of their relationship, and expand common interests in climate change, public health, economic and trade exchanges, and other areas.

Second, it should be healthy stability with competition within proper limits. Competition between major countries is not unusual, but it should not define the whole of China-U.S. relations. Even where competition exists, it should be healthy competition in which the two sides learn from each other, positive competition in which both strive to do better, and fair competition that follows rules.

Third, it should be constant stability with manageable differences. Both sides should maintain policy continuity and stability, and in particular honor the commitments they have made. A positive expectation for China-U.S. cooperation will provide greater certainty for the development of both countries and for the international situation.

Fourth, it should be lasting stability with expectable peace. China and the United States must not slide into conflict, confrontation or war. Peaceful coexistence is the greatest common denominator between the two countries. The consequences of China-U.S. conflict would be unbearable for both sides and the world. The key lies in abiding by the three China-U.S. joint communiqués, respecting each other’s social systems and development paths, respecting each other’s core interests and major concerns, and respecting each other’s right to development.

Compared with previous formulations of China-U.S. relations, this new positioning carries important practical and theoretical significance. In practical terms, it first gives a clear answer to the fundamental question of whether China and the United States are partners or rivals. It rejects the erroneous logic of defining China-U.S. relations by “strategic competition.” The new positioning is not only a correction of misguided policies of the past few years, but also a reshaping of the future direction of China-U.S. relations. Under this new paradigm, the world may move out of the trap of zero-sum rivalry and toward a more stable, cooperative and just future.

Next, the new positioning demonstrates a shared sense of international responsibility. China and the United States are both permanent members of the UN Security Council and the world’s two largest economies. China-U.S. relations have long gone beyond the bilateral scope. They are a key variable affecting world peace, stability, development, cooperation and global governance. In this sense, a stable China-U.S. relationship is itself an important contribution to world peace and development.

Moreover, the new positioning reflects a sober understanding of each country’s development path. In 2026, both countries are entering important stages of development. China is at the start of the 15th Five-Year Plan period and is advancing Chinese modernization through high-quality development. The United States is marking the 250th anniversary of its independence. The two sides recognize that realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and making America great again can proceed in parallel and benefit the world. This consensus rejects ideological bias and shows that countries with different civilizations, systems and paths can live in peace and achieve common development.

In theoretical terms, the new positioning enriches the theory and practice of international relations. Firstly, it fully reflects the core essence and development of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy. Secondly, this new concept represents the latest summary of China-U.S. relations. Lastly, this new formulation updates the traditional concept of “strategic stability.” Traditional strategic stability originated in U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control during the Cold War and focused mainly on preventing nuclear war and avoiding an uncontrolled arms race. By contrast, a constructive and strategically stable China-U.S. relationship expands the concept beyond military and nuclear security to a comprehensive view of stability covering politics, economy, science and technology, people-to-people exchanges, and global governance.

Looking ahead, the new positioning will have significant implications. Above all, it provides a basic framework for China-U.S. relations and safeguards international security. One important element of a constructive and strategically stable relationship is to establish regular high-level communication and crisis-management mechanisms, so as to prevent accidents and misjudgments from escalating into confrontation. The two sides agreed to strengthen military-to-military communication and exchange views on major international and regional issues. This creates necessary strategic space for addressing regional hotspots, preventing nuclear proliferation, and responding to non-traditional security threats.

Besides, it injects certainty into the global economy and helps reduce the systemic risks of “decoupling” and supply-chain disruption. The Beijing meeting sent a positive signal that China-U.S. relations are moving from confrontation toward cooperation. This helped boost market confidence, stabilize expectations, and reduce volatility in commodity prices, major stock indexes and exchange rates.

Furthermore, it will help improve global governance and promote an equal and orderly multipolar world and a universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization. A stable China-U.S. relationship is itself a global public good. If the constructive and strategically stable relationship is implemented, it will contribute to world economic recovery, better global governance, and more effective management of regional hotspot issues.

There are three important pathways to realizing this relationship. First, the two sides should improve institutional mechanisms, including regular meetings between the presidents, dialogue channels at all levels, and crisis-management arrangements. Second, both should advance cooperation in multiple fields, giving priority to climate change, public health, nuclear non-proliferation and other global governance issues, while restoring economic, trade, scientific, technological and people-to-people exchanges. Third, political bottom lines must be upheld. The Taiwan question is at the very core of China’s core interests. The United States must honor its commitment of not supporting “Taiwan independence.” Both sides should respect each other’s sovereignty, security and development interests, and refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs.

For decades, economic interdependence was widely regarded as the anchor of peace in the US–China relations. Trade, investment, and deeply integrated supply chains created substantial mutual benefits that confrontation seems irrational. Yet in recent years, this assumption is breaking down as tariffs, export controls, technology restrictions, and supply chain restructuring have transformed economic ties into tools of strategic competition. Thus, the question is no longer whether economics matters in US–China relations, but whether economic interdependence can still function as a restraint on geopolitical rivalry once it has become weaponized.

The answer is positive, but in a more limited and fragile way than before. The recent US–China summit in Beijing reached an agreement to pursue a “constructive strategic stable relationship,” alongside discussions on trade conditions, bilateral investment, supply chain stability, agricultural exports, and energy cooperation, despite the intensifying strategic competition. This reflects a shared recognition that complete economic rupture would be profoundly costly. Even after years of tariffs and mutual restrictions, the economic interdependence between the two countries remains structurally deep. China remains a critical manufacturing center, an essential market, and an increasingly significant technological and industrial power. Meanwhile, the United States continues to offer capital, innovation ecosystems, agricultural exports, and global financial influence. Modern globalization makes supply chain interdependence far more complex than traditional bilateral trade balances suggest. No major economy can truly achieve total “decoupling and chain-breaking.”

Yet the character of this interdependence has changed fundamentally. Economic ties are increasingly seen as sources of vulnerability. Washington has weaponized tariffs, semiconductor export controls, and investment restrictions to constrain China’s technological rise. Beijing, in turn, has demonstrated its own leverage through strategic resources, supply chain positioning, and targeted countermeasures. Economic interdependence has shifted from being purely an anchor of peace to becoming part of the battlefield itself.

Economic entanglement now may no longer generate trust, but it still generates restraint. The old assumption was that trade would produce political convergence and reduce rivalry. That expectation has clearly failed. The US and China are now strategic competitors despite being deeply economically connected. But economic interdependence can still serve another purpose, which is to raise the cost of escalation. The greater the level of mutual exposure, the stronger the incentive to prevent confrontation from spiraling into systemic rupture.

Current geopolitical conditions reinforce this logic. The instability in the Middle East and uncertainty surrounding the Strait of Hormuz remind both Washington and Beijing that global energy security remains deeply interconnected. Inflationary pressures, supply disruptions, and financial volatility affect the global economy as a whole. In such an environment, economic cooperation becomes less about friendship and more about crisis management.

At the same time, the US domestic politics complicate the stabilizing role of economic ties. One of the most insightful arguments from the source material is that America’s turn toward protectionism is not simply about China, but about internal structural discontent. Globalization became politically toxic not because it failed to generate wealth, but because its gains were unevenly distributed. Trump’s embrace of tariffs partly aims to reduce the negative effects brought by globalization. It is widely supported by American blue collar workers even though the policy is widely criticised for not being able to solve the problem. This suggests that economic reasons alone cannot guarantee stability, because trade policy is increasingly shaped by electoral incentives rather than pure economic calculation. This is why economic ties can no longer be seen as a sufficient guarantee of peace.

In this sense, US–China economic relations can still serve as an anchor of peace, because in an era of weaponized interdependence, the costs of losing control have become too dangerous for either side to ignore. More importantly, Chinese development can create many opportunities for the US. The two economies need to identify new engines of growth together in order to seek a win-win situation where economic ties between them create greater values than what they can obtain on their own.

The establishment of a “constructive strategic stability relationship” between China and the United States will fundamentally reshape the strategic environment surrounding Europe’s China “de-risking” policy. It does not mean Europe will abandon de-risking, but it will weaken the external drivers pushing Europe toward further securitization, bloc confrontation, and quasi-decoupling, while creating greater room for policy recalibration.

First, the new China–U.S. framework weakens the external pressure for Europe to approach China through a Cold War-style bloc framework and high-intensity de-risking measures. In recent years, Europe’s China policy has been heavily influenced by Washington’s narrative of “systemic competition”. After the Russia–Ukraine conflict, Europe became more dependent on the United States for security, making it more likely to align with U.S. restrictions on China in areas such as technology, supply chains, and industrial security. However, following the May 2026 Beijing summit, China–U.S. relations were elevated from “overall stability” to “constructive strategic stability,” emphasizing stronger strategic trust, managed competition, and reduced risks of miscalculation in order to establish controllable boundaries for long-term rivalry. Under these conditions, the political and strategic basis for Europe to maintain a highly confrontational de-risking agenda is likely to weaken.

Second, this shift creates a new adjustment window for Europe’s China policy. Da Wei argued that there is now an opportunity to “recalibrate” China–U.S. relations, while Wu Xinbo noted that bilateral ties are entering “a more stable new phase”. Greater stability in China–U.S. relations reduces European concerns over uncontrolled great-power confrontation and lowers pressure to fully align with escalating strategic rivalry. Previously, Europe’s de-risking agenda was driven not only by concerns over industrial security and technological dependence, but also by defensive reactions to deteriorating China–U.S. ties. As Beijing and Washington move toward a more stable framework for interaction, pragmatic voices in Europe are likely to gain influence, arguing that China policy should balance competition, cooperation, and limited risk prevention rather than comprehensive containment. In areas such as green transition, climate governance, macroeconomic coordination, and civilian supply chains, Europe has neither the capacity nor the economic incentive to pursue long-term exclusion of China. As a result, Europe’s de-risking policy is likely to become narrower, more targeted, and more technical.

Third, the new China–U.S. positioning further exposes Europe’s structural dilemma: security dependence on the United States, economic reliance on China, and aspirations for strategic autonomy. Europe’s security architecture remains closely tied to Washington, while its economy still depends heavily on China’s market, manufacturing capacity, and green supply chains. Zheng Yongnian described this as not only a “new positioning” for China–U.S. relations, but also a“new paradigm” for international relations, reflecting recognition that China and the United States remain long-term competitors yet must coexist. Huang Jing and Ding Yifan similarly framed the shift as a move from “zero-sum rivalry” to “coexistence-based competition”. In this context, a highly securitized de-risking strategy would impose growing economic and strategic costs on Europe. While the United States may still maintain strategic coordination and red-line management with China through summit diplomacy, European firms risk losing access to Chinese markets and industrial opportunities because of rigid policies. As a result, Europe may increasingly redefine “strategic autonomy” around its own interests rather than simply extending Washington’s China strategy.

At the same time, Europe is unlikely to abandon de-risking entirely. European concerns about China stem not only from U.S. pressure, but also from anxieties over industrial competition, critical technologies, data security, market access, economic dependence, and Taiwan-related geopolitical risks. The more likely outcome is therefore not the disappearance of de-risking, but its moderation, narrowing, and technocratization. Europe will probably maintain restrictions and screening mechanisms in sensitive sectors such as semiconductors, AI, critical minerals, and data security, while becoming increasingly reluctant to expand de-risking into comprehensive decoupling or serve as the front line of prolonged China–U.S. confrontation.

In short, a “constructive strategic stability relationship” between China and the United States is unlikely to end Europe’s de-risking policy, but it may gradually shift it away from broad geopolitical securitization toward a narrower, more targeted, and more pragmatic form of risk management and strategic rebalancing.

The constructive strategic stability framework established at the Beijing summit carries significant structural implications for the Asia-Pacific and the broader international order. Its importance lies less in resolving the fundamental tensions between China and the United States than in redefining the terms on which great-power competition is conducted, with consequences that ripple outward to shape the strategic calculations of Asia-Pacific states, Europe, and the Global South alike.

In the Asia-Pacific, the power balance between China and the United States has shifted substantially over the past nine years. The region is moving away from a period of clear American primacy toward something closer to genuine Sino-American parity, and with that shift comes a more fluid regional order in which national interest increasingly takes precedence over durable allegiance. The reactions across the region have been sharply divergent. South Korea and ASEAN have greeted the development with broad relief: sustained bilateral dialogue raises the prospect of more effective crisis management in contested areas such as the South China Sea, reduces the economic spillover from trade disputes, and, perhaps most importantly, eases the pressure on smaller states to commit to one side. Japan‘s response has been rather more troubled. Its strategic value to Washington has long rested on the assumption of enduring China-US competition, and a more managed relationship between the two powers inevitably raises questions about what role Japan is meant to play. Cutting across all of these reactions is the underlying reality of deep supply chain integration between China and the United States, spanning precision manufacturing, electric vehicles, and related sectors, which makes the decoupling that some advocate considerably more disruptive in practice than it tends to appear in theory.

On Europe, the prevailing view is that the China-US-Europe triangle has become an essential framework for making sense of how the international system is being reorganized. Europe’s push for strategic autonomy signals that it no longer accepts the role of a passive variable in Sino-American competition, and the old hub-and-spoke structure centered on Washington is giving way to a more genuinely multipolar dynamic. That said, European China policy has long been shaped by American preferences, and the habits of deference built up over decades are not easily shed. The more immediate change is that transatlantic relations are under considerable strain, enough so that Europe is actively exploring greater room for maneuver in its engagement with Beijing. The trilateral relationship stands at an inflection point. Washington retains its structural advantage, and both Brussels and Beijing remain largely reactive, yet that still leaves meaningful space for the two to define the relationship on their own terms. In practical terms, this argues for reviving substantive China-Europe economic dialogue, treating existing trade frictions as an opening for negotiation rather than a source of grievance, and addressing what has become a conspicuous gap in the broader trilateral dynamic. Ultimately, Europe’s ability to play a meaningful role in managing Sino-American competition depends on developing a genuinely independent strategic judgment, something that goes beyond defense spending and touches on how Europe conceives of its interests and its place in the world.

For ASEAN and the Global South, the implications of China-US stability are tangible and pressing. The gains from a more settled bilateral relationship are not confined to Shanghai and San Francisco; they extend across the full length of global value chains, from Ho Chi Minh City to Hamburg and from São Paulo to Nairobi, with the benefits falling most heavily on smaller, trade-dependent economies with little buffer against the shocks that great-power confrontation tends to generate. One of the less remarked costs of sustained China-US tension has been the pressure it exerts on third countries to declare their allegiances. Across much of Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, this has amounted to a chronic and unwelcome predicament, at once economically costly and politically awkward. A more stable China-US relationship goes some way toward relieving that pressure. There is also a broader dimension. Across the Global South, there remains a widespread expectation that China and the United States will together provide the international public goods and the baseline of predictability that smaller states are simply not positioned to supply for themselves. The challenges of climate change, public health, food security, and emerging technology governance are inherently transnational, and experience suggests that meaningful progress on any of them is very difficult to achieve without substantive engagement from both Beijing and Washington.

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Hosted by SUN Chenghao, we will invite scholars and experts to discuss major international issues from great power relations and global governance to emerging security and diplomatic challenges. Through these conversations, we hope to share diverse perspectives on China’s foreign policy and the evolving international landscape.

Over the past ten years, the narrative of strategic competition has dominated the development of the Sino-U.S. relationship. But at the same time, both China and the U.S. need to cooperate to solve the geopolitical conflicts and promote global governance. During U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to China after 9 years, a new concept proposed by China, a constructive relationship of strategic stability, was accepted by the U.S. and laid the foundation for the development of the future bilateral relationship.

What are the goals and evaluation for China and the U.S. regarding this Summit? Can this new strategic positioning improve the Sino-U.S. relationship? As the Sino-U.S. relationship has become one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world, keeping high-level and institutional communication may itself inject momentum into global peace and development.

In the first episode of the ChinaVoice, scholars with China-U.S. study experience analyze the outcomes of the summit, the expectations of both countries, the significance of the new strategic positioning, the balance between strategic competition and cooperation on global governance, as well as the prospects for the bilateral relationship.

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Experts in today’s dialogue:

Key Points:

Assessing the Outcome: A “Framework Summit”

SUN Chenghao and SUN Bingyan agree that both sides got something out of the summit. Most notably, for the first time in approximately a decade, China and the US have agreed on a new formal framework for managing their relationship—“the constructive strategic stability”. Under this framework, bilateral competition is expected to be more manageable and predictable, with institutional mechanisms such as the trade commission and the investment commission now on the table. That said, SUN Bingyan characterizes the summit as a “temporary easing” rather than a structural breakthrough, cautioning that long-term strategic competition continues to run beneath the surface of the relationship.

SUN Bingyan also delivers his opinion on the G2 concept. President Trump appears drawn to a “G2” approach, expecting “the top two powers” can govern the world through realpolitik. China, however, continues to reject the framing. Beijing remains committed to a multipolar world order and prefers reforming existing multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations, rather than either dismantling them through a G2 arrangement or sustaining American hegemony by being a responsible stakeholder.

China Should Seize the Window Under Trump

The Trump administration brings a distinctive policy style that China may be able to leverage. Led by President Trump, the US is now focused heavily on “deals” and commercial outcomes. As SUN Chenghao observes, Trump seemed much more focused on concrete deliverables that he could present politically at home, such as aircraft, agricultural export, etc. SUN Bingyan further notes a meaningful distinction in how Trump approaches China compared to his treatment of traditional allies. With Beijing, Trump appears more willing to compromise based on reciprocal value. Therefore, China should take the chance to hold more conferences with the Trump administration, actively seizing opportunities to negotiate and bargain while the window remains open.

Future Outlook

Looking ahead, SUN Bingyan highlights two points that may shape the trajectory of the relationship. The first is whether a new trade truce can be reached by November of this year, which would significantly determine the future course of the trade war. The second is the end of the Trump administration, at which point the relationship will face renewed pressure from the mainstream of US politics and US politicians committed to sustained strategic competition with Beijing.

On specific flashpoints, SUN Chenghao warns that there are still too many sensitive issues that are now interconnected at the same time. Among all these risks, first, Taiwan remains the most dangerous and sensitive flashpoint. A major new US arms sale to Taiwan or any move that China interprets as upgrading official or military ties could trigger a very sharp reaction. Second, domestic politics inside the US can push the administration towards a tougher China policy. Third, Deeper US involvement in overseas military conflicts, particularly in the Middle East or Indo-Pacific, may cause tensions to spill over into a broader strategic confrontation.

SUN Bingyan equally underscores the centrality of Taiwan’s stability. He assesses that the Trump administration will likely maintain public declarations against Taiwan independence to avoid any direct provocation of Beijing’s redlines, while sustaining support for Taiwan’s deterrence capabilities. Beyond Taiwan, SUN Bingyan also flags that more Chinese high technology entities may become the target of restrictions, which may further escalate the bilateral tech war.

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ChinAffairsplus shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu.

Through carefully selected Chinese academic articles, we aim to provide you with key insights into the issues that China’s academic and strategic communities are focused on. We will highlight why each article matters and the most important takeaways. Questions or criticisms may be addressed to sch0625@gmail.com

Today, we have selected an article written by Liao Baizhi, Tang Zhichao, Chen Wenxin, Lu Ruquan, and Chen Qinghong, which focuses on Geopolitical Rivalry in the Middle East and Its Global Impact.

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Summary

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a joint war of aggression against Iran. Currently, the development on the battlefield has far exceeded the control of both nations. The US and Israel have failed in their goal of regime change in Iran. Consequently, Trump’s “Donroe Doctrine” has suffered its first major setback, and the U.S. strategy of low-cost hegemony maintenance has become unsustainable.

The military confrontation between the U.S.-Israeli alliance and Iran has impacted the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East. The U.S.-Israeli military alliance has seen unprecedented strengthening, and Gulf states have drifted back toward confrontation with Iran, while simultaneously recognizing the immense risks of over-reliance on US security guarantees.

The war has rapidly spilled over, triggering a global chain reaction. Security issues regarding strategic corridors have become further pronounced, and global energy and supply chain security face significant challenges. This conflict has delivered a severe shock to the global geopolitical order, exposing what is perceived as the inherent fragility and erratic nature of American hegemony, thereby shattering the myth of U.S. military invincibility.

Furthermore, the war has intensified domestic inflation and fiscal issues within the United States, eroding its economic dominance. It has deepened fractures within the U.S. alliance system, weakened mutual trust between the United States and Europe, and catalyzed new changes in major country relations. By deliberately violating international law and the fundamental norms of international relations, the U.S. has exacerbated the fragmentation of the international order.

Why It Matters

This symposium examines the U.S.-Israel war on Iran through several global shifts: the reordering of the Middle East, changes in U.S. hegemony, disruptions to energy security, and the evolution of global governance. The article shows that this conflict matters far beyond the regional battlefield. Through five interconnected lines of analysis, it explains how the war has reached into global strategic, economic, and institutional domains. Today, this war serves as a key test for U.S. strategic power, the unity of U.S. alliances, the resilience of energy networks, and the future of international norms.

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Key Points

1. The War Is Accelerating the Reconfiguration of Middle Eastern Geopolitics

   1. U.S.-Israel Strategic Overreach in the “New Middle East” Agenda

      The United States and Israel have spent recent years trying to shape a “new Middle East.” The campaign against Iran was intended as a decisive step in that agenda. In practice, however, the operation was constrained by poor preparation, weak coordination, and the lack of a credible post-strike plan. As the battlefield moved beyond U.S.and Israeli control, the war exposed the limits of American military power. It also revealed the erosion of U.S. credibility and Washington’s weakening ability to rally allies. In this sense, the conflict may mark the beginning of a more visible “post-American” moment in the Middle East.

   2. Israel’s Military Ascendance and the Risk of Strategic Overstretch

      Since the latest round of the Palestine-Israel conflict began, Israel has tried to turn strategic vulnerability into regional initiative by using military force to reshape its security environment. The article suggests that Israel will remain a major driver of geopolitical change in the Middle East, regardless of how the war ends, yet this position still depends heavily on U.S.material and political support. If that support weakens or becomes more contested, Israel may face growing risks of strategic overstretch.

   3. Gulf Security Outsourcing Under Pressure

      For Gulf states and other regional actors, the war has blurred the boundary between a “Middle East of war” and a “Middle East of peace.” Countries that had focused on economic diversification and domestic transformation now face renewed exposure to regional conflict. Their model of outsourcing security to the United States is therefore under serious strain. The U.S. security umbrella has become not only a source of protection, but also a channel through which strategic risk is transmitted. Iran, meanwhile, has been weakened militarily but has become more hardline politically. This combination could produce a more unstable regional security environment after the war.

2. The War Is the Culmination of a Long Structural Confrontation

   1. From the “Twelve-Day War” to Structural Confrontation

      The current conflict is not only a continuation of the “Twelve-Day War” of June 2025 but the accumulated result of U.S.-Israeli confrontation with Iran since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Washington and Tel Aviv have pointed to Iran’s alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-standing “support for terrorism” to justify the war. However, these are proximate justifications rather than root causes. The deeper drivers lie in the contest over the Middle East order, political and ideological antagonism, and a fundamental clash over security concepts and policies.

   2. Two Conflicts Within One Triangle

      The U.S.-Iran conflict is different from the Israel-Iran conflict. The former is mainly about Iran’s resistance to U.S. hegemony, external interference, and foreign control in the Middle East. The latter is more directly driven by ideological hostility and mutual threat perceptions. Although both the United States and Israel seek regime change in Iran, their calculations differ.Israel’s objectives are more uncompromising, while the United States remains more opportunistic and conditional, wary of being drawn into another prolonged Middle Eastern war.

   3. Law, Geopolitics, and Ideology

      The authors describe the war as aggressive and unjust. Legally, the U.S.-Israeli strikes lacked U.N. Security Council authorization and did not meet the conditions for self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Geopolitically, the war is an attempt to preserve U.S.-Israeli regional hegemony and reshape the Middle East order. Ideologically, it is a confrontation among Trump’s “Donroe Doctrine,” Israel’s right-wing religious Zionism, and Iranian Khomeinism.

3. The Collapse of Washington’s “Low-Cost” Hegemony

   1. The Logic of Hegemony on a Budget

      During his second term, Trump sought to preserve U.S. hegemony through a strategy of domestic renewal, global burden-shedding, and strategic focus. This “low-cost” model emerged in the post-Cold War era as a way for the U.S. to maintain dominance despite its relative decline. The core logic is to maximize strategic gains with minimal direct investment by relying on ally burden-sharing, asymmetric military tools, and financial leverage.

   2. Failure of the “Quick-Win” in Iran
      The Trump administration attempted to replicate the “Venezuela model” in Iran, aiming for a rapid, overwhelming operation that would secure regime change without dragging the U.S. into a long war. The plan relied on Israel as the front-line force, while the U.S. provided intelligence, logistics, and air support. They expected limited strikes to dismantle Iran’s nuclear and command structures while avoiding a ground war, but the reality of the conflict quickly shattered these hopes.

   3. Asymmetric Drain and Strategic Blowback
      Iran’s “mosaic defense” and regional countermeasures trapped Washington in a high-cost, low-return dilemma. High-end U.S.military advantages became fiscal liabilities as expensive defense systems were depleted by low-cost Iranian drones and swarm attacks. The conflict also fractured the alliance system. Most European partners refused to join the strikes, while Gulf states began to view the U.S. security umbrella as a lightning rod for risk rather than a safeguard.

   4. America’s “Suez Moment”
      The war proves that “low-cost hegemony” is no longer sustainable in a multipolar world. Before the conflict, Washington could still lead by relying on the residual credibility of its power. With that credibility now spent, the cost of maintaining global dominance is set to skyrocket. This failure may be remembered as America’s “Suez moment,” a permanent turning point for U.S. influence in the Middle East.

4. The War Has Disrupted the Global Energy Order

   1. Hormuz as the Epicenter of the Global Energy Shock
      The conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran has sent severe shockwaves through the global energy order. After the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the impact rippled rapidly through the entire oil and gas value chain, spreading from the Middle East to the global market. As the world’s most critical energy chokepoint, the Strait handled approximately 35% of global seaborne crude oil and 20% of the world’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply in 2025. This blockade has effectively severed a primary lifeline of the global economy.

   2. Supply Paralysis and the Shift to Land Routes
      The closure of the Strait has caused the global market to pivot sharply from abundance to extreme supply tightness. With tankers and LNG carriers stranded, major Middle Eastern producers have been forced to slash output as their storage capacity reaches its limits. This crisis has triggered an urgent search for alternative energy routes. Gulf states are now prioritizing overland pipelines that bypass the Strait, as the war has exposed the inherent vulnerability of maritime energy corridors. Over the long term, this shift may drive significant investment into land-based pipeline networks and more diversified transport routes.

   3. The “Security Turn” in Asian Energy Policy
      The conflict is forcing a radical redesign of energy policies across Asia. Because the vast majority of energy flowing through Hormuz is destined for Asian markets, these importers have been hit the hardest. In the short term, energy security has become the absolute priority for nations dependent on these imports. In the medium and long term, these countries are expected to accelerate supply diversification, expand strategic reserves, and view their energy transitions primarily through a security lens.

   4. China’s Resilience and Structural Exposure
      For China, the war serves as both a stress test and a stark reminder of its structural vulnerabilities. China has shown strong resilience, supported by coal as a stabilizing base, leadership in renewable energy, and the use of strategic oil and gas reserves. However, its dependence on foreign energy remains high, with a significant share of its imports still relying on the Strait of Hormuz. To mitigate these risks, China should strengthen domestic energy production, enhance its ability to secure allocate global resources, and take a more active role in global energy governance.

5. The War Reveals Deeper Changes in Global Governance

   1. The Structural Tensions of Governance
      The U.S.and Israel war on Iran is more than a high intensity regional conflict. It is a revealing window into the structural tensions of global governance. The war challenges three long standing assumptions: hegemony produces stability, alliances ensure security, and international rules are irrelevant in the face of power politics. A hegemonic power can shift from being the guardian of the international system to its primary disruptor. It also demonstrates how military alliances can become channels for risk transmission and why international rules remain foundational despite repeated violations.

   2. The Credibility Crisis of U.S. Hegemony
      The war has further eroded the credibility and narrative foundations of U.S.hegemony. While Washington has long positioned itself as the defender of global order and rules, its conduct in this conflict has reinforced perceptions of U.S. power as selective, unilateral, and destabilizing. Launching sudden strikes during a diplomatic window undermined legal legitimacy and destroyed diplomatic trust. Furthermore, the shifting and ambiguous war aims of Washington have left its international credibility in tatters.

   3. Alliances as Channels of Risk
      The conflict has exposed the inherent dangers of traditional military alliances. Gulf states that relied on U.S. protection found themselves vulnerable to direct retaliation, while European and NATO members showed marked reluctance to get involved. This reflects the classic alliance dilemma of entrapment and abandonment, where states are either dragged into conflicts by their allies or find themselves abandoned when they need support most. In an era of long-range precision strikes and autonomous warfare, these risks have become even more acute.

   4. Toward a More Stable International Order
      Despite the rise of unilateralism, the war has highlighted the enduring value of international law. The conflict has triggered renewed calls to defend sovereignty and the UN centered international system. The article concludes that the international community must reject hegemonic thinking and bloc confrontation in favor of a more just and practical global governance system. In this context, the Global Governance Initiative proposed by President Xi is presented as a vital framework. Its emphasis on sovereign equality, the rule of law, and multilateralism is seen as a possible pathway toward building a stable and functional international order.

Conclusion

Overall, the U.S.-Israel war on Iran as a significant event in the deepening transformation of the international system. It has accelerated the reconfiguration of Middle Eastern geopolitics and generated systemic shocks for U.S. hegemony, alliance politics, the global energy order, and the international rules system. Washington and Tel Aviv had hoped to use a rapid military campaign to force regime change, reshape the Middle East order, and sustain U.S. hegemony at low cost. Instead, the war has revealed Iran’s resilience, the security concerns of regional states, the fractures within the U.S.-led alliance system,and the vulnerability of global energy markets.

From a longer historical perspective, the significance of the war lies not only in its impact on the Middle Eastern battlefield, but also in its exposure of the deeper contradictions of the existing international order. The sustainability of unipolar hegemony is declining. The security promises of traditional alliance systems are increasingly facing questioning. The vulnerabilities of global energy and supply-chain systems have become more visible.

At the same time, the foundational role of international law and multilateral rules has become more important. The article therefore stresses the need for the international community to oppose hegemonism and power politics while advancing a more equitable, inclusive, and effective global governance system.

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About the Author

Liao Baizhi廖百智: Research Professor, Director of the Institute of Middle East Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations(CICIR).

Tang Zhichao 唐志超: Director of the Department of Political Studies and the Middle East Development and Governance Research Center at the Institute of West Asian and African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS).

Chen Wenxin陈文鑫: Fellow and Director of the Institute of American Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations(CICIR).

Lu Ruquan陆如泉: Senior Economist, President of CNPC Economics & Technology Research Institute.

Chen Qinghong陈庆鸿: Deputy Director and Research Professor of Institute of World Political Studies at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations(CICIR).

About the Publication

The Chinese version of this article was published in Contemporary International Relations （《现代国际关系》）, No.4, 2026. Contemporary International Relations, a policy-oriented research journal, has been published by China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations since 1990. A primary purpose of its journal is to present the views of CICIR researchers on international politics and international relations. The journal’s scope of publication also includes papers by scholars and researchers from other institutes in China and from around the world. It covers analysis of changes in international relations and prominent world events.

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China Scholar Insights is a feature which aimed at providing you with the latest analysis on issues that Chinese scholars and strategic communities are focusing on. We will carefully select commentary articles and highlight key points. Questions or criticisms can be directed to sch0625@gmail.com

I am SUN Chenghao, a fellow with the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University. ChinAffairsplus is a newsletter that shares Chinese academic articles focused on topics such as China’s foreign policy, China-U.S. relations, China-European relations, and more. This newsletter was co-founded by me and my research assistant, ZHANG Xueyu.

In the lead-up to and aftermath of the leaders’ summit, I was interviewed by a wide range of international and Chinese media outlets, including the Associated Press, Reuters, The New York Times, Bloomberg, Politiken, Berlingske, Japan Broadcasting Corporation NHK, Tokyo Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun, The Straits Times, Lianhe Zaobao, China-US Focus, China Review News Agency, South China Morning Post, Sing Tao Daily, HK01, Xinhua News Agency, CGTN, China Daily, China News Service, The Paper, and Jiemian News.

The questions raised by these media organizations were wide-ranging, thoughtful, and deeply engaging, prompting me to reflect on the summit from multiple perspectives. I am also sincerely grateful to the many journalists and friends in the media community who have followed this newsletter over time. It is through these ongoing exchanges and interactions that we have been able to jointly deepen our understanding and interpretation of major international developments.

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From China’s perspective, the central objective of the summit was not to resolve any single issue, but rather to use leader-level diplomacy to reestablish a relatively stable and predictable framework for China-U.S. relations. Today, the relationship is no longer defined simply by traditional trade frictions; it has evolved into a broader and more complex strategic competition. In this sense, the summit was fundamentally a “tone-setting” meeting aimed at preventing bilateral relations from sliding into uncontrolled confrontation.

The new formulation of a “constructive relationship of strategic stability” sends an important and highly positive signal, and its significance can be understood on three levels.

First, it emphasizes the importance of peace and stability in China-U.S. relations. “Strategic stability” is originally a concept rooted in military and nuclear strategy, extending this concept to the China-U.S. relationship suggests that both sides hope to establish a stable and manageable framework for bilateral ties, even amid intensifying competition. Second, “strategic stability” is itself a very weighty concept. Applying it to China-U.S. relations indicates that both sides attach significant importance to the bilateral relationship and recognize that China-U.S. interactions are central to global order and international security. Third, the phrase also contains an expectation of dynamic development. The inclusion of the word “constructive” suggests that strategic stability is not merely a minimal baseline for avoiding conflict, nor a static balance, but rather an evolving process with room for further development.

As for whether China considers the summit a “success,” I do not think success should be measured by whether the two sides reached a grand bargain. The structural contradictions in China-U.S. relations cannot be resolved in a single meeting. Rather, success should be assessed in three ways.

First, whether both sides were able to reaffirm basic bottom lines: not seeking conflict, not pursuing full decoupling, and not allowing competition to spiral out of control. Second, whether the two countries could restore or strengthen concrete communication mechanisms, particularly in trade, finance, military security, artificial intelligence, and regional crisis management. Third, whether they could achieve limited but practical progress in specific areas, such as easing trade tensions, stabilizing supply chains, restoring people-to-people exchanges, and maintaining crisis communication channels.

Overall, China’s expectations for the summit were pragmatic and limited. The goal was neither to revive the era of comprehensive engagement nor to eliminate strategic competition altogether, but rather to place competition within a more manageable framework. In that sense, if the summit helped stabilize the broader relationship, clarify bottom lines, manage risks, and preserve space for future cooperation, it could already be regarded as a meaningful and positive outcome for Beijing.

China hopes the summit can help bring a degree of phased stability to China-U.S. economic relations. Recent communications between Vice Premier He Lifeng, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer all emphasized continued dialogue, dispute management, and pragmatic cooperation, while China also expressed serious concerns over recent U.S. restrictive trade measures. This suggests that trade and economic issues remain among the few areas where the two sides may still achieve limited but tangible progress.

Overall, I believe the summit discussions focused on four major issues.

First, preventing further escalation of economic frictions. The defining feature of current China-U.S. economic relations is no longer simply trade imbalance, but the growing “securitization” of trade and technology. Beijing is particularly concerned that Washington may continue expanding technology restrictions and further politicize normal economic relations. China therefore hopes the United States will avoid introducing additional restrictive measures and prevent the formation of an escalating cycle.

Second, supply-chain and industrial-chain stability. Although both sides continue discussing “de-risking” and supply-chain restructuring, the reality is that the Chinese and American economies remain deeply interconnected, especially in consumer goods, manufacturing, energy, and parts of the high-tech sector. China is therefore closely watching whether the United States will continue promoting “de-China” supply chains or preserve space for pragmatic cooperation in selected areas.

Third, tariffs and market access. If the Trump administration continues intensifying tariff measures, costs will rise not only for China, but also for American companies and consumers. Beijing hopes both sides can at least avoid another large-scale tariff escalation, while also paying attention to whether Washington may send more positive signals regarding investment, financial cooperation, and people-to-people exchanges.

Fourth, maintaining communication mechanisms. Both governments increasingly recognize that even amid long-term strategic competition, minimum communication channels remain essential. Without them, market uncertainty and geopolitical risks would continue to expand.

On technology issues, the participation of Jensen Huang in the delegation underscored how semiconductors and AI have become especially prominent topics. His visit fueled speculation over whether there could be progress regarding NVIDIA’s H200 chip sales to China. However, while limited commercial arrangements may emerge, I do not expect any fundamental shift in the overall direction of U.S. export controls on advanced AI chips and semiconductor equipment. Washington will likely continue treating advanced chips, computing power, and semiconductor technologies as core components of strategic competition.

A more realistic outcome would be renewed AI governance dialogue between the two sides, including discussions on military AI, nuclear risks, model safety, and the misuse of AI by non-state actors. From China’s perspective, the key priority is to prevent AI cooperation from becoming merely another instrument of technological containment, while establishing a more equal communication mechanism on AI risk governance. In other words, there may be small commercial breakthroughs and new regulatory dialogue, but the broader background of technological competition will remain unchanged.

Regarding rare earths, the United States’ primary objective can be summarized in two words: “stable supply.” Washington does not necessarily expect China to fully remove export controls, but it does hope China will maintain predictable and uninterrupted commercial supply, particularly for rare earth oxides, metals, and high-performance magnets that are essential for U.S. automotive, electronics, semiconductor, energy, and defense industries.

Rare earths possibly became one of the most important concrete issues in the economic negotiations surrounding the summit. The U.S. business community is particularly focused on China’s export-license approval process and whether Beijing will continue the relative “rare earth truce” that has existed since last year. The Trump administration hopes China will continue and potentially expand export licenses, improve approval transparency and efficiency, and ensure basic supply for both civilian and dual-use industries.

China’s most likely response is to continue granting export licenses to qualified American firms, particularly in civilian sectors such as electric vehicles, consumer electronics, and green energy. Beijing may also moderately expand exports of certain magnets and processed rare-earth products in exchange for positive U.S. responses on tariffs, market access, or broader economic mechanisms.

However, China is unlikely to fully remove export controls. Rare earths remain one of the few areas where China retains a significant strategic advantage, particularly in refining, separation, and heavy rare-earth processing. From Beijing’s perspective, rare earths are not simply a trade issue, but also a matter of national security, industrial competition, and strategic leverage. China may demonstrate flexibility to stabilize bilateral economic relations and signal willingness to cooperate, but it is unlikely to relinquish control over such a strategically important resource.

Taiwan was undoubtedly one of the most sensitive and consequential issues discussed during the summit. One of Beijing’s main frustrations in recent years has been what it sees as a contradiction in U.S. policy: while Washington publicly reiterates adherence to the One-China policy, it has simultaneously expanded arms sales, official exchanges, and security cooperation with Taiwan. From China’s perspective, this gradually “hollows out” the One-China framework.

In this context, China likely conveyed three main messages during the summit.

First, Beijing hopes the United States will avoid further upgrading official and military ties with Taiwan, including reducing high-level political exchanges, avoiding new large-scale arms sales, and refraining from sending destabilizing security signals in the region. China believes rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait are closely linked to increasing external involvement.

Second, China wants Washington to translate its statement of “not supporting Taiwan independence” into more concrete policy restraint. Beijing is increasingly concerned that Taiwan is becoming more deeply integrated into the broader framework of U.S.-China strategic competition, including discussions around using Taiwan as a strategic lever against China.

Third, China also emphasized the importance of crisis management. As military and security activities by both sides around the Taiwan Strait continue to increase, Beijing hopes communication mechanisms can prevent accidental incidents from escalating into direct China-U.S. confrontation.

Before Trump’s visit to China, many in Washington’s strategic and Taiwan policy circles worried that he might approach the Taiwan issue in an overly transactional manner. In this context, the “Six Assurances” and the Taiwan Relations Act remain important political and institutional constraints that Trump must take into account, although they are not the sole determinants of his policy approach.

From my observation, Trump’s diplomatic style is highly personalized and transactional, focusing more on broader negotiating outcomes than on rigid diplomatic language. Nevertheless, even if Trump wished to introduce tactical flexibility on Taiwan, he would still face substantial constraints from Congress, the military, and the broader U.S. policy establishment.

After concluding his state visit to China, Trump publicly stated in an interview with Fox News that he “Does Not Wish to See Anyone Move Toward Independence” in Taiwan. From Beijing’s perspective, this was already viewed as a relatively positive signal. Although Trump’s motivation may primarily be to avoid a costly conflict, the statement also suggests that China’s emphasis on the Taiwan issue did resonate with him.

That said, Beijing does not expect any fundamental shift in U.S. Taiwan policy. Strategic competition with China now commands broad bipartisan consensus in Washington, and Congress, the military, and the U.S. strategic community all place growing importance on Taiwan. China’s more realistic objective is therefore not to force a complete reversal of U.S. policy, but rather to prevent Washington from crossing further perceived red lines and turning Taiwan into the primary trigger point for comprehensive China-U.S. confrontation.

The current Iran crisis has significantly reshaped both the broader atmosphere and the agenda of the summit. With the escalation of military tensions involving Iran, the summit has increasingly taken place against the backdrop of a wider global security crisis.

From China’s perspective, the Iran issue affects the summit on at least three levels.

First, it has strengthened the summit’s crisis-management dimension. The international community is concerned not only about Iran itself, but also about the risk of broader regional spillover, including instability in the Strait of Hormuz, disruptions to global energy markets, and the possibility of wider conflict across the Middle East. In this sense, the summit is no longer simply about how China and the United States compete, but also about how they prevent further destabilization of the international system.

Second, the crisis has elevated the importance of energy security and global supply chains. China remains a major importer of Middle Eastern energy, and the Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most critical energy corridors. A prolonged escalation would affect oil prices, global shipping, and financial markets. Beijing is therefore closely watching whether Washington intends to further expand military operations or preserve diplomatic space for de-escalation.

Third, the Iran issue also directly affects China-U.S. relations. In recent years, Washington has increasingly accused Chinese companies of maintaining energy and trade ties with Iran and has expanded sanctions accordingly. China, however, believes that the extensive use of unilateral sanctions and extraterritorial measures by the United States has itself contributed to rising international tensions. Beijing is therefore likely to emphasize that regional crises should not be further instrumentalized or turned into new tools for strategic pressure against China.

I do not believe the Iran issue completely overshadowed bilateral topics during the summit, but it certainly became an important strategic issue. The Middle East crisis is now no longer just a regional matter—it has implications for global energy security, financial stability, and major-power coordination. The United States likely hopes China can play a constructive role in stabilizing the situation, particularly in preventing a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz, since continued escalation would ultimately damage not only China’s economy, but also the United States and global markets more broadly.

At the same time, significant differences remain between China and the United States regarding Iran policy. Washington continues to rely more heavily on sanctions and military deterrence, while Beijing emphasizes political settlement, diplomatic mediation, and multilateral coordination under the United Nations framework. As a result, the two sides may be able to reach limited consensus on preventing escalation, but they are unlikely to fully align on specific Iran policies.

As for China’s likely position, I believe it can be summarized in four points: promoting de-escalation and a ceasefire; emphasizing diplomatic negotiations over military solutions; maintaining the security of international energy routes and global economic stability, especially the reopening and stability of the Strait of Hormuz; and opposing unilateral sanctions and extraterritorial jurisdiction, which Beijing believes further aggravate global instability at an already fragile moment.

If the two presidents are indeed able to maintain such a high frequency of interaction this year—including the possibility of four meetings—it would itself reflect a shared recognition that China-U.S. relations have entered a stage requiring continuous management. One of the major problems in recent years has been that when high-level communication declines, the risks of miscalculation and geopolitical spillover rise very quickly. The U.S. side has already indicated that President Xi may be invited to visit the United States in September, which also suggests that both governments recognize the importance of sustained leader-level diplomacy.

Looking ahead to a second Trump administration, I believe China-U.S. relations are likely to display several defining characteristics.

First, competition will become increasingly long-term and structural. Compared with Trump’s first term, one major change is that Washington has now developed a much broader bipartisan consensus on strategic competition with China. Across trade, technology, supply chains, artificial intelligence, defense, finance, and security, much of the U.S. strategic community increasingly views China as America’s primary long-term competitor. As a result, even if high-level dialogue continues, the relationship is unlikely to return to the earlier era where engagement itself was the dominant framework.

Second, the “transactional diplomacy” style of the Trump administration will likely become even more pronounced. Unlike more traditional U.S. presidents, Trump tends to place multiple issues within a single negotiating framework. Trade, Taiwan, technology, energy, Iran, and broader Middle East issues could all become interconnected bargaining elements. This creates both opportunity and uncertainty. On the one hand, Trump may be more willing than other administrations to pursue short-term deals or tactical compromises. On the other hand, the volatility of his policymaking style may also increase concerns about the consistency and predictability of U.S. policy.

Third, China-U.S. relations may enter a phase of intense competition combined with limited stability. Strategic rivalry will likely continue—and in some areas intensify—but both sides will also place greater emphasis on crisis-management mechanisms. Whether in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, or global supply chains, the risks of escalation are now significant. Both Beijing and Washington understand that direct confrontation would carry extremely high costs. As a result, even amid growing competition, both sides will still need to preserve communication channels across military, diplomatic, and economic domains.

Fourth, China-U.S. relations will become increasingly intertwined with global hotspots and governance challenges. The Iran crisis already demonstrates that China-U.S. relations are no longer simply bilateral in nature, but are deeply embedded within broader questions of regional security and global governance. In the future, issues such as the Middle East, Ukraine, energy security, AI governance, and global financial stability will likely involve simultaneous competition and coordination between the two countries.

Overall, I do not believe China-U.S. relations under a second Trump administration will move toward comprehensive rapprochement, but neither do I think they are destined to become a full-scale “new Cold War.” A more likely outcome is long-term coexistence under conditions of sustained strategic competition. Both sides will remain highly cautious at the strategic level, while still recognizing the necessity of maintaining minimum cooperation on global economic stability, crisis management, and international order. In this sense, the central question for future China-U.S. relations is no longer whether competition exists, but rather how to prevent competition from spiraling out of control. I believe that will become one of the core missions of China-U.S. summit diplomacy in the years ahead.

I think it is important to avoid two extremes when evaluating this summit. One extreme is to fully adopt Trump’s narrative and describe it as a “fantastic deal.” The other is to dismiss the meeting entirely simply because no highly detailed or comprehensive agreement was announced. More accurately, this was not a “breakthrough summit,” but rather a “stabilization summit” or a “framework summit.”

From the public information available, the Trump side clearly emphasized commercial outcomes, including reported agreements involving Boeing aircraft purchases and expanded trade cooperation. However, many details—including delivery schedules, contract specifics, and implementation timelines—remain uncertain. Similarly, while there were reports that a limited number of Chinese firms could potentially purchase NVIDIA H200 chips, there has been no clear indication of large-scale delivery or any fundamental easing of U.S. technology restrictions. In many ways, Trump’s description of a “fantastic deal” reflects a combination of domestic political messaging and commercial branding.

China’s presentation of the summit outcomes was notably more restrained. Chinese officials emphasized “balanced and positive” progress in economic dialogue, including the establishment of trade and investment consultation mechanisms, discussions on agricultural market access, and continued efforts to stabilize bilateral trade under a reciprocal tariff framework. In other words, the United States focused more on specific “deals,” while China emphasized longer-term “frameworks” and mechanisms.

If we look at what each side gained, the United States achieved several objectives. Trump obtained outcomes that can be presented domestically as political and economic successes, including narratives surrounding Boeing, agriculture, energy, and market access. U.S. businesses also saw signs of potential stabilization in China-U.S. relations, particularly in aviation, agriculture, energy, and parts of the technology sector. In addition, Washington secured continued communication space with Beijing on broader issues such as Iran, the Strait of Hormuz, and supply-chain stability.

China’s gains were more strategic in nature. First, Beijing promoted the new concept of a “constructive strategic stability relationship,” which I believe was the summit’s most important political outcome. China sees this as a new strategic framework that could guide bilateral relations over the coming years. Second, China succeeded in reducing the immediate risk of simultaneous escalation across trade, technology, Taiwan, and Middle East-related tensions. Third, Beijing demonstrated its ability to shape the diplomatic agenda: Trump visited China, but China also used the summit to introduce its own broader vision for managing bilateral relations.

At the same time, both sides clearly failed to achieve certain goals. The United States did not secure major breakthroughs on Iran, AI governance, or export-control issues. China, meanwhile, did not obtain any fundamental change in U.S. policy regarding advanced chip restrictions, Taiwan, or the broader framework of strategic competition. Washington will continue maintaining significant technology controls and security-oriented policies toward China.

Overall, the summit did not produce a grand bargain. Rather, it resulted in limited practical deals combined with a broader strategic framework. And I do not think it is productive to view the summit purely through a zero-sum “winner versus loser” framework. China-U.S. relations are not a game in which one side can simply defeat the other. In many ways, this is now a “defensive match” in which both sides are primarily trying to avoid losing control.

If I had to use a sports analogy, I would say the United States was looking for visible “goals” it could present to domestic audiences—Boeing orders, agricultural purchases, energy cooperation, or market access narratives. China’s approach, however, was less about scoring a specific commercial victory and more about controlling the pace and rules of the game itself.

The concept of a “constructive relationship of strategic stability” essentially reflects that logic: the two sides may continue competing, but they should avoid turning competition into direct confrontation. There can be rivalry, but not collision; disagreement, but not systemic breakdown.

So, while neither side achieved everything it wanted, both sides gained something important: the United States obtained several politically useful deliverables, China advanced a broader strategic framework, and both countries achieved a degree of short-term stability. In today’s China-U.S. relationship, that may already be one of the most realistic forms of “win-win.”

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